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Since numerous cases in the litigation concerning the 2000 Presidential
Election had the same litigants, we have labeled cases with Roman numerals
as a helpful guide to the reader.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220
(Fla. 2000). Trial court orders were appealed to the First District Court of
Appeal, which certified the orders to the Supreme Court of Florida. The
decision was issued on November 21, 2000.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board 11 v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273
(Fla. 2000). This case was before the Supreme Court of Florida on remand
from the United States Supreme Court decision in Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board. The decision was issued on December 11, 2000.
Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec.
4, 2000).
Gore 11 v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2000). The Supreme Court of
Florida dismissed a petition for writ of mandamus on December 1, 2000.
Gore III v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000). Trial court final
judgment was appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, which certified
the judgment to the Supreme Court of Florida. The decision was issued on
December 8, 2000.
Gore IV v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 524 (Fla. 2000). This case was before
the Supreme Court of Florida on remand from the United States Supreme
Court decision in Bush II v. Gore. The decision was issued on December 22,
2000.
Siegel I v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla. 2000). A request
was made to enjoin four canvassing boards from proceeding with manual
recounts of the presidential election. The request was denied on November
13, 2000.
Siegel II v. LePore, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000). The United States Supreme
Court denied writ of certiorari on November 24, 2000.
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Siegel III v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000). This case was an
appeal from the district court to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. The
court affirmed the district court's decision on December 6, 2000.
Siegel IV v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1218 (1lth Cir. 2000). The Eleventh
Circuit denied a petition for rehearing on December 9, 2000.
Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). The United States Supreme
Court treated an application for stay as a petition for writ of certiorari, and
granted both, in regards to Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I v. Harris
on December 9, 2000.
Bush 11 v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The United States Supreme Court
reversed the Supreme Court of Florida and remanded the case for further
proceedings.
I. INTRODUCTION
On the evening of November 7, 2000, anyone watching the media
coverage of the presidential election knew that they were observing history
in the making. After an extraordinarily divisive presidential campaign,
America and the world sat in anticipation of who would be the next
President of the United States. Some people went to bed late, thinking that
when they awoke they would know the identity of the nation's next leader.
Others stayed up into the early morning hours of November 8th in order to
be one of the first to know the name of the next President. When the votes
came in, the news media created a color-coded mosaic map of the nation,
assessing either red or blue to the respective candidate, as it became clear
who had won each state. However, two states remained yellow, Florida and
New Mexico, with neither being assessed to a candidate. One of those
states, Florida, had a significant number of electoral votes, enough to
determine the outcome of the election.
Once it became clear that the eyes of the nation were turning to the
Sunshine State, Florida election law became extraordinarily important.
Pursuant to Florida law, because there was less than one-half of one percent
of the total votes cast in the election separating the two leading candidates,
the Division of Elections began a statutorily mandated machine recount of
the ballots. Once the machine recount was completed, twenty-four hour
news networks began carrying "election tickers" carrying the phrase "Florida
2001]
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Recount: Bush by 537." Almost instantaneously, the election entered the
Florida courts and, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court.
The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the prominent legal
issues surrounding the 2000 Presidential Election. First, it will examine the
State of Florida election law prior to the 2000 election. Second, it will
provide the events leading to the various legal challenges. Third, it will
examine the important issues involved in the election protest and contest that
followed. Exploring these cases will demonstrate that the reasoning of many
of the cases, especially those of the United States Supreme Court, whether
because of result-oriented reasoning or incredible time pressures, have
created law that is difficult to reconcile with precedent and is harmful to
state and federal government.
I. FLORIDA ELECTION LAW BEFORE THE 2000 ELECTION
A. The Florida Constitution and the Right to Vote
Immediately after the preamble, the Florida Constitution, unlike the
federal constitution, begins with a Declaration of Rights that is guaranteed to
all Florida citizens.1 The framers of the Florida Constitution gave primacy
2
of position to the Declaration of Rights with good reason. It sets forth a
series of rights that the framers of the Florida Constitution deemed basic to
all Floridians.3 The Declaration of Rights limits the power of the state,
saying "[t]hus far shalt thou come, but no farther.' 4
I. FLA. CONST. art. I.
2. See State ex rel. Davis v. City of Stuart, 120 So. 335, 347 (Fla. 1929) ("Primacy
of position in our State Constitution is accorded to the Declaration of Rights. It comes first,
immediately after the preamble.").
3. Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 963 (Fla. 1992) ("The text of our Florida
Constitution begins with a Declaration of Rights-a series of rights so basic that the Framers
of our Constitution accorded them a place of special privilege."). See Davis, 120 So. at 347
("It is significant that our Constitution thus commences by specifying those things which the
state government must not do, before specifying certain things that it may do.").
4. Id.
These Declarations of Rights... have cost much, and breathe the spirit of that sturdy
and self-reliant philosophy of individualism which underlies and supports our entire
system of government. No race of hothouse plants could ever have produced and
compelled the recognition of such a stalwart set of basic principles, and no such
race can preserve them. They say to arbitrary and autocratic power, from whatever
official quarter it may advance to invade these vital rights of personal liberty and
private property, "ius far shalt thou come, but no farther."
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The Declaration of Rights places more rigorous restraints on govern-
ment intrusion than the federal constitution, increasing the fundamental
protections accorded to Florida citizens above those accorded by the federal
government.5 The federal constitution represents the floor for basic
freedoms, but the Florida Constitution is the ceiling of fundamental rights
6retained by its citizens. While the federal Bill of Rights provides common
uniformity, Florida's Declaration of Rights provides a higher level of
protection from governmental intrusion to Floridians.
The first right pronounced in the Declaration of Rights is the "political
power" provision, which provides that "[a]ll political power is inherent in
the people." s Almost seventy years ago, the Supreme Court of Florida deter-
mined that the right to vote is a constitutional right in the State of Florida.9
More recently, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the right to
vote was within the Florida Constitution's political power provision.10
5. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962. When the rights provided by the Florida Constitution
should be construed in the same manner as the federal constitution, the Florida Constitution
has set forth "conformity clauses." See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12.
6. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962. Traylor states:
Federal and state bills of rights thus serve distinct but complementary purposes. The
federal Bill of Rights facilitates political and philosophical homogeneity among the
basically heterogeneous states by securing, as a uniform minimum, the highest com-
mon denominator of freedom that can prudently be administered throughout all fifty
states. The state bills of rights, on the other hand, express the ultimate breadth of the
common yearnings for freedom of each insular state population within our nation.
Id. See Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions As Separate Sources of
Fundamental Rights, 35 RuTGERS L. REv. 707,709 (1983).
7. Traylor, 596 So. 2d at 962. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25
(1937) ("[Il]mmunities that are valid as against the federal government by force of the specific
pledges of particular amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, and thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states");
see, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73 (1932) (finding the right to counsel applicable
to the states because it is of "fundamental character"); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.").
8. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1. Specifically, the Florida Constitution provides: "Section
1. Political power-All political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation herein of
certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people." Id.
(emphasis added).
9. State ex rel. Landis v. Dyer, 148 So. 201, 203 (Fla. 1933) ("The right to vote,
though not inherent, is a constitutional right in this state.").
10. Treiman v. Malmquist, 342 So. 2d 972, 975 (Fla. 1977) ("The declaration of
rights expressly states that 'all political power is inherent in the people.' The right of the
people to select their own officers is their sovereign right.... .") (citations omitted).
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B. The Florida Statutory Scheme
The Florida Legislature had set forth a statutory scheme to establish and
provide for elections." Although a specific portion of the scheme was
reserved for the election of presidential electors, 12 the statutes regulating the
conduct of the actual election were the same for every elected political
office, including presidential electors.' 3 Chapter 102 of the Florida Statutes
was specifically dedicated to regulating the conduct of elections and
ascertaining the results.'
4
Each county had both a supervisor of elections, 15 and a county
canvassing board.16 The supervisor of elections was an elected official
responsible for "the registration books and had the exclusive control of
matters pertaining to registration of electors."' 7
The county canvassing board was a three-member body, normally
composed of a county court judge who acts as chair, the supervisor of
elections, and the chair of the board of county commissioners.18  Each
county canvassing board had the responsibility to canvass the number of
votes returned for each candidate, nominee, constitutional amendment, or
other measure submitted to the county's electorate. 19
Pursuant to the statutes, under some circumstances, the county
canvassing board had the discretion to order a recount of the ballots from a
precinct.-- If the results from a precinct were missing, if the returns had
omissions, or if any of the returns had an obvious error, the county
canvassing board could choose to order a recount from the affected
precincts. If the county canvassing board chose to engage in a recount,22
11. See FLA. STAT. §§ 101.001-103.151 (2000).
12. §§ 103.011-.151.
13. §§ 102.012-.171.
14. Id.
15. § 98.015.
16. § 102.141.
17. § 98.015(3).
18. § 102.141(1). If a member of the commission was unable to serve, that member
could be replaced under the statute. § 102.141(1)(a)-(d).
19. § 102.141(3).
20. § 102.166(4)(c).
21. § 102.141(3).
22. § 102.166. Note that once a county canvassing board had decided to engage in a
recount, they could not then reverse that decision, and they had to complete the recount.
Id. But see Miami-Dade County Democratic Party v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing Bd.,
773 So. 2d 1179, 1180-81 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (determining that mandamus will not
lie where a recount would be impossible by the deadline, but, dismissing without prejudice to
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the county canvassing board would make an initial quasi-judicial legal
determination of what is a "legal vote," which is subject to de novo review
by the Florida courts.?3 Furthermore, undercertain circumstances, specifi-
cally where a candidate was defeated or eliminated by less than one-half of
one percent of the votes, where a judicial officer was retained or not retained
by one-half of one percent or less, or where a measure appearing on the
ballot was approved or rejected by one-half of one percent or less, the county
canvassing board was required to order a mandatory recount, unless the
losing candidate requests in writing that a mandatory recount was unneces-
sary.
1. The Protest Procedure, Florida Statutes § 102.166
The results certified by the county canvassing board were not the final
determination of the number of votes cast in the county. A candidate or a
voter qualified to vote in the questionable election had the right to protest the
election returns as being erroneous?2 Furthermore, any candidate on the
ballot, political committee, or political party could request, in writing, that
Miami-Dade County Democratic Party and the Florida Democratic Party "to seek relief in the
Florida Supreme Court from the court-ordered deadline and to ask the Supreme Court to
fashion an equitable remedy tailored to the conditions of Miami-Dade County").
23. The review accorded to a county canvassing board was similar to that of other
state administrative agencies. The board engaged in quasi-legislative action when it engaged
in an action "with respect to transactions to be executed in the future," such as enacting
ordinances. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993). Quasi-
legislative actions are acceded considerable deference on review and will be sustained so long
as they are fairly debatable. Nance v. Indiatlantic, 419 So. 2d 1041, 1041 (Fla.
1982). However, the board engages in quasi-judicial action when the action has "an impact
on a limited number of persons... on identifiable parties and interests, where the decision is
contingent on a fact or facts arrived at from distinct alternatives presented at a hearing, and
where the decision can be functionally viewed as policy application, rather than policy
setting .... ." Snyder, 627 So. 2d at 474 (emphasis added). Quasi-judicial actions are
reviewed by Florida courts de novo and will only be sustained if they are' supported by
substantial competent evidence. DeGroot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957).
24. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000).
25. § 102.166(1). The candidate or voter had to file a sworn, written protest of the
returns before the canvassing board certified the results to the Department of State, or within
five days after midnight of the date the election was held, whichever was later. § 102.166(1)-
(2). Therefore, candidates or voters had a minimum of five days in which they could file a
protest with the county canvassing board. § 102.166(2). As amended in section 102.168 of
the 2001 Florida Statutes, the section now allows a protest to be filed within ten days rather
than only five.
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the county conduct a manual recount of the ballots.26 The county canvassing
board had the discretion to authorize a manual recount that must include at
least three precincts and at least one percent of the total votes cast.27 If the
manual recount indicated an error in vote tabulation that could affect the
outcome of the election, the county canvassing board had three options.28
First, the board could correct the tabulation error and recount the other
precincts with the same tabulation problem.29  Second, the board could
"request the Department of State to verify the tabulation software." 30
Finally, the board could manually recount all of the ballots.
31
When conducting a manual recount, whether of a three-precinct sample
of the ballots or of all the ballots in the election, the Florida Legislature had
provided counting procedures. The county canvassing board appoints as
32
many counting teams as necessary. Each counting team was required to
have at least two electors that, when possible, must be of at least two
political parties.33 However, the candidate in the protested race could not be
a member of a counting team.34 If a counting team could not discern the
voter's intent when casting the ballot, the ballot must be presented to the
county canvassing board to determine the voter's intent.
35
26. § 102.166(4)(a). Any request for a manual recount had to be made prior to the
county canvassing board's certification of the results, or within seventy-two hours after
midnight of the date the election was held, whichever was later. § 102.166(4)(b).
27. § 102.166(4)(d). The person requesting the manual recount could select the three
precincts to be recounted. Id. If more than three precincts were recounted, then the county
canvassing board selected the additional precincts. Id.
28. § 102.166(5). The definition of the phrase "error in the vote tabulation" was not
defined in the statute. Id. The inherent vagueness of this phrase was a legal issue presented to
the Supreme Court of Florida for determination in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I v.
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000). That case and the issue of the definition of the phrase
"error in the vote tabulation" is discussed infra Part IV.
29. § 102.166(5)(a). This solution appears directed at mechanical errors that have
lead to erroneous results, such as a situation where an optical scanning machine does not
count every third ballot.
30. § 102.166(5)(b). Like the first remedy, this remedy appears to be directed at a
technical or mechanical problem in the tabulation of votes. See § 102.166(5)(a). The proce-
dures to verify the tabulation software also appeared in the protest statute. § 102.166(8)-(9).
31. § 102.166(5)(c).
32. § 102.166(7)(a).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. § 102.166(7)(b). In full, this provision provided, "[i]f a counting team is unable
to determine a voter's intent in casting a ballot, the ballot shall be presented to the county
canvassing board for it to determine the voter's intent." Id. This provision may be viewed as
a codification of the "will of the voter" standard discussed infra Part II.
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2. The Contest Procedure, Florida Statutes § 102.168
After the election has been certified or a candidate had been nominated
for office (after a primary election), an unsuccessful candidate, an elector
qualified to vote in the election, or a taxpayer could contest the election in a
Florida circuit court, by bringing an action against the county canvassing
board or election board.36  The purpose of such a contest was for the
complainant to establish the right of the unsuccessful candidate to the
elected office.37 A contesting complainant was entitled to an immediate
hearing on the issues presented in the contest.
38
In order to successfully contest an election, a complainant had to
demonstrate one of five grounds. 39 First, a complainant could prove
"[m]isconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of any election official or any
member of the canvassing board sufficient to change or place in doubt the
result of the election." Second, a complainant could prove "[ilneligibility
of the successful candidate for the nomination or office in dispute." 41 Third,
and most significant to the 2000 Presidential Election, a complainant could
prove "[r]eceipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal
votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election."
42
Fourth, a complainant could provide the circuit court with "[p]roof that any
elector, election official, or canvassing board member was given or offered a
bribe or reward in money, property, or any other thing of value for the pur-
pose of procuring the successful candidate's nomination or election...."43
36. § 102.168(1); see also § 102.168(4). In order to invoke the contest provision, the
contestant had to file a complaint in a Florida circuit court
within 10 days after midnight of the date the last county canvassing board empowered
to canvass the returns certifies the result of the election being contested or within 5
days after midnight of the date the last county canvassing board empowered to canvass
the returns certifies the results of that particular election following a pro-
test ... whichever occurs later.
§ 102.168(2).
37. § 102.168(3). If the election contested was for a referendum, the purpose of the
contest was to set aside the result of the referendum vote. See id.
38. § 102.168(7).
39. See § 102.168(3).
40. § 102.168(3)(a).
41. § 102.168(3)(b).
42. § 102.168(3)(c). The phrases in this section, what constitutes a "rejection" or a
'legal vote," were significant issues in the election contest regarding the 2000 Presidential
Election.
43. § 102.168(3)(d). This provision also allowed for a contest in a referendum
election.
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Finally, the statute provided a catch-all provision that would allow a contest
for "[a]ny other cause or allegation which, if sustained, would show that a
person other than the successful candidate was the person duly nominated or
elected to the office in question .... ,4
There were two remedies provided by statute if the complainant was
successful.4 5 The first remedy was a broad delegation of remedial power in
the contest provision.46 In the contest provision, the legislature made a broad
delegation that a circuit court could "provide any relief appropriate under
[the] circumstances" in order "to prevent or correct any alleged wrong"
brought out in an election contest.47
The second remedy was a judgment of ouster.48 If the successful candi-
date "has been commissioned or has entered upon the duties ... or is holding
the office" then the circuit court could enter a judgment of ouster against the
successful candidate.49 The judgment of ouster could then be presented to
the Governor.50 Upon presentation of the judgment of ouster, "the Governor
shall revoke [the] commission [of the wrongfully elected candidate] and
commission the person found in the judgment to be entitled to the office.",51
C. The "Intent of the Voter" Standard and Other Guiding Principles
Long before the 2000 Presidential Election, the Florida courts,
considering the state constitutional underpinnings of the right to vote, had set
52forth a number of guiding principles in resolving election disputes. One
44. § 102.168(3)(e). This provision also contained an opportunity for a contest to a
referendum. See id. As discussed infra Part V, this provision, if employed properly, may
have impacted the jurisprudence of the election cases with respect to the "butterfly ballot"
issue.
45. See § 102.168-.1682. The statutory remedy does not "abridge any remedy that
may now exist by quo warranto" at common law. § 102.169.
46. § 102.168(8).
47. Id.
48. § 102.1682. If a referendum was set aside by a contest, the circuit court could
enter a judgment setting aside the referendum and voiding the election. § 102.1682(2).
49. § 102.1682(1).
50. See id.
51. Id. This remedy was decidedly ineffective for presidential electors whose duties
of office were completed once they vote for the presidential candidate for whom they were
pledged to vote. Significantly, the entire contest provision has been significantly amended
since the 2000 Presidential Election. Ch. 2001-40, § 17, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 127 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 101.5604 (2000)).
52. The Florida Legislature delegated the adjudication of election disputes to the
courts. See § 102.168.
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principle that guides Florida courts is the "will of the voter." One of the
earliest cases where the Supreme Court of Florida relied on the "will of the
voter" standard was the 1917 case of Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough 3
In Darby, a school district bond election dispute, a total of fifty-five
votes were cast.54  Of those votes, twenty-seven votes were in favor of
issuing the bonds, and twenty-six votes were against issuing bonds. 55 Two
ballots, however, were not counted because they were marked by a cross
mark after the words "Against Bonds" rather than before it as required by
Florida's general election law.
56
On a writ of error, the Supreme Court of Florida first established that
mandamus was appropriate because it determined that the question of
whether a ballot is illegal and should not be counted because of the mark the
voter places on the ballot "is a question of law., 57 The court then deter-
mined that "[w]here a ballot is so marked as to plainly indicate the voter's
choice and intent in placing his marks thereon, it should be counted as
marked unless some positive provision of law would be thereby violated. 58
Because no provision in the law required the ballots to be discounted, the
Darby court reasserted that the issue was a proper question of law and
affirmed the lower court's issuance of mandamus, requiring the counting and
inclusion of the two ballots. 9
In 1940, the Supreme Court of Florida decided a similar case, State ex
rel. Carpenter v. Barber,60 and provided a clearer statement of the standard
by which courts were to decide the legal question of whether ballots were to
61be counted. In Carpenter, a Democratic primary election dispute, two
candidates for Orange County Commissioner received the identical number
62of votes-i 193 . Carpenter petitioned for a writ of mandamus, compellingthe election board to recount the votes.6 3 On the two ballots that the election
53. 75 So. 411 (Fla. 1917).
54. Id. at 412.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id
58. Darby, 75 So. at 412. The Supreme Court of Florida's use of the phrase "the
choice as expressed" provides a similar standard to the "intent of the voter" standard that
evolved thirty years later. Id. See State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49 (Fla. 1940);
see also Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976).
59. Darby, 75 So. at 412.
60. 198 So. 49 (Fla. 1940).
61. Id.
62. ld.
63. Id. Carpenter's motivation for the recount was that "19 ballots were not marked
for either... Carpenter or Bourland, and 2 votes were marked as 'not counted' for either
2001]
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board refused to count, the elector had marked an "X" after the name of the
candidate rather than before the name of the candidate as the statute
required. 64
The Carpenter court determined that election statutes should be
construed liberally in favor of the voters "to prevent disfranchisement of
legal voters., 65 Furthermore, when counting ballots, the intention of the
voters should prevail because the purpose of election law is "to obtain an
honest expression of the will or desire of the voter. ' 66  Therefore, the
Carpenter court concluded that the intention of the voter should be
ascertained from manually examining the ballot, and a vote should be
counted for the candidate if the will and intention of the voter could be
determined.67
The "will of the voter" standard has continued to thrive in Florida. In
68Boardman v. Esteva, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the
"will of the voter," if discernable, trumps the technical requirements of the
statutes. 69 Boardman involved a contested election for a seat on the Florida
Second District Court of Appeal. 70  Esteva received a majority of the
machine votes, but Boardman gained such an overwhelming majority of the
absentee votes that Boardman sustained an overall majority of 249 votes,
declaring him the winner.71 Esteva brought suit in circuit court alleging
"1450 irregularities or errors in the absentee ballots," and, because the
ballots had been commingled, he requested that the absentee ballots be
72thrown out and that he be declared the winner. The circuit court found thatonly eighty-eight of the allegations set forth illegalities, most of which were
candidate." Id. Although under the 2000 statutory scheme, an automatic machine recount
would have occurred in this situation; in 1940, no statute with a similar effect was in
place. See FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000).
64. Carpenter, 198 So. at 51. See also Ch. 17898, § 8, 1937 Fla. Laws 359, 362
(amending section 1275 of the Revised General Statutes of Florida (1920)).
65. Carpenter, 198 So. at 51.
66. Id.
67. Id. Rather than remanding to the election board to determine the intent of the
voter, the Carpenter court itself actually examined the two ballots at issue. The court
determined that the intention of the voter was not discernable on one ballot, but that on the
second ballot the voter clearly intended to vote for Carpenter. Id.
68. 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at261.
72. Id.
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"unsubstantial. 73 The First District Court of Appeal reversed, concluding
that the trial court erred by not strictly complying with the statutory
requirements for absentee voting 74
The Supreme Court of Florida disagreed. 75 Reversing the First District
Court of Appeal and reinstating the trial court's order, the Boardman court
began by noting that the real parties in interest in an election dispute are the
voters.7 While the candidate has an interest in the outcome of the dispute,
the electorate has the ultimate interest because the candidate is elected to
serve the public interest.77 The Supreme Court of Florida reiterated that the
right to participate in the electoral process is constitutional.78  Therefore, the
voters, not the candidate, are the party that the court must give primary
consideration.79
In order to protect the rights of the voters, the Boardman court
determined that strict adherence to the technical statutory requirements could
frustrate the rights of the voters.80 The court determined that when dealing
73. Boardman, 323 So. 2d at 261-62. Among the eighty-eight ballots, thirteen did
not have the application signed by the applicant, seventeen did not have the return envelopes
signed across the flap, thirty-nine did not indicate the official title of the subscribing witness,
and nineteen did not have the names of the electors on record. Id. at 261.
74. d at 262.
75. Id. at 263-64.
76. Id. at 263 ("We first take note that the real parties in interest here, not in the legal
sense but in realistic terms, are the voters.").
77. Boardman, 323 So. 2d at 263 ('The contestants have direct interests certainly, but
the office they seek is one of high public service and of utmost importance to the people, thus
subordinating their interests to that of the people.").
78. Id.
Ours is a government of, by and for the people. Our federal and state constitutions
guarantee the right of the people to take an active part in the process of that govern-
ment, which for most of our citizens means participation via the election process. The
right to vote is the right to participate, it is also the right to speak but more impor-
tantly the right to be heard. We must tread carefully on that right or we risk the
unnecessary and unjustified muting of the public voice.
Id. (emphasis added).
79. Id. ("[The voters] are possessed of the ultimate interest and it is they whom we
must give primary consideration.").
80. Id at 263. The court stated:
By refusing to recognize an otherwise valid exercise of the right of a citizen to vote for
the sake of sacred, unyielding adherence to statutory scripture, we would in effect
nullify that right .... If we are to countenance a different result, one contrary to the
apparent will of the people, then we must do so on the basis that the sanctity of the
ballot and the integrity of the election were not maintained, and not merely on the
theory that the... ballots cast were in technical violation of the law.
Boardman, 323 So. 2d at 265.
17
: Nova Law Review 26, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
with election irregularities the fundamental inquiry is "whether or not the
irregularity complained of has prevented a full, fair and free expression of
the public will." I While the Boardman court agreed with the First District's
assessment that absentee ballot law must be strictly construed, it did not
agree that strict construction of law necessarily equates to requiring strict
82compliance to that law, specifically where it does not guarantee the purity
of the ballot.83  Instead, the Boardman court held that "the primary
consideration in an election contest is whether the will of the people has
been effected." 84
The Supreme Court of Florida's precedent of liberally construing the
election statutes in favor of effectuating the will of the voter continued in
85State ex rel. Chappell v. Martinez. In Chappell, the court considered a
request by Chappell, an unsuccessful candidate to the United States House of
Representatives, to disregard the votes cast in Flagler County.86  The
successful candidate for Florida's Fourth Congressional District, James,
received 125,467 votes while Chappell received 124,735 votes. 87 After a
statutorily required recount,88  Chappell requested that Flagler County's
ballots be ignored, and he be declared the winner.89 Chappell claimed that
because Flagler County's certification was not received "by 5 p.m. of the
seventh day after an election," the statute required that the "missing counties
shall be ignored, and the results shown by the returns on file shall be
certified .... ."90
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Chappell court determined
that the "missing counties" language did not turn the certification process
into a "'ministerial' duty."9' Rather, there is a level of judgment that the
81. id.
82. Id. at 265-67.
83. Id. at 267 ("Strict compliance is not some sacred formula nothing short of which
can guarantee the purity of the ballot.").
84. Id. at 269.
85. 536 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1988).
86. Id. at 1008.
87. Id.
88. See FLA. STAT. § 102.141 (1987).
89. Chappell, 536 So. 2d at 1008. Chappell argued that without the Flagler County
ballots, he would have the majority of ballots cast in the election and would be the winner. Id.
at 1008-09.
90. Id. at 1008. See FLA. STAT. § 102.111 (1987).
91. Chappell, 536 So. 2d at 1008.
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state canvassing commission should exert when complying with the
statutes.92
To support its holding, the Chappell court turned to Boardman's ruling
that the object of holding an election is not a "hypertechnical compliance
with statutes," but "the electorate's effecting its will through its balloting."
93
The Chappell court determined that the statutes are "no magic," and if
complied with to the extent that they can ascertain the will of the electorate,
then there is no reason to discount any votes that are questioned.94
The Supreme Court of Florida's most recent examination of an election
dispute and the "will of the voter" standard arose in Beckstrom v. Volusia
County Canvassing Board.95 Beckstrom stemmed from a protest of election
returns from a Volusia County election for sheriff.96  Beckstrom, the
unsuccessful candidate, protested the election returns based upon allegations
of fraud.97 The county canvassing board tabulated the votes and certified the
results to the Department of State, declaring Beckstrom's opponent,
incumbent Sheriff Vogel, the winner.98
On Beckstrom's motion, the circuit court ordered a manual recount of
the ballots, which, once again, revealed Vogel to be the winner.99 Beckstrom
92. Ud The court also determined that the literal terms of the statute were complied
with because "the returns arrived telephonically" prior to the deadline set by section 102.111
of the 1987 Florida Statutes. Id.
93. Id
94. Id at 1008-09. Specifically, the Supreme Court of Florida quoted the Boardman
Court's rhetorical question when it stated:
There is no magic in the statutory requirements. If they are complied with to the extent
that the duly responsible election officials can ascertain that the electors whose votes
are being canvassed are qualified and registered to vote, and that they do so in a proper
manner, then who can be heard to complain that the statute has not been literally and
absolutely complied with?
Chappell, 536 So. 2d at 1008-09. It was not until the 2000 Presidential Election that an
unexpected answer to the court's question appeared.
95. 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998).
96. Id. at 721-22 n.1. The protest was filed pursuant to section 102.166(11) of the
1995 Florida Statutes, which provides in relevant part:
Any candidate for nomination or election, or any elector qualified to vote in the elec-
tion related to such candidacy, shall have the right to protest the returns of the election
or the practices attendant thereto as being fraudulent by presenting to any circuit judge
of the circuit wherein such fraud is alleged to have occurred a sworn, written protest.
FLA. STAT. § 102.166(11) (1995).
97. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 722. Specifically, Beckstrom claimed that the staff of
the Volusia County Supervisor of Elections had engaged in fraudulent conduct. Id
98. Id.
99. Id The recount revealed 79,902 votes for Vogel and 77,012 votes for Beckstrom.
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filed a second amended protest making the same allegation of fraud and
adding allegations of substantial failure of election officials to comply with
absentee ballot election laws. t o On the second set of allegations, Beckstrom
claimed that election officials tampered with the absentee ballots, violating
Florida law.10' Specifically, Beckstrom alleged that election officials
violated the law by marking over the voter-created marks of at least 6500
absentee ballots with a black felt-tip marker, because the voters had not
followed the instructions to mark the ballot with a number two pencil.0 2 An
Id. The certified results showed that Beckstrom received fifty-two percent of the precinct vote
but only forty percent of the absentee vote. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 722 n.3. The recount
revealed that Beckstrom's claim that receiving such a discrepancy between the precinct vote
and the absentee vote was evidence of fraud by the Supervisor of Elections was erroneous.
The Beckstrom court noted that the United States presidential election held on the same day
"showed a 9-percent margin between [the Republican Party candidate's] percentage of
absentee votes and percentage of precinct votes." Id. at 722. Additionally, in the
congressional election in the same district, the Republican Party candidate "had a 15-percent
margin between absentee and precinct vote percentage totals." Id.
100. Id. at 722. ("The absentee ballots were of crucial importance to the sheriff's
election."). As the court explained, "although [Beckstrom] received more votes than Vogel in
the precincts, Vogel received a sufficient majority in the absentee votes to overcome
[Beckstrom's] precinct vote margin of victory." Id. Thus, if Beckstrom could have
established that the absentee ballots should have been thrown out, the court's remedy would
have been to declare him the winner. See, e.g., In re Protest of Election Returns and Absentee
Ballots in the November 4, 1997 Election for the City of Miami, 707 So. 2d 1170, 1173-74
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
101. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 722. Beckstrom alleged that the election officials
violated section 101.5614 of the Florida Statues by marking over the voter-created marks of at
least 6500 absentee ballots with a black felt-tip marker. Id. Section 101.5614(5) of the 1995
Florida Statues provides, in relevant part:
If any ballot card... is damaged or defective so that it cannot properly be counted by
the automatic tabulating equipment, a true duplicate copy shall be made of the dam-
aged ballot card in the presence of witnesses and substituted for the damaged bal-
lot .... If any paper ballot is damaged or defective so that it cannot be counted prop-
erly by the automatic tabulating equipment, the ballot shall be counted manually at the
counting center by the canvassing board .... After duplicating a ballot, the defective
ballot shall be placed in an envelope provided for that purpose, and the duplicate ballot
shall be tallied with the other ballots for that precinct.
FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (1995).
102. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 722. Similar problems occurred in the 2000 Presidential
Election in Seminole County and in the counties composing the Florida panhandle where
optical scanning machines were used. In Seminole County, a heavily Republican county, "any
ballot the machine rejected was then examined by hand to see if they could determine the 'will
of the voter.' If they could make an accurate judgment, they prepared a new ballot to replace
the original one and added the newly crafted ballot to the count." JIM HUCK, THE ANOINTED
ONE: THE RISE OF GEORGE W. BUSH, Ch. 15, at http:lwww.angelfire.comlca3/jphuckl
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additional 1000 absentee ballots were also marked with a black felt-tip
marker, but "it was impossible to determine whether they were marked over
or newly marked.4
0 3
The circuit court concluded that the "re-marking procedure" was the
key issue. 0 4 The court determined that the re-marking procedure "was not in
substantial compliance with section 101.5614(5)" because the procedure
provided no way to verify the results of the election.'0 5 The circuit court
found that this noncompliance arose to "gross negligence" and created an
"opportunity for fraud.",10 6 However, the circuit court found that "no fraud
was proven." 107 Applying Boardman v. Esteva,'08 the circuit court held that
"there was a 'full and fair expression of the will of the people. Vogel won
it."",
109
Beckstrom appealed the circuit court's decision to the Florida Fifth
District Court of Appeal. 10  This court affirmed the circuit court, but
Book4Ch.15.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2001). "[M]ore than 10,000 ballots were duplicated
in at least twenty-six Florida counties." Paul Lukasiak, Evidence Suggests Ballot Tampering
in Florida's Escambia County, at http://www.onlinejournal.com/SpeciaLReports/Lukasiak
071301/lukasiakO7l3Ol.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2001). In Escambia County alone, the
canvassing board duplicated more than 2400 absentee ballots. Id.
103. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 722-23. In 1996, Volusia County, along with five other
Florida counties, used an optical scan tabulating system named "Accu-Vote." Id at 722 n.5.
Voters are instructed to mark their ballots with number two pencils, and the machine rejects
any ballot marking with something other than a number two pencil. Id. The Volusia County
Supervisor of Elections, undertaking the same procedure with respect to rejected ballots as the
supervisors in three other counties, used a black felt-tip marker to re-mark ballots the scanner
could not read. Ld. The re-mark was placed over the voter's original mark, allowing the
machine to read the vote. Id.
104. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 723.
105. Id In the 2000 amendments to the Florida Election Code, counties continue to
be able to choose their voting method. Ch. 2001-40, § 17, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 127. One
method that has already been explored is computer touchscreen voting. While touchscreen
voting has already been criticized, the technology also raises the question of how it will fulfill
the requirements of substantial compliance under section 101.5614(1) of the Florida Statutes
so that county canvassing boards and courts will be able to later verify the results. Paul M.
Schwartz, Bye to Chads; Hello to What?, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 2001, at A24 (asserting that
direct recording electronic devices result in as many discarded or invalid ballots as lever
machines and a considerably higher error rate than optical scanners).
106. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 723.
107. Id.
108 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976).
109. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 723.
110. Id.
2001]
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certified the issue to the Supreme Court of Florida."' Specifically, the Fifth
District recognized that Boardman did not provide guidance on the degree of
negligence in the handling of absentee ballots or the use of automatic
tabulating equipment to conduct an election, absent fraud, that would require
judicial intervention.' 12
Proceeding from the Boardman court's holding that the "real parties in
interest" in elections are the voters, 1 3 the Supreme Court of Florida turned
to two of Beckstrom's claims: "that the trial court erred as a matter of law
by refusing to invalidate the absentee ballots, [and] that the trial court erred
when it concluded that there was no evidence of fraud in the absentee ballot
process."' 1 4 In order to resolve these claims, the Beckstrom court refrained
the issue presented and determined that a circuit court not only can sustain
an election result when it has found substantial noncompliance with the
election statutes, but also when it has found that the result reflects the will of
the people." 5  The Beckstrom court then held that a court should void a
contested election, absent fraud or intentional wrongdoing, if two elements
are present: 1) "substantial noncompliance with statutory election proce-
dures," and 2) substantial noncompliance resulted in reasonable doubt "as to
whether the certified election expressed the will of the voters."
'
"16
111. Id.
112. Id. at 723-24.
113. Id. at 724. See also Boardman which stated:
[The real parties in interest here, not in the legal sense but in realistic terms, are the
voters. They are possessed of the ultimate interest and it is they whom we must give
primary consideration .... Our federal and state constitutions guarantee the right of
the people to take an active part in the process of... government, which for most of
our citizens means participation via the election process. The right to vote is the right
to participate; it is also the right to speak, but more importantly the right to be heard.
We must tread carefully on that tight or we risk the unnecessary and unjustified muting
of the public voice. By refusing to recognize an otherwise valid exercise of the right of
a citizen to vote for the sake of sacred, unyielding adherence to statutory scripture, we
would in effect nullify that right.
Boardmnan, 323 So. 2d at 263.
114. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 724-25.
115. Id. at725.
116. Id. The court stated:
[l]f a court finds substantial noncompliance with statutory election procedures and also
makes a factual determination that reasonable doubt exists as to whether a certified
election expressed the will of the voters, then the court in an election contest brought
pursuant to section 102.168, Florida Statutes (1997), is to void the contested election
even in the absence of fraud or intentional wrongdoing.
Id. This case could have had a significant impact on the "butterfly ballot" litigation if the
"butterfly ballot" claim was brought at the appropriate time in the election litigation. See
discussion infra Part V.
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However, the Beckstrom court was careful to point out that it was not
holding that a court lacks authority to void an election where there is a
substantial unintentional failure to comply with the statutory proce-
dures.1 7 The Beckstrom court determined that a court could void an election
if the first element was present-that there was a substantial unintentional
failure to comply with statutory election procedures-and there was
evidence of the second element. However, the Beckstrom court failed to
determine whether a court could void an election where only the second
element was present, that reasonable doubt exists as to whether the certified
election expressed the will of the voter, whatever its source. Indeed, the
holding of the Beckstrom court was that if both elements are present and that
the first element causes the second, a court must void the election. 19 The
Beckstrom court established that substantial noncompliance alone is not
enough of a basis of authority for a court to void an election.
n2
The Beckstrom court determined its holding by making a "necessary
distinction" between judicial determinations of fraud and judicial determina-
tions of substantial noncompliance.12 ' Boardman established that even if the
election result expressed the will of the voters, a result obtained by fraud
cannot be sustained.12 If there is unintentional, substantial noncompliance
with the election statutes however, the Beckstrom court held only that such
unintentional noncompliance can be "excused" if the result of the election
reliably reflects the will of the voters.1 3 Essentially, an election that reliably
117. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 725 ("We stress, however, that we are not holding that a
court lacks authority to void an election if the court has found substantial unintentional failure
to comply with statutory election procedures.").
118. Id:
119. See id. at 725 ("In sum, we hold that even in a situation in which a trial court
finds substantial noncompliance caused by unintentional wrongdoing as we have defined it,
the court is to void the election only if it finds that the substantial noncompliance resulted in
doubt as to whether a certified election reflected the will of the voters.").
120. Id.
121. Id:
122. Boardman, 323 So. 2d at 267.
123. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 725. The Beckstrom court stated that "the essence of
our Boardman decision is that a trial court's factual determination that a contested certified
election reliably reflects the will of the voters outweighs the court's determination of
unintentional wrongdoing by election officials in order to allow the real parties in interest-
the voters--to prevail." Id.; see also Boardman, 323 So. 2d at 259. The Beckstrom court
defined "unintentional wrongdoing" to be "statutorily mandated election procedures in
situations in which the noncompliance results from incompetence, lack of care, or ... the
election officials' erroneous understanding of the statutory requirements." Beckstrom, 707 So.
2d at 725.
20011
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reflects the will of the voters outweighs the unintentional wrongdoing of
election officials.lU Such a holding, the Beckstrom court noted, is necessary
to allow the voters, the real parties in interest, to prevail.125 Therefore, the
necessary amount of negligence is "gross negligence" or "negligence that is
so pervasive that it thwarts the will of the people."'
26
Turning to the facts, the Beckstrom court determined that although the
re-marking procedure was not in substantial compliance with the Florida
Statutes 2T and presented the opportunity for fraud, the circuit court was
acting in its discretion when it determined that there was no actual fraud.'
21
Furthermore, the Beckstrom court determined that the trial court's finding of
gross negligence was a measure of the culpability of the election officials,
not the election's expression of the will of the voters. 12 9  Rather, the
Beckstrom court affirmed, finding that the trial court was within its
discretion when the trial court found that the election was a "'full and fair
expression of the will of the people."",1
30
M. FACTS OF THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION
On November 7, 2000, Florida voters cast almost 6,000,000 ballots in
the general election for President and Vice President of the United
States.13' On November 8, 2000,132 the Florida Division of Elections
reported that Republican candidates Governor George W. Bush and
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The Beckstrom court clearly established that the term "gross negligence," as
used in this context, should not be confused for the type of negligence in a "tort action." Id.
127. See FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (1998).
128. Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 726.
129. Id. at 727.
130. Id. The Beckstrom court also noted that it disapproved of the statement of the
final judgment of the trial court: "I do not have jurisdiction to set aside this election." Id.
Rather, the Beckstrom court stated, "[t]he trial court clearly had jurisdiction to consider and
decide the issue presented." Id. Instead, the Beckstrom court explained that a "correct
statement of the law is that the trial court found no factual basis for requiring that the election
be set aside." Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 727. Similar logic as that applied in Beckstrom was
used to sustain the 2000 Presidential Election as a full and fair expression of the will of the
people, despite the documented irregularities in the Supervisor of Elections offices for
Seminole and Martin Counties. See discussion infra Part VI.
131. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1225 (Fla.
2000).
132. On the same day, Florida Governor Jeb Bush removed himself from the Florida
Elections Canvassing Commission. Id. at 1273 n.12.
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Secretary Richard Cheney received 2,909,135 votes, and Democratic
candidates Vice President Al Gore and Senator Joseph Lieberman received
2,907,351 votes, a margin of 1784 votes. 133 The other candidates on the
presidential ballot received 139,616 votes. 34  Because the margin of
difference between the two leading candidates was less than "one-half of a
percent... of the votes cast," section 102.141(4) of the Florida Statutes
required each of Florida's sixty-seven counties to conduct an automatic
recount of the ballots.
35
The automatic recount showed the Republican candidates were still
winning the race, but their lead had been reduced from the initially stated
1784 votes to 300 votes.136  After the automatic statewide recount was
conducted, the Florida Democratic Party requested manual recounts in
Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties.137 The manual
recounts revealed tabulation discrepancies that could affect the outcome of
the election. In conformity with the requirements of section 102.166(5)(c) of
the Florida Statutes, the four counties decided to manually recount all of the
ballots.
38
Concerned that it would not be able to complete the manual recount by
November 14, 2000, the deadline imposed by sections 102.111 and 102.112
of the Florida Statutes for certifying the results of the election, Palm Beach
County sought an advisory opinion from Florida's Division of Elec-
tions. 39 An advisory opinion was issued by the Division of Elections stating
that, absent unforeseen circumstances, all county election returns had to be
received by November 14, 2000 by 5:00 p.m. in order to be included in the
133. Id. at 1225.
134. Siegel I v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1044 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
135. Bush II v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 100-01 (2000). Section 102.141 of the Florida
Statutes mandated a recount whenever a candidate was defeated by "one-half of a percent or
less of the votes cast." FLA. STAT. § 102.141 (2000). In 1999, the Florida Secretary of State's
office ruled that this mandated recount must consist of running the ballots through the
counting machines again, not merely checking the reported totals against the machine readout
without actually reading the ballots. However, sixteen of Florida's sixty-seven counties re-ran
their computer tapes or inspected the electronic memories of their tabulating equipment
instead of recounting the ballots as required. Lisa Getter, Decision 2000: America Waits,
L.A. TIMmEs, Nov. 21, 2000, at A17.
136. Touchston HI v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1135 (1lth Cir. 2000).
137. Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1273 n.16 (Fla. 2000). See also Bush II, 531
U.S. at 101. Governor Bush did not request a manual recount in any Florida county. Brief in
Opposition of Respondents Al Gore, Jr., and Florida Democratic Party at 7, Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000) (No. 00-836).
138. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1225.
139. Id.
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certification of the statewide results.14 On November 13, 2000, Florida's
Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, issued a statement announcing that
absent unforeseen circumstances, returns from the county must be received
by 5:00 p.m. on the seventh day following the election in order to be
included in the certification of the statewide results.
14
On November 13, 2000, Volusia County initiated a lawsuit against the
Secretary of State seeking a declaratory judgment that it was not bound by
the November 14, 2000 deadline. 42 This lawsuit was later joined by Palm
Beach County, Vice President Gore, and Senator Lieberman. In that action,
Volusia County and Palm Beach County also requested an injunction
prohibiting the Secretary of State from ignoring election returns submitted
after November 14, 2000.143 On November 14, 2000, the Second Circuit
Court of Florida, which is located in Leon County, 44 held that while the
county canvassing boards were mandated to certify and file their returns with
the Secretary of State by 5:00 p.m. November 14, 2000, there was nothing to
prevent the county canvassing boards from filing with the Secretary of State
further returns after completing a manual recount.145 It would then be up to
the Secretary of State to determine whether any such corrective or
supplemental returns filed after 5:00 p.m. November 14, 2000 were to be
ignored.146 The court admonished the Secretary of State, stating that she
could not decide ahead of time what late returns should or should not be
ignored and directed her to properly exercise her discretion in making a
decision on the returns.147
In response to the circuit court's order, the Secretary of State an-
nounced that she was in receipt of certified returns resulting from the initial
recount from all counties in the state.' 48 She then issued a directive
instructing all counties who intended to submit late returns to submit to her
by 2:00 p.m. on November 15, 2000, a written statement of "the facts and
circumstances" justifying any belief on their part that they should be allowed
140. Deadline for Certification on County Results, Advisory Op. Fla. Div. of Elections
00-10 (Nov. 13, 2000). See also Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1225-
26.
141. See also Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1226.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The capital of Florida is Tallahassee, which is located in Leon County.
145. McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1693713, at *1 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct.
Nov. 14, 2000).
146. Id. at*3.
147. Id. at*4.
148. Palm Beach County Canvassing BdL 1,772 So. 2d at 1226.
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to amend the certified returns previously filed.1 49 Four counties complied.1 50
On November 15, 2000, the Secretary of State rejected the counties' reasons
and announced that she would not accept the amended returns, but rather
would rely on the earlier certified totals for the four counties.
51
On November 16, 2000, Vice President Gore and the Florida Democ-
ratic Party filed a motion in the Second Circuit Court seeking to compel the
Secretary of State to accept the amended returns.152 On November 17, 2000,
the circuit court denied relief in a brief order.153  On the same day, the
Florida Democratic Party and Vice President Gore appealed the second
order.' - The First District Court of Appeal consolidated that appeal with the
Volusia County Canvassing Board's appeal that was already pending, and
certified both appeals to the Supreme Court of Florida.' 55
Thereafter, on November 21, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida
imposed a deadline of 5:00 p.m. on November 26, 2000 for a return of ballot
counts (extending the November 14, 2000 deadline of section 102.111 of the
Florida Statutes by twelve days) and directed the Secretary of State to accept
manual counts submitted prior to the deadline. 56 On November 22, 2000,
the Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board declared that it would not
conduct a manual recount because it could not comply with the November
26, 2000 deadline.
157
The Palm Beach County Canvassing Board requested the Secretary of
State to extend the November 26, 2000 deadline until the morning of
November 27, 2000 so that it could complete its manual recount.158 On
November 26, 2000, the Secretary of State denied Palm Beach County's
request.159 On November 26, 2000, at approximately 7:30 p.m., Florida's
Secretary of State certified that Governor Bush and Secretary Cheney had
received 2,912,790 votes and Vice President Gore and Senator Lieberman
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1227.
152. 1&
153. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd I, 772 So. 2d at 1227.
154. Id.
155. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida granted Volusia County Canvassing Board's
motion to voluntarily dismiss its appeal in the Supreme Court of Florida. Id
156. Id.
157. Miami-Dade County Democratic Party v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing Bd.,
773 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
158. Id
159. Id.
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had received 2,912,253 votes, a difference of 537 votes.' 60 On November
27, 2000, following the certification of Governor Bush as the winner of the
presidential election in Florida, Vice President Gore commenced an election
contest action in the Second Circuit Court of Florida challenging the
certification on the grounds that the certified results included "a number of
illegal votes" and failed to include "a number of legal votes sufficient to
change or place in doubt the result of the election."'
161
On December 4, 2000, following a two-day evidentiary hearing, the
court denied all relief and entered a final judgment.162 Vice President Gore
appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, which certified the judgment
to the Supreme Court of Florida. 
16
IV. THE PROTEST CASES
A. Supreme Court of Florida
When Secretary of State Harris set forth an interpretation of Florida
election law that county canvassing boards were to certify and report their
election results to the Department of State by 5:00 p.m. on November 14,
2000,164 the Volusia County Canvassing Board and the Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board sought a temporary injunction against the Secretary of
State in the Second Circuit Court of Florida mandating that she consider the
certified results of Volusia and Palm Beach Counties, even if they were filed
160. Touchston v. McDermott II, 234 F.3d 1130, 1136 (lth Cir. 2000).
161. Bush II v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 101 (2000). See also Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000).
162. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1247.
163. Id.
164. The November 13, 2000 opinion provides in pertinent part:
[Ilf the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board fails to certify the county returns to the
Elections Canvassing Commission by 5:00 p.m. of the seventh day following the
election, the votes cast in Palm Beach County will not be counted in the certification of
the statewide results.
[Aibsent such unforeseen circumstances, returns from the county must be received by
the Elections Canvassing Commission by 5 p.m. on the seventh day following the
election in order to be included in the certification of the statewide results....
[T]he county canvassing board may certify other electin [sic] results to the Department
of State while the manual recount continues for the presidential election.
Deadline for Certification on County Results, Advisory Op. Fla. Div. of Elections 00-10 (Nov.
13, 2000).
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late.10 Initially, the circuit court granted the temporary injunction in part
and denied the injunction in part. In a second hearing on the matter,
165. McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1693713, at *1 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct.
Nov. 14,2000).
166. d at *4. Perhaps due to the expediency exercised in the cases following, there
has been little analysis of the court's order. The court's analysis, however brief it was, is
illustrative of Florida courts deference for administrative agencies and respect for coordinate
branches of government. The central basis of the court's reasoning was that it seemed
appropriate to yield "great deference" to the Secretary of State's construction of election
laws. Id. at *1. However, despite that "great deference," the court did not agree with
Secretary Harris' conclusions. Id. While the court believed that the election laws did provide
Secretary Harris with some discretion, it stopped short of chastising her as abusing that
discretion. Rather, the court determined only that the discretion the statutes gave to Secretary
Harris had not been exercised. Under the court's analysis, in order to exercise her discretion,
Secretary Harris must have contemplated her "decision based upon a weighing and
consideration of all attendant facts and circumstances." Id. at *3. However, the court shirked
from setting forth a mandatory duty upon Secretary Harris to consider "all attendant facts and
circumstances" by making Secretary Harris' duty to "consider all of the facts and circum-
stances" discretionary as well. McDermott, 2000 WL 1693713 at *3. Indeed, the court only
established that "[t]he Secretary may, and should, consider all of the facts and circumstances."
Id (emphasis added).
The court's opinion accomplished its central purpose, outlining the issues for the
Supreme Court of Florida to consider in the inevitable appeal to follow. The court effectively
set forth five issues for the Supreme Court of Florida. First, whether the balance of legislative
intent in the Florida Election Code should fall towards accuracy or finality. The court
recognized that the Secretary's strict interpretation of the deadline imposed by section 102.112
of the Florida Statutes "has come down hard on the side of finality;" however, the contest
provision of section 102.168, which provided for a manual recount of all ballots under certain
circumstances, could be the countervailing balance of accuracy. Id. at *1.
Second, the court recognized that section 102.166 of the Florida Statutes, the protest
provision, provides to "any candidate, or qualified elector, the right to protest the returns of a
county canvassing board by filing a sworn written protest, and that protest may be field within
five (5) days of the election, or any time before the Canvassing Board certifies the results,
whichever occurs later." Id. at *2 (emphasis added). The court recognized that this provision
raises the possibility that the canvassing board will have to "address a protest of its returns the
day before, or hours before, it was to certify the results pursuant to the deadline in Section
102.112, Florida Statutes, thus making it impossible to correct any error before the
deadline." Id However, the other possibility that the court's opinion does not explicitly
acknowledge is that the canvassing board may also be placed in the position that it would have
to address a protest, and possibly manually recount all the ballots, after it has submitted its
certified results to the Department of State.
Third, the court recognized that the Florida Election Code "suggests that certifications
of the results in an election might occur later than usual if there is a protest of the
returns." McDermott, 2000 WL 1693713 at *2. The court demonstrates that the text of
section 102.168, the contest provision, contemplates the situation that an election is contested
after a protest has occurred. However, perhaps recognizing that it had set forth the issue
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absent record evidence of a failure by the Secretary of State to exercise
appropriate discretion, the circuit court denied the request to issue an
injunction.' 67 Rather than pass judgment on the case, the First District Court
of Appeal certified the question directly to the Supreme Court of Florida.
In Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I v. Harris,168 the Supreme
Court of Florida considered the issues raised by the circuit court: whether
the county canvassing boards may permit manual recounts of the ballots, and
whether Secretary Harris must accept the manual recounts if submitted after
the statutory deadline. 69 Eventually, the court suffered by defending central
principles of Florida's democracy while attempting to accord respect to a
coordinate branch of government. While the underlying basis for the
Supreme Court of Florida's decision necessitated a rather basic analysis of
the guiding principles of Florida law and the Florida Election Code, the
court stopped short of characterizing and castigating Secretary Harris'
actions as an abuse of discretion. Instead, the court set forth a cryptic
rationale for the remedy provided.
effectively for a subsequent appeal, the court did not attempt to examine how the protest and
contest provisions can be best effectuated in an election for presidential electors.
Fourth, the court raised concern about the inconsistency between the consent decree,
between the State of Florida and the federal government, and the Florida Election Code. The
consent decree provides that "absentee ballots of overseas electors must be counted if received
up to ten (10) days after the election." Id. The Secretary of State claimed that the consent
decree functions as a "supplemental certification" date. Id. However, the court found no basis
in the statutes for any "supplemental certification" date, raising the issue of the effect of the
consent decree certification date. Id.
Fifth, the court raised the scope of the Secretary of State's discretion to ignore later
returns pursuant to section 102.112 of the Florida Statutes. Id. at *3. Since the statute used
the discretionary term "may," the court determined that the duty was discretionary and "[t]hat
the Secretary may ignore late filed returns necessarily means that the Secretary does not have
to ignore such returns." McDermott, 2000 WL 1693713 at *3. By recognizing this duty as
permissive, the court raised the question of whether Secretary Harris' actions were an abuse of
her discretion, a question it avoided by characterizing Secretary Harris' actions as a failure to
exercise discretion.
The deference afforded the Secretary of State was evidenced in the court's second order
refusing to enjoin the Secretary of State from certifying the election in the absence of
testimony creating record evidence that the Secretary was abusing her discretion by certifying
the presidential election, while Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia Counties had
still not certified their election returns to the Secretary of State and were involved in recount
procedures. See McDermott v. Harris, No. 00-2700, 2000 WL 1714590, at *1 (Fla. 2d Cir.
Ct. Nov. 17, 2000).
167. Id.
168. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
169. Id. at 1228.
[Vol. 26:647
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss3/1
Berger and Tobin
Guiding the Supreme Court of Florida's analysis was the long standing
principle espoused by the court in Boardman v. Esteva,170 which stated the
paramount consideration in any election dispute is the will of the people.1
7 1
Therefore, the court determined that the goal, like that of the Boardman
court, was to reach the result that reflected the will of the voters, or in the
instant case, that determined the will of the voters. 172 Accordingly, the court
made clear that to decide the issues before it, the court would rely u on the
"will of the voter" principle and principles of statutory construction.
Turning to the first issue, whether the county canvassing boards could
permit a manual recount of the election ballots, the court looked to the
Division of Elections' opinion construing the language "error in vote
tabulation" to exclude a discrepancy between the original machine return
and the sample manual recount, based upon the manner that the ballots were
marked or punched. 74 The court determined that the Division of Elections'
opinion was contrary to the plain meaning of section 102.166(5) of the
Florida Statutes, which allowed for the manual recount of all ballots.
Despite the deference normally provided to an agency's opinion,175 it could
not be followed because the agency's construction was against the law.
176
Rejecting the Division's contention that "error in vote tabulation only means
170. 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976).
171. Palm Beach Canvassing Board 1, 772 So. 2d at 1227-28.
172. Id. at 1228.
173. Id. Indeed, Broward County was permitted to join this action on appeal and in
doing so put the issue of the standard for the legal intent of the voter squarely before the
Supreme Court of Florida. The court did not take up the issue directly, but instead, cited
several cases to give the canvassing boards guidance on the intent of the voter standard,
including Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 611 (Ill. 1990). Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd. L 772 So. 2d at 1238.
174. Id. at 1228. See Manual Recount Procedures and Partial Certification of County
Returns, Advisory Op. Fla. Div. of Elections 00-13 (Nov. 13,2000).
175. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. , 772 So. 2d at 1228. See Donato v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 767 So. 2d 1146, 1153 (Fla. 2000); Smith v. Crawford, 645 So. 2d
513, 521 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
176. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1228. It should be noted that
the Division of Elections' opinions concerning "error in vote tabulation" were issued while
the hearing in the Second Circuit courtroom was in process. On November 13, 2000, the
Division of Elections released two opinions on manual recount procedures. The first was
addressed to Judge Charles E. Burton, Chairperson of the Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board. Manual Recount Procedures and Partial Certification of Count Returns, Advisory Op.
Fla. Div. of Elections 00-13 (Nov. 13, 2000). The second opinion was addressed to Al
Cardenas, Chairman, Republican Party of Florida. Definitions of Errors in Vote Tabulation,
Advisory Op. Fla. Div. of Elections 00-11 (Nov. 13, 2000).
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a counting error resulting from incorrect election parameters or an error in
the vote tabulating software," the Supreme Court of Florida observed that
the statute includes no words of limitation. 177  Furthermore, the court
recognized that the Florida Legislature used phrases other than "vote
tabulation" when it referred to the voting system rather than the vote count,
such as "vote tabulation system" or "automatic tabulating equipment.'
178
The court also contrasted the section with other sections of the Florida
Election Code to support a broader reading of "error in vote tabulation.'
179
Besides the textual basis for its conclusion, the Supreme Court of
Florida felt it important to note that, despite the increased importance of
technology in American society, "our society has not yet gone so far as to
place blind faith in machines."' 180 Indeed, "humans routinely correct the
errors of machines" in "almost all endeavors, including elections."'' There-
fore, the Division of Election's opinion placing such "blind faith" in the
counting machines was contrary to the plain meaning of the Florida Election
Code.
182
The Supreme Court of Florida then turned to the second issue, whether
the Elections Canvassing Commission must accept a return after the seven-
day deadline set forth in the Florida Election Code. 1 3 Beginning with the
Florida Constitution, the court began with the principle that "[a]ll political
power is inherent in the people."' 184  The court turned to another state
177. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1229.
178. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2000).
179. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1229 (recognizing that "error
in vote tabulation" is more than machinery errors because "[s]ection 101.5614(5) provides
that '[n]o vote shall be declared invalid or void if there is a clear indication of the intent of the
voter as determined by the canvassing board,"' "section 101.5614(6) provides that any vote in
which the Board cannot discern the intent of the voter must be discarded," and section
102.141 requires the county canvassing board to look for discrepancies between the machine
count and the sample hand count).
180. Id.
181. Id. See also Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585 (Ill. 1990) (determining ballots
without completely dislodged chads that had not been read by a tabulating machine were legal
votes that must be manually counted because the legislature had not explicitly labeled them
void and discounted them from inclusion in the election); Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d
1241, 1243 (Mass. 1996) (examining punch card ballots to discern the "intent of the voter"
despite the tabulating machine's inability to read a ballot with an undislodged chad).
182. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I, 772 So. 2d at 1229-30.
183. Specifically, the seven-day deadline appears in section 102.111 and section
102.112 of the 2000 Florida Statutes.
184. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. , 772 So. 2d at 1230 (quoting FLA. CONST.
art. I, § 1).
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constitutional provision providing that elections are to be regulated by
law.185 The statutes, however, provide no deadline for a county canvassing
board wishing to file corrected, amended, or supplemental returns.186
As a result, the Supreme Court of Florida recognized that there were
187two areas where the statutes were ambiguous. First, the time frame for
conducting a manual recount conflicted with the time frame for submitting
county returns. 88 Second, the statutes establishing whether the Secretary of
State could ignore county returns conflicted because one statute made the
duty mandatory, while the other made the duty permissive.'i 9
The first area, the recount conflict, results from the protest provision,
section 102.166, and the deadline established by section 102.111 and section
102.112 of the Florida Statutes. Section 102.166(1) allowed "[a]ny
candidate.., or any elector qualified to vote in the election related to such
candidacy" the right to protest the returns "as being erroneous."' 9 The time
period for filing a protest pursuant to section 102.166(1) was "prior to the
time the canvassing board certifies the results for the office being protested
or within 5 days after midnight of the date the election is held, whichever
occurs later." 191 Section 102.166(4)(a) allowed a candidate to provide the
county canvassing board with a written request for a manual recount.1 92 The
time period for a written request for a manual recount, according to section
102.166(4)(b), could be made prior to the time the canvassing board certified
the returns or within seventy-two hours after the election, whichever
occurred later.193  The court recognized that a manual recount could be
requested at any point prior to certification, but the manual recount could
lead to a full recount which could require several days, especially in a
185. Id. The court quotes Article VI, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution, which
provides:
SECTION I. Regulation of elections.-All elections by the people shall... be deter-
mined by a plurality of votes cast. Registration and elections shall, and political party
functions may, be regulated by law; however, the requirements for a candidate with no
party affiliation or for a candidate of a minor party for placement of the candidate's
name on the ballot shall be no greater than the requirements for a candidate of the party
having the largest number of registered voters.
Id. (emphasis in original).
186. Id. at 1231.
187. Id.
188. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd L 772 So. 2d at 1231.
189. Id.
190. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(1) (2000).
191. § 102.166(2).
192. § 102.166(4).
193. Id.
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populous county. t94 Therefore, the court determined that the protest
provision, section 102.166, conflicted with the deadline by which the county
canvassing boards "must" submit their returns to the Elections Canvassing
Commission established by sections 102.111 and 102.112, 5:00 p.m. of the
seventh day following the election. 
195
The second area of ambiguity in the Florida Statutes dealt with by the
Supreme Court of Florida involved a conflict between two statutes, section
102.111 and section 102.112. The former mandated that missing counties be
ignored if submitted after 5 p.m. of the seventh day following the election,1
96
194. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1232-33.
195. Id. at 1233.
196. Section 102.111 of the Florida Statutes provides in relevant part:
(1) Immediately after certification of any election by the county canvassing board, the
results shall be forwarded to the Department of State concerning the election of any
federal or state officer. The Governor, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the
Division of Elections shall be the Elections Canvassing Commission. The Elections
Canvassing Commission shall, as soon as the official results are compiled from all
counties, certify the returns of the election and determine and declare who has been
elected for each office. In the event that any member of the Elections Canvassing
Commission is unavailable to certify the returns of any election, such member shall be
replaced by a substitute member of the Cabinet as determined by the Director of the
Division of Elections. If the county returns are not received by the Department of
State by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following an election, all missing counties shall be
ignored, and the results shown by the returns on file shall be certified.
§ 102.111 (emphasis added).
During the 2000 Presidential Election, Florida Governor Jeb Bush chose to recuse
himself from the Elections Canvassing Commission because of the conflict of interest
presented since his brother, George W. Bush, was the Republican Presidential candidate.
However, Katherine Harris, Florida's Secretary of State and Florida's Chair for George W.
Bush's Presidential campaign felt that no conflict of interest meriting recusal from the
Elections Canvassing Commission existed. Harris' decision has led to considerable criticism
and various attempts at election reform directed at the Secretary of State's involvement in
elections. See JAKE TAPPER, DowN AND DiRTY: THE PLOT TO STEAL THE PRESDENCY 55, 78,
88-89, 165, 176-79, 350, 476 (2001) (raising questions of Secretary Harris' political
involvement and inability to be impartial); Editorial, Reformer of the Moment, PALM BEACH
POST, Mar. 25, 2001, at 2E (implying improper conduct by functioning as state co-chair of the
Bush campaign and stopping recounts to "certify her boss"); Editorial, An Unseemly Mix of
Data, MriMI HERALD, Aug. 10, 2001, at 8B (questioning the presence of George W. Bush's
campaign speeches on the same state-owned computers as Secretary Harris' official statements
as Florida's top elections officer); S.B. 1138, 103d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (legislative
bill, which died in Committee of Government Oversight and Productivity, proposing that the
Secretary of State not be allowed to engage in partisan activities including, inter alia,
"actting] as a leader of or hold an office in a political organization"); H.B. 1625, 103d Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2001) (legislative bill, which died in Committee on Rules, Ethics and
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and the latter provided discretion to ignore any missing counties submitted
after the same deadline. 97 In order to resolve this "shall vs. may" conflict,
the Supreme Court of Florida first turned to traditional rules of statutory
construction to discern the intent of the legislature when enacting the
Florida Election Code.9
The first rule of construction that the court turned to was that "the
specific statutes controls the non-specific statute."' 99 The court concluded
that section 102.112 specifically addressed the "deadline" for submitting
returns and the corresponding penalties, while section 102.111 examined the
duties of the Elections Canvassing Commission and only tangentially
referred to the deadline for submitting returns.2  Second, the court turned to
recency.20' It determined that section 102.111 was enacted in 1951, 20 2 but
section 102.112 was enacted in 1989 in a revision of chapter 102.
203
Third, the court considered that a statute should not be read as to render
any other provision meaningless or absurd.20 4 The court determined that
reading the provisions as mandatory would render the alternative penalty of
personal fines against the canvassing board meaningless, because if the
returns were required to be ignored, there is no need for a personal penalty
Elections, proposing that the Secretary of State be eliminated as a mandatory member of the
Elections Canvassing Commission).
197. Section 102.112 of the Florida Statutes provides in relevant part:
(1) The county canvassing board or a majority thereof shall file the county returns for
the election of a federal or state officer with the Department of State immediately after
the certification of the election results. Returns must be filed by 5 p.m. of the 7th day
following the first primary and general election and by 3 p.m. on the 3rd day following
the second primary. If the returns are not received by the department by the time
specified, such returns may be ignored and the results on file at that time may be
certified by the department.
§ 102.112 (emphasis added).
198. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1234. See also Capers v.
State, 678 So. 2d 330 (Fla. 1996).
199. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1234. See, e.g., State ex rel.
Johnson v. Vizzini, 227 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1969).
200. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1234.
201. ld ("[I]t is also well-settled that when two statues are in conflict, the more
recently enacted statute controls the older statute .... The more recently enacted provision
may be viewed as the clearest and most recent expression of legislative intent."). See, e.g.,
McKendry v. State, 641 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1994).
202. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. II, 772 So. 2d at 1287.
203. See Ch. 89-338, § 30, 1989 Fla. Laws 2162.
204. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1234. See, e.g., Amente v.
Newman, 653 So. 2d 1030 (Fla. 1995).
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for submitting late returns. Fourth, the court looked to whether a
particular reading would allow the statutory scheme to be read as a whole. M
6
If the Elections Canvassing Commission were required to reject any late
returns, then the manual recount provisions of the protest statute, section
102.166, if followed, would require rejections of the returns. The court
determined that the legislature did not intend to disenfranchise a county's
voters because the county officials followed the dictates of the Florida
Election Code.2M7 Fifth, the Supreme Court of Florida looked to the intent of
the Florida Election Code when enacted in 1951.208 The court found that the
legislature contemplated all ballots being received by the Elections
Canvassing Commission by the statutory deadline.m However, some ballots
have been extended beyond those dates. 21 Because the original intent of the
legislature could no longer be effectuated, the Supreme Court of Florida
determined that "the mandatory language [of] section 102.111 has been
supplanted by the permissive language of section 102.112. ' '21
The Supreme Court of Florida then returned to the Florida Constitution
and construed the statutes in favor of the right of suffrage. 212 The Florida
Constitution recognizes that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the
205. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1234-35.
206. Id. at 1235. See Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.
2d 452 (Fla. 1992). While the Supreme Court of Florida set forth a distinguishable analysis
under this rule of statutory construction, the rule of reading all statutory provisions in
harmony with one another could easily be read as another way of stating that no statutory
provision should be read to render any other meaningless or absurd. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1235. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida treated
these rules as separate rules of construction. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. First, overseas absentee ballots are not regulated by the Florida Statutes, but by a
consent decree with the federal government. Overseas absentee ballots are therefore provided
with a ten-day extension beyond the statutory deadline. Overseas absentee ballots and the
legal ramifications of the consent decree are discussed at length infra in Part VI. Second, the
deadline has to be considered in connection with section 101.5614(8) of the Florida Statutes,
which requires that the "official return of the election" consist of "write-in, absentee and
manually counted results." FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(8) (2000). If those results must be
obtained to constitute the official return of the election, reading the mandatory provision as
controlling would allow for those types of ballots required to be included in the official return
of the election to be excluded because they cannot be obtained by the mandatory statutory
deadline.
211. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board 1, 772 So. 2d at 1235-36.
212. See id. at 1236.
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people. ' '213 Part of that inherent political power is the sovereign right of the
people to select their own leaders, and that right may not be infringed upon
by unreasonable and unnecessary restraints.21 4 Therefore, the court
determined that because election laws were intended to facilitate the right of
suffrage, the laws should be liberally construed in favor of the citizen's right
to vote.215 Indeed, the court recognized that the fundamental purpose of
election law was "to facilitate and safeguard the right of each voter to
express his or her will in the context of our representative democ-
racy., 21 6 Therefore, technical requirements of election law could not subvert
its central constitutional purpose.
The court then turned to the Secretary of State's discretion under
section 102.166 of the Florida Statutes and determined that while the
Secretary is statutorily delegated discretion in determining whether to accept
amended election returns, that discretion is constitutionally limited and can
only be exercised under certain circumstances. 218 As stated previously, the
Florida Constitution provides that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the
people." 219 The court established that the "political power" provision made
213. FLA. CONsT. art. I, § 1.
214. See Treiman v. Malmquist, 342 So. 2d 972, 975 (Fla. 1977) ("The declaration of
rights expressly states that 'all political power is inherent in the people.' The right of the
people to select their own officers is their sovereign right, and the rule is against imposing
unnecessary and unreasonable [restraints on that right] .... Unreasonable or unnecessary
restraints on the elective process are prohibited."); see also Pasco v. Heggen, 314 So. 2d 1, 3
(Fla. 1975) ('We have also stated that only unreasonable or unnecessary restraints on the
elective process are prohibited."); State ex reL Landis v. Dyer, 148 So. 201, 203 (Fla. 1933)
('T'he right to vote, though not inherent, is a constitutional right in this state. The Legislature
may impose reasonable rules and regulations for its governance, but it cannot under the guise
of such regulation unduly subvest or restrain this right.").
215. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1237. See State ex rel.
Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 51 (Fla. 1940).
Generally, the courts, in construing statutes relating to elections, hold that the same
should receive a liberal construction in favor of the citizen whose right to vote they
tend to restrict and in so doing to prevent disfranchisement of legal voters and the
intention of the voters should prevail when counting ballots .... It is the intention of
the law to obtain an honest expression of the will or desire of the voter.
Id.
216. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. , 772 So. 2d at 1237. See State ex rel.
Landis v. Dyer, 148 So. 201, 203 (1933).
217. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1237. See Boardman v.
Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 269 (Fla. 1975) ("In summary, we hold that the primary consideration
in an election contest is whether the will of the people has been effected.").
218. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1237.
219. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
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clear that, in the State of Florida, the right to vote is a constitutional right.220
Therefore, the right to vote is a paramount right in the State of Florida. As a
result, if the Secretary of State exercised her discretion in a way that
provided an "unreasonable and unnecessary restraint" on the right to vote,
that exercise of discretion would run afoul with the Florida Constitution.2
1
Based on this constitutional precept, the Supreme Court of Florida
limited the Secretary of State's discretion to ignore a county's returns to two
situations that raise questions about the integrity of the electoral process.
2 2
First, the Secretary of State could properly take the drastic remedy of ignor-
ing a county's late returns if including the late returns precluded a contest of
the certification of the election.223 Second, the Secretary of State could
properly ignore a county's late returns if including the late returns precludes
"Florida voters from participating fully in the federal electoral process."
224
Irrespective of which situation the Secretary claimed had arisen that
justified ignoring a county's returns, the Supreme Court of Florida made it
clear that the Secretary of State may not set forth a sweeping, prospective
rule that disenfranchises the electorate in order to deter county canvassing
boards from granting manual recounts if the boards deem that a manual
recount is appropriate. 225 The court determined that the Secretary of State
could only invoke such a remedy after ihe returns had been submitted, and
the Secretary must set forth her basis for ignoring the returns, which must be
a basis adequately supported by the law. Essentially, the court determined
220. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1237.
221. See id. at 1237-38.
222. Id. at 1237.
223. Id. ("Ignoring the county's returns is a drastic measure and is appropriate only if
the returns are submitted to the Department so late that their inclusion will compromise the
integrity of the electoral process.., by precluding a candidate, elector, or taxpayer from
contesting the certification of an election pursuant to section 102.168 ....").
224. Id. ("Ignoring the county's returns is a drastic measure and is appropriate only if
the returns are submitted to the Department so late that their inclusion will compromise the
integrity of the electoral process... by precluding Florida voters from participating fully in
the federal electoral process.").
225. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I, 772 So. 2d at 1237-38 ("To disenfranchise
electors in an effort to deter Board members, as the Secretary in the present case proposes, is
unreasonable, unnecessary, and violates longstanding law."). Interestingly, although the
Supreme Court of Florida claimed that the Secretary's actions violated "longstanding law," the
court offered no support for this proposition. Id. at 1238. However, the court could have
supported this proposition, if it so desired. See Darby v. State ex reL McCollough, 75 So. 411
(1917); State ex rel. Chappell v. Martinez, 536 So. 2d 1007 (1988).
226. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1237 ("In either case, the
Secretary must explain to the Board her reason for ignoring the returns and her action must be
adequately supported by the law.").
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that each instance in which the Secretary of State determines whether to
ignore a county's returns must be analyzed by the Secretary on an individual,
case-by-case basis.227 However, the Supreme Court of Florida dealt with all
of these issues without explicitly stating that Secretary Harris had indeed
abused her discretion. Rather, the court seemed content by claiming that
Secretary Harris' discretion was limited to two specific sets of circum-
stances.
The Secretary, however, characterized the basis for the manual recounts
as a mere "possibility that the results... could affect the outcome of the
election if certain results obtain."' 9 She claimed that the county canvassing
boards had not asserted actual substantial noncompliance with the Florida
Election Code, and absent an assertion of substantial noncompliance,
227. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida supported the proposition that recounts should
proceed expeditiously with United States Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 1238. The court
noted that in Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972), the United States Supreme Court
determined that "[a] recount is an integral part of the Indiana electoral process and is within
the ambit of the broad powers delegated to the States by Art. I, s 4." Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1238. However, whether conducting federal elections are a
power "delegated to the States" or a power reserved by the states is an issue discussed infra in
Part VII.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida turned to the Supreme Court of Illinois to
support the proposition that "an accurate vote count is one of the essential foundations of our
democracy." Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I, 772 So. 2d at 1238. See Pullen v.
Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585,611 (111. 1990).
228. Compare Palm Beach County Canvassing BaL 1, 772 So. 2d at 1237 ("Based on
the foregoing, we conclude that the authority of the Florida Secretary of State to ignore
amended returns submitted by a County Canvassing Board may be lawfully exercised only
under limited circumstances .. "), and id at 1238 ("The court, however, erred in holding
that the Secretary acted within her discretion in prematurely rejecting any amended returns
that would be the result of ongoing manual recounts."), with Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board II v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1289 (Fla. 2001) ("We conclude that, consistent with the
Florida election scheme, the Department may not reject a Board's amended returns that are
filed on or before the day after the date that the overseas ballots are due. Such a rejection
constitutes a clear abuse of discretion, as the Elections Canvassing Commission cannot certify
the election prior to that date.") (emphasis added). It may have been in the interest of the Vice
President Gore's and Senator Lieberman's attorneys to place any possible conflict of interest
involving Secretary Harris on the record. This may have contributed to their contention that
Secretary Harris had abused her discretion by making such a claim more plausible by
providing a motive or by establishing impropriety and allowing them to argue that the Florida
cases involving fraud were more likely to be applicable. See discussion supra note 166.
229. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd , 772 So. 2d at 1239 ("The Board has
alleged the possibility that the results of the manual recount could affect the outcome of the
election if certain results obtain.") (citing Letter from Katherine Harris to Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board (Nov. 15, 2000)) (alteration in original).
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Secretary Harris claimed that she did not believe that she could accept
returns after the statutory deadline.2 The Supreme Court of Florida
rejected this interpretation, t Relying primarily upon State ex rel. Chappell
v. Martinez, the court made clear that the will of the electors supercedes any
technical statutory requirements.232
However, in failing to explicitly set forth that Secretary Harris had
abused her discretion, presumably out of respect to a coordinate branch of
government,2 3 the Supreme Court of Florida was placed in an odd position
of justifying a remedy when it had not emphatically established a wrong. As
a result, the court invoked its "equitable powers.., to fashion a remedy that
will allow a fair and expeditious resolution of the questions pre-
sented .... ,234 With this equitable power, the Supreme Court of Florida
extended the deadline to receive amended certifications until November 26,
2000, resetting the deadline to five days from the date the opinion was
issued.235
230. Id. ("However, absent an assertion that there has been substantial noncompliance
with the law, I do not believe that the possibility of affecting the outcome of the election is
enough to justify ignoring the statutory deadline.") (alteration in original).
231. Id.
232. Id.
mhe electorate's effecting its will through its balloting, not the hypertechnical compli-
ance with the statutes, is the object of holding an election. 'There is no magic in the
statutory requirements. If they are complied with to the extent that the duly responsible
election officials can ascertain that the electors whose votes are being canvassed are
qualified and registered to vote, and that they do so in a proper manner, then who can
be heard to complain the statute has not been literally and absolutely complied with?'
See Chappell, 536 So. 2d at 1008-09 (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 267 (Fla.
1976)).
233. Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978). The court held
in Askew that:
Until the provisions of Article I, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution are altered by
the people we deem the doctrine of nondelegation of legislative power to be viable in
this State. Under this doctrine fundamental and primary policy decisions shall be made
by members of the legislature who are elected to perform those tasks, and administra-
tion of legislative programs must be pursuant to some minimal standards and guide-
lines ascertainable by reference to the enactment establishing the program.
Id. See also Chiles v. Children A-F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991) (delineating two
precepts underlying the separation of powers doctrine and stating "[tihe doctrine encompasses
two fundamental prohibitions. The first is that no branch may encroach upon the powers of
another. The second is that no branch may delegate to another branch its constitutionally
assigned power." (citations omitted)).
234. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1240.
235. Id. The de facto basis for this equitable remedy became clear on remand: to
provide county canvassing boards with the time to effectuate manual recounts that they lost
40
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Time would soon demonstrate that the remedy provided by the court
would raise an opportunity for federal intervention, and footnote fifty-five of
the court's opinion was the vehicle for that intervention to occur. In the
clause leading to footnote fifty-five, the Supreme Court of Florida
determined that Secretary Harris' discretion was limited to two situations,
one of which was that returns should only be ignored if Florida voters would
236be disenfranchised from participating in federal elections. To cross-
reference the federal law substantiating this premise, the Supreme Court of
Florida created footnote fifty-five which stated, "See 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-10
(1984). ' '  In this note, the United States Supreme Court found its vehicle
when Secretary Harris abused her discretion, putting "the parties in the same position they
would have been at the time the Division issued its advisory opinion on Monday, November
13, 2000." Id. at 1290.
236. Id. at 1237.
237. In the December 12, 2000 opinion, the United States Supreme Court stated that
the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that "the Florida Legislature intended to obtain the safe-
harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5." Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000). There is no such
expression in Florida's election laws, and any attempt by the Supreme Court of Florida to read
that expression into Florida's election laws would obviously run afoul of tide 3, section 5 of
the United States Code. In addition, what the Supreme Court of Florida said in its December
11, 2000 per curiam opinion was that Florida intended to comply with title 3, sections 1-10 of
the United States Code. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. II, 772 So. 2d at 1282. The
Supreme Court of Florida made no finding concerning Florida's desire to take advantage of
the safe-harbor provision. Certainly, Florida can comply with sections 1-10 without taking
advantage of its safe-harbor provision. In addition, on remand of this opinion on December
11, 2000, at footnotes seventeen and twenty-two, the Supreme Court of Florida made no
expression or interpretation that Florida had chosen to take advantage of the safe-harbor
afforded by section 5. Id. at 1287, 1290.
On December 22, 2000, on remand of the December 12, 2000 decision in Gore III v.
Harris by the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Florida said that the Court
had mandated that "any manual recount be concluded by December 12, 2000, as provided in 3
U.S.C. §5." Gore IV v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000). The per curiam remand
opinion by the Supreme Court of Florida made no mention that Florida law required recounts
to be completed by December 12, 2000. Id. Justice Shaw, concurring with the per curiam
opinion on remand, said:
In my opinion, December 12 was not a 'drop-dead' date under... the Florida election
scheme. December 12 was simply a permissive "safe-harbor" date to which the states
could aspire. It certainly was not a mandatory contest deadline under the plain lan-
guage of the Florida Election Code (i.e., it is not mentioned there) or [in] this Court's
prior rulings. Second, regardless of the safe-harbor date, I am not convinced that
additional safeguards could have been formulated that would have satisfied the United
States Supreme Court.
Id. at 528-29 (Shaw, J, concurring). It should be further noted that Justice Shaw voted with
the 4-3 minority against Vice President Gore's and Senator Lieberman's position in the
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into the 2000 Presidential Election controversy that had already embroiled
Florida.
B. United States Supreme Court
The United States Supreme Court first granted certiorari238 on a Florida
election issue in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board on the two
questions presented in Governor Bush's brief:
1. Whether post-election judicial limitations on the discretion
granted by the legislature to state executive officials to certify elec-
tion results, and/or post-election judicially created standards for the
determination of controversies concerning the appointment of
presidential electors, violate the Due Process Clause or 3 U.S.C. §
5, which requires that a State resolve controversies relating to the
appointment of electors under the "laws enacted prior to" election
day.
2. Whether the state court's decision, which cannot be recon-
ciled with state statutes enacted before the election was held, is in-
consistent with Article II, Section 1, clause 2 of the Constitution,
which provides that electors shall be appointed by each State "in
such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct."
39
When the Court granted certiorari it requested that, in addition to the issues
presented in the petition, the parties brief what the consequences would be if
the Court found that the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida did not
comply with title 3, section 5 of the United States Code.240
original case before it went to the United States Supreme Court. Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1243, 1262 (Ha. 2000) (Shaw, J., concurring). Obviously, the only mandate for December 12,
2000 came from the United States Supreme Court, not the Florida Election Code or the
Supreme Court of Florida. Simply put, the United States Supreme Court, by mandate, read
provisions into Florida law and into title 3, section 5 of the United States Code which simply
did not exist.
238. 531 U.S. 1004(2000).
239. Pet. for a Writ of Cert. at i, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S.
70 (2000) (No. 00-836).
240. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 1004, 1005 (2000) ("In
addition, the parties are directed to brief and argue the following question: 'What would be
the consequences of this Court's finding that the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida
does not comply with 3 U.S.C. § 5?"').
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In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,4l the United States
Supreme Court unanimously vacated the Supreme Court of Florida's
decision in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board L242 The Court began its
analysis by pointing out that, traditionally, the Court defers to a state court's
interpretation of a state law.243 However, the Court found this situation
distinguishable. 2" Since the Florida Election Code establishes the method
of selection of presidential electors and not simply state officers, the Court
determined that the legislature, in enacting the Florida Election Code, was
not acting under the authority given to it by the people of Florida, but by
"virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the
United States Constitution."24 5 The clause provides that "[elach State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of
Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to
which the State may be entitled in the Congress .... "M
The Court turned to dicta in McPherson v. Blacker to support the
proposition that the power to appoint presidential electors ultimately lies
with the state legislature.247 The Court then referenced the Supreme Court of
Florida's opinion and determined that there were portions of that opinion
that could be read as "circumscrib[ing] the legislative power" delegated in
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution. The
United States Supreme Court reasoned that because portions of the Supreme
Court of Florida's opinion, based on the Florida Constitution's guarantee of
paramount right to vote, invalidated laws that placed "unreasonable or
unnecessary restraints on the right of suffrage" and required that "because
election laws are intended to facilitate the right of suffrage, such laws must
be liberally construed in favor of the citizens' right to vote," the Supreme
Court of Florida could be viewed as having subverted a power delegated by
the federal constitution to the state legislature.249
241. 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
242. Id at 78.
243. Id. at 76.
244. Id.
245. Id. (emphasis added).
246. U.S. CoNsr. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
247. Bush, 531 U.S. at 76; McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
248. Bush, 531 U.S. at 77.
249. l While the United States Supreme Court did not acknowledge that the Florida
Constitution, with the exception of amendments by initiative or an unlikely constitutional
convention, is, in some form, a legislative product, the Court's analysis suffers from more
severe and fundamental problems as well. See FLA. CONST. art. XI.
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The Court then turned to title 3, section 5 of the United States Code, the
"safe harbor" provision that requires Congress to accept a state's electoral
votes if the state has provided for a final determination of any controversy or
contest surrounding the appointment of presidential electors at least six days
before the meeting of the electors.25 0  The Court then determined that
because section 5 "would assure finality of the state's determination if
made... before the election," the legislature's desire to take advantage of
section 5's "'safe harbor' would counsel against any construction of the
Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law."2
5 1
However, because the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion was deemed by
the United States Supreme Court to have "considerable uncertainty as to the
precise grounds for the decision," the Court vacated the opinion and
remanded the case to the Supreme Court of Florida for further proceedings
not inconsistent with their opinion.
252
The United States Supreme Court's decision merits significant
criticism. By determining that Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 is a "direct
grant of authority" to the states by the federal governmentZ 3 the Court turns
federalism on its head. Central to the federal system of government is that at
the Constitutional Convention; the states delegated those powers necessary
for a functioning central government to a federal government in the United
254States Constitution. Effectively, the several states relinquished some of
255their sovereign powers to the federal government. However, those powers
250. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000), which provides in pertinent part:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the ap-
pointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or contest
concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State, by judicial or
other methods or procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least six
days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors, such determination made
pursuant to such law so existing on said day, made at least six days prior to said time of
meeting of the electors, shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as
the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such a State is concerned.
251. Bush, 531 U.S. at 78. See supra text accompanying note 236.
252. Bush, 531 U.S. at 78.
253. Id. at 76.
254. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating "the State governments
would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not,
by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States") (emphasis added).
255. See PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTIrTUON, 1787-1788, at 272 (John
Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., 1888) ('This system proposes a union between
thirteen sovereign and independent states .... "); Herbert J. Storing, The "Other" Federalist
Papers: A Preliminary Sketch, 6 POL. Sci. REv. 215, 220 (1976) (considering the historical
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that were not relinquished to the federal government were retained by the
states. 6
The United States Supreme Court's "direct grant of authority" view
contemplates that the states relinquished the power to select presidential
electors to the federal government at the Constitutional Convention and then,
in an act of charitable benevolence, the federal government donated that
power to the states. Under such logic, the federal government can "direct[ly]
grant" the authority to select electors to a specific entity of the several states,
namely the legislature. However, Article IR, Section 1, Clause 2, rather than
being a "direct grant" of authority, is a reservation of power by the states.
The text of the clause itself supports this proposition. The Constitution
establishes that "[ejach State shall appoint" presidential electors, textually
recognizing that the power to select presidential electors lies in the several
states. 7
and legal priority of the states, it is striking how widely the Federalists adopted the view of the
Union as a coming together of sovereign states).
256. See THE FEDERALIST No. 39 (James Madison) ("the proposed government cannot
be deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only,
and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects");
see also TIE FEDERALIST No. 40 (James Madison) ('T]he States, in all unenumerated cases,
are left in the enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction.").
257. A clause similar to Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution appears in the Articles of Confederation. In order to select congressional
delegates, Article V of the Articles of Confederation provides, in part, "delegates shall be
annually appointed in such manner as the legislatures of each state shall direct .... " The
framers of the constitution were certainly skeptical of a centralized government. See G.
WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AmERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-87, at 464 (1969) (noting that most
Americans had a "deeply rooted mistrust of central power"); BENjAMIN FLErCHER WRIGHT,
CONSENSUS AND CoNTINurry, 1776-87, at 55 (1958) (noting that Anti-Federalists "distrusted
the new system because it would be remote and not so immediately subject to control.").
However, when the framers created the preceding Articles of Confederation they were even
more skeptical. Indeed, the Articles of Confederation did not provide the power to regulate
interstate commerce, a power to enforce of laws of the Confederation, a Confederation
judiciary, or even the power to collect taxes. Under the Bush Court's logic, the states would
have relinquished the power to select delegates to the United States under Article V of the
Articles of Confederation, and the United States then granted that power back to the
states. From a centralized government so loosely composed as to lack the power to regulate
any commerce, to enforce laws, or even to collect taxes, it is unlikely that the states would
have relinquished any power to a centralized government that was not absolutely neces-
sary. Therefore, when the language of the Articles of Confederation was imported into the
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, it is highly unlikely that the
framers would have suddenly changed the meaning of the clause.
2001]
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Furthermore, the United States Constitution, by its text, does not
ultimately delegate the power of selecting electors with the state legisla-
tures 7. The Constitution provides that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in a
[m]anner as the [1]egislature thereof may direct," presidential electors. 2 9
Thus, the federal constitution contemplates that the manner of selecting
electors lies within the discretion of the state legislatures. If the state
legislature has such clear discretion, then it should certainly be able to
invoke other branches of state government in selecting presidential
electors. 26 Statutorily delegating the duty to interpret the will of the voter to
the state judiciary is far from an infringement on the dictates of Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2 and a subversion of legislative discretion. Indeed, by
setting forth a statutory scheme, the legislature has set forth the manner of
selecting electors.2 1
The text of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code supports this
view. Apparently, when creating section 5, Congress believed that the
federal constitution contemplates a state legislature delegating issues of
enforcement and interpretation to a coordinate branch of government.
262
Section 5 provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day
fixed for the appointment of the electors, for itsfinal determination
of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or
any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or
procedures, and such determination shall have been... made at
least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors, shall be
conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes
as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far
as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by such a State is
concerned. 3
258. However, the state legislature can certainly determine that the manner of selection
is by legislative vote. Indeed, state legislatures used legislative selection as the manner of
selection for quite some time. However, such an action granted the power of selection of
presidential electors to the state legislature by the state legislature itself.
259. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
260. Vikran Amar & Alan Brownstein, Bush v. Gore and Article 1lh Pressured
Judgment Makes Dubious Law, FED. LAWYER 27, 31 (Mar./Apr. 2001).
261. See FLA. STAT. § 97.106 (2000).
262. The text of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code specifically refers to
"judicial or other methods or procedures" for methods of determination.
263. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000) (emphasis added).
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The text of section 5 makes clear that Congress recognized that the
appointment of electors could result in a "controversy or contest.
'
"
Further, Congress recognized that the "final determination of any contro-
versy or contest" could be made "by judicial or other methods or proce-
dures" that are set in place by the state legislature "by laws enacted prior to
the day fixed for the appointment of electors."265 A judicial determination of
a controversy or contest would have never occurred unless Congress
believed that the state legislature could delegate determinations of
controversies to other state governmental branches or entities.
Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court ignored central
principles of state constitutional law. Under the Court's "direct grant of
authority" view of Article RI, state legislatures are granted plenary power to
choose the manner to select electors and, according to the Court's reasoning,
to select electors themselves. However, unlike the federal government,
the several states are independent sovereigns with all the inherent powers of
common law sovereignty, absent those relinquished to the federal govern-
ment. 67 State constitutions are limitations on the inherent sovereign power
of states created by the people of that state.268
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 as a reservation of power by the states,
rather than a "direct grant of authority," allows for limitations on the state by
the people of Florida via the Florida Constitution. Those limitations operate
when the Florida Legislature selects the manner to appoint elec-
tors. Therefore, if a law of the Florida Legislature operates in a manner that
violates one of the paramount rights of the people of the State of Florida,
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70,76 (2000).
267. TRE FEDERALIST No. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) ("the State governments would
clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not, by that
act, exclusively delegated to the United States"); see also Raoul Berger, The Founder's
Views-According to Jefferson Powell, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1033, 1037 (1989) ("each of [the
States] was a sovereign and independent state, that is, that each of them had a right to govern
itself by its own authority, and its own laws, without any control from any other power upon
earth"); PENNSYLvANiA AND THE FEDERAL CONSTTUTION, supra note 255, at 218-19 (James
Wilson characterized the United States as "composed of 13 distinct and independent States,"
and the purpose of the Federal Convention was to frame a government for "thirteen
independent and sovereign States."); id at 265 (preserving the state governments was the
"favorite object" of the Framers).
268. See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 169, 178 (1983) (state constitutions are limits on plenary governmental power rather
than grants of power); see also John Choon Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42
EMORY L.J. 967 (1993) (state governments exercise general plenary power).
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then the legislature is subverting the sovereign limitations set forth by the
people of Florida. At least one commentator has gone so far as to state that
when a state legislature exceeds its constitutional authority, the legislature is
no longer acting as a legislature.2 9 Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 does not
bestow a power upon state legislatures that did not exist before the creation
of the federal constitution. Rather, it sets forth an expression of a power
reserved by the states at the Constitutional Convention. Therefore, when
selecting the manner to appoint presidential electors, state legislatures are
still bound by state constitutional restrictions. Essentially, the federal
constitution "takes state legislative bodies as it finds them--subject to pre-
existing control by the people of each state, the ultimate masters of the state
legislatures-and the state constitutional limits that those people cre-
ate.' 270 As a result, the United States Supreme Court's expression that the
Florida Constitution may have "'circumscribe[d] the legislative power'
provided by Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 rests on the faulty premise that
this clause gives the Florida Legislature power that the people of Florida had
not granted it.
27
'
The only source that the United States Supreme Court used to support
the "direct grant of authority" view was McPherson v. Blacker.272 Specifi-cally, the Court quoted a particular portion of McPherson which states:
[Art. II, § 1, cl. 2] does not read that the people or the citizens shall
appoint, but that 'each State shall'; and if the words 'in such man-
ner as the legislature thereof may direct,' had been omitted, it
would seem that the legislative power of appointment could not
have been successfully questioned in the absence of any provision
in the state constitution in that regard. Hence the insertion of those
words, while operating as a limitation upon the State in respect of
any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power, cannot be held to
operate as a limitation on that power itself."73
269. Amar & Brownstein, supra note 260, at 31.
270. Id.
271. Bush, 531 U.S. at 77.
272. Id. at 76. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
273. Bush, 531 U.S. at 76 (alterations in original) (quoting McPherson, 146 U.S. at
25). Quite subtly, the United States Supreme Court qualified the quotation by stating that the
issue presented in McPherson was not "the same question petitioner raises here." Id. This
subtlety does not avoid the obvious conclusion that the Court either did not understand or
chose to avoid long standing understanding of the reservation to the states contained in Clause
2 as well as the nature and direction of the Florida Constitution.
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Based upon the McPherson quotation, the Court determined that portions of
the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board I "may be read to indicate that [the Supreme Court of Florida]
construed the Florida Election Code without regard to the extent to which
the Florida Constitution could, consistent with Art. I, § 1, cl. 2, 'circum-
scribe the legislative power."' 274 Essentially, the United States Supreme
Court determined that the Supreme Court of Florida did not consider
whether Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 limited the Supreme Court of
Florida's interpretation of the Florida Constitution by improperly usurping
the power of the legislature.
However, more than one-hundred years ago in McPherson, the United
States Supreme Court considered whether the State of Michigan could,
consistent with Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, select electors by allowing
each congressional district to popularly vote for one elector.275  The
remaining two electors would be selected by the popular vote of a compila-
tion of the congressional districts into an "Eastern Electoral District" and a
'Western Electoral District."276 Presidential elector nominees challenged the
system of elector selection as violating Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the
United States Constitution.277 The United States Supreme Court held that
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 did not limit the discretion of the Michigan
Legislature from selecting the district selection of presidential electors.278
In order to come to this holding, the McPherson court responded to the
prospective electors' argument that Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 mandated
that presidential electors be selected by the state as a unit.279 The Court
rejected this argument, determining that the clause did not function as a
limitation of the inherent powers of the state.20 Absent the clause, the state
legislature would still have the power to determine the manner of selection
because the legislature, was limited by the state constitution, as the direct
representative of the people.28 Rather, Article II, Section 1, Clause 2
confirms that the state has the inherent authority to select presidential
electors, and the legislature may determine the manner in which the state
274. Id. at 77.
275. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 2-6.
276. Id. at 5-6.
277. Id. at 2-3.
278. Id. at 36. The McPherson court also determined that the method of selection of
presidential electors did not violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution. Id at 37.
279. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 24-25.
280. Id. at 25-28.
281. Id. at25-26.
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selects its electors. When read in full, McPherson recognizes the legisla-
ture's inherent authority to determine the manner of selection, and the state's
ability to limit the inherent authority in the state constitution when it states
the following:
"A State in the ordinary sense of the constitution," said Chief
Justice Chase .... "is a political community of free citizens, occu-
pying a territory of defined boundaries, and organized under a gov-
ernment sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and estab-
lished by the consent of the governed." The State does not act by
its people in their collective capacity, but through such political
agencies as are duly constituted and established. The legislative
power is the supreme authority except as limited by the constitution
of the State, and the sovereignty of the people is exercised through
their representatives in the legislature unless by the fundamental
law power is elsewhere reposed. The Constitution of the United
States frequently refers to the State as a political community, and
also in terms to the people of the several States and the citizens of
each State. What is forbidden or required to be done by a State is
forbidden or required of the legislative power under state constitu-
tions as they exist. The clause under consideration [Article II, Sec-
tion 1, clause 2] does not read that the people or the citizens shall
appoint, but that "each State shall"; and if the words "in such man-
ner as the legislature thereof may direct," had been omitted, it
would seem that the legislative power of appointment could not
have been successfully questioned in the absence of any provision
in the state constitution in that regard. Hence the insertion of those
words, while operating as a limitation upon the State in respect of
any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power, cannot be held to
operate as a limitation on that power itself.
282
The McPherson court recognized that a state legislature's inherent
authority, as limited by the state constitution, would include the power to213
select the manner for the state to select presidential electors. While
McPherson supports the proposition that Article II, Section 1, Clause 2
functions to limit the state from circumscribing the legislature's power to
determine the manner of selecting electors, McPherson is also clear that
282. Id. at 25 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
283. Id.
50
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss3/1
Berger and Tobin
when the legislature determines the manner of selection, the legislature must
comport with the state constitution.2m In the Florida election cases, the
Florida Constitution restricts the government by requiring that all political
power remains inherent in the people and that Florida citizens retain the right
of suffrage.2
5
Even under a broader view, the United States Supreme Court's decision
merits criticism. The Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board I established that the right to vote and to have that
vote counted were paramount rights.28 6 The United States Supreme Court,
however, vacated the decision, not just because the right to vote is not
necessarily a federal right, but the right of the people to vote may conflict
with the federal constitution. Although the federal constitution does not
guarantee the right of the people of a state to vote for presidential electors, it
is difficult to conceive that by constitutionally guaranteeing its citizens the
right to popularly vote for presidential electors, a state constitution directly
conflicts with the federal constitution.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board sent a clear and unequivocal message to the
Supreme Court of Florida on remand: do not do anything that could
arguably be a change in the law.ng In so doing, the Court guaranteed that the
Supreme Court of Florida would not be able to clarify the "intent of the
voter" standard or resort to equity to resolve any of the issues that the parties
set forth, including establishing a remedy. However, the basis for this
message is questionable.
The reason that the Supreme Court of Florida could not "change the
law" was that the United States Supreme Court determined that the Florida
Legislature wished to take advantage of the "safe harbor" provision, title 3,
section 5 of the United States Code.229 The provision functions as a "safe
284. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 25.
285. Even if the United States Supreme Court's reading of McPherson were proper,
there has been a question of whether that proposition of McPherson has been superceded by
more recent cases. See Amar & Brownstein, supra note 260, at 33. Specifically, Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968), has been viewed by some commentators as a demonstration that
there is a constitutional "trend" that popular voting for presidential electors is preferred. Id.
286. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1227-28 (Fla.
2000).
287. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70,78 (2000).
288. Id. at 77-78.
289. Id.
Since [3 U.S.C.] § 5 contains a principle of federal law that would assure finality of the
State's determination if made pursuant to a state law in effect before the election, a
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harbor" because if the conditions of section 5 are satisfied, then Congress
must accept the state's presidential elector votes. 290 Therefore, unless the
conditions can be satisfied in the time specified in section 5, the "safe
harbor" established by the section cannot be used irrespective of any
legislative wish to do so.
However, the conditions set forth by section 5 are not just that the state
has provided for appointment of electors by laws enacted prior to election
day. Section 5 also requires that to fit within the safe harbor, if the state has
provided a method to resolve controversies or contests concerning the
appointment of electors, then a final determination must be made six days
prior to the meeting of the electors.29 1  The United States Supreme Court
implies that the legislative wish to take advantage of the safe harbor
commands that all final determinations be made by six days before the
appointment of electors.292 However, the basis of section 5 is that if a state
meets the conditions, including having reached a final determination for any
controversies or contests, then Congress must accept its votes. The basis of
section 5 is not that if a legislature wants the protection that the state's
judicial determinations must meet a new date. Effectively, the Court reads
the conditions as results and the results as conditions, reversing the if-then
nature of section 5.
Furthermore, as an if-then statement, section 5 does not, alone, prevent
the laws of an election from being changed after election day. Although
changing the laws of an election after election day could present due process293
concerns, a plain reading of section 5, in the context of our system of
legislative wish to take advantage of the 'safe harbor' would counsel against any
construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law."
Id. at 78.
290. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
291. Id.
292. Bush, 531 U.S. at 77. There is a clear question of whether the legislature is to
"opt-in" to the safe harbor provision or "opt-out." While the Supreme Court of Florida
implies that the Florida Legislature did not explicitly opt-in to the safe harbor, Palm Beach
County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1237, the United States Supreme Court implied that
by not opting out of the safe harbor provision the Florida Legislature has taken advantage of
the safe harbor. Bush, 531 U.S. at 78 (referring only to the Supreme Court of Florida's
statement that the legislature intended to "participat[e] fully in the federal election process" as
the basis for invoking title 3, section 5 of the United States Code, implying that it is an "opt-
out" provision). On remand from the contest, the Supreme Court of Florida again established
that there is no "legislative wish" to take advantage of the safe harbor of section 5. Gore IV v.
Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 529 (Fla. 2000) (Shaw, J., concurring).
293. Note that Vice President Gore was entitled to a recount in Miami-Dade County
that was never completed. The Third District Court of Appeal found "[t]he results of th[e]
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government, simply establishes that one of the conditions necessary to take
advantage of the "safe harbor" provision is that the laws for the appointment
of electors be enacted prior to election day. If this condition is not fulfilled,
it does not mean the electors are somehow invalid or illegal, but that they
can be subjected to congressional scrutiny.
C. Back to the Supreme Court of Florida
With the United States Supreme Court's opinion, the Supreme Court of
Florida reconsidered Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I v. Harris. The
court reinstated the disposition it came to in that case, but the court also
considered the federal constitutional and statutory provisions that the United
States Supreme Court directed. 294 The court began its analysis considering
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution and
McPherson.295 Following the "direct grant of authority" mandate of the
United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Florida looked to
another portion of the McPherson opinion that established that the state
legislature may retain the selection of electors itself, delegate the selection of
electors to another governmental entity, or "'provide that [presidential
electors] shall be elected by the people of the State at large."'296  The
manner of selection in Florida, as it has been since at least 1847, is popular
election by the citizens of Florida.297 Furthermore, in consideration of title
sample recount showed 'an error in the vote tabulation which could effect the outcome of the
election' thus triggering the Canvassing Board's mandatory obligation to recount all of the
ballots in the county." Miami-Dade County Democratic Party v. Miami-Dade County
Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (citation omitted). This
finding was later cited as a reason for reversing the trial court by the Supreme Court of Florida
on December 8, 2000. Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1258 (Fla. 2000).
294. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. H v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000).
295. Id at 1281-82.
296. Id. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 34-35 (stating presidential electors "may be
chosen by the legislature, or the legislature may provide that they shall be elected by the
people of the State at large... and it is, no doubt, competent for the legislature to authorize
the governor, or the Supreme Court of the State, or any other agent of its will, to appoint these
electors." (emphasis added)).
297. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. II, 772 So. 2d at 1282.
In this State, at least since 1847, the right to elect the President of the United States has
been firmly vested in the citizens of this State by the Legislature. As section 103.011
of the Florida Statutes (2000), provides: "Electors of President and Vice President,
known as presidential electors, shall be elected on the first Tuesday after the first
Monday in November of each year the number of which is a multiple of 4."
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3, section 5 of the United States Code, the Supreme Court of Florida
determined that "[c]onsistent with... federal law and... state law" the
legislature enacted the Florida Election Code to regulate all elections in the
state of Florida.298
Although the disposition of the Supreme Court of Florida remained the
same, the United States Supreme Court's opinion had some effects on the
court's analysis. The Supreme Court of Florida established that the Division
of Elections could only properly exercise its discretion to ignore amended
returns if failing to do so would preclude a contest pursuant to section
102.168 of the Florida Statutes, or if such action would preclude Florida
voters from participating in the federal election process, as provided in title
3, section 5 of the United States Code.299
When applying the law to the case before it, the Supreme Court of
Florida also unequivocally stated that the Division of Elections had abused
its discretion by rejecting amended returns prior to the date overseas ballots
were due.3° In Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I, presumably out of
respect to a coordinate branch of government, the Supreme Court of Florida
298. Id. The court stated:
Consistent with the above provisions of federal law and with longstanding principles of
state law, the Florida Legislature in 1951 enacted the Florida Election Code, contained
in chapters 97-106, Florida Statutes (2000), which sets forth uniform criteria regulating
elections in this state and which provides methods and procedures, including judicial
methods and procedures, for the final determination of any controversy or contest
concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors in this state.
Id.
299. Id. at 1289. Unlike Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I, in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board II the Supreme Court of Florida referred to the Division of
Elections as the entity that abused its discretion, not the Secretary of State. Although only the
court may be able to address the basis for this change, with all of the media and political
pressure that had been placed on Florida Secretary of State Harris, it is possible that the court
was attempting to provide respect to coordinate governmental entities by focusing on the
Division as a whole, rather than specifically on Secretary Harris. Alternatively, with all the
political pressure that had come to rest upon the court, the court may have focused on the
Division to avoid making the court's decision look anything less than professional and
judicious. See Martin Merzer & Lesley Clark, Supreme Court of Florida Allows Recounts to
Proceed, MIAMI HERALD, November 22, 2000 (stating that former Secretary of State and close
aide to Bush, James Baker, claimed that the Supreme Court of Florida changed the rules and
invented a new system for counting the election results.); cf. Joe Follick, Keep Counting,
TAMPA TRIBUNE, Nov. 22, 2000, Nation/World, at 1; Linda Kleindienst et al., Courts Allow
Recounts to Go on, SUN-SENTINAL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 22, 2000, at IA; Jennifer Sergent &
Michael Peltier, Court Unanimous: Hand Tallies Must Count, STUART NEws (Fla.), Nov. 22,
2000 at Al; Counting the Vote: Update, N.Y. TiES, Nov. 22, 2000, at A24.
300. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. II, 772 So. 2d at 1289.
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stopped short of claiming that the Florida Secretary of State had abused her
discretion. In Palm Beach County Canvassing Board II, when it was clear
that the Supreme Court of Florida was not the final arbiter of the Florida
election, the Supreme Court of Florida had to sacrifice civility for fidelity.' °
The court also clarified the reason that the Division abused its discretion. It
began with a faulty premise that "error in vote tabulation" did not include a
discrepancy based on the manner in which the ballot is marked or punched,
making the Division's exercise of discretion outside the confines of the
law.3
02
Finally, when establishing a remedy, the Supreme Court of Florida
explained its basis for resorting to equity in Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board L303  However, the court made no mention that it was relying on
equity as the basis for its remedy in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board
//.304 Instead, the court explained that the Division of Election's initial
decision was an attempt to place the county canvassing boards at issue in the
same position that they would have been in but for the Division's advisory
opinion of November 13, 2000.30s Accordingly, the court explained that the
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I remedy was "not a new 'deadline,"'
306with no prospective application. The court established that the date setallowed for all the requirements of the Florida Election Code to be
301. Id.
We conclude that, consistent with the Florida election scheme, the Department may not
reject a Board's amended returns that are filed on or before the day after the date that
the overseas ballots are due. Such a rejection constitutes a clear abuse of discretion,
as the Elections Canvassing Commission cannot certify the election prior to that date.
Id. (emphasis added). With this blatant statement of an "abuse of discretion," the Supreme
Court of Florida avoiding directly attacking Secretary Harris by attributing the abuse to the
Elections Canvassing Commission. Id. Yet, the Elections Canvassing Commission, unlike
Secretary Harris, was not a party in the case.
302. Id at 1290.
[Un this case, the Department applied its discretion in accord with a faulty premise:
that an "error in vote tabulation" does not include a situation where a discrepancy
between the original machine return and sample recount is due to the manner in which
a ballot has been marked or punched. Accordingly, the Department did not exercise its
discretion within the confines of the law.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd II, 772 So. 2d at 1290 (citations omitted).
303. Id.
304. Id. at 1291-92.
305. Id. at 1290 ("In this Court's original opinion, we granted a remedy which, in
effect, put the parties in the same position they would have been at the time the Division
issued its advisory opinion on Monday, November 13, 2000.").
306. Id. at 1290.
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construed consistently, allowing both for an election contest under section
102.168 of the Florida Statutes and for Florida to meet the federal deadline
set in title 3, section 5 of the United States Code.3 °7
In a strong conclusion, the Supreme Court of Florida reiterated that it
was not creating "new law," but was determining issues of statutory
construction of election laws in accord with legislative intent.38 Significant
among the policy considerations made by the Florida Legislature, the court
expressed that it identified the rights of suffrage and the election being
determined by the will of Florida voters.30 9 The Florida Legislature, the
court explained, vested the power of selection of presidential electors in the
hands of Florida voters, and in so doing, placed that election within the
bounds of the Florida Election Code.3'o Thus, the court is limited to
construing the Florida Election Code.31 With the novelty of the nature of
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board II, the court explained that it is
required to examine disputes involving state and local elections.312
Irrespective, the court explained that there is no basis in the Florida
Election Code for the court to apply the code "one way for presidential
elector elections and another way for all other elections. 31 3 Rather, the
Florida Legislature has established that the code should apply equally to all
elections. However, based on the "clear legislative policy" of elector
suffrage and having those votes count, the court construed the statutory
timetable as "directory. 31 5 Finally, in order to attempt to avoid any further
federal intervention in construing the Florida Election Code, the Supreme
Court of Florida, "as the ultimate arbiter of conflicting Florida law,"
concluded that its "construction of the [Election Code] results in the
307. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bda 11, 772 So. 2d at 1289.
308. Id. at 1291.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Such a conclusion lies in diametric opposition to the principles espoused in
McPherson. See cases cited supra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
312. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 11, 772 So. 2d at 1291 ("[T]he parties have
provided us no citations to court cases in Florida involving disputes over presidential electors
under Florida's election laws. This case may be the first.").
313. Id.
314. Id.
315. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida also set forth that it had an "unbroken line of
cases" supporting these principles. See id. Further, the legislature, in its most recent
amendments to the Florida Election Code "have been crafted not only to be consistent with
these policies, but also to ensure adherence to them." Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd If,
772 So. 2d at 1291.
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formation of no new rules of state law."3"' Instead, the court concluded that
its determination is "simply a narrow reading and clarification of those
statutes, which were enacted long before the [2000 Presidential E]lection
took place.' 317 Instead, the court established that if the Code needs to be
revised, that lies in the discretion of the proper governmental branch, the
Florida Legislature. 18
The most practical effect of the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board II was that, rather than taking the
more virtuous road that it had taken in Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board I, the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board forced the Supreme Court of Florida to look
political.319 The United States Supreme Court made clear that the Supreme
Court of Florida had to avoid all possible ambiguities so that the Court could
determine whether the Supreme Court of Florida was relying on federal
law. However, the practical effect of that consideration was that, while the
Supreme Court of Florida could be somewhat more tactful in its overruling
of Secretary Harris's decisions in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I,
the court was forced to directly state that the decision was a "clear abuse of
discretion" in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board 11.320 Although the
Supreme Court of Florida attempted to avoid the political ramifications of
this action by attributing the decision to the Division of Elections rather than
Secretary Harris in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board II, the political
effect was unavoidable.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1292. Chief Justice Wells dissented to the court's issuance of an opinion in
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board II because the United States Supreme Court was
considering Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000), an appeal of the Supreme Court of
Florida's determination of the election contest pursuant to section 102.168 of the Florida
Statutes. Id. at 1292 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). See discussion infra Part IX.
319. The ad hominem attacks of Republicans certainly predisposed the nation and
contributed to that perception. See, e.g., Frank Bruni, Counting the Vote, The Reaction: Bush
Camp, Outraged, Vows to Seek Recourse to Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2000, at Al.
Angered by the court's ruling that Florida law permits hand recounts, Governor George W.
Bush accused the Supreme Court of Florida of overreaching. Bush accused the court of using
"the bench to change Florida's election laws and usurp the authority of Florida's election
officials... writing laws is the duty of the legislature; administering laws is the duty of the
executive branch." Id.
320. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. II, 772 So. 2d at 1289. However, the court still
attempted to avoid being perceived as political by directing the "abuse of discretion." Id.
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V. THE BUTrERFLY BALLOT ISSUE
For counties that used machine ballots in the 2000 election, Florida law
stated that machine ballots "shall as nearly as practicable conform to the
requirements of the form of the paper ballot for that election. ' '321 The statute
321. FLA. STAT. § 101.27 (2000). The statute provided:
(1) All ballots for voting machines shall be printed on strips of white cardboard,
paper, or other material of such size as will fill the ballot frames of the machine, in
plain black type as large as the space will permit, so as to show the name of the candi-
date, statement of the proposed constitutional amendment, or other question or proposi-
tion submitted to the electorate at any election.
(2) The captions on the ballots for voting machines shall be placed so as to
indicate to the elector what push knob, key, lever, or other device is used or operated in
order to cast his or her vote for or against a candidate, proposed constitutional amend-
ment, or other question or proposition submitted to the electorate at any election.
(3) The order in which the voting machine ballot is arranged shall as nearly as
practicable conform to the requirements of the form of the paper ballot for that elec-
tion. The names of the unopposed candidates shall not appear on the general election
ballot; each unopposed candidate shall be deemed to have voted for himself or her-
self. If two or more write-in candidates are seeking election for one office, only one
blank space shall be provided.
(4) If the official ballot is longer than the voting machine can accommodate,
paper ballots may be used in conjunction with a voting machine, in which case the
order of the offices on the voting machine ballot shall be the same as prescribed in ss.
101.141(4) and 101.151(3). Where the machine ballot is filled in this order, there shall
be a continuation of the ballot in the same order on paper ballots, except that no state
or federal opposed officer shall be placed upon a paper ballot. In any primary election,
if the official ballot is longer than the voting machine can accommodate, paper ballots
may be used in conjunction with a voting machine, in which case the order of the
offices on the voting machine ballot shall be the same as prescribed in s. 101.141(4),
except that no portion of a category of candidates as established in s. 101.141(4) shall
be divided between the voting machine ballot and the paper ballot. In the event a
category of candidates must be removed from the voting machine ballot because of the
foregoing provision, the supervisor of elections in such county may complete the
balance of the voting machine ballot with some whole portion of another category of
candidates out of its proper sequence, except that no state or federal office shall be
placed upon a paper ballot.
(5) In all primary elections, supervisors of elections may print voting machine
ballots in shaded colors to group and identify the number of candidates in any or all
races. Colors shall be light or pastel with candidates' names overprinted in plain black
type. In no case shall any particular color or pattern of colors be used to identify any
political party in the general election.
(6) Should the above directions for the complete preparation of the ballot be
insufficient, the Department of State shall determine and prescribe any additional
matter or form in which the ballot may be printed.
[Vol. 26:647
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entitled "[sipecifications for general election ballot" provided, in pertinent
part, "[tjo vote for a candidate whose name is printed on the ballot, place a
cross (X) mark in the blank space at the right of the name of the candidate
for whom you desire to vote." 322  The statute then went on to lay out the
form of the ballot, dependent on an order determined by which political
party received the highest vote total for Florida Governor in the last general
election, followed by the party receiving the next highest vote total.3?3 The
322. § 101.151(3)(a).
323. § 101.15 1. The statute provided:
In counties in which voting machines are not used, and in other counties for use as
absentee ballots not designed for tabulation by an electronic or electromechanical
voting system, the general election ballot shall conform to the following specifications:
(1) The ballot shall be printed on paper of such thickness that the printing
cannot be distinguished from the back.
(2) Across the top of the ballot shall be printed "Official Ballot, General Elec-
tion," beneath which shall be printed the county, the precinct number, and the date of
the election. The precinct number, however, shall not be required for absentee ballots.
Above the caption of the ballot shall be two stubs with a perforated line between the
stubs and between the lower stub and the top of the ballot. The top stub shall be stub
No. I and shall have printed thereon, "General Election, Official Ballot," and then shall
appear the name of the county, the precinct number, and the date of the election. On
the left side shall be a blank line under which shall be printed "Signature of Voter." On
the right side shall be "Initials of Issuing Official," above which there shall be a blank
line. The second stub shall be the same, except there shall not be a space for signature
of the elector. Both stubs No. I and No. 2 on ballots for each precinct shall be pre-
numbered consecutively, beginning with "No. 1." However, a second stub shall not be
required for absentee ballots.
(3)(a) Beneath the caption and preceding the names of candidates shall be the
following words: "To vote for a candidate whose name is printed on the ballot, place a
cross (X) mark in the blank space at the right of the name of the candidate for whom
you desire to vote. To vote for a write-in candidate, write the name of the candidate in
the blank space provided for that purpose." The ballot shall have headings under
which shall appear the names of the offices and names of duly nominated candidates
for the respective offices in the following order: the heading "Electors for President
and Vice President" and thereunder the names of the candidates for President and
Vice President of the United States nominated by the political party which received
the highest vote for Governor in the last general election of the Governor in this state,
above which shall appear the name of said party. Then shall appear the names of
other candidates for President and Vice President of the United States who have been
properly nominated. Votes cast for write-in candidates for President and Vice Presi-
dent shall be counted as votes cast for the presidential electors supporting such
candidates. Then shall follow the heading "Congressional" and thereunder the offices
of United States Senator and Representative in Congress; then the heading "State" and
thereunder the offices of Governor and Ueutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Attor-
ney General, Comptroller, Treasurer, Commissioner of Education, Commissioner of
Agriculture, state attorney, and public defender, together with the names of the candi-
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Florida Legislature included a sample ballot in the statute.324 These statutes
dates for each office and the title of the office which they seek; then the heading
"Legislative" and thereunder the offices of state senator and state representative; then
the heading "County" and thereunder clerk of the circuit court, clerk of the county
court (when authorized by law), sheriff, property appraiser, tax collector, district
superintendent of schools, and supervisor of elections. Thereafter follows: members of
the board of county commissioners, and such other county offices as are involved in
the general election, in the order fixed by the Department of State. When a write-in
candidate has qualified for any office, a subheading "Write-in Candidate for... (name
of office).. ." shall be provided followed by a blank space in which to write the name
of the candidate. With respect to write-in candidates, if two or more candidates are
seeking election to one office, only one blank space shall be provided.
(b) Immediately following the name of each office on the ballot shall be printed,
"Vote for One." When more than one candidate is nominated for office, the candidates
for such office shall qualify and run in a group or district, and the group or district
number shall be printed beneath the name of the office. The name of the office shall be
printed over each numbered group or district and each numbered group or district shall
be clearly separated from the next numbered group or district, the same as in the case
of single offices. Following the group or district number shall be printed the words,
"Vote for One," and the names of the candidates in the respective groups or districts
shall be arranged thereunder.
4) The names of the candidates of the party which received the highest number
of votes for Governor in the last election in which a Governor was elected shall be
placed first under the heading for each office, together with an appropriate abbreviation
of party name; the names of the candidates of the party which received the second
highest vote for Governor shall be second under the heading for each office, together
with an appropriate abbreviation of the party name.
(5) Minor political party candidates and candidates with no party affiliation
shall have their names appear on the general election ballot following the names of
recognized political parties, in the same order as they were certified.
(6) Except for justices or judges seeking retention, the names of unopposed
candidates shall not appear on the general election ballot. Each unopposed candidate
shall be deemed to have voted for himself or herself.
(7) The same requirement as to the type, size, and kind of printing of official
ballots in primary elections as provided in s. 101.141(5) shall govern the printing of
official ballots in general elections.
(8) Should the above directions for complete preparation of the ballot be insuffi-
cient, the Department of State shall determine and prescribe any additional matter or
form. Not less than 60 days prior to a general election, the Department of State shall
mail to each supervisor of elections the format of the ballot to be used for the general
election.
(9) The provisions of s. 101.141(7) shall be applicable in printing of said ballot.
FLA. STAT. 101.151 (2000) (emphasis added).
324. Section 101.191 of the Florida Statutes is entitled "[florm of general election
ballot." In pertinent part, the statute provided:
(1) The general election ballot shall be in substantially the following form:
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OFFICIAL BALLOT GENERAL ELECTION
No. - COUNTY, FLORIDA
Precinct No.
(Date)
(Signature of Voter) (Initials of Issuing Official)
Stub No. I
OFFICIAL BALLOT GENERAL ELECTION
No. COUNTY, FLORIDA
Precinct No.
(Date)
(Initials of Issuing Official)
Stub No. 2
OFFICIAL BALLOT GENERAL ELECTION
- COUNTY, FLORIDA
Precinct No.
(Date)
TO VOTE for a candidate whose name is printed on the ballot, mark a cross (X) in the blank space
at the RIGHT of the name of the candidate for whom you desire to vote. To vote for a candidate whose
name is not printed on the ballot, write the candidate's name in the blank space provided for that purpose.
ELECTORS
For President
and
Vice President
(A vote for the candidates will actually be a vote for their electors) Vote for group
DEMOCRATIC
(Name of Candidate)
For President
(Name of Candidate)
For Vice President
REPUBLICAN
(Name of Candidate)
For President
(Name of Candidate)
For Vice President
(NAME OF MINOR PARTY)
(Name of Candidate)
For President
(Name of Candidate)
For Vice President
NO PARTY AFFILIATION
(Name of Candidate)
For President
(Name of Candidate)
For Vice President
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were part of a statutory framework designed to prevent voter confusion and
to facilitate voters in making their choices.
The Democratic Party received the second highest vote total in
Florida's 1998 gubernatorial election, and, accordingly, the Democratic
ticket of Vice President Gore and Senator Lieberman appeared second on the
ballot under the office of President and Vice President of the United States.
The second hole punch from the top and to the right of the names of Gore
and Lieberman was designated for Mr. Pat Buchanan and Ms. Ezola Foster
of the Reform Party and appeared to the left of Buchanan's and Foster's
names. For the office of President and Vice President, the Palm Beach
County "butterfly ballot" required voters to make their selections by
punching holes at the right of some candidates' names and at the left of other
candidates' names. In the case of Gore-Lieberman, the Buchanan-Foster
hole punch was to the right of their names.
Whether this ballot was in substantial compliance with the election laws
was the issue decided in Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,
326
the Palm Beach County butterfly ballot case. In Fladell, the Supreme Court
of Florida determined the effect of the noncompliant butterfly ballot, during
the protest phase of the presidential election.327 The complaint asked for
WRITE-IN
For President
For Vice President
FLA. STAT. § 101.191 (2000).
325. See, e.g., § 101.161 (requiring amendments to be printed in clear and
unambiguous language); § 101.051 (allowing electors to seek assistance in casting ballots);
§ 101.131(1) (requiring the Department of State to print, in large type on cards, instructions
for the electors to use in voting and display the cards in the polling places as information for
electors); § 101.131(2) (requiring two election officers to provide further instructions
concerning the manner of voting when requested by an elector).
326. 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2000).
327. Id at 1241-42. The protest phase of the election ended on November 26,
2000. The contest phase of the election could not occur until the election had been certified
under Florida law. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(2) (2000). Logically, the contest phase must follow
certification of the election results because one of the grounds for filing a contest is "[p]roof
that any elector, election official, or canvassing board member was given or offered a bribe or
reward in money, property, or any other thing of value for the purpose of procuring the
successful candidate's nomination or election or determining the result on any question
submitted by referendum." § 102.168(3)(d) (emphasis added). Moreover, the statute required
that "It]he canvassing board or Election Canvassing Commission shall be the proper party
defendant, and the successful candidate shall be an indispensable party to any action brought
to contest the election or nomination of a candidate." § 102.168(4) (emphasis added). Thus, a
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declaratory relief 328 However, it was not clear from the face of the
complaint as to whether relief was being sought under sections 102.166 or
102.168 of the Florida Statutes, since neither statute was specifically
mentioned in the complaint.329 Further, it was not clear whether relief was
being sought pursuant to the analysis and holding of Beckstrom v. Volusia
County Canvassing Board.330
The trial court in Palm Beach County treated the complaint as a
complaint for declaratory relief under section 102.168 of the Florida
Statutes.33' In the order filed November 20, 2000, the court cited Beckstrom
for a court's authority to void a state election pursuant to section 102.168.
Beckstrom provides that
[i]f a court finds substantial non-compliance with statutory
election procedures and also makes a factual determination
that reasonable doubt exists as to whether a certified election
expressed the will of the voters, then the court in an election
contest brought pursuant to section 102.168, Florida Statutes
(1997), is to void the contested election even in the absence
of fraud or intentional wrongdoing.
332
The trial court never reached the issue framed by Beckstrom because it
bifurcated the proceedings to determine first whether a revote or new
election was permitted by law.333 Accordingly, the trial court failed to
contest phase could not occur until the election has been certified because otherwise, the
successful candidate, an indispensable party to the contest action, would not be determined
until the election has been certified. Not only did Vice President Gore contest the certification
of Governor Bush as the winner of Florida's electoral votes, Vice President Gore also
challenged the certifications of the canvassing boards in Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and
Nassau Counties. Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247-48 (Fla. 2000).
328. Fladell, 772 So. 2d at 1240-41.
329. Id
330. 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998). In Beckstrom, the court held:
In sum, we hold that even in a situation in which a trial court finds substantial non-
compliance caused by unintentional wrongdoing as we have defined it, the court is to
void the election only if it finds that the substantial noncompliance resulted in doubt as
to whether a certified election reflected the will of the voters.
Id. at 725.
331. See generally Fladell v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp.
36 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 2000).
332. Id. at 37.
333. Id. at 36.
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conduct an evidentiary hearing on the question of whether the butterfly
ballot was substantially noncompliant, causing reasonable doubt concerning
whether the election (still uncertified at this point) expressed the will of the
voters.334 The trial court proceeded to rule that a revote was not permissible
in a presidential election.
The Supreme Court of Florida ruled this holding a nullity.336 Rather
than dismiss the Fladell case as being premature for a contest under section
102.168, because no election had been certified, the court concluded "as a
matter of law that the Palm Beach County [butterfly] ballot does not
constitute substantial noncompliance with the statutory requirements
mandating the voiding of the election. 3 37 The court decided this without the
benefit of any findings by the trial court below. This holding was unusual
considering the mandatory venue for a contest for statewide office was in
Leon County, Florida, not Palm Beach County.338 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court of Florida had additional grounds for not hearing the case in the first
instance. The Supreme Court of Florida chose to take Fladell and rule upon
it despite the fact that: 1) no election had been certified; 2) the trial court
did not have venue for the action; and 3) the trial court did not develop a
record on the issue the Supreme Court of Florida decided. In Palm Beach
334. Id. at 36. In 1974, the Second District Court of Appeal decided Nelson v.
Robinson, 301 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974), which involved a post-election
challenge to a form of ballot which listed the candidates for a single office in alphabetical
order using the same color ink, but on different lines. Nelson, 301 So. 2d at 509-10.
Robinson claimed that the organization of the ballot denied the individual candidates equal
protection of the law. kl. at 509. The fundamental question that the Second District Court of
Appeal set forth for lower courts to answer was, "[c]an it be said that the election was not a
free expression of the public's will?" Id. at 511. The court analyzed the case solely on
constitutional grounds and determined that the "mere confusion" that stemmed from the ballot
did not operate to deny the voters their "free choice." Id. at 511. The court found that the
equal protection rights of the voters were not violated because voters could properly effectuate
their will if they took the time to examine the ballot and cast their vote. Id. at 511. The court
also determined that a candidate had no constitutional rights to a particular place on a ballot,
rather the equal protection rights of candidates extend only to guaranteeing that their name
will appear on the ballot. Nelson, 301 So. 2d at 511-12.
335. Fladell, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. at 39.
336. Fladell, 772 So. 2d at 1243.
337. Id. at 1242.
338. See FLA. STAT. § 102.1685 (2000), which reads:
The venue for contesting a nomination or election or the results of a referendum shall
be in the county in which the contestant qualified or in the county in which the ques-
tion was submitted for referendum or, if the election or referendum covered more than
one county, then in Leon County.
Id. (emphasis added).
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County Canvassing Board I, the Supreme Court of Florida allowed for a true
demarcation between the contest portion of the post-election period and the
protest period.339  This decision was rendered less than ten days before
deciding Fladell.340 In Fladell, the Supreme Court of Florida ignored its
decision in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I when it decided a case
initiated and tried in the protest period prior to the election being certified,
but under the contest statute.34'
While the issue was never directly addressed in the court's reasoning,
one can only surmise that the reason the court did not find "substantial non-
compliance" sufficient to meet the test set forth in Beckstron was because
section 101.27(3) of the Florida Statutes stated that "the order in which the
voting machine ballot is arranged shall as nearly as practicable conform to
the requirements of the form of the paper ballot for that elec-
tion. 34 Without explanation of a factual record, the Supreme Court of
Florida seemed to infer that the butterfly ballot conformed as nearly as
"practicable" with the requirements of the form of paper ballot under section
101.151 of the Florida Statutes.343 Clearly, on its face, the butterfly ballot
did not conform. Whether there were "practicable" considerations for it not
conforming was not a matter of record. 44 Given the pronouncement of the
339. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1231 (Fla. 2000).
340. Id.
341. Fladell, 772 So. 2d at 1242.
342. FLA. STAT. § 101.27(3) (2000).
343. § 101.151.
344. It would be hard to understand an argument for this type of nonconformance with
the requirements of the paper ballot statute, but in any event, no record was made or required
to show any "practicable" reasons for the noncompliance. Without a record to determine the
"practicable" reasons for the noncompliance, it is hard to see how the court concluded that the
noncompliance was not substantial.
In addition, the butterfly ballot does not appear to have complied with the requirements
of Florida law that "sample ballots shall be in the form of the official ballot as it will appear at
that polling place on election day." § 101.20(1). Palm Beach County's sample ballot,
distributed in the days before the election, was not in the form of the actual ballot used at the
polls because it did not show the punch holes down the middle of the ballot. See generally
id. This additional reason for substantial noncompliance was never developed in a factual
record because of the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida. There is little doubt as to the
statistical anomaly of the discrepancy in the unusual amount of votes received by Patrick
Buchanan as a result of his hole punch being second, not third on the ballot. See Jake Tapper,
Buchanan Camp: Bush Claims are "Nonsense," Salon.com, at http://www.salon.com/
politics/featureI2000/11/10/buchanan/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2002). The butterfly ballot was
"used to explain the 3407 votes in the county for Buchanan, as compared with the 561 votes
for Buchanan in Dade County, which is much larger than Palm Beach County, and the 789
votes for him in Broward County." Id. Similarly, the large number of double punched ballots
[Vol. 26:647
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Supreme Court of Florida in Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Board
that "nothing can be more essential than for a supervisor of elections to
maintain strict compliance with statutes in order to ensure credibility in the
outcome of the election,"3 45 it will remain a mystery as to why the Supreme
Court of Florida avoided having the courts of Florida address the substantive
issues of the butterfly ballot. No doubt a considerable factual record could
have been created under these circumstances to support the proposition that
the butterfly ballot did not "as nearly as practicable conform to the
requirements of the form of the paper ballot" for the election.
Contrary to media reports and impressions to the contrary, Vice
President Gore and Senator Lieberman were not plaintiffs in the butterfly
ballot case. No election had been certified. The contest action by Vice
President Gore and Senator Lieberman was not commenced until November
27, 2000, after Secretary Harris had certified Governor Bush and Secretary
was being attributed to people who thought they needed to vote for both Vice President Gore
(the second hole punch) and Senator Lieberman (the third hole punch) on the butterfly ballot.
For instance, the Palm Beach Post stated "[tihe ballots show [at least] 5,330 Palm Beach
County residents, many of them in Democratic strongholds, invalidated their ballot cards by
punching chads for Gore and Reform Party candidate Pat Buchanan, whose hole on the punch
card appeared just above Gore's." Joel Engelhardt and Scott McCabe, Over-votes Cost Gore
the Election in Florida, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 11, 2001, at IA.
345. Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519,524 (Fla. 2000).
346. FLA. STAT. § 102.27(3) (2000). The 2001 Florida Legislature effectively
eliminated the butterfly ballot by amending section 101.151 of the Florida Statutes to require
a uniform primary and general election ballot for each certified voting system.
(6) The general election ballot shall be aranged so that the offices of President
and Vice President are joined in a single voting space to allow each elector to cast a
single vote for the joint candidacies for President and Vice President and so that the
offices of Governor and Lieutenant Governor are jointed in a single voting space to
allow each elector to cast a single vote for the joint candidacies for Governor and
Lieutenant Governor.
(8)(a) The Department of State shall adopt rules prescribing a uniform primary
and general election ballot for each certified voting system. The rules shall incorporate
the requirements set forth in this section and shall prescribe additional matters and
forms that include, without limitation:
1. Clean and unambiguous ballot instructions and directions;
2. Individual race layout; and
3. Overall ballot layout.
(b) The department rules shall graphically depict a sample uniform primary and
general election ballot form for each certified voting system.
FLA. STAT. § 101.151(6)-(8) (2001). See Ch. 2001-40, § 7, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 121-24.
67
: Nova Law Review 26, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
712 Nova Law Review [Vol. 26:647
Cheney the winners at 7:30 p.m. on November 26, 2000.147 Because Fladell
was sub judice before the Supreme Court of Florida and was interpreted as
an election contest case when Gore and Lieberman filed their contest
complaint, they were precluded from bringing the butterfly ballot case as
part of their contest.
While there is no question that the remedy would have been dramatic,
Florida law permitted a revote for statewide elections. 349 It is for this reason
that the Supreme Court of Florida was correct in declaring the balance of the
347. Todd S. Purdum, Counting the Vote: The Overview, Bush Is Declared Winner in
Florida, but Gore Vows to Contest Results, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27,2001, at Al.
348. It is clear that lawyers and others representing Vice President Gore and Senator
Lieberman asked Mr. Fladell and others not to file this lawsuit at this time. TAPPER, supra
note 196, at 148. One is reminded of the Will Rogers' lament "I am not a member of any
organized party. I am a Democrat." When it became clear that Democratic operatives and
other plaintiffs were not going to let Vice President Gore and Senator Lieberman control their
own fate and strategy with respect to which claims would be brought and when they would be
brought, the Will Rogers' lament once again became self-evident. If the butterfly ballot had
been contested properly during the contest phase by Vice President Gore and Senator
Lieberman, the Supreme Court of Florida would have been confronted with the noncompli-
ance issues of the butterfly ballot, coupled with the defective punch card voting machines in
Palm Beach County. Whether or not they would have satisfied Beckstrom and section
102.168(3)(e) of the Florida Statutes requiring the voiding of the election and a revote would
have made for a more interesting question. Certainly, a factual record would have been
developed on the butterfly ballot, with affidavits of some people indicating the ballot confused
them. Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, Broward Wraps up as Palm Beach Hurries, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Nov. 26, 2000, at Al (stating Democratic lawyers collected 10,000 "complaints and affidavits
they plan to use in challenging the Palm Beach vote totals. The voters cited everything from
misaligned ballot cards to contradictory voting instructions to unhelpful poll workers."); Brad
Hahn & Jeff Shields, Both Sides Vow Fight to the End, Battle Expected to Go On and On,
SUN-SE4IEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Nov. 26, 2000, at 16A (stating "voters ... were confused by
the two-page layout of the presidential tickets and fear they cast their ballot for the wrong
candidates."); Don Van Natta, Jr., Counting the Vote: Palm Beach County, Gore Set to Fight
Palm Beach Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 25, 2000, at Al (stating that "[alnother basis for [a]
challenge is 10,000 sworn affidavits signed by residents ranging in age from 18 to 98. Many
of these voters said they were confused by the butterfly ballot's design or were denied
assistance or given wrong instructions by harried and often rude poll workers. . . ."). The
Supreme Court of Florida's holding that additional votes from the Palm Beach County recount
should be counted because the punch card machines created non-counted votes for President
and Vice President, or "undervotes" would seemingly make a prima facie case for satisfying
the requirements of Beckstrom for a revote. Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1260 (Fla.
2000).
349. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720, 725 (Fla. 1998).
See also In re Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots in Nov. 4, 1997 Election of
the City of Miami, 707 So.2d 1170, 1174 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing that a
new election is available as a judicial remedy if it is appropriate).
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trial court's opinion concerning the remedy as a nullity. Had the butterfly
ballot's effects been challenged in the contest phase of the election, a circuit
judge in Leon County would have had the power to initiate an order deemed
necessary to correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate
under the circumstances. 350 Revotes have been ordered in other state and
federal elections.351
Congress specifically contemplated that a state's appointment of
presidential electors might be inconclusive on election day when it enacted
title 3, section 5 of the United States Code, which states: "[w]henever any
State has held an election for the purpose of choosing electors, and has failed
to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be
appointed on a subsequent day in such manner as the legislature of such
state may direct."
352
As previously discussed, Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution, reserves to the states the power to appoint its presiden-
tial electors.353 Under title 3, section 5 of the United States Code, Congress
granted the states a safe harbor to resolve their election disputes concerning
presidential electors in such a manner as was provided by laws enacted prior
to the day fixed for the appointment of the electors. Congress, as the
certifying authority for presidential electors under the federal constitution,
has within its authority to create this safe harbor for certification.3a
Under section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes, a law enacted prior to
the 2000 election, the Florida Legislature delegated the power to resolve
disputes concerning the election of presidential electors to the judicial
branch of Florida's government. 355 Having delegated that power, any change
in that delegation after the date of the election would have violated title 3,
350. FA. STAT. § 102.168(8) (2000); Beckstrom, 707 So. 2d at 725.
351. E.g., Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 367 (1969) (directing state and local
officers to conduct a new election in Greene County, Alabama); LaCaze v. Johnson, 310 So.
2d 86 (La. 1974) (recognizing that the trial court properly annulled a congressional election
and properly ordered a new election because a voting machine failed to record votes for a
candidate and the missing votes may have altered the election outcome); State v. Bakken, 329
N.W.2d 575 (N.D. 1983) (determining that a new election for a state house race was proper
when the result of the original election was encircled in doubt).
352. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (emphasis added).
353. See also supra note 257.
354. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 ("Ihe Congress may determine the Time of chusing
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same
throughout the United States.").
355. FLA. STAT. § 102.168 (2000) (stating "the certification of election or nomination
of any person to office... may be contested in the circuit court .... ).
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section 5 of the United States Code."' It is interesting to note the current
statute specifically reserves to the Florida Legislature the jurisdiction and the
sole authority to hear any contest of the election of a member to either house
of the Florida Legislature.357 The Florida Legislature could have reserved
jurisdiction in presidential contests or other elections held for state elective
office in a similar fashion, but failed to do so. Accordingly, and correctly,
the Supreme Court of Florida applied section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes
to the election of presidential electors from Florida and consistently declared
the trial court's rulings with respect to these matters a "nullity., 358  It is
important to note, the United States Supreme Court in Bush II v. Gore never
questioned the ability of the Supreme Court of Florida to resolve an election
dispute for presidential electors in Florida. They only questioned the
application of the Supreme Court of Florida's remedy for the dispute,
thereby approving that portion of the court's decision in Fladell declaring
356. Attempts by the Florida Legislature after the election to appoint a slate of electors
would have been a violation of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code, because the
legislature had delegated its authority to resolve election disputes to the courts before the
election. If the Florida courts had been permitted to complete the task delegated to them by
the Florida Legislature, only one slate of presidential electors would have been sent to
Congress-either the set certified by Secretary Harris on November 26, 2000, or a judgment
of ouster for those electors would have been ordered with a mandamus that a new slate of
electors be certified. If Governor Jeb Bush refused to execute the judgment of ouster, or
Secretary Harris refused to certify the new slate of electors, then indeed Congress would have
been the arbitrator of competing claims. Other appropriate action would have been taken to
enforce the Florida courts' orders in order to eliminate the competing claims. See FLA. STAT.
§ 102.1682(1) (2000) (describing judgment of ouster remedy).
357. Section 102.171 of the Florida Statutes states:
The jurisdiction to hear any contest of the election of a member to either house of the
Legislature is vested in the applicable house, as each house, pursuant to s. 2, Art. III of
the State Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications, elections, and returns of
its members. Therefore, the certification of election of any person to the office of
member of either house of the Legislature may only be contested in the applicable
house by an unsuccessful candidate for such office, in accordance with the rules of that
house. This section does not apply to any contest of the nomination of any person for
the office of member of either house of the Legislature at any primary or special
primary election in which only those qualified electors who are registered members of
the political party holding such primary election may vote, as provided for in s. 5(b),
Art. VI of the State Constitution. This section does apply to any contest of a primary or
special primary election for the office of member of either house of the Legislature in
which all qualified electors may vote, as provided for in s. 5(b), Art. VI of the State
Constitution, and the recipient of the most votes is deemed to be elected according to
applicable law.
FLA. STAT. § 102.171 (2000).
358. See Bush II v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
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the court's holding that section 102.168 did not apply to presidential election
contests a nullity.
The Florida Constitution states that "[n]o person belonging to one
branch shall exercise any powers agertaining to either of the other branches
unless expressly provided herein." The Florida Legislature is not free to
re-delegate as much of its lawmaking power as it may deem appropriate.
60
The application of section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes to presidential
elections passes constitutional muster because there has been no redelegation
of power. 61 The legislature has directed Florida courts to act in accordance
with specific guidelines in resolving election disputes. Further, Florida's
nondelegation doctrine is not violated because the review of elections is not
362
"textually assigned" to the legislature by the Florida Constitution. The
Supreme Court of Florida was free, in the appropriate context, to order any
remedy in an election for presidential electors that it could have ordered for
election of any other state officials.
363
If the Supreme Court of Florida was confronted with challenges to strict
legality and ballot effects in the contest phase, no one knows whether
Florida would have ordered a revote due to time constraints and logistical
uncertainties. It is well known that to take advantage of the safe harbor rule,
the revote would have to have occurred and been certified by December 12,
2000.364 There is guidance with respect to who would be eligible to vote in a
new election.365 The Florida courts would have faced a difficult task of
359. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3. Contrary to the United States Constitution, the Florida
Constitution contains an express limitation of power.
360. B.H. v. State, 645 So. 2d 987, 992 (Fla. 1994). The court stated that Florida has
repeatedly and expressly rejected the federal doctrine, noting that "the federal approach might
be more aptly called a 'nondoctrine,' because it consists primarily of the refusal to act despite
earlier precedent." Id at 992 n.3.
361. Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1253 (Fla. 2000).
362. See Chiles v. Children A-F, 589 So. 2d 260, 264 (Fla. 1991) (declaring that if a
statute purports to give one branch powers textually assigned to another by the Constitution,
then that statute is unconstitutional).
363. See Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720, 727 (Fla.
1998).
364. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000). Had a revote been certified after December 12, 2000,
Congress could still have accepted the results of the revote, but the revote would have
occurred without the safe harbor rule.
365. The question of whether state election officials could "restrict the right to vote in a
new, curative election to those who participated in the original, defective election" was
answered in Ayers-Schaffner v. Distefano, 37 F.3d 726, 726 (1st Cir. Ct. App. 1994). In
Ayers-Schaffner, the court noted that the deprivation of "a qualified voter of the right to cast a
ballot because of failure to vote in an earlier election [was] almost inconceivable." Id at 727
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determining how to handle overseas and absentee ballots in a new elec-
366tion, but one imagines that the same statutory and regulatory rules in
existence would had to have been deployed for the new election. In Gray v.
367Sanders, the United States Supreme Court held that "[o]nce the geo-
graphical unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all
who participate in the election are to have an equal vote.,, 368 Applying this
principle, the geographic area in question for the presidential election was
Florida, not Palm Beach County. Allowing only Palm Beach County voters
to vote twice would have raised a handful of equal protection problems.
First, it would have been unfair for Palm Beach County voters that
voted for Nader and other third party candidates to switch their votes to one
of the two major party candidates, an option not available to other Florida
voters.369 Second, a limited revote would have allowed Palm Beach County
voters to correct their improperly cast punch card votes, an option not
available to voters in other punch card counties. 370 A statewide revote would
pass equal protection muster for Florida citizens, because all votes would be
treated equally.
In Fladell, the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Florida held, based on the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Foster v. Love,371 that a revote
may give a state an unfair advantage in a presidential election. 37' A state
(referencing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 554-55 (1964) which stated that "[a]ny
restrictions [on the right to vote] strike at the heart of representative government"). The court
stated that "depriving eligible voters of the right to vote in the 'effective' election shakes that
foundation [of our democratic process] and weakens, rather than supports, the broad goal of
preserving the integrity of the electoral process." Id. at 729 (alterations in original). The court
concluded that "present voting status is the only appropriate yardstick for eligibility" in a new
election. Id. at 731.
366. See discussion infra Part VI.
367. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
368. Id. at 379.
369. The Court of Appeals of New York noted that a limited voting system would be
constitutional for local elections but not for statewide elections. Blaikie v. Power, 13 N.Y.2d
134, 143 (1963).
370. Obviously, beyond the butterfly punch card problems, it is clear that those who
used punch card machines were less likely to have their votes counted and that this may now
be a constitutional violation. See Bush II v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000); B.J. Palermo, Bush-
Gore Lives On, NAT'L. L.J., Sept. 17, 2001, at Al. After Bush H v. Gore, it is clear that any
revote would have to have been statewide to satisfy constitutional muster.
371. 522 U.S. 67 (1997).
372. Fladell v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 36, 38-39 (Fla.
15th Cir. Ct. 2000). In Foster, the United States Supreme Court held that a Louisiana "open
primary" in October was in violation of title 2, section 7 of the United States Code because
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would have an undue advantage if it voted before other states because it
could influence future outcomes and force candidates to give those states
more attention. However, this concern was not present in Florida because
there was no undue influence over the other states. Each state is its own
sovereign when it comes to selecting presidential electors, and each state has
a right to determine the method in which it chooses electors. 373 For example,
Oregon allows a statewide mail-in ballot, giving their citizens more time to
vote in advance of election day. 374  Nebraska and Maine split their
presidential electoral votes by House district, rather than having a statewide
winner take all.375 A revote would have been constitutional because other
states could not be influenced by a revote, and Florida would have no greater
voice in the Electoral College when convened than that already constitution-
ally assigned to Florida.
During the election dispute, the Florida Legislature debated whether it
could name its own slate of electors to the Electoral College. Since the
Florida Election Code and the Florida Constitution vest a right to vote in the
people, this act would have been unconstitutional.376 Once a state legislature
vests its rights to vote in the people, the right to vote as the legislature has
prescribed is fundamental.377 As the Supreme Court of Alabama has held,
once the legislature has provided for the appointment of electors, its powers378
and functions have ended. Since section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes
and the rest of the Florida Election Code had been prescribed as the method
to resolve presidential election disputes in Florida, the legislature had
congressional candidates were elected on a date other than the date prescribed by
Congress. Foster, 522 U.S. at 68. The Court noted instances in which runoff elections were
held after election day. Id. However, the court stated in Fladell that it was the intent of
Congress to require presidential elections to be held on a specific day. Fladell, 772 So. 2d at
1242-43. The court's analysis ignored the broad discretion Congress granted the states under
title 3, section 5 of the United States Code to resolve election disputes.
373. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892). See discussion supra Part IV.
374. OR. REv. STAT. § 253.065 (2000).
375. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 802 (1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-714 (1998).
376. See FLA. STAT. § 103.021 (2000) (providing that presidential electors should be
elected by the people).
377. See McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 4 (1892). In McPherson, the United
States Supreme Court noted that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, "[wlhenever presidential
electors are appointed by popular election, then the right to vote cannot be denied or
abridged." Id. The right to vote intended to be protected refers to the right to vote as
established by the laws and constitution of the state. See also Bush II v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98
(2000).
378. Opinion of Justices, 34 So. 2d 598 (Ala. 1948).
2001]
73
: Nova Law Review 26, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
provided for the appointment of electors and would not be able to circum-
vent the people's right to choose their electors. 1 9
In 2001, the Florida Legislature amended section 102.168 of the
Florida Statutes, deleting a circuit judge's ability to provide any relief
appropriate under such circumstances. The legislature also deleted section
102.168(3)(e), which provided a catchall exception to allow an election
contest to show that a person other than the successful candidate was the
person duly elected to the office in question.3 80 As a result, Florida courts
can no longer provide "any relief" that they see fit, but must follow the
common law quo warranto standard set forth in section 102.169 of the
Florida Statutes.
31'
We will never know if the Supreme Court of Florida, confronted with
an admittedly noncompliant ballot in the contest phase of the election, would
have used its statutory powers to order a statewide revote. Given that the
Supreme Court of Florida ordered a statewide recount of the undervotes in
an attempt to remedy the punch card ballot problems, and the United States
Supreme Court's holding in Bush II v. Gore on the unconstitutionality of the
attempted recount, it seems the only constitutional remedy may have indeed
been a new statewide election. The effects of the butterfly ballot would have
been brought under section 102.168(3)(e) of the Florida Statutes.382 The
irony is Vice-President Gore and Senator Lieberman never had an
379. See discussion supra note 214.
380. Ch. 2001-40, § 44,2001 Fla. Laws 117, 153.
381. Quo warranto is a "common law writ designed to test whether a person exercising
power is legally entitled to do so." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1256 (6th ed. 1990). At
common law, Florida courts could void an election, but the standard for doing so was much
narrower than section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes. See Nelson v. Robinson, 201 So. 2d
508, 511 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (requiring a showing of irregularities to void an
election).
382. FA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(e) (2000) (granting grounds to contest an election for any
allegation which, if sustained, "would show that a person other than the successful candidate
was the person duly nominated to the office in question."). If a complaint had been filed by
Vice President Gore to contest the election on butterfly ballot issues, it may have alleged the
following: 1) a ballot format was used in Palm Beach County that did not meet mandated
legislative requirements; 2) thousands of Palm Beach County voters signed affidavits that they
incorrectly cast their votes; 3) there was an unexplainable statistical discrepancy between
Buchanan votes in Palm Beach County and the rest of Florida and the country; and 4) the
order of the candidates on the ballot did not as nearly as practicable conform to the
requirements of the form of the paper ballot for the election-all of which resulted in
substantive non-compliance with statutory election procedures resulting in reasonable doubt
as to whether the certified election expressed the will of the voters. See Beckstrom v. Volusia
County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720, 725 (Fla. 1998).
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opportunity to present the butterfly ballot problem because a private plaintiff
usurped the issue,383 attaining an unfavorable legal result. The Fladell case
was brought in the wrong phase of the post-election process, in the wrong
trial court, and without developing a factual record on the critical issues in
the case. As a result, the issues surrounding the butterfly ballot were never
fully litigated under Florida law, which allowed Florida courts to avoid
addressing the possibility of a revote or new election for presidential
electors.
VI. OVERSEAS ABSENTEE BALLOT ISSUE
A. History of the Law
In 1955, Congress passed the Federal Voting Assistance Act (FVAA) in
an effort to extend the right to vote to military personnel that were absent
from their homes during primary, general, or special elections. 384  The
FVAA was an effort to preserve the right to vote with ease for military
citizens overseas and provided express recommendations to state legislatures
for proposed implementation. 385  To accommodate military personnel
utilizing absentee ballot suffrage rights, the FVAA provided that all
balloting materials should be shipped free of postage and established
safeguards to protect against invalidation of absentee ballots.386
383. Fladell v. Elections Canvassing Comm'n, 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 36 (Fla. 15th
Cir. Ct. 2000).
384. Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1307 (N.D.
Fla. 2000) (citing H.R. REP. No. 1385 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2067, 2068; S.
REP. No. 580 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2777,2779).
385. Id. at 1307-08. The FVAA's recommendations for state implementation
suggested, in pertinent part:
(I) accept a state absentee ballot application as an application 'for registration under
such States' election laws'; (2) waive registration of individuals covered under the Act
'who, by reason of their service, have been deprived of an opportunity to register'; (3)
accept a federal post card application 'as simultaneous application for registration and
for ballot'; and (4) 'authorize and instruct ... election officials, upon receipt of the
[federal] post card application.. to mail immediately to the applicant a ballot,
instructions for voting and returning the ballot, and a self-addressed envelope.
Id. (alterations in original).
386. Id. at 1308 (citing Federal Voting Assistance Act § 102, 69 Stat. 584, 584-85
(1955); S. REP. No. 580 (1955), reprinted in 1955 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2777, 2779). This free
postal privilege applied whether the balloting materials were "transmitted individually or in
bulk." Id. See also Federal Voting Assistance Act §§ 303-05, 69 Stat. 584, 588-89 (1955).
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While this absentee ballot voting right was extended in all states to
military persons under the FVAA by 1968, civilian citizens were not
extended the same or even similar rights.8 7 In response, Congress amended
the FVAA to include citizens "temporarily residing abroad and engaged in
business, the professions, teaching, the arts, and other walks of life.,
388
However, only slightly more than a majority of the fifty states responded to
this newly initiated FVAA amendment, resulting in discriminatory treatment
of civilian citizens residing overseas.
38 9
In an effort to curb this obvious discrimination, Congress passed the
Overseas Citizens Voting Rights Act of 1975 (OCVRA) to "assure the right
of otherwise qualified private U.S. citizens residing outside the United States
to vote in Federal elections." 390 The OCVRA, by eliminating strict residency
requirements formerly imposed on overseas citizens, re-enfranchised
overseas civilian citizens through a "simplified absentee voting registration
procedure." 391 The contemporaneous enactment of the OCVRA and the
FVAA caused conflicts in individual state implementation because of the
inconsistencies of standards between the two federal acts. 392 In 1978,
Congress responded by amending the two acts to harmonize the prior
inconsistencies. 3
387. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1308 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1385; S. REP. No. 1025
(1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2064, 2065).
388. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1025; see also Act of June 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-343,
82 Stat. 180, 180-81 (1968) (repealed 1986)).
389. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1308. "Only twenty-eight States and the District of
Columbia enacted statutes 'expressly allowing absentee registration and voting in Federal
elections for citizens 'temporarily residing' outside the United States."' Id. (citing H.R. REP.
No. 94-649, at 2 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2358, 2359.). However, of the
states that did implement this amendment, insistence on residency requirements provided
obstacles that civilian citizens overseas found difficult to meet. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-
649, at 3).
390. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-649, at 1). The OCVRA required in pertinent
part: "Each citizen residing outside the United States shall have the right to register absentee
for, and to vote by, an absentee ballot in any Federal election in the State .... Overseas
Citizens Voting Rights Act § 3, 89 Stat. 1142.
391. Id. at 1309.
392. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
393. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 95-1568, at 2 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5759, 5760); see also Act approved Nov. 4, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-593, 92 Stat. 2535 (1978)
(repealed 1986)). The deficiencies noted by the Committee on House Administration, in part,
are as follows: "the fact that State laws were not uniform and the existence of substantial
disparities 'as to filing requirements and deadlines, the right to register and vote absentee, and
other provisions relating to absentee voting by person recovered under the FVAA."' Id. at
1309-10. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-1568, at 2).
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While Congress made diligent attempts to provide suffrage rights to
military and civilian citizens through the FVAA and the OCVRA, by the
early 1980s, Florida still remained unable to adequately implement these
federal guidelines into an effective state statutory scheme. 94  Florida's
absentee ballot statutory scheme, at that time, did not provide timely
distribution of ballots to overseas citizens, giving these citizens inadequate
time to return overseas absentee ballots prior to the election night dead-
line.395 The federal government had the power to regulate franchise rights
provided to citizens by state legislatures,396 and as a result, intervened to
remedy Florida's inadequate statutory scheme.
397
The Florida statutory scheme in the early 1980s only allowed absentee
ballots to be counted if received by 7:00 p.m. the night of the elec-
tion.3 98 This deadline, while adequate for a majority of the states,39 9 proved
394. United States v. Florida, No. 80-1055 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 1982) (consent decree).
The United States was seeking
injunctive relief to remedy the failure of defendants [State of Florida] to ensure that
United States citizens located abroad, who are guaranteed by the [OCVRA] or the
[FVAA] the right to vote absentee in federal elections conducted by the State of
Florida, receive absentee ballots on a date sufficiently preceding election day to permit
them to return their ballots in a timely manner.
Id. at 2.
395. Id. at 2-3. "Florida counties did not begin to mail ballots to overseas citizens for
the November 1980 election until at least 20 days prior to the election... [This] mailing of
absentee ballots... threatened to deprive a substantial number of these voters of the
opportunity and right to vote .... " Id.
396. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 292 (1970). The court held in pertinent part
that "[t]he power of the States with regard to the franchise is subject to the power of the
Federal Government to vindicate the unconditional personal rights secured to the citizen by
the Federal Constitution." Id.
397. Florida, No. 80-1055 at 1. The Attorney General of the United States sought to
enforce the provisions provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 1973dd (OCVRA) and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973cc(b) (FVAA) within the state of Florida. Id.
398. Id. at 2. (citing FLA. STAT. § 101.67(2) (1982)).
399. See generally ALA. CODE § 17-10-23 (1996); ALAsKA STAT. § 15.20.170 (Michie
2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-5-411(1) (Michie 2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-158(g)
(West 1999); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 5515 (1999); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-386(2) (1998);
IDAHO CODE § 34-1005 (Michie 2000); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19-9 (West 1993); 10 ILL
COmp. STAT. ANN. 5/20-9 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-11-10-3 (Michie 1998); Ky. REv.
STAT. ANN. § 117.086(1) (Michie 2000); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18:13-11 (West 2000); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 755 (West 1993); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 54, § 93 (West
1991); MICH. COMP. LAws § 168.765 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 203b.08(1) (West
1992); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-731, 733 (2000); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 115.293(1) (West
1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-13-229(3) (1999); NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-950 (1998); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 659:47 (1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:57-26 (West 1999); N.M. STAT.
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unworkable in Florida due in part to the September and October dates in
which it held initial and second primary elections.40° At the time, Florida
held a 'first primary election" on the first Tuesday falling on the sixth day or
later of September.4° 1 Following this initial primary, a second primary
election was held four weeks later, usually falling in the first week of
October.4 2 Finally, the general election followed during the first week of
November.
403
Essentially, Florida's initial and second primary election statutory
scheme provided, at most, twenty days in which to send out overseas
absentee ballots and receive valid responses prior to the general election
deadline.4 4 The Florida scheme was found to be in conflict with the
provisions set forth in the OCVRA and FVAA, which guaranteed overseas
military and civilian citizens the right to vote.4°5 This conflict arose because
the four week interval separating Florida's second primary election from the
actual general election gave Florida election officials insufficient time in
which to conduct the process of mailing out ballots, while also denying
ample opportunity for a timely response from overseas voters .406  This
conflict was quite apparent during the 1980 election in which more than half
of Florida's sixty-four counties had not mailed absentee ballots to the
overseas voters twenty days prior to November's general election.0 7
ANN. § 73-14-31 (Michie 2000); N.Y. ELEr. LAw § 8-412 (McKinney 1998); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 163-231(4) (1999); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 14-104 (West 1997); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 253.082 (1999); R.I. GEN. LAws § 17-20-26(a)(1)(iv) (2000); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-15-230
(Law Co-op. 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 12-19-12 (Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-
6-303(a)(1)-(b) (1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20a-3-306 (2)(a) (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §
2543 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-712(d) (Michie 2000); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. §
29.36.060 (West 1993); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-3-5(f) (Michie 1999); Wis. STAT. ANN. §
6.87(6) (West 2000); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 22-9-118 (Michie 2000).
400. Florida, No. 80-1055 at 4. However, this is no longer the case due in part to the
Election Reform Act of 2001, and its elimination of Florida's second primary.
401. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 100.031 (1982).
402. Florida, No. 80-1055 at 4. See FLA. STAT. § 100.061 (1982).
403. Florida, No. 80-1055 at 4. See FLA. STAT. § 100.091 (1982).
404. Florida, No. 80-1055 at 4.
405. Id. The federal government felt that Florida did not permit overseas voters the
right to vote, which is guaranteed by the OCVRA and the FVAA. Id.
406. Id.
407. Id. at 3.
The following chart sets forth the mailing dates for Florida counties [in the 1980
election]:
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The 1980 election likely caused the actionjy the federal government in
1981 against the State of Florida and its Secretary of State, George
Firestone.408 The federal government's intervention in Florida's absentee
ballot statutory scheme resulted in a "temporary" consent decree. 409 The
consent decree extended Florida's deadline for receipt of absentee ballots ten
extra days to allow Florida overseas voters ample time to cast a vote in the
November general election.410 The ten-day extension was to be utilized in
the 1982 federal election, followed forty-five days later by a report from
Florida compiling the absentee voting results.4 1 The Florida Legislature
was then required to draft a plan of compliance, remedying the problems
encompassed in Florida's absentee ballot law, and submit it within sixty
days of the close of the 1983 legislative session.
412
Meanwhile, the federal government was still struggling to ensure that
the overseas voters were not disenfranchised. Realizing that the main
problem overseas voters faced was untimely receipt of ballot materials, the
federal government enacted the Uniform and Overseas Citizens Absentee
Voting Act (UOCAVA).4 3 Enacted in 1986, the UOCAVA's main purpose
Date 1980 No. of Counties Date 1980 No. of Counties
October 11 1 October 19 2
October 12 0 October 20 5
October 13 1 October 21 13
October 14 3 October 22 7
October 15 5 October 23 1
October 16 9 October 24 2
October 17 11 October 25 1
October 18 5
(October 15 was 20 days prior to the election.)
Florida, No. 80-1055 at 3.
408. Id. at 1.
409. Il at 7. While the consent decree was a "temaporary" solution (applicable only to
the 1982 federal election) to Florida's overseas absentee ballot situation, the current Florida
Administrative Code regulating overseas absentee ballots implements virtually the same
solution. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. ls-2.013 (2000).
410. Florida, No. 80-1055 at 7.
411. Id. at 8. Florida was required to report the dates each county mailed out their
ballots for the first primary, second primary, and the general election. Id. Additionally,
Florida's report was to include the number of ballots received before the close of polls, after
the close of polls, the number per county, and the number not counted because the ballot was
not postmarked by the general election date or received after the ten-day deadline. Id.
412. Id.
413. Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1310 (N.D.
Fla. 2000) (citing Pub. L. No. 99-410, 100 Stat. 924 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 608-609, 39 U.S.C. § 3406, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff to 1973ff-6)).
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was to facilitate absentee ballot voting, while also providing "for a write-in
absentee ballot that may be used in federal general elections by overseas
voters who, through no fault of their own, fail to receive a regular [State]
absentee ballot in sufficient time to vote and return the ballot prior to the
voting deadline in their State.' 4 14 Additionally, the UOCAVA repealed the
FVAA and the OCVRA in an effort to consolidate their provisions.
415
The UOCAVA provided overseas voters the added safeguard of the
416federal write-in ballot. This safeguard is available to overseas voters, as
provided in the UOCAVA, upon showing both a timely application for a
state absentee ballot and the failure to receive such a ballot.4, 7 However, a
federal write-in ballot is only valid if the applying voter's state absentee
ballot application is received thirty days prior to the general election or if the
voter's absentee ballot is received no later than the state absentee ballot law
permits.418 Additionally, the federal write-in ballot must be submitted from
outside the United States.419
In the aftermath of the "temporary" consent decree and the enactment of
the UOCAVA, Florida made efforts to ensure the right to vote to its
residents overseas. Due in part to the consent decree of 1982, Florida's
overseas absentee ballot law was bifurcated on the state level. 42 Essentially,
Florida's overseas absentee ballots were governed by both the Florida
Statutes and the Florida Administrative Code.421  Therefore, technically
Florida's overseas absentee ballot law was governed by the Florida Statutes,
the Florida Administrative Code, and the UOCAVA. Florida's three-tiered
414. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1310-11. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-765, at 5 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2009, 2009 (emphasis added)).
415. Id. at 1311.
416. Id.
417. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-2(a)).
418. Id. at 1311-12. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-2(b)(2) & (3)).
419. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1311 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-2(b)(1)).
420. Id. at 1313-14.
421. FLA. STAT. §§ 101.6101-.72 (2000); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IS-2.013
(2000). Given the changes in Florida law, specifically section 102.528 of the Florida
Statutes, it became clear that absent a specific grant of authority to an administrative agency,
an administrative regulation cannot exceed or change a grant of authority given by a
legislative statute. See S.W. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So.
2d 594 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000); State v. Day Cruise Ass'n, 794 So. 2d 696 (Fla 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2001). Given that the administrative code exceeded the specific authority of the
statute, it seems that Florida's law governing absentee ballots, to the extent it was being
regulated by an administrative code and absent specific legislative authority, was not
enforceable.
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overseas absentee ballot statutory scheme remained in effect during the 2000
Presidential Election.422
During the 2000 Presidential Election, the Florida Statutes set forth the
proper procedure in which an overseas absentee voter could request a ballot.
It was required that the absentee voter receive an absentee ballot thirty-five
days prior to the first primary, and forty-five days prior to the second
primary and general election.423 Additionally, during the 2000 Presidential
Election, the Florida Statutes required that the returned overseas absentee
ballots have "an APO, FPO, or foreign postmark" to be considered valid and
count towards a vote in that election. 24 Finally, the Florida Statutes set
forth specifications regarding who qualified an "absent qualified elector
overseas."
425
In addition to the guidelines set forth by the Florida Statutes during the
2000 Presidential Election, the overseas absentee ballot law in Florida was
also governed by a provision in the Florida Administrative Code.426 This
provision, incorporated into the code in 1984,427 reiterated the Florida
Statutes by requiring the mailing of ballots to overseas absentee voters
thirty-five days prior to the first primary,428 and provided that ballots be
422. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 101.6101-.72 (2000); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IS-
2.013 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-2(a) (2000).
423. FLA. STAT. § 101.62(4)(a) (2000).
424. § 101.62(7)(c). This requirement has since been found, by the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Florida, to conflict with federal law and has been
eliminated by the Florida Election Reform Act of 2001. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1315-16;
Ch. 2001-40, § 52, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 158 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 101.62 (2001)).
APO and FPO are the abbreviated forms of Army Post Office and Fleet Post Office.
425. FLA. STAT. § 101.62(7)(a)(1)-(3) (2000). The statute sets forth in pertinent part
that the following are qualified:
1. Members of the Armed Forces while in the active service who are permanent
residents of the state and are temporarily residing outside of the United States and the
District of Columbia;
2. Members of the Merchant Marine of the United States who are permanent
residents of the state and are temporarily residing outside the territorial limits of the
United States and the District of Columbia; and
3. Other citizens of the United States who are permanent residents of the state
and are temporarily residing outside the territorial limits of the United States and the
District of Columbia.
Id.
426. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 1S-2.013 (2000).
427. Id.
428. r. 1S-2.013(4).
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distributed at least thirty-five days prior to the second primary.429 The code
provided a lower threshold of compliance than the Florida Statutes
requirement of an APO, FPO, or foreign postmark requirement, requiring
only that the returned ballots bear a postmark or signature dated "no later
than the date of the federal election." 410 Additionally, the 1982 "temporary"
consent decree's ten-day hiatus for absentee ballot validation was codified in
this code, thereby allowing the acceptance of Florida overseas absentee
ballots ten days following the close of polls in a presidential preference
primary and the federal general election.43
Combined together, the Florida Administrative Code provision and the
Florida Statutes simultaneously provided Florida's state guidelines for
overseas absentee ballot law during the 2000 Presidential Elec-
tion.432 However, while facially these two authorities appear to have
resolved any apparent conflict arising between the UOCAVA and Florida's
previous overseas absentee ballot statutory scheme, the aftermath of the• • • 433
2000 Presidential Election proved otherwise.
B. The Effect on the 2000 Presidential Election
By passing the UOCAVA, Congress attempted to simplify the voting
process for American citizens abroad, while simultaneously providing each
state with discretionary power to adopt individual state overseas absentee
429. r. 1S-2.013(5). This allows a shorter period than the Florida Statutes, which
requires forty-five days for mailing ballots prior to the second primary and general election.
See § 101.62(4)(a). Following the 2000 Presidential Election, the State of Florida temporarily
eliminated the second primary from its election statutory scheme. Ch. 2001-40, § 34, 2001
Fla. Laws 117, 140 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 101.97.021 (2001)).
430. Compare FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. IS-2.013(7) (2000), with FLA. STAT.
§ 101.62(7)(c) (2000). The Florida Administrative Code and the Florida Statutes, while
operating simultaneously to regulate overseas absentee ballots, provide different thresholds for
the validation of overseas absentee ballots. This variation in thresholds created an anomaly
where a statute was overridden by an administrative code, which is unconstitutional and illegal
in Florida. However, it remained intact to comply with the 1983 consent decree. This
anomaly spanned twenty years and leaves questionable the Florida Legislature's inaction in
consolidating the two thresholds into one standard, an action that may have minimized
confusion as to the proper standard for a valid overseas absentee ballot.
431. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. ANN. r. 1S-2.013(7) (2000). "With respect to the presidential
preference primary and the general election, any absentee ballot cast.., shall be counted if
received no later than ten days from the date of the federal election ... ." Id.
432. Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1313-14
(N.D. Fla. 2000).
433. See generally Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1305.
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voting procedures. 43 While Congress gave the states discretionary power to
regulate the overseas absentee ballot law within each state, the UOCAVA
trumps individual state law when conflicts arise.435 In the aftermath of the
2000 Presidential Election, Governor Bush and Secretary Cheney challenged
Florida's overseas absentee ballot statutory scheme, alleging that several of
Florida's requirements conflicted with UOCAVA mandated requirements.436
During the 2000 Presidential Election, Florida required that an overseas
ballot for a federal office must be "postmarked or signed and dated no later
than the date of the Federal election" to be deemed a valid vote.437
Specifically, Bush and Cheney alleged that Florida's requirement that
overseas ballots bear a postmark or a dated signature was in direct conflict
with the UOCAVA.438 Florida's inclusion of this requirement was due to the
ten-day extension following the actual election in which overseas absentee
votes were accepted, coupled with a necessity to avoid the threat of voter
fraud by assuring that all votes were cast prior to the close of polls.
439
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida,
agreeing with Bush and Cheney, found Florida law in conflict with the
"spirit of the UOCAVA." 44 The UOCAVA explicitly requires all "balloting
materials... shall be carried expeditiously and free of postage," demonstrat-
ing that postmarks are not required for validity.441 Requiring a postmark at
434. Id. at 1314. "[C]ongress has directed the states to provide a simplified procedure
for overseas citizens... [and] federal law continues to leave many of the details of overseas
absentee voting procedure to the States." Id.
435. kl "[S]tate procedures must be reasonable for the congressional mandate to have
any meaning.... [Any state requirement that conflicts with the mandatory provisions of the
Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act is preempted and invalid." Bush, 123
F. Supp. 2d at 1314 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Prigmore v. Renfro, 356 F. Supp. 427,
430,433 (N.D. Ala. 1972)).
436. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1314. Initially, it may appear that only the absentee
voter or the federal government would have the appropriate standing to challenge Florida's
overseas absentee ballot scheme's compliance with federal guidelines. However, presidential
candidates may obtain standing by claiming the possibility of a direct, cognizable injury in the
absence of the ability to pose such a challenge.
437. FLA. ADMIN. CODEANN. r. 1S-2.013(7) (2000).
438. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1314. "Plaintiffs claim that Defendant's rejection of
ballots with no postmark, an illegible postmark, or a postmark dated after the election day
conflicts with federal law, which does not require any postmark at all." Id
439. Id. at 1315.
440. Id. The court stated that the "[p]laintiffs are correct that nowhere in the federal
legislation does the requirement of a postmark appear." Id. at 1314.
441. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1315. (quoting 39 U.S.C. § 3406(a)(1) (alteration in
original)).
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the time UOCAVA was enacted was not necessary because at that time no
state allowed overseas absentee ballots to be counted past the close of polls
on the day of the general election.442 However, contrary to when the
UOCAVA was enacted, Florida currently does allow a ten-day period
following the close of polls in which acceptance of overseas absentee ballots
is allowed."43 While the UOCAVA and the Florida Administrative Code had
both been enacted since the 1980s, this clear-cut contradiction of federal and
state law was not apparent until the 2000 Presidential Election.4 "
Following Florida's requirements, the Hillsborough County Canvassing
Board rejected overseas absentee ballots during the 2000 Presidential
Election on the basis of lack of postmark.45  However, the court did not
deem Florida's statutory requirements invalid. 46 While the court recognized
that the federal legislation lacked a requirement for a postmark," 7 it also
recognized that the federal legislation allowed states to provide safeguards
against overseas absentee voting fraud.44 Therefore, the court, by upholding
Hillsborough County's rejection of undated overseas absentee ballots,
approved of Florida's requirement of a postmark or dated signature for a
valid overseas absentee ballot.4 9
442. Id. (citing 39 U.S.C. § 3406(a)(1) n.7).
443. Id. The Florida Administrative Code holds in pertinent part:
(7) With respect to the presidential preference primary and the general election, any
absentee ballot cast for a federal office by an overseas elector which is postmarked or
signed and dated no later than the date of the Federal election shall be counted if
received no later than 10 days from the date of the Federal election as long as such
absentee ballot is otherwise proper.
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.013(7) (2000).
444. Whether or not the court's ruling in Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing
Board would have violated both the safe harbor provisions of title 3, section 5 of the United
States Code and the admonition of the Supreme Court in its remand opinion in Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board makes for an interesting question.
445. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1314. The Hillsborough County Canvassing Board
rejected overseas absentee ballots on the basis of "no postmark, an illegible postmark, or a
postmark dated after the election." Id.
446. Id. at 1315.
447. Id. at 1314.
448. Id. at 1315. The legislative history of the OCVRA reveals the congressional
intent that "States would still be free under this bill to establish further safeguards against
[overseas absentee] fraud." Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 n.7 (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-649,
at 4, 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2358, 2361).
449. ld However, while the court upheld Florida's postmark requirement and
approved of Hillsborough County Canvassing Board's rejection of ballots without the
required postmarks, some Florida counties ultimately accepted overseas absentee ballots
without postmarks, a practice unprecedented from prior presidential elections. See David
Barstow & Don Van Natta, Jr., How Bush Took Florida: Mining the Overseas Absentee Vote,
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While Governor Bush and Secretary Cheney raised, and the court
directly addressed Florida's absentee ballot postmark requirement, the
second option available to overseas absentee voters for validly casting a
vote, merely signing and dating the envelope, was left unaddressed. Bush
and Cheney merely attacked the Hillsborough County Canvassing Board's
rejection of overseas absentee ballots based upon their lack of postmark,
illegible postmarks, and post election postmark,45 but refrained from
challenging the Board's possible rejection of ballots for lack of postmark
coupled with a lack of dated signature.4" Additionally, while the court
recognized that Bush and Cheney were challenging "Florida's requirement
that overseas ballots be postmarked or signed and dated,"452 the court's
ruling focused primarily upon whether the postmark requirement conflicted
with federal law.453 Therefore, it appears that neither Bush and Cheney, nor
the court, found conflict between Florida's requirement of a dated signature
and the federal law regulating overseas absentee voting.
45
While the court upheld Florida's requirement that overseas ballots be
postmarked or signed and dated and Hillsborough County Canvassing
Board's implementation of such, it denounced the fact that the Board
neglected to inform overseas absentee voters of such a requirement.455
Unfortunately, federal law does not require a state to provide overseas
absentee voters notice of the postmark or dated signature prerequisites.
456
Nevertheless, the court indirectly suggested that the Florida Legislature
remedy this apparent "deficiency" in Florida's absentee ballot procedures.
457
N.Y. TVMES, July 15, 2001, at 1. Unequal application of the overseas absentee ballot
requirement by Florida counties, if not remedied, likely could raise an equal protection
question in future elections.
450. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.
451. See icL Ironically, only one of Florida's sixty-seven counties provided an area on
the absentee ballot for an overseas absentee voter to provide a dated signature. See Barstow &
Van Natta, Jr., supra note 449, at 17.
452 Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1314.
453. Id. at 1314-15.
454. See id. However, since in actuality Florida's goal was to curb voter fraud, it
would seem that a postmark would be a more reliable source than a dated signature for
purposes of determining when a vote is cast.
455. Md at 1315. "IT]he fact that Florida neglectfed] to... [advise voters of the
postmark prerequisite] is disappointing and just plain wrong." Il
456. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1315. "[There is no federal requirement that Florida
advise overseas voters of the postmark or signed and dated prerequisite to receiving the extra
ten mailing days.. . ." Id.
457. Id. "The court has the utmost confidence that Florida's legislature will quickly
resolve this deficiency." ld.
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However, the court agreed with Bush's and Cheney's allegations that
the Hillsborough County Canvassing Board's rejection of write-in ballots
because "they lacked an APO, FPO, or foreign postmark conflicted with
federal law."458  The court found that the UOCAVA's only apparent
exclusion of federal write-in ballots occurs if submission is from within the
United States. 459 Additionally, the court found that the UOCAVA requires
that a voter sign an oath that the write-in ballot was mailed from outside the
United States of America.46° Finally, the court found that the UOCAVA
explicitly states that a write-in ballot may be "submitted," which may
connote a method other than mail.46'
The court found that Florida's APO, FPO, and the foreign postmark
requirement for write-in ballots was in direct conflict with federal law.4 2
The court reasoned that Florida's postmark requirements allowed election
officials to disregard the signed oath on the write-in ballot, conflicting with
federal law.463 Additionally, the court found that Florida's postmark
requirement conflicted with the "submitted" language of the UOCAVA,
placing an unnecessary limitation on the method in which an overseas voter
may cast a write-in ballot. 4 Ultimately, the court decided that Florida's
postmark requirement for federal write-in ballots disrupted the "spirit" of the
UOCAVA, 5 namely to provide overseas voters ease in casting their vote in
a federal election.
466
Therefore, while the court appears to recognize a state's right to provide
safeguards against voter fraud, it does not allow for a broad extension of
that right with regard to federal overseas write-in ballots.468  The court
458. Id.
459. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1316 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-2(b)(1)).
460. Id.
461. Id. "Also noteworthy is Congress' choice of words. The UOCAVA only requires
that federal write-in ballots be 'submitted,' rather than mailed, from a location outside the
United States." Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1973(2)(b)(1).
462. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. While the court appears to initially address the
rejection of both overseas absentee ballot and federal write-in ballot based on lack of foreign
postmark, its analysis appears to only address the effect on write-in ballots. Id. at 1315-16.
463. Id. at 1316.
464. Id. "While a mailed ballot would likely receive a postmark, a submitted ballot
could encompass a wide range of methods of delivery that would not." Id.
465. Bush, 123 F. Supp. at 1315.
466. Id. at 1309.
467. l at 1315.
468. Id. "[A]ny state statute that requires a foreign postmark on a federal write-in
ballot conflicts with the UOCAVA." Id.
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strictly read the UOCAVA's language regarding federal write-in ballots,49
limiting write-in ballot exclusions to ballots "submitted" from within the
United States.47° Additionally, the court recognized that states are limited to
this narrow exclusion of write-in ballots, because protection against voter
fraud is provided by the required signed oath that the ballot is mailed from
outside the United States.47r This logic is incomplete however, because the
oath is devoid of any language certifying that the ballot was cast prior to or
on the date of the election. Therefore, a voter could swear or affirm that he
or she voted overseas without certifying that the ballot was cast prior to the
election. The problems with this certification by the voter are self-evident in
the context of the 2000 Presidential Election.472
Consequently, protection against voter fraud seemed to provide an
underlying foundation in Florida's overseas absentee ballot statutory
scheme, while becoming a paramount concern on the federal level.473 The
federal government, while providing that the UOCAVA would be the
ultimate governing authority in overseas absentee ballot issues, allowed state
governments a minimal amount of authority in providing individual
safeguards against the possibility of voter fraud.474 Florida's compliance
with the UOCAVA required that overseas absentee ballots be counted ten
days following the close of the general election polls.475 Thereby, Florida
implemented precautions, unlike those required by the UOCAVA, to protect
469. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. "The UOCAVA only requires that federal write-
in ballots be 'submitted,' rather than mailed, from a location outside the United States. While
a mailed ballot would likely receive a postmark, a submited ballot could encompass a wide
range of methods of delivery that would not." Id.
470. Id.
471. Id. at 1317.
472. Id. at 1316. "Mhe UOCAVA demands that the states permit the use of federal
write-in ballots and provides the mechanism to determine if they were submitted from outside
the United States." Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. However, this oath is devoid of any
language guaranteeing that the ballot was cast prior to or on the date of election. See iL This
signed oath protection against voter fraud with the addition of a date guarantee, may likely be
a guidepost for future absentee ballot reformation. However, the elimination of the second
primary coupled with the elimination of the ten-day hiatus for counting the overseas absentee
ballot would, in effect, eliminate the need for a guarantee that the ballots were mailed prior to
the date of the election. Florida could have required that all overseas ballots be received by
election day like other states required.
473. See il at 1315.
474. Id.
475. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.013 (2000). See generally United States
Florida, No. 80-1055 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 1982) (consent decree).
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against the threat of voter fraud.476 However, in light of the aftermath of the
2000 Presidential Election and the potential federalization of electors, it is
questionable whether protecting against voter fraud should remain in the
power of the individual states rather than a uniform federal safeguard
reflected in a uniform UOCAVA. Additionally, following the 2000
Presidential Election, it remained questionable whether Florida's require-
ments of postmarks and dated signatures would be necessary, absent the ten-
day hiatus between the close of polls and the counting of Florida absentee
ballots. Finally, it is obvious that Florida's excessive protections against
voter fraud can be remedied by reform of the overseas absentee ballots
statutory scheme.
C. Reform of Florida's Overseas Absentee Ballot Scheme
The 2000 Presidential Election brought out the distinct differences
between Florida's overseas absentee ballot law and the majority of the
country's similar statutory schemes. 4" Florida's ten-day hiatus between the
close of polls and the acceptance of absentee ballots was unheard of in a vast
majority of the fifty states, most of which required overseas absentee ballots
by the close of polls on the day of the general election.47 8 Additionally,
Florida was the only state holding primaries in September and October, a
prime contributing factor in the necessity of the unusual ten-day period
between the close of election polls and Florida's acceptance of overseas
absentee ballots.479 At the time of the 2000 Presidential Election, Florida's
overseas absentee ballot scheme allowed for an overseas voter to have the
opportunity to potentially cast a vote three times: 1) thirty-five days prior to
the first primary, overseas voters are sent their first absentee ballot;480 2)
thirty-five to forty-five days prior to the second primary and the general
election, overseas voters are sent a second absentee ballot;481 and 3) through
476. See FLA. ADMiN. CoDEANN. r. 1S-2.013 (2000); FLA. STAT. § 101.62 (2000).
477. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE Ann. § 3509.05 (2000).
478. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 398.
479. See generally United States v. Florida, No. 80-1055 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 1982)
(consent decree).
480. FLA. ADMi. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.013(4) (2000). See also FLA. STAT.
§ 101.62(4)(a) (2000).
481. r. 1S-2.013(5) (requiring that supervisor of elections mail overseas voters absentee
ballots thirty-five days prior to the secondary primary). See also § 101.62(4)(a) (requiring that
supervisor of elections mail overseas voters absentee ballots at least forty-five days prior to the
second primary and general election).
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the use of a federal write-in ballot.4 2 During the aftermath of the 2000
Presidential Election, the combination of all of these unique characteristics
brought to light the various opportunities available for overseas absentee
ballot fraud,483 the exact problem the UOCAVA sought to abolish.4
In May of 2001, the Florida Election Reform Act of 2001 was enacted
in an attempt to clarify the discrepancies in Florida's election statutory
scheme, including the overseas absentee ballot issues. 485  As a likely
response to the court's holding in Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing
Board, section 101.62 of the Florida Statutes was reformed to reflect the
omission of the requirement for an APO, FPO, or foreign postmark.48 6 This
will impact both write-in and overseas absentee ballots.
However, this lack of an APO, FPO, or foreign postmark requirement,
coupled with Florida's ten-day acceptance of overseas absentee ballots
following the actual election appears to heighten the risk of voter fraud.
Section 101.64 of the Florida Statutes was amended to reflect an alteration
requiring that the oath, which the overseas voters sign prior to returning their
overseas ballots, is "solemnly" sworn and affirmed. This language likely
reflects Florida's response to its limited ability to safeguard against the arena
of voter fraud by use of write-in ballots, as prescribed in Bush v. Hillsbor-
ough County Canvassing Board. 488
Additionally, the Florida Election Reform Act of 2001 inaugurated
several statutes and provisions following numerous undertones suggested by
482. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973ff-1, 2(a) (1994).
483. See generally Barstow & Van Natta, Jr., supra note 449. While denounced
publicly as attempting to disenfranchise military voters, in reality Democratic Party attorney
Mark Herron's memorandum, dated November 15, 2000, was actually bringing to the public
knowledge the reality of opportunity for voter fraud in Florida. Further, the Republican Party
ultimately relied on arguments nearly indistinguishable from those set forth in Mark Herron's
memorandum when arguing subsequent absentee ballot cases. ld.
484. See Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1315
(N.D. Fla. 2000).
485. See generally Ch. 2001-40,2001 Fla. Laws 117.
486. Id. at 157.
487. Id. at 158. This amendment added the language "do solemnly swear and affirm
that I," which previously was not incorporated in the language of the oath. Id. Additionally,
the reform amended the oath to reflect language saying "that I [the absentee voter] have not
and will not vote more than one ballot in this election." Id. This language was probably
added to curb any allegation that a voter may have the opportunity to vote on numerous
occasions through the use of the absentee ballot process. See id.
488. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1316. The Florida Election Reform Act of 2001
strengthened the language of the oath the voter's sign, likely to provide a safeguard against
fraud by the only means available as a result of the Bush court's holding. See id.
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the Bush II court. Statutes were initiated separately dealing with write-in
ballots and overseas absentee ballots.489 Additionally, the election reform
act added a provision to section 101.65 of the Florida Statutes embodying
instructions regarding overseas absentee ballot validity. 490 However,
perhaps most significantly, section 100.061 of the Florida Statutes was
inaugurated to effectively eliminate Florida's use of the second primary
election until January 1, 2004.491
While write-in ballots have been permitted in Florida through federal
mandate,492 the Florida Election Reform Act of 2001 codifies the use of
write-in ballots on a state level as well. 493 This act sets forth the process to
receive,494 execute,495 validate, 496 and develop a write-in ballot.497 Again, the
absence of an APO, FPO, and foreign postmark requirement for the write-in
ballot's validity is evident.498 Therefore, the Florida Statutes now provides
within Florida's absentee ballot statutory scheme, guidelines to follow
regarding write-in ballots that facially appear in compliance with the
UOCAVA.
499
In addition to the newly initiated write-in ballot, the Florida Election
Reform Act of 2001 also inaugurated a statute specifically addressing the
issue of overseas absentee voters.500 This newly initiated statute provides for
a modernization of overseas absentee ballot law through the use of e-mail
489. Ch. 2001-40, §§ 48--50, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 155-56. Section 101.6951, entitled
"[s]tate write-in ballot," was added to Florida's election statutory scheme, directly addressing
write-in ballot voting. Id. Section 101.6952, entitled "[a]bsentee ballots for oversea voters,"
was added to Florida's election statutory scheme, directly addressing overseas absentee ballot
voting. Id. at 156.
490. Id. at 160.
491. FLA. STAT. § 100.061 n.2 (2001). "Notwithstanding S. 100.091, Florida Statutes,
or any other provision of the Florida Election Code to the Contrary, there shall be no second
primary election between the effective date of this act and January 1, 2004." Id.
492. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973ff-1(3) (1994).
493. Ch. 2001-40, § 48,2001 Fla. Laws 117, 155-56.
494. FLA. STAT. § 101.6951(1) (2001).
495. § 101.6951(2).
496. § 101.6951(3).
497. § 101.6951(4).
498. See id. In addition, as stated previously, such language was also eliminated from
section 102.62(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes, which previously housed such a requirement for
write-in ballots and overseas absentee ballots. Id.
499. See § 101.6951. This write-in ballot statute has yet to be implemented. Therefore,
while it appears to be in compliance with the UOCAVA, it has not been proven, upon
application, to be in compliance.
500. § 101.6952.
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services, 50 and explicitly details the date requirements for validity of
502overseas absentee ballots. 5 0 Following the holding in Bush v. HilIsborough
County Canvassing Board,°3 Florida reiterated in section 101.6952(2) of the
Florida Statutes the necessity of either a postmark or a signature and date no
later than the date of election for a valid overseas absentee ballot.
504
However, this new statute also provides for the acceptance of an overseas
absentee ballot that is postmarked after the date of the election if the
signature and date on the outside of the envelope reflects a date that is prior
to the date of election.0 5 While facially this newly initiated statute appears
to comply with the state right to protect against fraud,5 this statute permits
a problem to arise. An overseas voter is now given the ability to falsely sign
and date an envelope, to reflect a date prior to the election, and in turn cast
their vote following the date of the election.0 7 While this inauguration of a
specific overseas absentee voter statute facially appears in compliance with
501. § 101.6952(1).
502. § 101.6952(2).
503. 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1314-15 (holding that based on a state's right to protect
against voter fraud a postmark or signature and date requirement does not conflict with the
UOCAVA).
504. See Ch. 2001-40, § 49, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 156 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 101.6952 (2001).)
505. Id. The revised statute states in pertinent part:
For absentee ballots received from overseas voters, there is a presumption that the
envelope was mailed on the date stated and witnessed on the outside of the return
envelope, regardless of the absence of a postmark on the mailed envelope or the exis-
tence of a postmark date that is later than the date of election.
FLA. STAT. § 101.6952(2) (2001). Extrinsic evidence reveals that votes cast after the date of
election were tabulated into Florida's final vote count in the 2000 Presidential Election. See
Barstow & Van Natta, Jr., supra note 449. The lower standard of section 101.6952(2) of the
Florida Statutes for absentee ballot validity may likely lead to an increase in such voter fraud
incidences, clearly the opposite goal of Florida's election reform.
506. See Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
507. However, relying on a signature and date rather than a legible postmark will likely
give rise to allegations of voter fraud, similar to allegations that arose during the 2000
Presidential Election. See Barstow & Van Natta, Jr., supra note 449. "Might Democrats now
quietly-illegally--reach out to overseas supporters, particularly in Israel, and urge them to
send in their ballots? Could the Clinton-Gore [or Republican] administration interfere with
the delivery of ballots from Navy ships, military installations and American embassies?" Id. It
appears, from the language of this new statute, that such rumored illegal tactics could be
entertained with greater ease in future elections.
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the UOCAVA and a state's right to protect against voter fraud, 508 application
of such a statute may reflect an opposite result
0 9
The United State District Court for the Northern District of Florida,
coincident with permitting Florida to protect against voter fraud through
postmarks and signature and date requirements, reprimanded Florida for its
inaction in notifying oversea absentee voters of such a requirement.5 0 The
Florida Election Reform Act of 2001 reflects a response to this reprimand
through the introduction of section 101.65(7) to the Florida Statutes.5 11
While in the past absentee voters were not required to be notified of a
postmark or signature and date requirement for a valid ballot,512 this new
provision requires supervisors of elections to enclose instructions reflecting
the signature and date requirement with each absentee ballot that is
513
mailed. This required instruction, while reinforcing the importance of a
signature and date on a voter's certificate, fails to do so for the same on the
514
outside of the envelope. Therefore, because there is no mandated
instruction to inform the voter of the importance of a signature on the
outside of the envelope, the required instruction implemented by section
101.65(7) of the Florida Statutes515 does not aid voters in executing a valid
absentee ballot in compliance with the newly initiated validity default
provision of section 101.6952. The latter places heavy reliance on the date
and signature reflected on the return envelope.J 6 While the District Court
did not require, but merely hoped, that Florida would inform voters of such
508. See Ch. 2001-40 § 49, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 156 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 101.6952 (2001).
509. Reliance on a written date above a postmark's date may result in ease in voting
after an election and validly casting a vote.
510. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
511. Ch. 2001-40 § 54,2001 Fla. Laws 117, 159-60 (to be codified at FLA STAT § 101.65
(2001).
512. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1315.
513. Ch. 2001-40 § 54, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 159-60. The United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida was unable to require that Florida provide overseas
absentee voters instructions. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1315. However, Florida appears to
have taken the court's suggested reprimand serious, and the new provision holds in pertinent
part: "VERY IMPORTANT. If you are an overseas voter, you must include the date you
signed the Voter's Certificate on the line above [date] or your ballot may not be counted."
Ch. 2001-40, § 54, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 160.
514. See id. at 159-60.
515. Id.
516. Id. at 156. The instruction still fails to inform the absentee voters of the possible
necessity of a signature and a date on the outside of the envelope for the validity of their vote.
See id. at 160.
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requirements, 51 7 it appears that the implementation of section 101.65(7) of
the Florida Statutes does not fulfill the high hopes of the court.518
Finally, the promulgation of section 100.091 of the Florida Statutes
likely reflects the Florida Legislature's awareness of the need to eliminate
the second primary, or at the very least its belated timing.519 While never
directly addressing the validity of Florida's ten-day period of acceptance of
overseas absentee ballots, the Bush court uncovered the discrepancies faced
by the state canvassing boards in protecting against voter fraud.5l While
section 100.091 of the Florida Statutes temporarily eliminates the second
primary election until January 2004,521 it does not facially eliminate the ten-
day period for acceptance of overseas absentee ballots, a period which was
implemented into the Florida Administrative Code in response to Florida's
belated second primary.5 Since the elimination of the second primary is
occurring on an experimental basis, it would seem that the ten-day period set
forth in the Florida Administrative Code should be eliminated as well.
523
Overall, it appears that the Florida Election Reform Act of 2001 is an
attempt to remedy the deficiencies set forth by Bush v. Hillsborough County
Canvassing Board. However, it would appear that a simpler solution to the
overseas absentee ballot issue would be to eliminate the ten-day period
between the general election and the counting of the overseas absentee
ballots.524 The extension of the time period in which Florida allowed
overseas absentee ballots to be accepted resulted from the lack of adequate
time in which overseas voters had to cast a vote between the second primary
517. See Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1315. "The Court has the utmost confidence that
Florida's legislature will quickly resolve this deficiency." ld.
518. See Ch. 2001-40 § 54,2001 Fla. Laws 117, 160.
519. See FLA. STAT. § 100.091(2) (2001).
520. See generally Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1305.
521. § 100.091(2).
522. See generally United States v. Florida, No. 80-1055 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 2, 1982)
(consent decree).
523. See FLA. STAT. § 100.061 n.1 (2001). Essentially, the language of the statute
expressly negates § 100.091 of the Florida Statutes and "any other provision of the Florida
Election Code to the contrary" until January 1, 2004. Id. However, the language of rule 1S-
2.013 of the Florida Administrative Code is not contrary to the elimination of a second
primary, and therefore would likely not be negated by the implementation of § 100.091(2),
preserving Florida's ten-day acceptance period for overseas absentee ballots. It would seem
that the elimination of the ten-day period would be the best protection against fraud because
following its elimination; the timely delivery of the ballot on the day of the election would
provide the necessary fraud protection.
524. See FA. ADMiN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.013 (2000).
20011
93
: Nova Law Review 26, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
election and the general election. 525 The resulting impact of such an
extension was Florida's requirement of a postmark or signature and date
requirement to curb against voter fraud by casting votes following the close
of elections.5 6
However, the elimination of Florida's second primary election logically
results in an extermination of the need for such a ten-day acceptance
period.52 7 The temporary implementation of section 100.061 of the Florida
Statutes will allow, for roughly the next three years, the supervisors of
elections in Florida counties to have ample opportunity to distribute and
collect overseas absentee balloting material, 52 a remedy to the problem that
led to the necessity of the ten-day period initially.529 The absence of the ten-
day period results in the absence of a postmark or dated signature protection
against voter fraud, and in turn a remedy to the deficiencies set forth in the
holding of Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Board.530 However, the
Florida Legislature's solutions set forth in the Florida Election Reform Act
of 2001 are illogical in that they are a response to a system which contem-
plates a late second primary, one which has been eliminated. So long as the
reason for the ten-day period was eliminated in the second primary, it would
seem that election reform would also require the elimination of the ten-day
period as well.
D. Florida's Absentee Ballot Voter Fraud Issue in the 2000 Presidential
Election
While the integrity of Florida's overseas absentee ballots was
threatened by the concept of voter fraud,531 accusations concerning voter
fraud were stirred on the local non-overseas absentee ballot front as well.
532
Both Taylor and Jacobs involved attempts to invalidate absentee ballot votes
for lack of strict compliance with the Florida absentee ballot laws.533
525. See Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1314. See generally Florida, No. 80-1055.
526. See FLA. STAT. § 101.6952(2) (2001).
527. See § 100.061(2).
528. This would be the result because the supervisor of elections would be given more
than five weeks to compile the results of the primary election, distribute the absentee ballots,
and collect the absentee ballots.
529. See generally Florida, No. 80-1055.
530. Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1317-18.
531. See generally id. at 1305.
532. See generally Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla.
2000); Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2000).
533. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 521; Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 518.
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However, the fraud regarding the absentee ballot issue during the aftermath
of the 2000 Presidential Election was addressed on the application level,
534
not the actual voting level, as it was in Bush v. Hillsborough County
Canvassing Board.535
Prior to the 2000 Presidential Election, Republican and Democratic
Party officials disseminated absentee ballot request forms to prospective
absentee voters of their affiliation.536 At this time, Florida Statutes required
that, among other requirements, the "person making a request for an
absentee ballot must disclose... the elector's voter registration num-
ber ... .537 Consequently, in Martin and Seminole Counties, the Democratic
Party preprinted their elector's registration numbers or left an appropriately
marked area for the registration number on their party's absentee ballot
request forms, while the Republican Party left off any type of instruction or
area requesting the voter's registration number on their party's absentee
ballot forms.538 As a result, numerous Republican request forms were
returned incomplete because the request forms lacked the voter's identifica-
tion number.539
Both Martin and Seminole Counties' Supervisors of Elections,
recognizing the omissions from the Republican absentee ballot request,
informed and allowed only Republican Party officials access to the
incomplete absentee ballot request forms, providing these officials an
opportunity to fill in the omitted voter registration numbers. 54° While
534. Id.
535. See generally Bush, 123 F. Supp. 2d at 1305.
536. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 521.
537. Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 518 n.1 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 101.62(1)(b) (2000)).
538. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 521; Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 518.
The request form prepared by the Democratic Party had a space provided for the voter
identification number or the voter identification number was preprinted on the request
form. In contrast, the request form prepared by the Republican Party did not include
either a space for the voter identification number or the preprinted number. In addition
there was no instructions on the Republican form informing the voter to include the
voter identification number.
Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 521.
539. Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 518. "The Martin County Supervisor of Elections received
a number of Republican request forms which had missing or incorrect voter identification
numbers on them." IL See also Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 521. "[Thousands of request forms
without voter identification numbers were returned to the Supervisor's office." Id.
540. Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 518. In Taylor, the supervisor actually allowed Republican
party officials to physically remove the ballots from the supervisor's office to remedy the
absent registration numbers. Id. In Jacobs, the Republican Party officials were permitted to
utilize the Seminole County Supervisor of Elections office and equipment to remedy the
absent registration numbers. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 521.
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Republican officials were given access to the absentee ballot request forms
to remedy such problems, no other political party was notified of or given
the same or even similar access to absentee ballot request forms. 541 While
allegations and the appearance of partisan favoritism resulted from the
specialized treatment afforded the Republican Party officials, the Taylor and
Jacobs courts justified such treatment as fair.542 Both courts found that no
other political parties lacked the problem arising from the omission of the
registration number, and therefore found it unnecessary for each county's
supervisor of elections to contact parties unaffected by such a problem. This
left the Republican Party as the sole party affected and consequently
contacted.543
Additionally, the courts, in finding against fraud or misconduct,
recognized that no other party, aside from the Republican Party, requested
the opportunity to obtain access or was denied access, to the request
forms. 4 Thereby, the Taylor and Jacobs courts found no disparity in
allowing the Republican Party exclusive access to the inadequate absent
ballot request forms.545
However, while the Taylor and Jacobs courts recognized the lack of
effect or request on any other party,546 both courts seem to bypass the fact
that at the time only the Republican Party was made aware of the fact that
the Supervisor of Elections in Martin and Seminole Counties would not
strictly construe section 101.62 of the Florida Statutes and allow alterations
541. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 522-23; Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 518. Not only were
Republican Party officials the only party officials given access to the request forms, they were
also the only party officials given notice of such discrepancies in the request forms. See
Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 523.
542. Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 518-19. The court found "despite these irregulari-
ties... the sanctity of the ballot and the integrity of the election were not affected." Id. at 519.
See also Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 522-23.
543. Id. at 523. "Unlike the Republican mall-out, the Democratic mail-out did not
suffer from the general omission of the voter identification numbers. Therefore, there was no
need for the Democrats to request access to the request forms to correct them .. " Id. See
also Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 518.
544. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 523.
[There was no evidence that such a request [for access to absentee ballot request
forms] was made by the Democratic Party or any other political subdivi-
sion.... [TMhere was no evidence that the request of any representative, including any
Democrat, was denied by the Supervisor. Thus, there was no adequate showing that
there was disparate treatment of Republicans.
I
545. l Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 519.
546. Id.
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made to the request forms.5 7 While apparent from the facts that all political
parties, other than the Republican Party, were not informed of the Supervisor
of Elections' deviation from policy standards, the courts declined finding
against the Supervisor of Elections' decision because, unlike the Republican
Party, access to the ballots was not requested by any other political party
representatives. 5" In effect, this construction of facts avoided any need to
confront the equitable issue of whether it was fair and lawful that a single
political party was permitted to engage in those activities without the
knowledge or observation of any other party or candidate.5 9 If it was
unlawful for a party to be given access to the absentee ballot request forms,
then the remedy for that wrong would have been to void the absentee
ballots. A partial voiding of the absentee ballots for this wrong appears to
have been available pursuant to Florida law.
5 0
Additionally, both courts recognized that the Supervisor of Elections in
Martin and Seminole Counties deviated from strict policies against the
547. This strict construction was not applied to the language of the statute, but rather to
estop the alteration of applications to conform with the language of the statute. Jacobs, 773
So. 2d at 523. While it facially appears that the Democratic party's absentee voter application
did not strictly comply with the language of the statute, because the identification numbers
were preprinted and not provided by the voter, such action was taken prior to the filing of the
application, and therefore did not constitute an alteration after the initial application. Taylor,
773 So. 2d at 519. Whereas, the Republican Party altered the absentee ballot applications
following the initial application, after the voter had an opportunity to view and approve such
alterations. Id.
mT3he Supervisor of Elections "treated the interests of the non-Republican voters
differently from those of Republican voters" because she informed the public that she
would strictly enforce the requirements of Section 101.62, Florida Statutes, including
the disclosure of the voter identification number, yet she honored the request of a
Republican representative to obtain access to the incomplete request forms and add the
voter identification numbers and did not notify the Democratic Party or any other
group of this development.
Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 523. See also Taylor, 733 So. 2d at 518 (showing that the Supervisor of
Elections policy was not to allow corrections of request forms, followed by the approval of
Republican official's request to change the forms).
548. Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 519. The court justified exclusive Republican access to
absentee ballot request forms because they were the only party that suffered from the omission
of voter identification numbers. Jacobs, 733 So. 2d at 523. However, that seems quite
speculative when not all of the Democrat absentee ballot request forms provided the voter
identification number.
549. Democrats and Independents may have had need of similar ministerial corrections
made to their ballots. However, they were unaware of such an option.
550. See In re Protest of Election Returns and Absentee Ballots in Nov. 4, 1997
Election for City of Miami, 707 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
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amendment of any omissions apparent on absentee request forms. 55' At that
time, the Supervisor of Elections for all Florida counties was Secretary of
State Harris.552 At the same time, Secretary Harris was also the co-
chairperson of Governor Bush's and Secretary Cheney's campaign in
Florida. 553 Because the Secretary of State supervises the actions taken by
each county's Supervisor of Elections,554 Harris' simultaneous undertaking
of both positions contributed to the appearance and allegations of partisan
favoritism in Martin and Seminole Counties.555 This conflict of interest
demonstrates Florida's need to implement reformation regarding the
permitted activities of its Secretary of State, calling for an elimination of
either the current duties of the Secretary of State or, more logically, activities
that would pose a conflict of interest with such required duties.
556
In addition to partisan favoritism, the Jacobs court addressed the issue
of strict compliance with absentee voting law. 557 Specifically section 101.62
of the Florida Statutes provided that the person requesting an absentee ballot
must provide their registration number on the request form for the absentee
ballot.558 The Jacobs court, recognizing that the Florida Statutes lacked a
provision specifying the penalty for missing elements of an absent ballot
request form, interpreted section 101.62 as being necessary, not manda-
tory.559 In actuality, if information was missing from an absentee ballot
551. Taylor, 773 So. 2d at 518; Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 523.
552. See Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Editorial, Eliminate Electoral College?,
BALT. SUN, Nov. 29, 2000, at 31A; Fox Hannity & Colmes (Fox News Network, Inc.
television broadcast, Nov. 19, 2000).
553. Germond & Witcover, supra note 552.
554. See FLA. STAT. § 97.012(1)-(2) (2000). "The Secretary of State is the chief
election officer of the state, and it is his or her responsibility to: (1) Obtain and maintain
uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of the election laws. (2) Provide
uniform standards for the proper and equitable implementation of the registration laws." Id.
555. See Fox Hannity & Colmes, supra note 552. The apparent deviation from strictly
held standards required the approval of the Secretary of State of Florida. See
§ 97.012(1). Florida may likely look to reform the requirements of such governmental
positions, amending the requirements to reflect that such positions should remain nonpartisan.
The holder of such a position should not run a campaign that their position can effect or
influence, ultimately displaying an appearance of impropriety.
556. Obviously, Republican operatives in the Taylor and Jacobs cases were permitted
to correct mistakes from a campaign being run by Secretary of State Harris, as the Bush-
Cheney co-chairperson for the state of Florida. See Germond & Witcover, supra note 552.
557. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 521.
558. Id. See also FLA. STAT. § 101.62(2)(b)(4) (2000).
559. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 522. (citing McLean v. Bellamy, 437 So. 2d at 737, 742-43
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
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request, then the voter would never have received an absentee ballot, and
likewise the absentee ballot containing the voter's choices would not have
been received by the Supervisor of Elections. What the court should have
considered but failed to address was whether the actions of the Supervisor of
Elections, by permitting the Republican party to fill in missing blanks on the
absentee ballot requests, resulted in one party benefiting from inequitable
and perhaps unlawful conduct pursuant to section 102.169 of the Florida
Statutes. This issue was avoided by the court. Accordingly, the analyses
required by Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Board and Boardman
v. Esteva was avoided by the court redefining the issue.
56
The Jacobs court further compared section 101.62 of the Florida
Statutes to similar statutes, demonstrating the absence of an invalidating
561directive in only section 101.62 . Thereby, in upholding the integrity of an
absentee ballot request, and contingent on an applicant providing adequate
information for identification, the Jacobs court "sidestepped" the explicit
requirements set forth by the Florida Statutes in applying for an absentee
ballot.5 62 The Jacobs court found that such a "sidestep" was valid because
the language of Florida's statute did not provide that "a lack of information
560. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998);
Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976).
561. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 522. "In comparison, Section 102.68(2)(c), Florida
Statutes require that a voters name, address and signature must be included on the request.
That section goes on to provide specifically that the failure to include the absentee voter's
name address and signature voids the ballot." Id. This demonstrates the Jacobs court's
process of distinguishing the process to apply for an absentee ballot opposed to casting an
absentee ballot. See id.
562. Id. "It cannot be said that the lack of a voter registration identification number on
an absentee ballot request is calculated to effect the integrity of the request itself or the
election, when substantial other identifying information has been included on the request." Id.
Section 101.62 of the Florida Statutes required the person making the request for an
absentee ballot to disclose:
1. The name of the elector for whom the ballot is requested;
2. The elector's address;
3. The last four digits of the elector's social security number;
4. The registration number on the elector's registration identification card;
5. The requester's name;
6. The requester's address;
7. The requester's social security number and, if available, driver's license
number;
8. The requester's relationship to the elector;, and
9. The requester's signature (written requests only).
FLA. STAT. § 101.62(1)0o) (2000).
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voids the ballot."5 63 Recognizing that the current absentee ballot require-
ments were implemented to avoid fraud, the Jacobs court found that the lack
of information would only void an absentee ballot application if there was a
lack of sufficient information to identify the voter, not merely for the
omission of a voter identification number. 
5
The Florida Election Reform Act of 2001 specifically targeted the
requirement of the requesting party's registration number, eliminating it
from the text of section 101.045.56 However, the act replaced this
registration element with a requirement of the requesting party's date of
• 566
birth. Additionally, the language of the statute was not altered to reflect an
567invalidating directive, which likely would lead a court to the conclusion
that the decision in Jacobs remains intact.
VII. THE FEDERAL CASES
Rather than raising constitutional concerns about the manual recount
procedure or the Florida Election Code in the Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board cases heard before the Supreme Court of Florida,
58
Governor George W. Bush chose to bring those concerns in federal court.
563. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 522. "Unless a statutory provision also specifically states
that the lack of information voids the ballot, the lack of the information does not automatically
void the ballot." id.
564. Id. "After rampant absentee voter fraud occurred in the Miami mayoral election,
the Miami Beach City Commission election and the Hialeah mayoral election, the Florida
Legislature amended the detailed absentee voter laws to include the requirements now found
in Section 101.62, Florida Statutes." IL Given the United States Supreme Court's reliance
and interpretation of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code, requiring no damages or
interpretation of state election law after election day which varies from pre-election
interpretation, it would have been interesting to see what would have happened if the United
States Supreme Court was confronted with an appeal in the Seminole and Martin county cases
based upon a violation of section 5.
565. Ch. 2001-40, § 36, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 142 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 101.45(3) (2001)).
566. Id. § 35, 2000 Fla. Laws at 141 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. 101.048 (3)
(2001)). This replacement was likely spurred by the familiarity the requesting party has with
their date of birth as opposed to their voter registration number, likely leading to less
omission.
567. See Ch. 2001-40, § 36, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 142 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 101.45(3) (2001)).
568. The Supreme Court of Florida was quite clear that no party had raised the issue of
the constitutionality of the Florida Election Code in the state protest proceedings. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1228 n.10; Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd. II v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1281 n.7. With the protest statute outlining the
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A. Siegel v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1041 (S.D. Fla. 2000)
1. Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction and Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
On November 11, 2000 at 9:47 a.m., the Republican candidates for
President and Vice-President, Governor Bush and Secretary Cheney, and
registered voters from seven Florida Counties (collectively the "Bush
plaintiffs") filed an Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary Injunction and a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida.569  In that action, the Bush plaintiffs sued the members of the
electoral canvassing boards for Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach and
Volusia Counties. The Bush plaintiffs sought relief under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and title 42,
section 1983 of the United States Code.5 71 The Florida Democratic Party
intervened in the district court proceedings and filed an opposition to the
Bush plaintiffs' emergency motion. 72
The Bush plaintiffs alleged that the canvassing boards had "violated the
Voter Plaintiffs' rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by arbitrarily
denying them the effective exercise of their right to vote and to have that
procedure for a manual recount, constitutional objections to the process are inherently
constitutional objections to the Florida Election Code.
569. Siegel I v. LePore, 120 F. Supp. 2d, 1041, 1044-45 (S.D. Fla. 2000). This was
the first legal action filed by either candidate. See Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction and Supporting Memorandum of Law at 1,
Siegel I (No. 00-9009). On November 13, 2000, another action was filed by registered voters
in Brevard County, Florida. Touchston I v. McDermott, 120 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (M.D. Fla.
2000). In that case the plaintiffs made essentially the same arguments as in Siegel L Id. In
the court's order on the Touchston I plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for Temporary Restraining
Order, it adopted the reasoning contained in Siegel I issued on Nov. 13, 2000. Therefore,
because the plaintiffs in Touchston I made the same arguments as the Bush plaintiffs and
because the court in Touchston I adopted the Siegel court's reasoning, this article will not
discuss the Touchston I case.
570. Siegel 1, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1044. In Florida, each county electoral canvassing
board ordinarily is "composed of the supervisor of elections; a county court judge, who shall
act as chair; and the chair of the board of county commissioners." FLA. STAT. § 102.141(1)
(2000). The county canvassing boards are charged with publicly canvassing [counting] the
vote given each candidate. § 102.141(2).
571. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Siegel I (No. 00-9009).
572. Opposition of the Florida Democratic Party to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Siegel I (No. 00-9009).
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vote counted in an equal and consistent fashion with all other voters in [the]
election., 573  In their emergency motion, the Bush plaintiffs requested the
district court to enjoin the four county canvassing boards from proceeding
with manual recounts of the November 7, 2000 election. 4
2. The District Court's Order on the Emergency Motion for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction
On November 13, 2000, the court entered a straightforward and legally
sufficient Order denying the preliminary injunction, and held that the Bush
plaintiffs had failed to show that they had a likelihood of success on the
merits of their constitutional claims and that they faced imminent irreparable
harm.575 The court began with an introduction of plaintiffs' claims and a
review of Florida's statutes on the administration of elections.5 76 The status
of the manual recounts that had been requested in Broward, Miami-Dade,
Palm Beach and Volusia counties was then outlined.577  The court then
addressed the standard for injunctive relief and, in reviewing the Bush
573. Complaint at 11, Siegel I (No. 00-9009). The same argument was made by
Governor Bush in Bush 11 v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). In that case, without any discussion of
the merits, the United States Supreme Court granted the emergency application and stayed the
mandate of the Supreme Court of Florida. Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
574. Siegel 1, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1044. In their complaint, the Bush plaintiffs' prayer
for relief included the following:
(a) Declaring that Defendants may not subject any vote totals to manual re-
counts;
(b) In the alternative, declaring that Florida Statutes § 102.166(4) is unconstitu-
tional to the extent it does not limit the discretion of Defendants to conduct manual
recounts in this case;
(c) Declaring that Defendants should certify and release forthwith all vote totals
that have been the subject of two vote counts since November 7, 2000;
(d) Declaring that the form of ballot used in Palm Beach County was valid;
(e) Declaring that any ballot punched or marked for two Presidential candidates
not previously counted cannot now be counted;
(f) Consolidating or removing to this Court any and all actions filed across the
State of Florida purporting to challenge the results of the November 7 statewide elec-
tion or otherwise delay the certification and release of those results; and
(g) Granting such other and further relief as this Court shall deem just and
proper.
Complaint at 16-17, Siegel (No. 00-9009).
575. Siegel 1, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1052-54.
576. Id. at 1044-45 (noting the administration of elections in Florida includes
statewide and local features and reviewing sections 97, 98, and 102 of the Florida Statutes).
577. Id. at 1045-47.
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plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief, applied the traditional four-factor test
that the Bush plaintiffs were required to demonstrate: "1) substantial
likelihood of success on the merits; 2) irreparable injury will be suffered
unless the injunction issues; 3) the threatened injury to the movant
outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing
party; and 4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public
interest.
'578
The court observed Eleventh Circuit case law, stating: "[a] preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the
movant clearly establishe[s] the 'burden of persuasion' as to the four
requisites, ' 579 and the "burden of persuasion in all of the four requirements is
at all times upon the plaintiff.
' 580
Next, the court proceeded with an analysis of the Bush plaintiffs'
58 1 . . 582
claims, quoting and reviewing the United States Constitution. The court
pointed out that the election of a President or Vice-President is not by
popular vote but that "[e]ach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors ... to choose a
President and Vice President., 583  Touching upon three United States
Supreme Court cases, the court affirmed that Article II gives the states
extensive power to pass laws regulating the selection of electors.584 The
court crystallized that Congress had given control of these matters to the
states and that "federal law gives states the exclusive power to resolve
controversies over the manner in which presidential electors are selected. 585
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day
fixed for the appointment of the electors, for its final determination
of any controversy or contest concerning the appointment of all or
any of the electors of such State, by judicial or other methods or
procedures, and such determination shall have been made at least
six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the electors such
determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said day,
and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the elec-
578. Id. at 1047 (quoting McDonald's Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (1lth
Cir. 1998)).
579. Id.
580. Siegel 1, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (quoting Snook v. Trust Co. of Ga. Bank of
Savannah, N.A., 909 F.2d 480,483 (11th Cir. 1990)).
581. Id.
582. Id. at 1047-48.
583. Id. at 1048 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1).
584. Id. (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31 (1968)).
585. Siegel 1, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 n.3.
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tors shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the
electoral votes as provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter
regulated, so far as the ascertainment of the electors appointed by
such State is concerned.586
The court went on to explain "while this power is broad, 'these granted
powers are always subject to the limitation that they may not be exercised in
a way that violates other specific provisions of the Constitution.'9
5 8 7
The Bush plaintiffs alleged that section 102.166(4) of the Florida
Statutes 88 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by denying them
the effective exercise of their right to vote and to have that vote counted in
an equal and consistent fashion with all other voters in the election.5 89  But
before addressing the Bush plaintiffs' specific claims, the district court
observed that the United States Supreme Court had adopted a balancing test
"which weighs 'the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the
rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments' versus the
legitimacy, strength, and necessity of the state interests underlying the
electoral scheme.
' 590
586. Id. (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000)).
587. Id. at 1048 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379-380 (1890)).
588. Section 102.166(4) of the Florida Statutes provides:
(4)(a) Any candidate whose name appeared on the ballot, any political committee
that supports or opposes an issue which appeared on the ballot, or any political party
whose candidates' names appeared on the ballot may file a written request with the
county canvassing board for a manual recount. The written request shall contain a
statement of the reason the manual recount is being requested.
(b) Such request must be filed with the canvassing board prior to the time the
canvassing board certifies the results for the office being protested or within 72 hours
after midnight of the date the election was held, whichever occurs later.
(c) The county canvassing board may authorize a manual recount. If a manual
recount is authorized, the county canvassing board shall make a reasonable effort to
notify each candidate whose race is being recounted of the time and place of such
recount.
(d) The manual recount must include at least three precincts and at least I
percent of the total votes cast for such candidate or issue. In the event there are less
than three precincts involved in the election, all precincts shall be counted. The person
who requested the recount shall choose three precincts to be recounted, and, if other
precincts are recounted, the county canvassing board shall select the additional pre-
cincts.
F A. STAT. § 102.166(4) (2000).
589. Siegel 1, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. This is precisely the same argument advanced
by Bush in Bush 11 v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
590. Siegel 1, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1048 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780,
789 (1983), citing Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30-31(1968)).
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Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propri-
ety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a chal-
lenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to
'severe' restrictions, the regulation must be 'narrowly drawn to ad-
vance a state interest of compelling importance.' But when a state
election law provision imposes only reasonable, nondiscriminatory
restrictions upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of
voters, 'the State's important regulatory interests are generally suf-
ficient to justify the restrictions.' 59 1
The district court emphasized that while election laws will invariably impose
burdens on voters, the government must play an active role in structuring
elections if they are to be fair, honest, and orderly.592 In this context, the
court then addressed plaintiffs' claims.
The Bush plaintiffs first alleged that the provisions of section 102.166
of the Florida Statutes "provide no standards to guide the discretion of the
canvassing board in determining whether a manual recount is warranted in
the first place or, if so, what the scope, nature, manner, and method of such
recount should be.' 593 The Florida Democratic Party argued that the Bush
plaintiffs' claim was "sheer hyperbole" and that "the statute makes clear that
the only purpose of the manual recount is to determine whether there is 'an
error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the elec-tions. , , 591
Second, the Bush plaintiffs alleged that section 102.166 of the Florida
Statutes failed to establish any criteria limiting the discretion of the
canvassing boards in their determination of how to conduct the tallying of
591. Id. (quoting Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (citations omitted)). In
stark contrast, on December 9, 2000, the United States Supreme Court issued a stay of the
mandate of the Supreme Court of Florida without any discussion whatsoever regarding the
state's interest in elections. See Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). In addition, the Court
treated the application for a stay as a petition for a writ of certiorari and granted certiorari. Id.
at 1046. In his dissent, Justice Stevens said that a stay should not be entered unless the Bush
plaintiffs made a substantial showing of a likelihood of irreparable harm, and that they had
failed to carry that heaving burden. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In fact, he noted that there
was a danger that a stay might "cause irreparable harm to the respondents-and, more
importantly, the public at large-because of the risk that 'the entry of the stay would be
tantamount to a decision on the merits in favor of the applicants."' Id. (citations omitted).
592. Siegel , 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1049.
593. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 11-12, Siegel I (No. 00-9009).
594. Opposition of the Florida Democratic Party to Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 25, Siegel I (No. 00-9009).
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votes. 595 The Florida Democratic Party asserted that the Bush plaintiffs'
argument was without merit because:
In fact, § 102.166 sets forth detailed standards and procedures gov-
erning when and how a manual recount is to be conducted. Specifi-
cally, § 102.166(5) sets the basic standard for a manual recount by
requiring reason to believe there has been "an error in the vote
tabulation which could affect the outcome of the election." Section
102.166(6) then provides that "[a]ny manual recount shall be open
to the public." Section 102.166(7) provides that "[t]he county can-
vassing board shall appoint as many counting teams of at least two
electors as is necessary to manually recount the ballots" and that a
"counting team must have, when possible, members of at least two
political parties." And, most important for present purposes, the
decision how to count a ballot must be governed by the "voter's in-
tent" in casting the ballot; whenever the counting teams cannot de-
termine intent, "the ballot shall be presented to the county canvass-
ing board for it to determine the voter's intent."
596
Third, the Bush plaintiffs alleged that if a manual recount gave effect to
partially punched ballots, or counted ambiguous ballots based on the
canvassing board's subjective interpretation of voters' intent, then it would
have the effect of unconstitutionally diluting the votes of other voters in the
affected county and in counties that were not subject to a recount.5 97 In their
opposition, the Florida Democratic Party argued that "[i]t does not 'dilute'
the vote of a citizen of one county to ensure that all properly cast votes in
another county are actually included in the final vote tally any more than
counting absentee ballots dilutes the votes of those who voted at the polling
booth on election day.
' 598
In addressing plaintiffs' claims, the court first quoted and reviewed the
wording of section 102.166 of the Florida Statutes. The court found
Florida's "state election scheme reasonable and non-discriminatory on its
face." 599 Looking to United States Supreme Court decisions, the district
court determined Florida's manual recount provision was a "generally-
applicable and evenhanded" electoral scheme designed to "protect the
595. Complaint at 12, Siegel I (No. 00-9009).
596. Opposition at 29, Siegel I (No. 00-9009).
597. Complaint at 12, Siegel I (No. 00-9009).
598. Opposition at 26, Siegel I (No. 00-9009).
599. Siegel 1, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.
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integrity and reliability of the electoral process." 6°°  The district court
identified Florida's manual recount provision as precisely the kind of
electoral law the United States Supreme Court has often upheld in legal
challenges. 601 The court stated that on its face, the manual recount provision
did not limit a candidate's access to the ballot or interfere with a voter's
602
right to vote. On the contrary, the court found that the manual recount
provision "safeguard[ed] the integrity and reliability of the electoral process
by providing a structural means of detecting and correcting clerical or
electronic tabulating errors in the counting of ballots.' Although the court
recognized that Florida's manual recount provision was discretionary in its
application, it was not "wholly standardless." 6  Instead, the plain language
of the statute revealed that the central purpose of the statute was to "remedy
'an error in the vote tabulation which could affect the outcome of the
election."' 605 The court noted "once a decision to conduct a manual recount
is made by the canvassing board, the Florida manual recount law articulates
a structured process for conducting the recount."6 6 The statute strengthens
rather than dilutes "the right to vote by securing as near as humanly possible
an accurate and true reflection of the will of the electorate. ' '607 The court
held that because the four county canvassing boards involved had reported
discrepancies between the initial automated count and recount, the statute
served "important governmental interests." 6 8
The district court further determined that Florida's manual recount
provision was the "type of state electoral law that safely resides within the
broad ambit of state control over presidential election procedures." 609 In
support of that determination, the court relied upon an Eleventh Circuit case
explaining that "'[tihe functional structure embodied in the Constitution, the
nature of the federal court system and the limitations inherent in the concepts
both of limited federal jurisdiction and of the remedy afforded by § 1983'
operate to restrict federal relief in the state election context."610 The district
court went on to emphasize that while federal courts may scrutinize state
600. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 n.9 (1983)).
601. Id. (citing Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787-89).
602. Id.
603. Id.
604. Siegel , 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.
605. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5) (2000)).
606. Id. at 1050 n.8.
607. Id. at 1050.
608. Id.
609. Siegel , 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1050.
610. Id. (quoting Curry v. Baker, 802 F.2d 1302, 1314 (11th Cir. 1986)).
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laws that infringe on voters' rights, federal courts should not intervene to
examine the validity of individual ballots or supervise administrative details
of an election, and then only in extraordinary circumstances will the
challenge of an election rise to the level of a constitutional depriva-
tion.61 The court relied upon a United States Supreme Court case that
reviewed and upheld a state procedure providing for a recount in an election
for the United States Senate.612 The United States Supreme Court had held
"[a] recount is an integral part of the ... electoral process and is within the
ambit of the broad powers delegated to the States."'613 In essence, the district
court stated "federal courts should tread cautiously in the traditional state
province of electoral 'procedures and tabulations ... [o]therwise federal
courts run the risk of being thrust into the details of virtually every
election."
614
a. Bush Plaintiffs' Equal Protection Argument Fails
Next, the district court summed up the plaintiffs' equal protection
argument:
The thrust of Plaintiffs' position is that Florida's decentralized
county-by-county electoral system can yield disparate tabulating
results from county to county. For instance, similarly-punched bal-
lots in different counties may be tabulated differently in a manual
recount due to the introduction of human subjectivity and error.
Further, if manual recounts are held in certain counties but not oth-
ers, ballots previously discarded by electronic tabulation in manual
recount counties would be counted while similarly-situated ballots
in non-manual recount counties would not-thereby diluting the
vote in non-manual recount counties. 615
First, the court said the plaintiffs' concerns were real but most
importantly, they were unavoidable given the "inherent decentralization
involved in state electoral and state recount procedures. '616  Forty-eight
states employ recount procedures, and many of those procedures differ in
611. Id.
612. Id. at 1051 (referring to Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972)).
613. Id. (quoting Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972)).
614. Siegel , 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1051. Obviously, this is what some critics of Bush I1
v. Gore say will result.
615. Id. at 1051.
616. Id. at 1051-52.
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their methods of tabulation.6 7 Florida has sixty-seven counties, in which
twenty-six counties use punch-card ballots, thirty-nine counties use optical-
scanning systems, one county uses a mechanical lever machine, and the other
uses manually-tabulated paper ballots.6 18 The district court recognized that
disparate tabulation systems will result in tabulation differences from county
619to county. Of course, different tabulation systems will also result in
tabulation differences from state to state. What the court correctly
recognized and what the United States Supreme Court failed to consider is
that "[u]nless and until each electoral county in the United States uses the
exact same automatic tabulation (and even then there may be system
malfunctions and the like), there will be tabulating discrepancies depending
on the method of tabulation."62 The district court did not view this as a sign
of weakness or a constitutional injury, rather, the court opined:
[S]ome solace can be taken in the fact that no one centralized body
or person can control the tabulation of an entire statewide or na-
tional election. For the more county boards and individuals in-
volved in the electoral regulation process, the less likely it becomes
that corruption, bias, or error can influence the ultimate result of an
election. 21
b. Bush Plaintiffs Failed to Demonstrate that Manual Recounts Were So
Unreliable that Their Use Would Rise to the Level of a Constitutional
Injury
The district court next turned to the Bush plaintiffs' claim that the
manual recounts were unreliable, and stated the burden of proof was on the
Bush plaintiffs to demonstrate that manual recounts are so unreliable that
their use rises to the level of a constitutional injury.622 The court noted that
manual recounts "have been available in numerous states since the time of
the Founding.' 623 While observing that some level of error is inherent in
manual tabulation, it was recognized that no method is error free.' 2 The
purpose of a manual recount following electronic tabulation is to provide a
617. Id. at 1052.
618. Id. at 1050, 1050 n.12.
619. Siegel I, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
620. Id.
621. Id
622. Id.
623. Id.
624. Siegel , 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
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check on the accuracy of the ballot tabulation.625 The Bush plaintiffs failed
to produce sufficient evidence to declare the use of Florida's manual recount
statute to be unconstitutional on its face.626 Quoting a recent United States
Supreme Court case, the district court affirmed that "[f]acial invalidation 'is,
manifestly, strong medicine' that 'has been employed by the Court sparingly
and only as a last resort."' 627 The court found it unconvincing that the Bush
plaintiffs argued that a process structured to render a vote tally more
accurate somehow diluted the voting rights of the people. 628  Merely
delaying the certification of presidential election result did not result in
diluting voting rights any more than counting the absentee ballots would
629dilute the votes cast on election day.
c. Bush Plaintiffs Alleged Injuries on an As-Applied Basis Were Speculative
The district court found the Bush plaintiffs' alleged injuries were
speculative and far from irreparable because: 1) the four-county canvassing
boards were still in the process of conducting manual recounts; 2) each of
the four county canvassing boards were at different stages of the manual
recount process; 3) no results had been announced; and 4) there was no
evidence to suggest that the manual recounts had generated erroneous
tabulations.630 Preliminary injunctive relief would have been premature.631
d. Bush Plaintiffs Had an Adequate Remedy in State Court
The district court stated that the Bush plaintiffs had failed to produce
any evidence that they lacked an adequate remedy in state court to challenge
the manual recount results or the canvassing boards' decisions concerning
commencement and administration of manual recount procedures. 632 It was
stressed that the Florida Statutes provide a process by which an unsuccessful
candidate can contest the certification of an election in circuit
633
court. Furthermore, the court noted Florida courts have the power to void
625. Id.
626. Id.
627. Id. (quoting Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998)).
628. Id.
629. Siegel , 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
630. Id. at 1052-53.
631. Id. at 1053.
632. Id.
633. Id.
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a contested election even in the absence of fraud or intentional wrongdo-
ing.634 The Bush plaintiffs would have a remedy in a state court claim, if
they could show that the manual recounts would lead to state certification of
635
an election result contrary to the will of the voters.
In essence, the district court found that the Bush plaintiffs had failed to
demonstrate a "clear deprivation of a constitutional injury or a fundamental
unfairness in Florida's manual recount provision."636 Although it recognized
the election had assumed national prominence due to the closeness of the
presidential election and the resulting indecision of who would be our next
president, the court labeled the Bush plaintiffs' claims "'garden variety'
election dispute[s]" which do not "rise to the level of constitutional
deprivation., 637 It was stressed that there were no allegations of clear and
direct infringements of the right to vote through racial intimidation or
fraudulent interference with an election.638 The court pointed out that the
mere possibility that the president-elect would be enveloped in a cloud of
illegitimacy did not justify enjoining the manual recount process that was
already underway. 639 "One of the strengths of our Constitution's method for
selection of the President is its decentralization. Florida, one of the 50
states, has 67 counties, each with a supervisor of election, a canvassing
board, and different voting and tabulation equipment. '"4 Federal courts
should not be the arbiters of disputes in elections. They have a limited role
and should only interfere when there is an immediate need to correct a
constitutional violation.641
B. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000)
1. Procedural Posture
On November 14, 2000, the Bush plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal of
the November 13th United States District Court order denying their request
for a preliminary injunction with the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. In
their opening brief, the Bush plaintiffs requested oral argument because
634. Siegel 1, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
635. Id.
636. Id.
637. Id. at 1054 (quoting Curry v. Baker, 802 F. 2d 1302 (1lth Cir. 1996)).
638. Id.
639. Siegel 1, 120 F. Supp. 2d at 1054.
640. Id.
641. Id.
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"[t]his case presents important questions regarding First and Fourteenth
Amendment protections of the fundamental right to vote. ' 64 2 The Bush
plaintiffs also filed an Emergency Motion for an Injunction Pending
Appeal.64 3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure, the Eleventh
Circuit ordered that the case be heard initially en banc.
64
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied the
emergency motion for an injunction on November 17, 2000.6'" On
November 22, 2000, the Bush plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari before
judgment in which they sought to invoke the United States Supreme Court's
rarely-used certiorari jurisdiction before judgment pursuant to title 28,
section 1254(1) of the United States Code 6 " under which the Court may
exercise certiorari jurisdiction "before or after rendition of judgment or
decree" by a federal appellate court.64 7 On November 24, 2000, the United
States Supreme Court declined to hear the equal protection claims presented
in Siegel. However, that same day, the Court granted certiorari in Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board.64 8 Obviously, the Court could have
heard the equal protection claims simultaneously with the issues regarding
title 3, section 5 of the United States Code that it interposed into the conflict
in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board. If the Court had done so,
then the Court would have been able to reconcile the tensions between the
equal protection issues, the title 3, section 5 of the United States Code
issues, and the concern for a timely resolution of the dispute. All of those
issues were ultimately addressed in the various opinions in Bush 11 v. Gore
on December 12, 2000.64 9 By choosing not to hear those issues simultane-
ously and determining fifteen days later 50 that the equal protection issue was
worthy of review, the Court helped create an urgent problem of time that
was easily preventable. On December 5, the Eleventh Circuit heard oral
642. Opening Brief for Appellants at v, Siegel III v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir.
2000) (No. 00-15981).
643. Siegel III v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1170 (1lth Cir. 2000).
644. Id. at 1170n.2.
645. Id. at 1163.
646. Title 28, section 1254(2) of the United States Code provides "[c]ases in the courts
of appeals may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by the following methods: (1) By writ of
certiorari granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case, before or after
rendition of judgment or decree."
647. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, at 2, 531 U.S. 1005 (No. 00-837).
648. 531 U.S. 1004 (2000).
649. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
650. Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000).
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argument on the merits in Siegel v. LePore.65 On December 6, 2000, the
Eleventh Circuit handed down its opinion affirming the denial of the
preliminary injunction.5 2
While the instant case was on appeal, several Florida cases were
appealed to the Supreme Court of Florida.653 In those cases, plaintiffs
challenged Florida's Secretary of State's decision refusing to accept the
results of manual recounts submitted after November 14, 2000 at 5:00
p.m.654 On November 21, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida ruled that
Florida's Secretary of State was required to accept results of manual
recounts submitted by the evening of November 26, 2000.655 The United
States Supreme Court vacated the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion on
December 4, 2000.656
2. Bush Plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for an Injunction Pending Appeal
The Bush plaintiffs' Emergency Motion for an Injunction Pending
Appeal requested the Eleventh Circuit to enjoin the county canvassing
boards from conducting manual ballot recounts and/or to enjoin them from
certifying the results of the presidential election which contain any manual
recounts.6 57 On November 17, 2000, the Eleventh Circuit denied the Bush
plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief and stated in pertinent part:
Both the Constitution of the United States and 3 U.S.C. § 5 indi-
cate that states have the primary authority to determine the manner
of appointing Presidential Electors and to resolve most controver-
sies concerning the appointment of Electors. The case law is to the
same effect, although, of course, federal courts may act to preserve
and decide claims of violations of the Constitution of the United
States in certain circumstances, especially where a state remedy is
inadequate. In this case, the State of Florida has enacted detailed
election dispute procedures. These procedures have been invoked,
and are in the process of being implemented, both in the form of
administrative actions by state officials and in the form of actions
651. Siegel Iii, 234 F.3d at 1172.
652. Id. at 1163.
653. Id. at 1170.
654. Id.
655. Id.
656. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
657. Siegel 111, 234 F.3d at 1172. See also Touchston II v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1130,
1132 (11th Cir. 2000).
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in state courts, including the Supreme Court of Florida. It has been
represented to us that the state courts will address and resolve any
necessary federal constitutional issues presented to them, including
the issues raised by Plaintiffs in this case. If so, then state proce-
dures are not in any way inadequate to preserve for ultimate review
in the United States Supreme Court any federal questions arising
out of such orders.65 8
3. Bush Plaintiffs' Broad Request on Appeal
Plaintiffs' request on appeal was broader than their request for
659injunctive relief pending appeal. On appeal, the Bush plaintiffs requested
the Eleventh Circuit to "reverse the district court's decision, enjoin the
canvassing board Defendants from conducting manual recounts or certifying
election results that include manual recounts, or order the deletion and/or
non-inclusion of final vote tabulations that reflect the results of manual
recounts. The Eleventh Circuit declined to convert the appeal of the
preliminary injunction into a final hearing on the merits of the Bush
plaintiffs' claims. 66 1 The Eleventh Circuit recognized that in some instances,
an appellate court may decide the merits of a case in connection with its
review of a denial of a preliminary injunction. 62 In Thornburgh v. American
663College of Obstetrician & Gynecologists, the United States Supreme
Court held that an appellate court may decide the merits of a case when it
has the benefit of "'an unusually complete factual and legal presentation
from which to address the important constitutional issues at stake."'
664
However, as the United States Supreme Court noted in Thornburgh, "[a]
different situation is presented, of course, when there is no disagreement as
to the law, but the probability of success on the merits depends on facts that
are likely to emerge at trial.465 The Eleventh Circuit stated that the instant
case clearly fell within the latter category because the answers to the
constitutional questions were "anything but clear" and noted that the factual
658. Siegel III, 234 F.3d at 1170-71 (quoting Touchston II, 234 F.3d at 1132-33).
659. Id. at 1171.
660. Id. at 1171.
661. Id. at 1171 n.4.
662. Id. at 1171.
663. 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
664. Id. at 757 (quoting Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 737 F.2d 283,
290 (3d Cir. 1984)).
665. Id. at 757 n.8.
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record before it was "largely incomplete and vigorously disputed."66 The
Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the district court's denial of the preliminary
injunction was based solely on limited affidavits and documents, there was
no discovery, no trial or plenary hearing, and the evidence presented was not
tested by cross-examination. 667 "Mere expediency" was not a reason to
reach the merits of the Bush plaintiffs' claims in the absence of evidence and
thus, the Eleventh Circuit denied the Bush plaintiffs' request.668
4. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, Res Judicata, and Collateral Estoppel Did Not
Bar Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Bush Plaintiffs' Claims
First the court considered whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
669
barred them from exercising jurisdiction over the Bush plaintiffs' claims.670
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that federal courts, other than the
United States Supreme Court, have only original subject matter, and not
appellate jurisdiction, and may not entertain appellate review of a state court•671
judgment. The doctrine applies to constitutional claims presented or
adjudicated by a state court and claims that are "inextricably intertwined"
with a state court judgment. 672 As the Eleventh Circuit explained, a "federal
claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court judgment 'if the federal
claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the
issues before it.' ' 673 The Eleventh Circuit observed that the United States
Supreme Court had vacated the Supreme Court of Florida's November 21,
2000 decision, and it was unclear whether any final judgments giving rise to
Rooker-Feldman concerns existed.674 Moreover, the parties had not asserted
any basis for a Rooker-Feldman bar.675  Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar the Bush plaintiffs
666. Siegel 111, 234 F.3d at 1171.
667. Id.
668. Id.
669. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is derived from two United States Supreme Court
cases decided sixty years apart: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and D.C.
Ct. App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
670. Siegel 111, 234 F.3d at 1172.
671. Id. (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415-16)
672. Id. (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 n.16).
673. Id. (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25 (1987) (Marshall, J.,
concurring)).
674. Id.
675. Siegel I11, 234 F.3d at 1172.
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from asserting constitutional challenges to the implementation of Florida's
manual recount provision. 676 After a brief review of Florida law regarding
application of res judicata and collateral estoppel, 677 the court concluded
that neither of those doctrines were a bar to their consideration of the issue
of the constitutionality of Florida's statutory manual recount provision.
678
5. Defendant Canvassing Boards Argue the Case Is Moot
Next, the court addressed the Defendant canvassing boards' argument
that the case was moot because the manual recounts had been completed and
the canvassing boards had certified the vote tabulation with the Elections
Canvassing Commission.679 Federal jurisdiction is limited to live cases or
controversies throughout all stages of the federal judicial proceedings. 60 The
Eleventh Circuit relied upon its earlier decision in Reich v. Occupational
Safety & Health Review Commission,681 where it held that "'[a] claim for
injunctive relief may become moot if: (1) it can be said with assurance that
there is no reasonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur and
(2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the
effects of the alleged violation."'' 682  The court concluded that neither
element was satisfied because there were various lawsuits pending in Florida
courts contesting the election results, and there were still manual recount
votes pending from at least two counties in the November 26th official
election results of the Florida Secretary of State.683
676. Id.
677. "Res judicata is defined as a legal or equitable issue which has been decided by a
court of competent jurisdiction; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Gray v. Gray, 107 So.
261, 262 (1926). Collateral estoppel "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact has
once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,443 (1970).
678. Siegel 11I, 234 F.3d at 1172 n.5.
679. Id. at 1172.
680. Id.
681. 102 F.3d 1200 (llth Cir. 1997).
682. Siegel 111, 234 F.3d at 1172-73 (11th Cir. 2000) (quoting Reich, 102 F. 3d at
1201).
683. Id. at 1173.
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6. Defendants Argue the Court Should Abstain From Hearing the Case
Under the Burford Abstention Doctrine
The Defendant canvassing boards argued that the Eleventh Circuit
should refrain from hearing the appeal under the Burford v. Sun Oil Co.
abstention doctrine.68 The Eleventh Circuit explained:
The Burford abstention doctrine allows a federal court to dismiss a
case only if it presents difficult questions of state law bearing on
policy problems of substantial public import whose importance
transcends the result in the case then at bar, or if its adjudication in
a federal forum would disrupt state efforts to establish a coherent
policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern .... A
central purpose furthered by Burford abstention is to protect com-
plex state administrative processes from undue federal interfer-
ence.
685
The Eleventh Circuit determined that the case did "not threaten to
undermine all or a substantial part of Florida's process of conducting
elections and resolving election disputes. 686 Rather, the court said the Bush
plaintiffs' claims targeted certain discrete practices set forth in section
102.166 of the Florida Statutes. The court maintained that the Burford
abstention doctrine should be applied "when federal interference would
disrupt a state's effort, through its administrative agencies, to achieve
uniformity and consistency in addressing a problem."'68 The Eleventh
Circuit maintained that the case did "not threaten to undermine Florida's
uniform approach to manual recounts," primarily because the basis of the
Bush plaintiffs' complaint was that there was an "absence of strict and
uniform standards" in Florida for initiating or conducting recounts.6 9
684. Id. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
685. Siegel 11, 234 F.3d at 1173 (referencing Boyes v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 199 F.3d
1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000); New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491
U.S. 350, 361-62 (1989)).
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Id. (citing Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 727-28 (1996)).
689. Id.
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7. Defendants Argue the Court Should Abstain From Hearing the Case
Under the Pullman Abstention Doctrine
The Defendant canvassing boards also argued that the court should
abstain from hearing the case under Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co. 690 The Pullman abstention doctrine provides that "a federal
court will defer to 'state court resolution of underlying issues of state
law.' 691 Before this doctrine may be applied, two elements must be met:
"(1) the case must present an unsettled question of state law, and (2) the
question of state law must be dispositive of the case or would materially
alter the constitutional questions presented. ' 692 As the court explained,
"[tihe purpose of Pullman abstention is to 'avoid unnecessary friction in
federal-state functions .... tentative decisions on questions of state law, and
premature constitutional adjudication... [and] is only appropriate when the
question of state law can be fairly interpreted to avoid adjudication of the
constitutional question. 6 93 Although the court was aware of the limited role
of federal courts in assessing a state's electoral process, the court placed
great weight on the fact that the Bush plaintiffs had alleged a constitutional
violation of their voting rights and concluded abstention was inappropri-
ate.694
8. The Eleventh Circuit Affirms the Denial of the Preliminary Injunction
The district court denied the Bush plaintiffs a preliminary injunction
because it found no likelihood of success on the merits and because the Bush
plaintiffs "had failed to show that an irreparable injury would result if no
injunction were issued. 695  In considering whether or not to reverse the
district court's order, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals applied a clear
690. 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Siegel 11, 234 F.3d at 1174.
691. Siegel III, 234 F.3d at 1174. (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534
(1965)).
692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Id. (citing Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691, 697 (5th Cir. 1981) (stating that
"while an alleged denial of voting rights does not preclude federal abstention, United States
Supreme Court precedent indicates that a federal court should be reluctant to abstain when
voting rights are at stake"); Edwards v. Sammons, 437 F.2d 1240, 1243 (5th Cir. 1971)
(stating the general rule that abstention is not appropriate "in cases involving such a strong
national interest as the right to vote")).
695. Id. at 1175.
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abuse of discretion standard of review. 696 The Eleventh Circuit held that the
Bush plaintiffs "still have not shown irreparable injury, let alone that the
district court clearly abused its discretion in finding no irreparable injury on
the record" and affirmed the decision of the district court.697
9. Standard for Injunctive Relief
The Eleventh Circuit applied the same traditional four-factor test used
in the district court when it denied the injunctive relief:
A district court may grant injunctive relief only if the moving party
shows that: 1) it has a substantial likelihood of success on the mer-
its; 2) irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction is-
sues; 3) the threatened injury to the movant outweighs whatever
damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and
4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public inter-
est.
698
Citing the same case law as the district court, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
"a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy," and the
burden of persuasion as to all four factors rests upon the Plaintiff.6 9
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the irrepoarable injury factor and
said it is "'the sine qua non of injunctive relief.' The court emphasized
that even if the Bush plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the
merits, the requirement to show an actual and imminent irreparable injury
must still be met.70 1 The Eleventh Circuit found that the Bush plaintiffs had
not demonstrated a threat of continuing irreparable harm.70 The court
elaborated and said Governor Bush and Secretary Cheney were not suffering
"serious harm" let alone "irreparable harm" because they had been certified
as the winners of Florida's electoral votes.703 Moreover, even if manual
696. Siegel III, 234 F. 3d at 1175 (citing Carillon Imps., Ltd. v. Frank Pesce Int'l
Group Ltd., 112 F.3d 1125, 11267 (11th Cir. 1997); Revette v. Int'l Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 740 F.2d 892, 893 (11th Cir. 1984); Harris Corp. v.
Nat'l Iranian Radio & Television, 691 F.2d 1344, 1354 (1lth Cir. 1982)).
697. Id. at 1175-76.
698. Id.
699. Id. at 1176 (citing All Care Nursing Serv., Inc. v. Bethesda Mem'l Hosp., Inc.,
887 F.2d 1535, 1537 (11th Cir. 1989)).
700. Id. (citations omitted).
701. Siegel III, 234 F.3d at 1176.
702. Id. at 1177.
703. Id.
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recounts were resumed in Florida pursuant to a state court order, it would be
highly speculative whether the results would place Vice President Gore and
Senator Lieberman ahead.704  The court noted that the case on appeal
involved recounts ordered by county canvassing boards and that if a state
court were to order recounts in a contest proceeding, it might raise different
legal issues.0 5 The Eleventh Circuit also declined to find that the "voter
plaintiffs'7 °6 were facing serious harm or imminent injury. The voter
plaintiffs did not claim they were either prevented from registering to vote,
prevented from voting, prevented from voting for the candidate of their
708choice, or that his or her vote was rejected or not counted.
The Eleventh Circuit rejected the Bush plaintiffs' contention that if
manual recounts proceeded "simply rejecting the results of those recounts
after the conclusion of this case will not repair the damage to the legitimacy
Bush presidency cause by 'broadcasting' the flawed results of a recount that
put Vice President Gore and Senator Lieberman ahead." 709 The Eleventh
Circuit rejected the Bush plaintiffs' assertion "that a violation of constitu-
tional rights always constitutes irreparable harm" and said that our case law
710has not reached that point.
In conclusion, the Eleventh Circuit reiterated that they "may reverse a
district court's denial of a preliminary injunction if and only if we find that
the court clearly abused its discretion."7 1 The court upheld the district
court's finding that the Bush plaintiffs had failed to show that immediate
irreparable harm would result if preliminary injunctive relief was not
ordered.712  "That critical finding remained just as compelling, and the
irreparability of the alleged injury is no more established, today [December
6, 2000]" than it was on November 13, 2000.7 13 The Eleventh Circuit
declined to decide the merits of the Bush plaintiffs' constitutional arguments
and stated "it is a 'fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial
restraint ... that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of
704. Id.
705. Id. at 1177 n.10.
706. The "voter plaintiffs" had each alleged that they had voted for Governor Bush and
Secretary Cheney. Siegel Ii, 234 F.3d at 1177.
707. Id.
708. Id.
709. Id.
710. Id.
711. Siegel II1, 234 F.3d at 1178.
712. Id.
713. Id.
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the necessity of deciding them.' ' 71 4 Given the court's view on the issue of
injury, it concluded there was no necessity to decide the constitutional
arguments.715
10. Chief Judge Anderson's Concurring Opinion on Equal Protection
716
Joining the per curiam opinion, Chief Judge Anderson set forth his
reasons why the Bush plaintiffs failed to state a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause.717 The chief judge began his discussion of equal
protection by stating the crux of the Bush plaintiffs' argument is that "some
ballots in counties not conducting manual recounts will not be counted
despite the voters' intent, because the ballots are not machine-legible, while
identical ballots in counties conducting manual recounts will be counted.
718
The chief judge began his review of the equal protection claim by
restating the United States Supreme Court's framework: "when a state
election law severely burdens voters' constitutional rights, it must be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest; however, lesser burdens
trigger less exacting review, and a state's important regulatory interest are
typically enough to justify reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions. 719
In the first step of his analysis, the chief judge considered whether
Florida's manual recount provision severely burdened the right of voters in
counties that did not conduct manual recounts. He stated that the Bush
plaintiffs could credibly argue that an inequitable burden would be placed on
voters simply because manual recounts were available in some counties and
not others.720 Logically, this would "lead to the untenable position that the
method of casting and counting votes would have to be identical in all states
714. Id. at 1179 n.12.
715. Id.
716. In Chief Judge Anderson's concurrence, he addressed the standard of review and
constitutional delegation of authority to the states and concluded that the Bush plaintiffs failed
to make the requisite showing of a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of their
claims, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a preliminary
injunction. Siegel III, 234 F.3d at 1179-81. This section of the article will focus on Judge
Anderson's concurring opinion regarding the Bush plaintiffs' equal protection claim. Judges
Tjoflat, Birch, Dubina and Carnes entered dissenting opinions, which are not discussed in this
article.
717. Id. 234 at 1181-86.
718. Id. at 1181-82.
719. Id. at 1182 (citing Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358
(1997)).
720. Id.
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and in every county of each state .... The only apparent way to avoid this
disparity would be for every state to use an identical method of count-
ing.",721 The chief judge pointed out that "no court has held that the mere use
of different methods of counting ballots constitutes an equal protection
violation" and that it would be "manifestly inconsistent with the command of
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, that presidential electors are to be appointed
in the manner directed by each state legislature.' 722 The chief judge also
noted that the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that the
recount provisions are "'within the ambit of the broad powers delegated to
the States by Art. I, § 4."723
The chief judge next turned to the Bush plaintiffs' unsuccessful attempt
to bolster their argument that all ballots should be treated exactly
alike.724 The Bush plaintiffs had suggested to the court that partisan
influences tainted Florida's manual recount procedures. Because the Florida
Democratic Party had requested manual recounts in Democratic counties and
because Florida's statute lacked guidelines to grant those manual recounts,
the canvassing boards' decisions whether to grant manual recounts were
affected by partisan influences. 725 Instead, the chief judge said the statute
itself specifically provides several safeguards, which reduce the risk of
partisan influences and, combined with judicial review, reduces the risk of
726partisan influences tainting the process. Additionally, the chief judge
noted that "any candidate has an equal right and an equal opportunity to
request manual recounts in any county," and the political parties were on
727
notice of this right and opportunity.
The chief judge then turned to an assessment of the severity of the
728impact on the right to vote. In his view, the scarcity of the evidence in the
record was significant. The Bush plaintiffs had not established partisan
manipulation or fraud nor did they claim that any canvassing board had
721. Siegel III, 234 F.3d at 716. This is the same logic used by the district court,
which stated "[ulnless and until each electoral county in the United States uses the exact same
automatic tabulation (and even then there may be systems malfunctions and the like), there
will be tabulating discrepancies depending on the method of tabulation)." Siegel I v. LePore,
120 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1052 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
722. Siegel II1, 234 F.3d at 1182 (citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 796
n.18 (1983); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968)).
723. Id. (quoting Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972)).
724. Id.
725. Id. at 1182-83 (referring to FLA. STAT. § 102.012-.171 (2000)).
726. Id. at 1183.
727. Siegel III, 234 F.3d at 1183.
728. Id.
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unfairly refused to conduct a manual recount.729 Instead, the Bush plaintiffs
merely argued that the canvassing board officials in Broward, Miami-Dade,
Palm Beach and Volusia Counties may have had strong personal interests in
the outcome of the election.730 The chief judge labeled the Bush plaintiffs'
argument as a "vague allegation of a possible manipulative or discriminatory
motive" that did not rise to the level of strict scrutiny of an equal protection
claim.
73
'
Based on his assessment of the Bush plaintiffs' equal protection claims,
the chief judge applied a reasonableness standard to judge the constitutional-
ity of Florida's manual recount statute:732  "when a state election law
provision imposes only 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon the
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, the 'State's important
regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the restric-
tions." 733 Chief Judge Anderson concluded that Florida had sufficiently
strong interests which justified the manual recounting of votes. He qualified
his conclusion by finding that: 1) Florida's manual recount provisions were
designed to remedy vote tabulation errors which could affect the outcome of
the election; 2) Florida's manual recount provisions were designed to arrive
at the true voters' intent; 3) Florida's manual recount provisions provide an
alternative method to discern the will of voters when doubt has been cast as
to the validity of a machine count; and 4) Florida has a strong interest in
insuring that the results of an election accurately reflect the intent of its
voters. 34
Turning to the Bush plaintiffs' argument that county-by-county
differences violated their equal protection rights, the chief judge reiterated
that the Florida Legislature had delegated to each county the power to decide
whether and how to conduct manual recounts and the state statute provided
the necessary guidelines and procedures.735 The chief judge identified
Florida's important regulatory interest as the efficient administration of
elections, which justified implementation of manual recount provisions on a
decentralized, localized basis.736
729. Id.
730. U at 1183-84.
731. Id. at 1184.
732. Siegel II, 234 F.3d at 1184.
733. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze,
460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)).
734. Siegel I1, 234 F.3d at 1184.
735. Id.
736. Id. at 1184-85.
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In further support of the chief judge's determination that the Bush
plaintiffs' claim of violation of equal protection did not warrant strict
scrutiny, he contrasted the facts of the instant case with United States
Supreme Court cases that had applied strict scrutiny.73 Unlike the Bush
plaintiffs' claims, the plaintiffs in those cases alleged they had been denied
the right to vote, or alleged that weighted voting systems arbitrarily and
systematically granted a lesser voice to some voters based on their
geographic location.738  He further supported his conclusion by citing
constitutional delegation of authority to the states to direct their own method
of a 3ointing presidential electors and confirmed the authority by case
law. The chief judge concluded that although inevitable variances will
result because manual recounts of ballots may take place in some counties
while ballots will be counted and recounted only by machine in other
counties, this alone does not severely burden the right to vote.
740
In conclusion, the chief judge said Florida's manual recount provision
does not limit a voters' ability to cast their votes, nor does it undermine the
certainty that their vote will be counted. 741 Although some ballots may
receive more scrutiny than others, the statute provided safeguards that
recounts will be open, fair, and accurate.742  There was no evidence
establishing partisan fraud or misconduct, nor was there any evidence of
errors in manual counting generating erroneous vote tabulations.743 Chief
Judge Anderson, in his special concurrence, said the Bush plaintiffs had
failed to demonstrate a severe impact on their equal protection rights and
thus, strict scrutiny of Florida's manual recount was not merited.
7
"
Florida's important regulatory interests justified the reasonable, nondis-
criminatory impact on the Bush plaintiffs' voting rights.
745
C. Summary of the Federal Cases
It is important to keep in mind that what was at stake here was the rights
of the voters. The right to vote is a fundamental right and thus, may trigger
737. Id. at 1185.
738. Id. (citing, for example, Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969)).
739. Siegel i, 234 F.3d at 1185.
740. Id.
741. Id.
742. Id.
743. Id. at 1186.
744. Siegel I1, 234 F.3d at 1186.
745. Id.
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equal protection concerns. Indeed, it sounds simple enough to say no state
shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." 746 When the 2000 Presidential Election occurred, Florida had in place
an election statute that provided guidelines and procedures for when and
how manual recounts were to take place. Only a few of Florida's counties
were proceeding with manual recounts when Siegel I v. LePore was filed in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
As the district court held and Chief Judge Anderson said in his specially
concurring opinion, unless and until each state, and each county within those
states, utilize the exact same voting methods and procedures, there may be
unequal treatment of ballots. The Eleventh Circuit refused to overturn the
district court's denial of an injunction against the recounts then proceeding
under section 102.166 of the Florida Statutes. Indeed, three of those
recounts proceeded to completion, and the vote totals from two of those
counties were included in the certified vote total signed by Secretary Harris,
which was approved by the United States Supreme Court in Bush 11 v.
Gore.
747
Fifteen days after denying certiorari of Governor Bush and Secretary
Cheney's petition for certiorari review in Siegel II v. LePore,748 and without
citing any factual evidence or any prior precedent, Justice Scalia said, in
writing his concurrence when the Court issued its injunction against further
recounts: 749
The issue is not, as the dissent puts it, whether "[c]ounting every
legally cast vote ca[n] constitute irreparable harm." One of the
principal issues in the appeal we have accepted is precisely whether
the votes that have been ordered to be counted are, under a reason-
746. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
747. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). The recounted vote totals of Broward County and Volusia
County were certified in the vote totals of Secretary Harris on November 26, 2000, as well as
those from other Republican leaning counties that had completed recounts on their own prior
to November 26, 2000, without a request from any party. See Manual Recount of Ballots,
Error in Voter Tabulation, Advisory Legal Op. Fla. Att'y Gen. 2000-65 (Nov. 14, 2000). The
counties that conducted recounts on their own prior to certification were Franklin, Gadsden,
Hamilton, Lafayette, Seminole, Union, and Taylor Counties. See Aff. of Achim Bergmann,
Florida Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 35
(Fla. 15th Cir. CL 2000) (No. CLOO-1 1078).
748. 531 U.S. 1005 (2000).
749. Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000) (granting application for stay; ordering that
the mandate of the Supreme Court of Florida, Case No. SCOO-2431, stayed, pending further
order of the Court; treating the application for stay as a petition for writ of certiorari; and
granting the writ of certiorari).
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able interpretation of Florida law, "legally cast vote[s]." The count-
ing of votes that are of questionable legality does in my view
threaten irreparable harm to petitioner Bush, and to the country, by
casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his
election.750
The determination of what constituted a legal vote, whether under the
procedure employed pursuant to section 102.166 or section 102.168 of the
Florida Statutes, belonged to the courts of the State of Florida and ultimately
751on appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida. It was an interpretation of
Florida law to be made by Florida courts. In denying certiorari of Siegel v.
LePore while accepting certiorari in Bush v. Gore, the United States
Supreme Court sustained the hand recounting of votes under section 102.166
of the Florida Statutes, the statute litigated on equal protection grounds in
Siegel, while vacating the hand recounting of votes under section 102.168 of
the Florida Statutes, the statute litigated on equal protection grounds in
Bush. Under either statute, the hand recounting of votes was to be
supervised by the Supreme Court of Florida, which makes the ultimate
determination of what constitutes a legal vote. An analysis that leaves
constitutional hand-recounted votes under section 102.166, while declaring
unconstitutional hand-recounted votes under section 102.168 is hard to
grasp. The Supreme Court of Florida was delegated the authority by the
Florida Legislature to determine what constituted a legal vote in an election
of presidential electors. If an equal protection problem existed as to the
disparate treatment of legal votes, it would have existed on election day
when some voters' votes were processed by machines better able to
determine voter intent than the malfunctioning punch card ballot ma-
chines.752 This disparate treatment was compounded in Palm Beach County
by the existence of the butterfly ballot. If an equal protection problem
existed on election day, because votes did not have an equal chance of being
750. Id. at 1046-47 (Scalia, J., concurring) (alterations in original).
751. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1238 (Fla.
2000); Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1256 (Fla. 2000) (citing Delahunt v. Johnston,
671 N.E.2d 1241 (Mass. 1996)) (holding that a vote should be counted as a legal vote if it
properly indicates the voter's intent with reasonable certainty); Pullen v. Mulligan, 561
N.E.2d 585, 613 (1990)) (holding that votes could be recounted by manual means to the
extent that the voter's intent could be determined with reasonable certainty, despite the
existence of a statute which provided that punch card ballots were to be recounted by
automated tabulation equipment).
752. See generally Palermo, supra note 370.
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counted on that day, the remedy was not to stop counting votes. The remedy
was to effectuate an election that counted all votes and honored democracy.
VIII. THE CONTEST CASES
A. Florida Circuit Court Cases
After the Supreme Court of Florida issued its decision in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board I v. Harris, the manual recounts of the ballots in
four counties proceeded. However, they did not proceed without incident.
Specifically, in either the manual recounts based on the protest or in the
post-election statutorily required automatic recount, four series of events
occurred which would be the subject of future litigation. Those events were:
1) the Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board's refusal to manually review
approximately 9000 ballots which the machine registered as non-votes; 2)
the approximately 3300 votes that were reviewed by the Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board under what Vice President Gore alleged to be an incorrect
per se rule; 3) the Nassau County Canvassing Board's decision to transmit
the election night returns, rather than the machine recount returns, to the
Secretary of State for inclusion in the certified result; and 4) the Florida
Election Canvassing Commission's decision to certify the election results
without the inclusion of the revised Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Nassau
Counties results.
1. Miami-Dade County's Refusal to Count
"On November 9, 2000, the Miami-Dade Democratic Party made a
timely request for a manual recount under section 102.166 of the Florida
Statutes. Initially, the Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board decided
against a full manual recount. However, the Board later voted to begin a
manual recount of all the ballots cast in Miami-Dade County, and the
recount began on November 19, 2000.754 The Board decided the morning of
November 22, 2000 that, in order to meet the certification deadline set by the
Supreme Court of Florida,755 it would focus its manual recount on the
approximately 10,500 ballots that had not registered a vote in the presiden-
753. Gore II, 772 So. 2d at 1258.
754. Id.
755. See generally Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. L 772 So. 2d at 1220.
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756
tial election, commonly referred to as nonvotes or undervotes. During the
two days of counting, the Board had reviewed approximately twenty percent
of the 635 Miami-Dade precincts, finding approximately 1750 untabulated
ballots, 388 of which had legal votes that the machines had failed to
tabulate.757  Later in the afternoon of November 22, 2000, the Board
discontinued its manual count." 8 The Board also voted to discard the 388
votes that it had tabulated up until that point.759
2. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board's Alleged Use of the Wrong Rule
Pursuant to a protest on November 9, 2000, the Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board commenced a manual recount of the ballots in the
presidential election. To count these ballots, the Board adopted a per se rule
that, unless there is a physical perforation showing the separation of one or
more comers of the rectangular chad, the ballot would not be considered to
have a legal vote.760 On November 14, 2000, the Florida Democratic Party
moved the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Florida, located in Palm Beach County,
for emergency declaratory relief that the Board's rule for exclusion of ballots
conflicted with Florida law. On November 15, 2000, the circuit court
granted the declaratory relief and issued an oral order in that regard.6 In a
756. Pet. for Writ of Mandamus or Other Writ or, in the Alternative, Review of Trial
Ct. Rulings and Brief of Appellants at 13, Gore II v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2000) (No.
SCOO-2385).
757. Id.
758. The basis of the Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board's decision to discontinue
its manual recount is of considerable dispute to this day. Vice President Gore and Senator
Lieberman claimed that the Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board's decision was impacted
by a "campaign of personal attacks upon Canvassing Board members and election personnel."
Id. According to Gore and Lieberman, this "near riot" significantly compromised the
decision making of the canvassing board. Id. They pointed to a news report of the incident
that stated: "One nonpartisan member of the board, David Leahy, the Supervisor of Elections,
said after the vote that the protests were one factor that he had weighed in his decision." Id.
See also Dexter Filkins & Dana Canedy, Counting the Vote, Miami-Dade County: Protest
Influenced Miami-Dade's Decision to Stop Recount, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2000, at 41A.
The Supreme Court of Florida avoided embroiling itself in this heated issue by simply
stating that the Board's stated reason for the suspension of the manual recount was that it
would be impossible to complete the recount before the deadline. Gore II!, 772 So. 2d at
1258.
759. Pet. for Writ of Mandamus at 14, Gore I1 (No. SCOO-2385).
760. Id. at 15.
761. The declaratory order stated in full:
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written order on November 22, 2000, the circuit court clarified its oral ruling
declaring that the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board "cannot have a
policy in place of per se exclusion of any ballot.' 762 Rather, the circuit court
declared that "[w]here the intention of the voter can be fairly and satisfacto-
rily ascertained, that intention should be given effect."763 The Board was
ordered to cease applying the per se exclusion of the ballots. However, Vice
President Gore and Senator Lieberman maintained that the wrong standard
continued to be applied to some 3300 ballots that were excluded by the Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board.7"
3. Nassau County Canvassing Board's Transmission of Election Night
Results
Nassau County, a small, northeastern county in Florida, played a
significant role in the 2000 Presidential Election contest. On November 7,
The State election statute contemplates that where an electronic or electrome-
chanical voting systems are used, no vote is to be declared invalid or void if there is a
clear indication of the intention of the voter.
The present policy utilized by the local election officials restricts the canvassing
board's ability to determine the intention of the voter.
Therefore, the Palm Beach Canvassing Commission has the discretion to utilize
whatever methodology it deems proper to determine the true intention of the voter and
it should not be restricted in that task. To that end, the present policy of a per se
exclusion of any ballot that does not have a partially punched or hanging chad, is not in
compliance with the intention of the law.
The Canvassing Board has the discretion to consider those ballots and accept
them or reject them.
DONE AND ORDERED in chambers at West Palm Beach, Palm Beach County,
Florida, this 15th day of November, 2000.
Dec. Order, Florida Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 8 Fla. L.
Weekly Supp. 35 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 2000) (No. CLOO-1 1078).
762. Florida Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 8 Fla. L. Weekly
Supp. 35, 36 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 2000).
763. Id. The court also provided guidance to the Palm Beach County Canvassing
Board when it stated that "each ballot must be considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances." Id. The court's order was not clear on what the legal intent of the voter
standard should be. Vice President Gore and Senator Lieberman might have made a strategic
error by allowing this Order to stand, allowing the Palm Beach County recount to continue
during the protest phase instead of appealing this circuit court decision. This appeal would
have stopped the counting in Palm Beach County in the protest phase, but it would have also
required the Supreme Court of Florida to directly address the intent of the voter standard for
what we now know would have been a necessary contest phase in the election.
764. Pet. for Writ of Mandamus at 15, Gore II (No. SCOO-2385).
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2000, the Nassau County Supervisor of Elections informed the Florida
Department of State that Vice President Gore and Senator Lieberman
received 6952 votes, and Governor Bush and Secretary Cheney received
76516,404 votes. On November 8, 2000, after conducting a machine recount,
the Nassau County Canvassing Board certified the results of a machine
recount which gave Gore and Lieberman 6879 votes and Bush and Cheney
16,280 votes. 76' The difference in the margin resulted in a net gain of fifty-
one votes for Gore and Lieberman. On November 24, 2000, the Board
submitted a new certification of election results, adopting the unofficial
767totals calculated on November 7th. Subsequently, Vice President Gore
included the vote discrepancy in his complaint to contest the election.
Section 102.141(4) of the Florida Statutes stated that a canvassing
board shall order a recount of votes cast with respect to an office where a
candidate was defeated by one-half of a percent or less of the votes cast for
such office. The statute also stated that if there was a discrepancy between
the returns of the machine count and the tabulation of the ballots cast, the
tabulations of the recount shall be presumed correct and such votes shall be
canvassed accordingly. 768 The canvassing board was obligated, in the
absence of a protest, to certify the results of the recount to the Department of
769State, the clerk of the court, and the supervisor of elections. No protest
was ever filed by the Bush legal team to challenge the certified results of the
November 8th recount.770 Vice President Gore claimed that the statutorily
mandated machine recount was the binding total to be used in the certified
results. If this claim was sustained, Gore and Lieberman would have gained
765. Allison Schaefers, Recount of Ballots Flawed, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Jacksonville),
Nov. 29, 2000, at P1.
766. Id.
767. See Richard Perez-Pena, Counting the Vote, Nassau County: One County Is
Puzzling over a Mystery Involving 218 Votes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2000, at A15.
768. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000). No evidence was ever presented by Nassau
County to overcome the statutory presumption under section 102.141(4) of the Florida
Statutes.
769. Morse v. Dade County Canvassing Bd., 456 So. 2d 1314 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
770. See Perez-Pena, supra note 767 (noting that the Nassau County Supervisor of
Elections called for a manual recount as the only way to resolve the discrepancy, but the board
could not order one without a request from one of the campaigns, and no such request was
made). "Bush opposed Gore's bid for manual recounts in southern Florida, and Republican
officials in Nassau County said the governor's case would have been undermined by asking
for one elsewhere." Id.
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a fifty-one total vote advantage against Bush and Cheney in the certified vote
total.
4. Florida Election Canvassing Commission's Refusal to Include the Results
of Manual Recounts
On November 26, 2000 the Florida Election Canvassing Commission
certified the results of the 2000 Presidential Election that took place on
November 7th.77 The results did not include the results of either the
completed or the partial Palm Beach County manual recount." 2 The results
also did not include the results of the partial manual recount in Miami-Dade
County or the untabulated votes in Mviami-Dade County.773 Furthermore, the
certification did not include the results of the statutorily mandated Nassau
County machine recount.
774
B. Supreme Court of Florida
On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida considered the Gore
contest in Gore v. Harris.775 In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court of Florida
affirmed in part, reversed in part and held that all the undervotes in the State
of Florida must be manually counted and included in the certified totals.776
After considering the federal law at issue, including title 3, section 5 of
the United States Code requirement that "by laws enacted prior to the day
fixed for the appointment of the electors," the Supreme Court of Florida
determined that the issues were controlled by section 102.168 of the Florida
Statutes.777 That provision, the court determined, established that the
manner chosen by the legislature to contest an election shall occur in a
judicial forumL7 78 The court also recognized that the purpose of the contest
provisions was "to afford a simple and speedy means of contesting election
771. Pet. for Writ of Mandamus at 18, Gore II (No. SC0O-2385).
772. 1&
773. Id.
774. 1l
775. The Supreme Court of Florida once again accepted jurisdiction based on its "pass-
through" jurisdiction, avoiding a hearing by a Florida District Court of Appeal. FLA. CONST.
art. V, § 3(b)(4).
776. Gore I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000).
777. Id. at 1248.
778. Id. at 1249. See FLA. STAT. § 102.168(1) (2000) ("[T]he certification of
election.., of any person to office ... may be contested in the circuit court by any
unsuccessful candidate for such office .. ") (emphasis added).
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to stated offices." 779 Furthermore, the court acknowledged that the contest
provision had been substantially revised in 1999, improving the access of a
losing candidate to a judicial resolution and providing additional grounds for
a candidate to contest an election. 780 The court then undertook a "common-
sense" approach to construing the election code and the contest statute.
779. Gore II1, 772 So. 2d at 1249. See Farmer v. Carson, 148 So. 557, 559 (Fla.
1933).
780. The 1999 amendments to section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes are as follows
(words stricken are deletions; words underlined are additions):
(1) Fxrept a prnvided in s 109 171 the certification of election or nomination of any
person to office, or of the result on any question submitted by referendum, may be
contested in the circuit court by any unsuccessful candidate for such office or nomina-
tion thereto nr hy nny electnr quififed to vnte in the el tinn related to guth mndidgey
or by any taxpayer, respectively.
(2) Such contestant shall file a complaint, together with the fees prescribed in chapter
28, with the clerk of the court within 10 days after midnight of the date the last county
canvassing board empowered to canvass the returns rertfie the. reslts of the elet'tinn
heing 'nntegted Ar within 5 dnyz nftpr midnight nf the dste the lnt enjinty ranwmzing
hoard empnwered tA ranvas the. returns tertifleg the rmnilt- nf that parti i ar clertinn
fnllnwing n prntet pnnant tn q IQ? 1Iq6(1) whichever ne.re later adj,n,, annd
(3) The complaint shall set forth the grounds on which the contestant intends to estab-
lish his or her right to such office or set aside the result of the election on a submitted
referendum. The grrnkdq of cnnte ting an eletnn under thi- ;ectinn nre'
(a) Misconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part of any election official or any
member of the canvassing board sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the
election.
(b) Ineligibility of the successful candidate for the nomination or office in
dispute.
(c) Receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes
sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election.
(d) Proof that any elector, election official, or canvassing board member was
given or offered a bribe or reward in money, property or any other thing of value for the
purpose of procuring the successful candidate's nomination or election or determining
the result on any question submitted by referendum.
(e) Any other cause or allegation which, if sustained, would show that a person
other than the successful candidate was the person duly nominated or elected to the
office in question or that the outcome of the election on a question submitted by
referendum was contrary to the result declared by the canvassing board or election
board.
(4) The canvassing board or election board shall be the proper party defendant,
and the successful candidate shall be an indispensable party to any action brought to
contest the election or nomination of a candidate.
(5) A statement of the grounds of contest may not be rejected, nor the proceed-
ings dismissed, by the court for any want of form if the grounds of contest provided in
the statement are sufficient to clearly inform the defendant of the particular proceeding
or cause for which the nomination or election is contested.
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In the 1999 legislative revision of the contest provision, the majority
determined that the amendments strengthened the rights of unsuccessful
candidates7 8 2 including the statutory right to a proper count that had existed
since 1845. 7 8 That right was reemphasized with the contest provision
amendments.783
(6) A copy of the complaint shall be served upon the defendant and any other
person named therein in the same manner as in other civil cases under the laws of this
state. Within 10 days after the complaint has been served, the defendant must file an
answer admitting or denying the allegations on which the contestant relies or stating
that the defendant has no knowledge or information concerning the allegations, which
shall be deemed a denial of the allegations, and must state any other defenses, in law or
fact, on which the defendant relies. If an answer is not filed within the time prescribed,
the defendant may not be granted a hearing in court to assert any claim or objection
that is required by this subsection to be stated in an answer.
(7) Any candidate, qualified elector, or taxpayer presenting such a contests to a
circuit judge is entitled to an immediate hearing. However, the court in its discretion
may limit the time to be consumed in taking testimony, with a view therein to the
circumstances of the matter and to the proximity of any succeeding primary or other
election.
(8) The circuit judge to whom the contest is presented may fashion such orders
as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the complaint is investi-
gated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any alleged wrong, and to provide
any relief appropriate under such circumstances.
Ch. 99-339, § 3, 1999 Fla. Laws 3544, 3547.
781. To illustrate, the court pointed to the unsuccessful candidate's right to an
immediate hearing, and the express authority of the circuit judge to fashion any necessary
orders to ensure that each allegation in the complaint is investigated, examined or checked.
See FLA. STAT. § 102.168(7)-(8) (2000).
782. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1251. See State ex rel. Millinor v. Smith, 144 So. 333,
335 (Fla. 1932).
The right to a correct count of the ballots in an election is a substantial right which it is
the privilege of every candidate for office to insist on, in every case where there has
been a failure to make a proper count, call, tally, or return of the votes as required by
law, and this fact has been duly established as the basis for granting such relief.
Id. (emphasis added).
783. See Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1251-52.
Recounts are an internal part of the election process. For one's vote, when cast,
to be translated into a true message, that vote must be accurately counted, and if
necessary, recounted. The moment an individual's vote becomes subject to error in the
vote tabulation process, the easier it is for that vote to be diluted.
Furthermore, with voting statistics tracing a decline in voter turnout and in
increase in public skepticism, every effort should be made to ensure the integrity of the
electoral process.
Integrity is particularly crucial at the tabulation stage because many elections
occur in extremely competitive jurisdictions, where very close election results are
always possible. In addition, voters and the media expect rapid and accurate tabulation
20011
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Turning to the trial court's order,784 the Supreme Court of Florida
addressed Vice President Gore's three claims of error based on the trial
court's analysis of the Miami-Dade ballots. First, the court dealt with the
claim that the trial court erred by using an improper standard of review. The
court determined that the trial court improperly applied an appellate abuse of
discretion standard to the contest proceedings, a de novo judicial proceed-
ing. 85  As a result, the court determined that the trial court improperly
relinquished its own authority to the canvassing boards.7
6
Second, the court addressed Bush's argument that all the votes in
Miami-Dade County and all the votes cast statewide, not a particular class of
votes in particular counties, must be hand counted. The court looked to the
text of the contest statute, highlighting that the grounds for contest to include
"rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt
the result of the election.''787  The court determined that in order for a
contestant to bring a challenge to a specific number of legal votes, logic
dictated that the contestant establish the "number of legal votes" that were
not counted. 788 The court determined that the text of the statute mandated
that the number is limited to the votes identified and challenged under the
789statute, not those in the entire county. Because Vice President Gore had
of election returns, regardless of whether the election is close or one sided. Nonethe-
less, when large numbers of votes are to be counted, it can be expected that some error
will occur in tabulation or in canvassing.
Id. (quoting from the Florida House of Representatives Committee on Election Reform 1997
Interim Project on Election Contests and Recounts).
784. See Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4.
2000).
785. Gore il, 772 So. 2d at 1252. The trial court order stated "[t]he local boards have
been given broad discretion which no Court may overrule, absent a clear abuse of
discretion." Id. "The court further finds that the Dade Canvassing Board did not abuse its
discretion .... The Palm Beach County Board did not abuse its discretion in its review and
recounting process." Id.
786. Id. ("In applying the abuse of discretion standard of review to the Boards'
actions, the trial court relinquished an improper degree of its own authority to the Boards.
This was error.").
787. Id. at 1253. See FLA. STAT. § 102.168 (3)(c) (2000) ("Receipt of a number of
illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the
result of the election.").
788. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1253.
789. Id. The court also discussed, as an evidentiary matter, whether uncontested votes
would be relevant. Id. The court determined that counting uncontested votes would be
irrelevant because it does not establish that there are legal votes that have been rejected.
Id. However, the court recognized that the legal votes that exist in the statewide undervotes
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met the threshold requirement to contest the election by establishing that
there were a sufficient number of uncounted votes to "at least place in doubt
the result of the election," Gore was entitled to relief on his claim in Miami-
Dade.79
Although Gore had only contested the undervotes in Miami-Dade
County, the Supreme Court of Florida then determined, absent any reference
to authority or precedent, that it is "absolutely essential" to conduct a
statewide manual recount. 91 Relief that did not include all similarly situated
voters, stated the court, would not be "valid under [the] circum-
stances."'792 The basis for this conclusion is that the election should be
determined by the Florida voters, not by a party's choice of ballots to
contest,793 because the Florida Legislature had vested the citizens of Florida
with the right to elect presidential electors, 9 placing the election of
presidential electors under the Florida election scheme. 795 Furthermore,
when a candidate contests an election, however, the legislature had provided
a broad grant of judicial authority to resolve the dispute and fashion relief.
The court explained that, consistent with the legislative policy, it had relied
upon the will of the voter.79
would be proper evidence in a contest proceeding and would be relevant to fashioning any
relief. Id.
790. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1254-55.
791. Id. at 1253.
792. Id.
793. Id. ("his election should be determined by a careful examination of the votes of
Florida's citizens and not by strategies extraneous to the voting process.").
794. FLA. STAT. § 103.011 (2000).
795. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1253.
796. Id. The Supreme Court of Florida established this "legislative policy" by looking
to section 101.5614(5)-(6) of the Florida Statutes. Id. at 1254 ("[T]he Legislature has
mandated that no vote shall be ignored 'if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter'
on the ballot, unless it is 'impossible to determine the elector's choice .... ."'). In his dissent,
Chief Justice Wells questioned the majority's use of section 101.5614 to establish a
"legislative policy" of proper hand counts because section 101.5614 authorizes the creation of
a duplicate ballot when a ballot is too damaged to go through a counting machine. Id. at 1267
(Wells, C.J., dissenting). However, presumably out of concern of overarching title 3, section
5 of the United States Code, the court diminished the value of its reliance of other states that
have decided issues regarding the "intent of the voter," citing those cases only to illustrate that
"other states also have recognized [the] principle." Id. at 1256. See also Delahunt v.
Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241 (Mass. 1996) (holding that a vote should be counted as a legal
vote if it properly indicates the voter's intent with reasonable certainty); Duffy v. Mortenson,
497 N.W.2d 437 (S.D. 1993) (determining and applying that every marking found where a
vote should be should be treated as an intended vote in the absence of clear evidence to the
20011
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Finally, the court addressed the burden of proof placed upon Vice
President Gore by the trial court. Basing the necessary burden on a case
797from 1982, the trial court determined that Gore had not demonstrated by a
"preponderance of a reasonable probability" that the results would have been
different if the votes in Miami-Dade County were counted.798 The Supreme
Court of Florida explained that this interpretation was erroneous because the
Florida Legislature amended the burden in 1999. Among the 1999
amendments to the contest provision was the inclusion of a list of grounds to
contest an election, including section 102.168(3)(c), which stated that the
"receipt of a number of illegal votes or a number of legal votes sufficient to
change or place in doubt the result of the election."799 Implying reasonable-
ness to the statutory standard, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that
demonstrating a "reasonable probability" is a significantly higher burden
than demonstrating a "reasonable doubt" in order to obtain relief.8re Because
there were 9000 undervotes in an election decided by only 537 votes, Gore
met the statutory threshold contest burden.
80 1
With the proper standard of review, the Supreme Court of Florida
considered the allegations in the complaint, requiring them to determine
what constituted a "legal vote."80 2  The court turned to the "legislative
policy" established in the statutory scheme, determining that the legislature
strongly emphasized discerning a voter's intent.803 Furthermore, the court
determined that it, like other states, has repeatedly held that if the voter's
intent may be discerned from the ballot then the vote constitutes a legal
contrary); Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585 (11. 1990) (holding that votes could be
recounted by manually to the extent that voter's intent could be determined with reasonable
certainty, despite the existence of a statute which provided that punch card ballots were to be
recounted by automated tabulation equipment). Both Delahunt and Pullen were cited by the
Supreme Court of Florida in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I v. Harris.
797. Gore 11, 772 So. 2d at 1255.
[lt is well established and reflected in the opinion of Judge Joanos and Smith v. Tine
[sic], that in order to contest election results under Section 102.168 of the Florida
Statutes, the Plaintiff must show that, but for the irregularity, or inaccuracy claimed,
the result of the election would have been different, and he or she would have been the
winner.
Id. (quoting the trial court's analysis in Gore I v. Harris, which referenced Smith v. Tynes, 412
So. 2d 925 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
798. Id.
799. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c) (2000).
800. Gore 111, 772 So. 2d at 1255.
801. Id. at 1256.
802. Id.
803. Id.
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vote. °4 Therefore, a legal vote is one in which there is a "clear indication of
the intent of the voter."
The court then turned to whether the failure of a county canvassing
board to count a legal vote constituted "rejection. ' '80 6 The court looked to
the legislative intent to import the common law meaning of "rejection,
807
and the cases interpreting the common law quo warranto action.8°' By doing
so, the court recognized that "rejection" includes the failure to count legal
votes. 809 It concluded that its analysis of the word "rejection" comported
with United States Supreme Court precedent and with other jurisdictions.s?°
1. The Trial Court's Refusal to Review Approximately 9000 Miami-Dade
Undervotes
Turning to the facts of the instant case, the Supreme Court of Florida
first considered the trial court's refusal to review approximately 9000
Miami-Dade undervotes. 811 The court determined that the trial court erred
812
on two grounds. First, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the
trial court erred by finding that the Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board
had not abused its discretion by failing to count the ballots.8 " Rather, the
Supreme Court of Florida determined that the results of the sample manual
recount and the commencement of a full manual recount triggered the
Canvassing Board's "mandatory obligation to recount all the ballots in the
county. 81
804. Id.
805. Gore I1. 772 So. 2d at 1256.
806. Id.
807. Id. at 1257.
808. Id. See State ex reL Clark v. Klingensmith, 163 So. 704 (Fla. 1935) (discussing
the court's conclusion that not counting votes was a rejection of votes).
809. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1257.
810. Id. See Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1973). The Roudebush court stated:
If a recount is conducted in any county, the voting machine tallies are checked and the
sealed bags containing the paper ballots are opened. The recount commission may
make new and independent determinations as to which ballots shall be counted. In
other words, it may reject ballots initially counted and count ballots initially rejected.
I
811. GoreIII,772So.2dat 1258.
812. Id. at 1259.
813. Id.
814. Id. at 1258 (citing Miami-Dade County Democratic Party v. Miami-Dade County
Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000)). The Supreme Court of
Florida also determined that the trial court erred by not following the controlling precedent of
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida determined that the trial
court erred by treating the contest as an appellate review of the Miami-Dade
County Canvassing Board's actions rather than a de novo judicial review.815
The responsibility to determine whether legal votes were rejected sufficient
to change or place in doubt the results of the election lies squarely upon the
trial court.816 Without ever examining the ballots that Vice President Gore
claimed the machine failed to register as a vote, the trial court concluded that
there was no probability of a different result, refusing to address the issue
and denying Gore the only evidence that can be relied upon to establish that
a remedy is appropriate.
8 17
2. The Trial Court's Refusal to Consider the 3300 Votes in Palm Beach
County
The Supreme Court of Florida distinguished the Palm Beach County
votes from the Miami-Dade County votes.
[U]like the approximately 9000 ballots in Miami-Dade that the County
Canvassing Board did not manually recount, the Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board did complete a manual recount of these 3300 votes
and concluded that because the intent of the voter in these 3300 bal-
the Third District Court of Appeal. See Pardo v. State, 596 So. 2d 665, 666 (Fla. 1992).
The trial court was confronted with motions to count votes on the first and second day
of the contest based upon the decision of Miami Dade County Democratic Party. Given the
time urgency to begin the counting process, the following motions were brought to begin the
process: Mot. to Conduct Statewide Manual Recount of all 180,000 "Undervotes" &
"Overvotes" in Florida; Emergency Mot. to Commence Counting of Votes in Miami-Dade and
Palm Beach Counties Pursuant to Beckstrom and Request for Immediate Hr'g; Mot. to Place
Disputed Miami-Date Ballots in the Registry of the Ct.; Mot. to Place Disputed Palm Beach
Ballots in the Registry of the Ct., Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d
Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000). The Second Circuit rejected the motions and denied them. On
December 1, 2000, the Supreme Court of Florida refused to hear the interlocutory appeal on
the court's refusal to order the recount that Vice President Gore was lawfully entitled to in
Miami-Dade County. Gore II v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 269, 270 (Fla. 2000). This may have been
in part because of the circuit court's wrongful refusal to sign an order denying the motions to
count the votes.
815. Gore Iil, 772 So. 2d at 1252.
816. Id. at 1250.
817. Id. at 1259. The Supreme Court of Florida saw this as the "ultimate Catch-22,
acceptance of the only evidence that will resolve the issue but a refusal to examine such
evidence." Id. Cf. Pullen v. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585 (Ill. 1990).
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lots was not discernible, these ballots did not constitute 'legal
votes. , s18
The Supreme Court of Florida found no error in the trial court's
determination that Vice President Gore failed to establish a preliminary basis
for relief as to the 3300 Palm Beach County votes.8 19 The court said that
Gore had "failed to make a threshold showing that 'legal votes' were
rejected. ' ' 20 Although the court reiterated that the trial court does not review
a canvassing board's actions under an abuse of discretion standard, the court,
without explanation, went on to hold that "in a contest proceeding [the
circuit court] does not have the obligation de novo to simply repeat an
otherwise-proper manual count of the ballots., 821 The court then held that
the canvassing board's actions may constitute evidence that a ballot does or
does not qualify as a legal vote.822 The court affirmed the trial court's denial
of relief and stated that Vice President Gore "failed to introduce any
evidence to refute the Canvassing Board's determination that the 3,300
ballots did not constitute 'legal votes."' 823 The Supreme Court of Florida
selectively applied the de novo review standard when it held that there was
to be de novo review by the trial court as to the Miami-Dade County ballots,
but on the other hand, said the trial court was correct to accept the counts
that had come out of Palm Beach County.
Vice President Gore had produced evidence at trial before the Second
Circuit Court of Florida of specific examples of legal ballots that were not
counted. 824  The trial court repeatedly refused to review the contested
ballots. 825 In light of the record, the Supreme Court of Florida was presented
818. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1259.
819. Ud at 1259-60.
820. Id. at 1260.
821. Id.
822. Id
823. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1260 (emphasis added).
824. During the contest trial, Vice President Gore admitted into evidence transcripts of
the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board as well as "ballots reviewed by the Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board, which [had been] determined to be an undervote, an overvote, or a
vote for a candidate, other than Gore/Lieberman, which [had] been the subject of Democratic
Party objections . .. ." Tr. of Contest Trial Before Judge Sauls, Dec. 2, 2000, at 43-44, Gore I
v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000).
825. See Gore I1 v. Harris, No. SCOO-2385 (Fla. Dec. 1, 2000) (order dismissing,
without prejudice, Vice President Gore's petition for 'Writ of Mandamus or Other Writ or, in
the Alternative, Review of Trial Court Rulings"). This order denied Gore's request to
immediately commence counting the contested ballots that the circuit court refused to
2001]
139
: Nova Law Review 26, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
to review, the court's analysis merits criticism. The court failed to fully
examine the trial court record, which contained specific exanples evidenc-
ing legal ballots that were not counted in Palm Beach, and expert
testimony from both sides that manual review of ballots were necessary in
close elections. 27 During the two-day evidentiary trial before the circuit
court, Vice President Gore submitted 3808 ballots that were in question, as
well as the transcripts of the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board.828 The
ballots, which were admitted into evidence, contained clear evidence of legal
votes that were excluded by the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,
including: 1) ballots where the voter mistakenly voted for one presidential
candidate, taped over the wrongly punched chad and then voted for Al Gore,
were declared overvotes and not counted;829 2) a damaged ballot on which
the voter wrote in the name of Al Gore for President was declared an
overvote and not counted;830 3) several ballots were declared undervotes and
not counted where, consistent with other races on the ballot, the voter made
a pinhole in the chad for Al Gore for President, which did not fully dislodge
the chad;831 and 4) a ballot was rejected as an undervote where "one comer is
definitely detached, and... [a Board member] can see right through it"
review. Certainly, a de novo review to make a legal determination as to what constitutes legal
votes cannot occur without a court examining the ballots.
826. Tr. of Palm Beach Canvassing Board, Nov. 19, 2000, at 66, 72-73, 75-76, 82,
84-85, Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000).
827. Experts from both sides concluded that a manual review of contested ballots was
necessary to ascertain voter intent. For example, Plaintiffs' expert witness, Kimball Brace,
testified that a manual review of punch card ballots might be marked due to defects or
limitations in the machines, or by the failure of the voter to completely follow instructions,
such that a machine would not register a vote that the voter intended to cast. Tr. of Contest
Trial Before Judge Sauls, Dec. 2, 2000, at 78-83, 89-90, 95, Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808,
2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000).
Defendants' expert witness, John Ahmann, testified that a manual review of punch card
ballots was necessary in very close elections because of limitations in the accuracy of machine
counts. The build-up of chads in machines can prevent voters from dislodging a chad, and so
requires that machines need to be cleaned. Tr. of Contest Trial Before Judge Sauls, Dec. 3,
2000, at 439, 441-43, Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec.
4, 2000).
828. See discussion supra note 827.
829. Tr. of Palm Beach Canvassing Board, Nov. 19, 2000, at 66, 75-76, 82, and 84-
85.
830. Tr. of Palm Beach Canvassing Board, Nov. 18, 2000, at 94-97.
831. Id. at 20-21.
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because the Board said the "policy we adopted before starting was the two-
comer... approach.
832
Pursuant to section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes, "the [trial] court's
responsibility is to determine whether 'legal votes' were rejected sufficient
to change or place in doubt the results of the election."8 33 The determination
of what constitutes a "legal vote" is subject to de novo review by Florida
834
courts. It is a legal determination to be made by a court, not a factual
determination.835 Without ever examining the 3300 ballots placed into
evidence by Vice President Gore, the trial court simply concluded that the
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board had acted within its discretion in the
counting process when it refused to count those ballots as legal votes. 36 The
trial court, as well as the Supreme Court of Florida, simply chose to ignore
prima facie evidence that legal votes had not been counted-the ballots
themselves, as reflected in the transcripts of the Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board.
Vice President Gore did not request a recount of all Palm Beach County
ballots. He properly identified and introduced into evident 3808 legal
ballots, which if properly counted, could have changed the result of the
election.837 The Supreme Court of Florida's analysis is based on the
proposition that the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board had reviewed all
of the ballots. Merely because the Palm Beach County ballots had been
counted once by hand, did not satisfy the court's obligation to determine
whether there was a "rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to
change or place in doubt the result of the election. 83 If the Board's review
was improper and it had unlawfully ignored legal votes, then the Board's
review did not comply with their duty to manually recount the ballots and
provide an accurate count. 9  It was the court's ultimate legal duty to
determine as a matter of law whether or not a challenged ballot constituted a
legal vote. The Supreme Court of Florida should not have departed from the
832. Tr. of Palm Beach Canvassing Board, Nov. 19, 2000, at 72-73.
833. Gore v. Harris III, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1259 (Fla. 2000).
834. See discussion supra note 785 (discussing the review accorded to a county
canvassing board). See also discussion supra Part II.
835. Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 75 So. 411,412 (Fla. 1917).
836. Gore II, 772 So. 2d at 1259.
837. See FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c) (2000).
838. Id.
839. See Darby, 75 So. at 411; State ex rel. Peacock v. Latham, 169 So. 597 (Fla.
1936); State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49 (Fla. 1940); McAlpin v. State ex rel
Avriett, 19 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1944); Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976); State ex
rel. Chappell v. Martinez, 536 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1998).
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de novo standard of review. The idea of a judicial manual recount is not
novel. It has long been held that the determination of a sufficient intent to
vote for a particular candidate "is ultimately a judicial question," and is
"subject to judicial procedure in which the courts may determine whether the
vote.., should be counted."
Yet, the Supreme Court of Florida seemed to struggle with and resisted
applying the chosen standard to the 3300 Palm Beach ballots. Perhaps the
court contemplated that allowing de novo review of the chosen Palm Beach
County ballots would open the door for future candidates to contest elections
based upon a mere assertion, without prima facie evidence, that a number of
legal votes had not been counted. It seems the court may have feared that
any losing candidate might attempt to challenge, de novo, millions of votes
without a basis, merely by claiming that the challenged votes were "legal
votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the elec-
tion. ''841 Accordingly, the court followed a de novo standard in Miami-Dade
County, where the ballots had not been reviewed, and something less than de
novo-an unarticulated standard, where the ballots had been reviewed once
in Palm Beach County. Clearly, the court avoided its de novo responsibility
concerning the Palm Beach County ballots in the face of evidence admitted
by Vice President Gore. Rather than avoid the de novo standard with regard
to the 3300 Palm Beach County ballots, and allowing for a glaringly
inconsistent shift in legal analysis, the court could have taken the issues
presented by the record below and determined what constituted a threshold
showing or prima facie evidence necessary to receive de novo review
afforded by section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes.
Clearly, Vice President Gore introduced evidence of legal votes which
were not counted by the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board. If Gore's
showing failed to meet his burden to obtain de novo review of the ballots in
evidence, it would seem the appropriate analysis would require a rejection of
the claim for review, with the court stating the requirements needed for a
primafacie showing to obtain a de novo review, and remand to the trial court
with direction to determine whether the newly imposed test could be met by
the petitioners. To simply say that no evidence had been introduced by Vice
President Gore ignored the trial record. By ignoring the record below, the
court avoided the rigorous legal analysis necessary to determine whether a
de novo review of the challenged ballots was warranted.
840. State ex rel. Nuccio v. Williams, 120 So. 314 (Fla. 1929). See also Darby, 75 So.
at 411; Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Board, 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998) (ordering
a ballot review of 8000 absentee ballots in dispute).
841. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(3)(c) (2000).
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3. The Nassau County Machine Recount
With respect to the claim in Nassau County, the circuit court held,
without analysis, that "the Nassau County Canvassing Board did not abuse
its discretion in its certification of Nassau County's voting results. Such
actions were not void or illegal, and was done with the proper exercise of its
discretion upon adequate and reasonable public notice."8 42 The majority in
the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed this holding, without analysis, stating
"we find that appellants did not establish that the Nassau County Canvassing
Board acted improperly."
8 43
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Florida did not offer
any explanation regarding Nassau County's burden, under section
102.141(4) of the Florida Statutes, of overcoming the statutory presumption
that the automatic machine recount mandated by statute was correct. s44 In
addition, the court ignored its own holding, just eight pages before in the
opinion, that the review of the Board's actions was a de novo review, and not
an abuse of discretion review.8 45 There is no discussion in the court's
opinion on whether or not Nassau County overcame the statutory presump-
842. Proceedings in the Cir. Ct. of the Second Jud. Cir., in and for Leon County, Fla.,
Dec. 3, 2000 at 12, Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000).
843. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1260.
844. This was yet another violation of election law. Section 102.141(4) of the Florida
Statutes provided:
(4) If the returns for any office reflect that a candidate was defeated or eliminated by
one-half of a percent or less of the votes cast for such office, that a candidate for
retention to a judicial office was retained or not retained by one-half of a percent or less
of the votes cast on the question of retention, or that a measure appearing on the ballot
was approved or rejected by one-half of a percent or less of the votes cast on such
measure, the board responsible for certifying the results of the vote on such race or
measure shall order a recount of the votes cast with respect to such office or measure.
A recount need not be ordered with respect to the returns for any office, however, if the
candidate or candidates defeated or eliminated from contention for such office by one-
half of a percent or less of the votes cast for such office request in writing that a
recount not be made. Each canvassing board responsible for conducting a recount
shall examine the counters on the machines or the tabulation of the ballots cast in each
precinct in which the office or issue appeared on the ballot and determine whether the
returns correctly reflect the votes cast. If there is a discrepancy between the returns and
the counters of the machines or the tabulation of the ballots cast, the counters of such
machines or the tabulation of the ballots cast shall be presumed correct and such votes
shall be canvassed accordingly.
FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000).
845. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1252-53.
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tion requiring a certification of the machine recount.846 There was no
finding in either the trial court's ruling or the Supreme Court of Florida's
opinion that Nassau County overcame the statutory presumption in favor of
the machine recount.847 Furthermore, no analysis was done by the trial court
or the Supreme Court of Florida as to the validity of Nassau County's
reconstituted canvassing board. The reconstituted board that decided to
ignore the results of the machine recount and certify the election night
results was a different canvassing board than the board originally constituted
to certify the election.848 The reconstituted canvassing board was constituted
in violation of section 102.141(1) of the Florida Statutes, which required
that a person who was a candidate on the ballot who had opposition in the
election being canvassed could not serve as a member of that county's
election canvassing board. 49 Marianne Marshall was a candidate with
opposition for the District 5 seat of the Nassau County Commission
850
Since the presidential election disputes involved the canvassing of the same
election in which Ms. Marshall had been a candidate, her service on the
Nassau County Canvassing Board on November 24, 2000 was in violation of
Florida law.85'
Not only did Nassau County fail to overcome the statutory presumption
of the validity of the machine recount, it certified the election night results
with an unlawfully constituted canvassing board. Neither of these concerns
was directly addressed by the trial court or the Supreme Court of Florida.
Given the ultimate remedy ordered by the Supreme Court of Florida, a
846. § 102.141(4).
847. Gore III, 772 So. 2d 1243; Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257
(Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000).
848. Third Party Compl. of Defs. George W. Bush and Dick Cheney at 46-50, Gore L
David Howard, a member of the canvassing board was out of town on November 24, 2000, the
day the canvassing board reconvened to certify its totals and was replaced by Marianne
Marshall, a candidate for County Commission, who had opposition on the November 7, 2000
ballot. Derek L. Kinner, All Countywide Incumbents Win in Nassau, Despite Early Trend,
FLA. TIwEs-UNION (Jacksonville), Nov. 9, 2000 at B-3.
849. Section 102.141(1) of the Florida Statutes provided, in pertinent part:
The county canvassing board shall be composed of the supervisor of elections; a county
court judge, who shall act as chair; and the chair of the board of county commission-
ers. In the event any member of the county canvassing board is unable to serve, is a
candidate who has opposition in the election being canvassed, or is an active partici-
pant in the campaign or candidacy of any candidate who has opposition in the election
being canvassed, such member shall be replaced ....
FLA. STAT. § 102.141(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
850. See Kinner, supra note 848.
851. § 102.141.
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statewide recount of the undervotes, the fifty-one vote net gain for Vice
President Gore in the machine recount was significant. In concluding that
the appellants did not establish that the Nassau County Canvassing Board
acted improperly,852 the Supreme Court of Florida could not address the
question as to whether or not the fifty-one vote net gain for Gore satisfied his
burden under section 102.168(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes. It would seem
that if the Supreme Court of Florida rendered the ultimate question presented
by section 102.168(3)(c) concerned "[r]eceipt of a number of illegal votes or
rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the
result of the election," 853 that the court would have included the revised vote
total in the current totals. Certainly, there would have been counties that had
less than a fifty-one vote difference in their totals if they were permitted to
conclude their count of the undervotes as ordered by the Supreme Court of
Florida.54
4. Whether the Vote Totals Must be Revised to Include the Legal Votes
The Supreme Court of Florida then considered whether the votes
identified by the county canvassing boards must be included in the certified
totals even though they were received after the deadline set in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board I v. Harris. 85 The court concluded that the trial
court erred as a matter of law when it did not include the returns submitted
after that deadline. 6 The court determined that the November 26, 2000
deadline was meant to allow the most time possible for an election contest,
and not to prohibit legal votes from being included in the certified
totals. 857 Indeed, the court reiterated that results should be included in the
certified total unless their inclusion would preclude an election contest or
disenfranchise Florida voters from participating in the election.8 58 Since the
inclusion of the identified legal votes did not produce either of these harms,
the court determined that they should be included. 59
852. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1260.
853. § 102.168(3)(c) (emphasis added).
854. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1260-62.
855. Id. at 1260.
856. Id
857. Id
858. kd See also Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220,
1237 (Fla. 2000).
859. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1260.
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Although the court did not address the circuit court's concern that no
authority that the circuit court was aware of required that the numbers be
included, authority to support the proposition does exist. 860 In Boardman v.
Esteva,8( the Supreme Court of Florida had determined that the will of the
voter trumps the technical requirements of the statute.8 62 Furthermore, the
court had previously extended Boardman to not just apply to the will of the
voter, but to include determining the will of the voter. Therefore, the
court could have again relied upon Boardman for the proposition that
determining the will of the voters supercedes the technical, scheduling
requirements of the statute, reinforcing that the circuit court erred by
claiming that no authority existed that required the county canvassing
board's legal votes to be included in the certified results.
Based on the error that the Supreme Court of Florida found in the
circuit court's determinations regarding the Miami-Dade ballots, the court
remanded the case to the circuit court to immediately begin tabulating the
Miami-Dade undervoted ballots.86 Furthermore, the court created a remedy
far beyond that which Vice President Gore had requested by requiring that
all of the state's undervotes be counted and added to the results.865 Gore
only requested that the specific ballots that he was contesting be included in
the certified totals, whereas Governor Bush and the intervenors, citizens of
western Florida, argued that a recount of the state's ballots, not just the
ballots contested by Gore, should be done.866  By accepting the latter
argument, the court turned away from Beckstrom v. Volusia County
Canvassing Board.67 In Beckstrom, the Supreme Court of Florida
considered whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by refusing to
invalidate a particular group of ballots (absentee ballots) and by refusing to
declare that particular group of ballots illegal.868 Indeed, the Beckstrom
court did not require Mr. Beckstrom to contest all the ballots, just those
860. Proceedings in the Cir. Ct. of the Second Jud. Cir., in and for Leon County, Fla.,
Dec. 3, 2000, at 12, Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2000).
861. 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1975).
862. Id. at 269.
863. See generally Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla.
1998).
864. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1247.
865. Id. at 1253.
866. Id. at 1247-48; Mot. to Conduct Statewide Manual Recount of All 180,000
"Undervotes" & "Overvotes" in Florida, Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257
(Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000). See also infra note 870.
867. 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998).
868. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 720.
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ballots that he believed were illegal. In Gore II, the court departed from
that principle. Rather, the Gore III court did not allow Gore's contest to
extend only to the ballots that he wished to contest, but to be applied to
ballots that he never intended to contest.869 Essentially, the court required
the recounting of ballots that were not only presumed valid, but that no party
had argued should not be presumed valid.8
In a harsh dissent, Chief Justice Wells criticized the majority's
conclusions because he believed that they would propel the nation and the
state "into an unprecedented and unnecessary constitutional crisis" which
would "do substantial damage to [the] country, [the] state, and [the Florida
Supreme] Court as an institution., 871 The majority erred, he claimed, by
ignoring viable legal theories that would allow the trial court's holding to be
sustained. 2 That theory was that the judiciary should defer to the decisions
of executive officials whose duty it is to implement election laws.
873
Without allegations of dishonesty, gross negligence, improper influence,
coercion, or fraud, the chief justice believed that the judiciary should not be
involved in the election process. 874 However, the chief justice conceded that
the Beckstrom court allowed judicial involvement if there were substantial
noncompliance with election laws.875  The chief justice would not have
allowed this contest because he believed that it did not constitute substantial
869. Id. at 1261-62.
870. Bush asked for recounts in "several other counties." Answer and Affirmative
Defenses of Defs. George W. Bush and Richard Cheney to Compl. to Contest Election at 13,
Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000). See also
Third Party Compl. of Defs. George W. Bush and Dick Cheney, Gore I; Mot. to Conduct
Statewide Manual Recount of all 180,000 "Undervotes" & "Overvotes" in Florida, Gore L
871. Gore I11, 772 So. 2d at 1263 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
872. Id.
873. Id. See Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840, 844 (Fla.
1993) ("[E]lection laws should generally be liberally construed in favor of the elector.
However, the judgment of officials duly charged with carrying out the election process should
be presumed correct if reasonable and not in derogation of the law."). See also Boardman v.
Esieva, where the court stated:
[The] judgments [of election officials] are entitled to be regarded by the courts as
presumptively correct and if rational and not clearly outside legal requirements should
be upheld rather than substituted by the impression a particular judge or panel of judge
might deem more appropriate... [C]ourts are to overturn such determinations only for
compelling reasons when there are clear, substantial departures from essential require-
ments of law.
Boardman, 323 So. 2d at 844-45.
874. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1264 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
875. Id.
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noncompliance with election laws.876 Manual recounts, the chief justice
contended, were provided for under the protest provisions of the Florida
Election Code, including manual recount procedures. 77 Reading the protest
and contest provisions together, the chief justice believed that the legisla-
ture's adoption of the contest provision did not set forth a ground for a
"duplicative recount by an individual circuit judge.,17 1
However, the chief justice's reasoning did not accurately depict the
facts or Vice President Gore's request for contest relief. Gore never asked
for a "duplicative recount" by a circuit judge. Rather, Gore first claimed that
the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board's manual recount was not
conducted under the proper standard, resulting in the rejection of a number
of legal votes.879 Gore simply contested the ballots that were counted under
this standard.880 Second, Gore claimed that the Miami-Dade County
Canvassing Board's manual recount simply did not include a specific,
segregated number of ballots in their certified total that should have been
included, and that some 9000 ballots were never counted in the first
instance.881 Neither of these sets of ballots were counted under the proper
standard a single time, therefore, if a circuit judge had determined that
counting the contested ballots was the proper remedy, the count would not
have been a duplicative recount.
The chief justice also determined that Gore simply restated the grounds
for a contest, but did not substantiate a basis to set aside an elec-
tion.882 Accordingly, the chief justice determined that, without this burden
being met, Gore was not entitled to have the ballots that he was contesting
883
counted. This, the chief justice determined, would be granting Gore a
remedy before he establishes that he is entitled to relief.88 The chief justice
concluded that granting this proposition sets a future precedent that a circuit
court must order partial manual recounts upon the "mere filing of a contest,"
a rule that the chief justice claimed had no basis in law. 8 5 Therefore, the
chief justice determined that a pari materia reading of the protest and
876. Id.
877. Id.
878. Id. at 1265.
879. Gore Ill, 772 So. 2d at 1252.
880. Id.
881. Id. at 1248.
882. Id. at 1264 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
883. Id. at 1266.
884. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1266 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
885. Id.
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contest provisions was necessary.886  Accordingly, the chief justice
concluded that because the county canvassing boards were statutorily
required to be a party defendant to a contest action in the circuit court, the
proper standard of review is whether the county canvassing board abused its
discretion. 887 Furthermore, because the protest provision was the only
provision with manual recount procedures provided by statute, the chief
justice opined that a manual recount may only occur in a protest action.888
However, the chief justice's reasoning on this point is also not an
accurate depiction of the argument made at trial and on appeal. Vice
President Gore claimed that the circuit court must count the ballots at issue
on two grounds. First, statistically there were a sufficient number of
uncounted or improperly counted ballots in the contested ballots to change
or place in doubt the outcome of the election. 889 Second, as a discovery
matter, Gore was entitled to know the votes that are on the ballots to
establish at trial that there are a sufficient number of legal votes to change
the outcome of the election.89° Furthermore, as explained by the majority, the
chief justice's determination placed Gore in a "[c]atch-22," requiring a count
of the contested ballots to prove that they can "change the outcome" of the
election, but only being allowed that count of the ballots as a remedy for the
action that he needs it to prove.891
Additionally, when making a determination of whether a ballot has a
"legal vote," the county canvassing board is functioning in a quasi-judicial
capacity, making a judicial determination. That determination is a mixed
886. Id.
887. Id. One of the chief justice's basis for this conclusion was that the county
canvassing board is statutorily required to be a party to a contest action. Id. See FLA. STAT. §
102.168 (2000).
888. However, in the same opinion, the chief justice deviates from this proposition that
the protest provisions may only apply in a protest proceedings. While explaining the
"logistical difficulties" of the relief ordered by the court, the chief justice claims that, during
the section 102.168 contest, the "questionable ballots must be reviewed by the judicial officer
appointed to discern the intent of the voter in a process open to the public." Gore III, 772 So.
2d at 1269 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). However, to support the contention
that the contest must be public, the chief justice cites section 102.166(6), the protest
provision. Id. Certainly, if the protest and contest provisions are to be read as separate
proceedings, whether a circuit judge's review of contested ballots must be public would be
controlled by Florida's open record laws, not the Florida Election Code protest provisions.
889. Id. at 1253.
890. Id.
891. Id. at 1259 ("The trial court has presented the plaintiffs with the ultimate Catch-
22, acceptance of the only evidence that will resolve the issue but a refusal to examine such
evidence.").
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question of law and fact; the board is examining the markings on the ballot
and determining whether it fulfills a legal standard of "the intent of the
voter." Even if an election contest is simply an appeal of a county canvassing
board's quasi-judicial determinations, as a mixed question of law and fact,
the issue appealed should be reviewed de novo.
892
Therefore, the chief justice's characterization of Gore's action was
inaccurate. Gore was not requesting a partial manual recount upon the mere
filing of a contest. Rather, Gore was requesting an examination of specific,
contested ballots for an initial or proper judicial determination, because the
quasi-judicial determination or failure to make a quasi-judicial determination
of the ballots by the county canvassing boards was erroneous as a matter of
law.
The chief justice criticized the majority for referring to a section
regarding "damaged or defective" ballots to establish a legislative policy that
courts and county canvassing boards should look to the "clear intent of the
voter., 893 However, laying aside that problem, the chief justice contended
that whether there is a "clear indication of the intent of the voter" is a
meaningless standard because it does not translate to a directive on how
exactly to count punch cards.894 These "county-by-county decisions," the
chief justice concluded, would eventualiy cause the Florida election results
to be stricken by the federal courts on equal protection grounds.895
892. See Bd. of County Comm'r v. Snyder, 627 So. 2d 469, 474 (Fla. 1993) (quasi-
judicial action is that which has "an impact on a limited number of persons.. . on identifiable
parties and interests, where the decision is contingent on a fact or facts arrived at from distinct
alternatives presented at a hearing, and where the decision can be functionally viewed as
policy application, rather than policy setting....") (emphasis added). Quasi-judicial actions
are reviewed by Florida courts de novo and will only be sustained if they are supported by
substantial competent evidence. De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957).
893. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1267 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
894. Id. The chief justice explained that the problem in application appears on whether
"a county canvassing board [should] count or not count a 'dimpled chad' where the voter is
able to successfully dislodge the chad in every other contest on that ballot." Id. Without
reference to the record, the chief justice concluded that "[t]he county canvassing boards
disagree. Apparently, some do and some do not." Id. Furthermore, the chief justice also
concluded, in the same dissenting opinion, that neither the Supreme Court of Florida nor the
circuit court "has the authority to create the standard by which it will count the under-voted
ballots." Id. at 1268. Simply stated, the chief justice's conclusion was that the present
standard did not work, but there was no one who had the power to make it work, so there
would be no relief. The chief justice completely ignored Florida precedent of the intent of the
voter.
895. Apparently, the chief justice believed that the equal protection concerns regarding
manual recounts of punch card ballots suddenly arose in the contest proceedings. However, if
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While the chief justice was correct that the protest and contest
provisions were silent with regards to the "clear indication of the intent of
the voter" standard, the implication made by the chief justice is that it is
somehow improper to look to other provisions of the Florida Election Code
when the legislature provided no guidance under the specific operating
896provision. This implication contrasts to the chief justice's conclusions in
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I v. Harris.897 There, the chief
justice agreed that "[w]here possible, courts must give effect to all statutory
provisions and construe related statutory provisions in harmony with
another."898 While the majority was less than clear that it was looking to
another portion of the Florida Election Code for the "clear indication of the
voter" standard,899 labeling it simply as a "legislative policy," it would not be
one accepts that the manual recounts of punch card ballots are "fraught with equal protection
concerns," those concerns existed at the protest proceedings and were challenged in federal
court at that time. The chief justice makes this point clear by an earlier citation of a dissenting
opinion in an Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals opinion on the issue. See Gore III, 772 So. 2d
at 1266 n.28 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (claiming that "manual recounts by the canvassing board
are constitutionally suspect," and citing Touchston III v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133 (l1th
Cir. 2000) (Toflat, J., dissenting)). As discussed supra in Part IV, the United States Supreme
Court chose not to speak to the issue when it was presented to the court in the protest
proceedings. See Siegel II v. LePore, 531 U.S. 1005 (denying writ of certiorari).
896. See Bush 11 v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).
[Section 102.168 of the Florida Statutes] does not define a 'legal vote,' the rejection of
which may affect the election. The State Supreme Court was therefore required to
define it, and in doing that the court looked to another election statute, § 101.5614(5),
dealing with damaged or defective ballots, which contains a provision that no vote
shall be disregarded 'if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as deter-
mined by the canvassing board.' The court read that objective of looking to the voter's
intent as indicating that the legislature probably meant 'legal vote' to mean a vote
recorded on a ballot indicating what the voter intended.
Id. at 131. The Supreme Court of Florida need look no further than its existing precedent in
defining the legal intent of the voter. See Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 75 So. 411 (Fla.
1917); State ex rel. Chappell v. Martinez, 536 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1988).
897. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
898. Il at 1235 (per curian) vacated by, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd.,
531 U.S. 70 (2000).
899. This is compounded by the fact that the Supreme Court of Florida had previously
relied on the Florida Constitution and case law to support this standard. However, the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board may have
"chilled" the Supreme Court of Florida from relying on the state constitution or its prior
precedent, forcing the court to rely on a basis in the Florida Election Code to support the
"intent of the voter" standard. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 78 ("[A] legislative wish to take
advantage of the 'safe harbor' [of 3 U.S.C. § 5] would counsel against any construction of the
Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law."); Bush II v. Gore, 531
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harmonious, when the legislature is silent, to construe the Florida Election
Code to allow for a particular manual recount standard for a "damaged or
defective" ballot, but a different standard for other ballots in a manual
recount. 9
The chief justice then criticized the court for holding that the Election
Canvassing Commission abused its discretion in refusing to accept either an
amended return reflecting the results of a partial manual recount or a late
amended return.901 The basis for the chief justice's conclusion was that he
believed it was "plain error" for the court to hold that the Election
Canvassing Commission abused its discretion by enforcing a deadline set by
the court.902 However, the chief justice misconstrued the holding of the
court. The court did not hold that the Election Canvassing Commission
abused its discretion. 9  Rather, the court held that there was a "rejection of
legal votes sufficient to place in doubt the outcome of the election."
9 4
Based on the contest provision, which granted significant power to the
judiciary to provide a remedy, the court ordered a manual count of the
uncounted ballots.905 The court determined, as a judicial procedure, that the
contest was not a review of the exercise of discretion of the Election
906Canvassing Commission or the county canvassing boards. Rather, a
contest is a purely judicial proceeding, and the circuit court had erred by
treating it otherwise. 90 7
The chief justice then turned to Article I, Section 1, Clause 2 of the
United States Constitution, and referenced the United States Supreme
Court's conclusion that the state legislature's authority is "plenary. ' 908 The
U.S. 98, 145 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (pointing out the previous remand may have made
the Supreme Court of Florida "reluctant" in its determinations).
900. Despite the chief justice's determinations, he does not even attempt to set forth an
alternative "uniform" standard. Rather, the chief justice was content to resolve the problem by
concluding that "this contest simply must end." Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d at 1268 (Wells,
C.J., dissenting). Furthermore, it could be claimed that by implication the ballots are
"damaged" or "defective" making the statute applicable. However, the chief justice did not
address this argument.
901. Id.
902. Id.
903. Id. at 1252.
904. Id. at 1253.
905. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1262.
906. Id. at 1252.
907. Id.
908. Id. at 1268 (Wells, C.J., dissenting). The basis for this determination was the
United States Supreme Court's reading of McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892) in Bush
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chief justice determined that the legislature has delegated to the county
canvassing boards, and only the county canvassing boards, the authority to
ascertain the intent of the voter.909 Furthermore, the chief justice determined
that the legislature did not authorize Florida courts to order partial recounts,
resulting in a conflict between the Supreme Court of Florida's order and the
United States Constitution.9 0
The chief justice's determination overlooks the plain language of the
contest provision. The chief justice clearly determined that the legislature
may delegate its "plenary" authority, as he concluded it did, when it
delegated that authority to the county canvassing boards.911 However, the
statute cited by the chief justice, section 102.166(7)(b) of the Florida
Statutes, was hardly exclusive language. 912 The section, in full, presented a
conditional statement: "[I]f a counting team is unable to determine a voter's
intent in casting a ballot, the ballot shall be presented to the county
canvassing board for it to determine the voter's intent."913 However, the
contest provision provided a considerably broader delegation of authority,
but to the judiciary.914 It stated that "[tihe circuit judge... may fashion such
orders as he or she deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the
complaint is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any
alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate under the circum-
stances." 915 If a party is contesting on the grounds that "legal votes" were
v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70 (2000). The Court's analysis of this
case is discussed supra in Part IV.B.
909. Gore I1, 772 So. 2d at 1268 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) ("The Legislature has given
to the county canvassing boards-and only these boards-the authority to ascertain the intent of
the voter. See § 102.166(7)(b), FLA. STAT. (2000).").
910. Id. Justice Harding, joined by Justice Shaw, concluded that "partial recounts"
were not the appropriate remedy under the circumstances. Id. at 1272 (Harding, J.,
dissenting). However, this is a significantly different conclusion. The chief justice
determined, not that such a remedy was inappropriate, but that the legislature never delegated
the judiciary the power to fashion such a remedy.
911. Id. at 1268 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the Florida Legislature properly
delegated authority to "ascertain the intent of the voter" to county canvassing boards).
912. IL See Fla. Stat. § 102.166(7)(b) (2000). Had the legislature intended to make
the county canvassing boards the only determiner of the intent of the voter, there are a number
of ways that it could have drafted the statutory scheme to provide for such a result. Examples
include not providing an appeal to the circuit court de novo or by providing a presumption to
the county canvassing board by statute, statutorily overruling the default de novo review. See
De Groot v. Sheffield, 95 So. 2d 912 (Fla. 1957).
913. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(7)(b) (2000).
914. See § 102.168(8) (emphasis added).
915. Id.
2001]
153
: Nova Law Review 26, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
rejected, then the extremely broad delegation of the contest statute appears
to allow the circuit court to examine the contested ballots to see if they
contain "legal votes" and to discern whether those "legal votes" are
"sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election." 916
In a separate dissent,917 Justice Harding concurred with the court that
the trial court applied an incorrect standard for a contest proceeding, 9 8 and
that the trial court set forth an incorrect burden of proof that had been
legislatively overruled.9 19 However, Justice Harding concluded that, despite
these erroneous standards the result of the case was unchanged.92  Since a
916. The chief justice then provided a number of practical problems with the court's
relief. One such problem was that the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion in Gore III was
issued on December 8, 2000, whereas the safe harbor deadline set by title 3, section 5 of the
United States Code was December 12, 2000. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1268 (Wells, C.J.,
dissenting). Therefore, the chief justice concluded that "under the majority's time line, all
manual recounts must be completed in five days, assuming the counting begins [on December
8, 2000]." Id. While the meaning of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code is discussed
supra in Part IV.B, the Supreme Court of Florida had the opportunity to begin the relief at a
much earlier date. On November 30, 2000, Vice President Gore requested that the Supreme
Court of Florida order an immediate counting of the ballots to ensure that the election contest
would be concluded before the deadline for certification of Florida's electors. Pet. for Writ of
Mandamus or Other Writ or, in the Alternative, Review of Trial Ct. Rulings and Brief of
Appellants, Gore II v. Harris, 779 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 2000) (No. SC-00-2385). The Supreme
Court of Florida denied the petition without prejudice. Gore II, 779 So. 2d at 270. Thus, the
logistical problems the relief ordered were not the fault of the Appellant, Vice President Gore,
who foresaw and attempted to prevent the difficulties with the United States Supreme Court's
construction of the "safe harbor" deadline of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code. See
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70 (2000). The other "practical
problems" presented by the chief justice were examined by the United States Supreme Court
in Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and will be discussed infra in Part IX.
917. Justice Harding was joined in his dissent by Justice Shaw. Gore I11, 772 So. 2d at
1273 (Harding, J., dissenting).
918. Id. at 1270 ("While abuse of discretion is the proper standard for assessing a
canvassing board's actions in a section 102.166 protest proceeding, it is not applicable to this
section 102.168 contest proceeding.").
919. Id. at 1271.
[The trial court judge] cited the First District Court of Appeal's decision in Smith v.
Tynes, 412 So. 2d 925, 926 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), as establishing [the reasonable
probability that the results of the election would have been changed] standard for
election contests .... Smith v. Tynes, which was decided in 1982, addressed the pre-
amendment statute which did not specify the grounds for a contest. Thus, the current
statutory standard [sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election]
controls here.
920. Id.
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contest action is a legal challenge to the outcome of an election, Justice
Harding stated that Vice President Gore did not carry his burden to
demonstrate that "the number of legal votes rejected by the canvassing
boards is sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of [a] statewide
election."' ' Justice Harding concluded that because a contest action is a
contest of the entire election, the purpose of the action is to determine
whether the candidate certified as the winner is indeed the statewide
winner.92" The problem upon which Gore contested, a "no-vote problem,"
was a statewide problem, the true result of which could not be determined
because Gore only requested that a subset of the no-votes be counted .
Justice Harding further concluded the evidence presented by Vice
President Gore at trial did not meet the burden necessary to properly contest
the election because he only set forth statistical evidence of the results in two
counties.92A Justice Harding contended that Gore failed to present evidence
that the statewide result would have been different if all statewide no-votes
would have been counted.925 Accordingly, at trial, Gore failed to answer the
question of "whether a sufficient number of uncounted legal votes could
[have been] recovered from the statewide 'no-votes' to change the result of
the statewide election."
Justice Harding also concluded that the problem with counting punch
card ballots is a systemic one, and any remedy would have to be state-
wide.927 Otherwise, Florida voters would be disenfranchised, and a non-
statewide remedy could violate the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.92 The remedy requested by Gore did not provide a more
accurate depiction of the will of the voters, but instead was an unfair
distortion of the statewide vote.
929
Finally, Justice Harding determined that the federal restrictions placed
on the State of Florida inhibit any remedy possible under the circumstances
of this case. 930 Referencing title 3, section 5 of the United States Code,
Justice Harding determined that election controversies and contests must be
921. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1271 (Harding, J., dissenting).
922. Id. at 1271-72.
923. Id.
924. Id. at 1272.
925. Id.
926. Gore II, 772 So. 2d at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting).
927. Id.
928. IL See discussion infra Part IX.B.
929. Id.
930. Id.
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finally and conclusively determined by December 12, 2000. 931 With the only
appropriate remedy believed by Justice Harding to be a statewide recount of
more than 170,000 "no-vote" ballots in five days, he determined that such a
remedy would be futile.932  Criticizing the majority, he expressed deep
concerns that the court's remedy would be both impossible and chaotic.
The result of the remedy, contended Justice Harding, would be to allow a
statewide election to be determined by a manual recount of a single county,
Miami-Dade. 934  Therefore, the remedy proposed by the majority would
create even more uncertainty than the uncertainty in the outcome of the
election that presently existed.935
Justice Harding's dissent fails to acknowledge that the court's majority
chose to fashion the same remedy under section 102.168(8) of the Florida
Statutes that Justice Harding called for in his dissent-a statewide recount of
the undervote. The court's majority, like Justice Harding, rejected Vice
President Gore's request for a count of the undervotes in Miami-Dade and
Palm Beach counties only. Gore did meet his burden under section
102.168(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes to place in doubt the outcome of the
election. Justice Harding misstated Gore's burden to obtain relief under this
statute. The burden was merely to show that there was either "[r]eceipt of a
number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to
place in doubt the result of the election.' 936 Beckstrom v. Volusia County
Canvassing Board makes it clear that it was up to the contestant to choose
the ballots he wished to challenge to meet the burden required by section
102.168(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes.937 Once the burden was met, the court
could "fashion such orders as he or she deems necessary... to prevent or
correct any alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate under such
circumstances." Justice Harding merged these two concepts in his
dissent. Just because Vice President Gore met his burden under section
102.168(3)(c), by selecting certain counties' undervotes to be challenged,
931. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1272 (Harding, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the
United States Supreme Court's construction of this provision, see supra Part IV.B.
932. Id. at 1272-73. Vice President Gore contended the relevant figure was
approximately 60,000 undervotes. See also Bush II v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 133 n.1, 135 (2000)
(Souter, J. dissenting) (pointing out that counsel for Gore made an uncontradicted
representation to the Court that the statewide total of undervotes is about 60,000.)
933. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1273 (Harding, J., dissenting).
934. Id.
935. Id.
936. FLA. STAT. § 102,168(3)(c) (2000).
937. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720, 725 (Fla. 1998).
938. § 102.168(8).
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did not mean the court was bound to accept Gore's proposed remedy if he
successfully carried his legal burden.939 As a result of the legal votes already
counted as of the date of the decision, there were less than 200 votes
separating the candidates. 94° There were approximately 9000 ballots in
Miami-Dade County alone that were not yet counted, which Vice President
Gore had a legal right to have counted.9 41 Certainly, Gore met his statutory
burden of placing in doubt the outcome of the election, and since the
majority accepted Justice Harding's remedy, one must question his reason
for dissent.942
Justice Harding concluded by stating it was impossible to complete an
accurate count of the statewide undervotes in the short time remaining to
complete the count.943 Justice Harding ended his dissent by quoting Vince
Lombardi in the context of comparing the presidential race with other
939. Id. ("The circuit judge to whom the contest is presented may fashion such orders
as he or she deems necessary to... provide any relief appropriate under such circum-
stances.").
940. The certified difference between Governor Bush and Vice President Gore was
537. As a result of adding the differences for Palm Beach and Miami-Dade counties, the
difference between the candidates was either 154 votes or 193 votes on December 8,
2000. See Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 n.4-5. (Fla. 2000). This does not include
the unlawful overseas ballots. See Barstow & Van Natta, Jr., supra note 449. If those votes
were deleted from the total, Vice President Gore and Senator Lieberman would have been
ahead by ninety-nine votes on December 8, 2000. Letter from Mitchell W. Berger, Attorney
at Law, to Editor, N.Y. Times (July 19, 2001) (on file with author). On December 9th, after
the United States Supreme Court issued its injunction against counting further votes,
Governor Bush filed a motion to prevent this vote count from being discussed with the press
and the American people. Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000); Mot. For Emergency Hr'g
to Enforce Court Orders, Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir Ct.
Dec. 4,2000). The Second Circuit Court of Florida denied this motion.
941. See Miami-Dade County Democratic Party v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing
Bd., 773 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000). See also Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1258-
1261.
942. The authors' disagreement with Justice Harding's reliance on title 3, section 5 of
the United States Code and the date of December 12 being a requirement for the conclusion of
any election contest under Florida law is discussed in connection with the decision of the
United States Supreme Court reversing Gore III v. Harris. See discussion infra Part IX. The
authors also disagree with Justice Harding's conclusion that the legislature has plenary power
to appoint electors, once the legislature has ceded that power to the citizens of the State of
Florida. See FLA. STAT. § 103.11 (2000); McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892). The
abiding principle governing all election law in Florida is set forth in Article 1, Section 1 of the
Florida Constitution: "[aill political power is inherent in the people. The enunciation herein
of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or impair others retained by the people." FLA.
CONST. art. I, § 1. See discussion supra Part II.A.
943. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1272-73 (Harding, J., dissenting).
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closely plazed contests, saying, "'[wie didn't lose the game, we just ran out
of time. '"'9  Unfortunately, it needs to be pointed out that much of the time
the running of the clock was because of the referee. The Supreme Court of
Florida refused to grant a Thanksgiving Day mandamus on the appeal from
the decision of the Miami-Dade County Canvassing Board to stop counting
ballots.945 Some fifteen days were lost on account of the refusal to grant this
mandamus. This was especially troubling since the court acknowledged
Vice President Gore's lawful right to enforce the "'mandatory obligation [of
Miami-Dade County] to recount all of the ballots in the county."' 946
944. Id. at 1273.
945. As the Supreme Court of Florida noted:
The Miami-Dade Canvassing Board stated as its reasons that it stopped an ongoing
manual recount because it determined that it could not meet this Court's certification
deadline. However, nothing in this Court's prior opinion nor the statutory scheme
governing manual recounts would have prevented the Board from continuing after
certification the manual recount that it had properly started. The Canvassing Board is
a neutral ministerial body. See Morse v. Dade County Canvassing Board, 456 So. 2d
1314 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). Therefore, although the Board may have acted in a neutral
fashion, the fact remains that three other Boards (Broward, Palm Beach and Volusia)
completed the recounts.
On Thanksgiving Day, November 23, 2000, an Emergency Petition for Writ for
Mandamus was filed in which Gore sought to compel the Miami-Dade Canvassing
Board to continue with the manual recount. Although we denied relief on that same
day, in our order denying this relief, the Court specifically stated that the denial was
"without prejudice to any party raising any issue presented in the writ in any future
proceeding." Accordingly, at the time that we denied mandamus relief we clearly
contemplated that this claim could be raised in a contest action.
Id. at 1259 n.17-18.
946. Id. at 1258 (citing Miani-Dade County Democratic Party, 773 So. 2d 1179). The
Second Circuit also prevented the vote count from being started by denying Vice President
Gore's motion to commence counting of votes in Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties,
which was filed on November 28, 2000. Emergency Mot. to Commence Counting of Votes in
Miami-Dade and Palm Beach Counties Pursuant to Beckstrom and Request for Immediate
Hr'g, Gore I v. Harris, No. 00-2808, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000). The
Supreme Court of Florida refused to review the circuit court's orders on an interlocutory basis,
in part because Judge Sauls refused to sign an order denying Vice President Gore's motions.
Gore was legally entitled to have these votes counted. 'The results of the sample manual
recount and the actual commencement of the full manual recount triggered the Canvassing
Board's 'mandatory obligation to recount all of the ballots in the county."' Gore III v. Harris,
772 So. 2d 1243, 1258 (Fla. 2000) (citing Miami-Dade County Democratic Party, 773 So. 2d
1179).
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IX. BUSH V. GORE
A. The Stay Order
On December 9, 2000, the United States Supreme Court stayed the
remedy ordered by the Supreme Court of Florida.947 In an unusual response
to a stay order, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, dissented to the Court's granting of a stay. Justice Stevens
contended that by granting the stay the Court was departing from three rules
of judicial restraint:94 1) the Court had erred in failing to respect the
opinion of the highest court of a State;949 2) the Court had failed to construe
its own jurisdiction narrowly and exercise that jurisdiction cautiously when
the resolution of the issue presented is committed to a coordinate branch of
the federal government, in this case Congress; 950 and 3) the Court departed
from declining to express an opinion on a federal constitutional question that
was not fairly presented to the court whose judgment is being reviewed. 951
Justice Stevens considered a full discussion of the merits to be impossible
under the time constraints, and that without a "substantial showing of a
likelihood of irreparable harm,"--a heavy burden that had not been
carried-relief should not be granted.952  However, Justice Stevens
947. Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000). The United Statues Supreme Court treated
Bush's application for a stay as a writ of certiorari and expedited briefs and oral argu-
ment. Id. However, the Court denied certiorari on the same issues when presented from the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Seigel 1 v. LePore. 531 U.S. 1005 (2000).
948. Bush , 531 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
949. Id. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 235 (1992) ("It would be a strange rule
of federalism that ignores the view of the highest court of a State as to the meaning of its own
law."); Duckworth v. Egan, 492 U.S. 195, 211 (1989) (warning of the care that must be taken
by a federal court when reviewing the judgments of state courts and that "the exercise of
federal power should not be undertaken lightly where no significant federal values are at
stake").
950. Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) (declaring that non-justiciable political questions include those matters that are
committed by the constitution to another branch of government); see also Powell v.
McCormick, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (stating the House of Representatives is the sole judge of
the qualifications of age, residency, and citizenship because they are "textually committed");
Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993) (stating the "Senate's decision to conduct
impeachment trial in committee was non-justiciable political question because textually
committed").
951. Bush , 531 U.S. at 1047 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
952. Id. Justice Stevens contended that, in his view, counting legally cast votes cannot
constitute irreparable harm. Id.
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determined that irreparable harm could occur to both Vice President Gore
and Governor Bush if the stay was granted.953 Considering those concerns
and the ambiguity of whether the decision of the Supreme Court of Florida
violated federal law, Justice Stevens dissented to the entry of the stay.
954
In an extremely rare move, Justice Scalia responded to Justice Stevens'
dissent, offering an opinion concurring with the entrance of the stay order.
955
Without addressing the merits, Justice Scalia established that a majority of
the Court "believe[s] that [Bush has] a substantial probability of success" on
956the merits. On the issue of irreparable harm, Justice Scalia dismissed
Justice Stevens' framing of the issue as whether "'[c]ounting every legally
cast vote ca[n] constitute irreparable harm."' '957  Rather, Justice Scalia
framed the issue before the Court as "whether the votes that have been
ordered to be counted are, under a reasonable interpretation of Florida law,
'legally cast vote[s].' ' '958 Therefore, Justice Scalia determined that there was
a threat of irreparable harm that he characterized as "a cloud upon what
[Bush] claims to be the legitimacy of his election."959 Justice Scalia saw
953. Id. at 1047-48. Justice Stevens noted that granting the stay would harm Gore and
the public because the "'entry of the stay would be tantamount to a decision on the merits in
favor of the applicants."' Id. See Nat'l Socialist Party of America v. Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327
(1977). Further, Justice Stevens implied that by granting the stay Bush and the entire nation
could suffer irreparable harm because preventing the relief "will inevitably cast a cloud on the
legitimacy of the election." Bush , 531 U.S. at 1048 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
954. Id. Justice Stevens determined that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision gave
weight to a "legislative command," consistent with earlier Florida decisions "ascertaining that
the will of the voters [is] paramount." Id. See State ex rel. Chappell v. Martinez, 536 So. 2d
1007 (Fla. 1998); Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976); McAlpin v. State ex rel.
Avriett, 19 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1944); State ex rel. Peacock v. Latham, 169 So. 597, 598 (Fla.
1936); State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49 (Fla. 1940). As well as being consistent
with other states, Justice Stevens determined that the Supreme Court of Florida's decision
reflects the basic principle inherent in democracy and the federal constitution, that every legal
votes should be counted. Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 1048; accord Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15
(1972); see Pullen V. Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 611 (Il. 1990); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 544-555 (1964); cf Hartke v. Roudebush, 321 F. Supp. 1370, 1378-79 (S.D. Ind. 1970)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
955. Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 1046 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Though it is not customary for
the Court to issue an opinion in connection with its grant of a stay, I believe a brief response is
necessary to JusTICE STEvENS' dissent.").
956. Id. However, the same "substantial probability for success" was not enough for
the United States Supreme Court to grant a stay or even hear the same issues presented in
Seigel 1 v. LePore, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000).
957. Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 1046 (Scalia, J., concurring).
958. Id. at 1047.
959. Id.
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irreparable harm arising from determining which votes were legally cast
after counting those votes.
960
Justice Scalia also framed an additional issue not presented by the
dissent: "the propriety, indeed the constitutionality, of letting the standard
for determination of voters' intent-dimpled chads, hanging chads, etc.-
vary from county to county, as the Florida Supreme Court opinion, as
interpreted by the [trial] [c]ourt, permits. 961 Justice Scalia determined that
having such a count proceed under such circumstances would prevent a
"later" count.962 Such a "later" count would be prevented he argued, as a
result of the "generally agreed" upon degradation of the ballots that makes a
subsequent recount "inaccurate."
B. The Per Curiam Decision
The United States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Bush II v. Gore
on December 12, 2000,9" the day the "safe harbor" of title 3, section 5 of the
960. Id.
961. Id.
962. Bush I, 531 U.S. 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring).
963. Id. One is only left to wonder why Broward County ballots that were "generally
agreed" to provide "inaccurate" results, according to the per curiam opinion, would later be
allowed by the United States Supreme Court to be included in the results of the election,
assuming the Court's goal was indeed to avoid "inaccurate" results. See Bush II v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (ending recounts, but not adjusting the changes made to the certified
results by the Supreme Court of Florida).
964. Id. at 98. While the styling of the case was justifiable to the casual observer, the
names "Bush" and "Gore" probably should have never been considered proper parties either at
the Supreme Court or in any of the prior proceedings. The true individuals elected in Florida
in the 2000 Presidential Election were not Governor Bush and Secretary Cheney or Vice
President Gore and Senator Lieberman, but the presidential electors. See FLA. STAT.
§ 103.011 (2000) ("Votes cast for the actual candidates for President and Vice President shall
be counted as votes cast for the presidential electors supporting such candidates.");
§ 103.021(2) ("The names of the presidential electors shall not be printed on the general
election ballot, but the names of the actual candidates for President and Vice President for
whom the presidential electors will vote if elected shall be printed on the ballot .... ).
This is more than an academic concern. Since the presidential electors are the
individuals who are directly elected to a position (presidential elector) by the Florida
electorate and not one prospective elector was a party to the suit, either in the United States
Supreme Court or below, then it is arguable that the actual parties lacked standing. See
Suzanna Sherry, Essay, The 2000 Presidential Election: What Happens When Law and
Politics Collide, 31 VAND. LAW. 20 (2001). If true, Bush, Cheney, Gore, and Lieberman were
limited to relying on Florida law that the real parties in interest in an election dispute are the
voters, but no voters were parties in Bush II v. Gore. See Boardman, 323 So. 2d at 263.
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United States Code expired.965 The reasoning of five justices appeared in a
966 967per curiam opinion. 966 After reciting the facts, the Court framed several
issues that were presented. The first issue concerned whether the Supreme
Court of Florida violated Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution and failed to comply with title 3, section 5 of the United States
Code, by establishing new standards for resolving presidential election
contests. The second issue concerned whether the use of manual recounts,
absent any standard, violates the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses.9 68
The framing of the issues alone demonstrates the awkward position in
which the Supreme Court of Florida was placed when it initially considered
Vice President Gore's election contest. The first issue presents a constitu-
tional violation if the Supreme Court of Florida had clarified the "intent of
the voter" standard, a violation that was strongly implied by the remanded
opinion in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board. The second
issue, however, presents the converse. If the Supreme Court of Florida did
not clarify the "intent of the voter" standard, then the manual recounts
However, in order to establish such third party standing, whether for presidential
electors or voters, the actual parties would have to show: 1) the third parties were unlikely to
be able to sue, which voters can do in Florida; 2) there is a "close relationship" between the
parties and the third party, such as a parent-child or doctor-patient relationship, which also did
not exist in these cases; or 3) the party is claiming a statute is "overbroad," and the case is
brought under the First Amendment, which clearly does not apply in the election cases. See,
e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Vill. of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better
Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). Despite these concerns about a fundamental preliminary issue,
no court and no party even questioned whether the parties had standing. That the United
States Supreme Court did not even approach this issue is quite surprising considering that,
somewhat recently, three of the Justices that joined in the Court's per curiam opinion have
strictly limited which parties have standing by requiring that "the party seeking review be
himself among the injured." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992).
965. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 110.
966. There has been extensive speculation on the actual author of the per curiam
opinion. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Election Case a Test and a Trauma for Justices, N.Y.
TPMEs, Feb. 20, 2001, at Al.
967. Bush I1, 531 U.S. at 100-03.
968. Id.
969. Id. See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000)
("Since [title 3, section] 5 [of the United States Code] contains a principle of federal law that
would assure finality of the State's determination if made pursuant to a state law in effect
before the election, a legislative wish to take advantage of the 'safe harbor' would counsel
against any construction of the [Florida] Election Code that Congress might deem to be a
change in the law.") (emphasis added). However, it remains debatable whether any legislative
wish exists, and how the Florida Legislature was to invoke any desire to take advantage of it.
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violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.97° Essentially, by its construction of Article II,
Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution and title 3, section 5 of
the United States Code, and its "innovative" reading of McPherson v.
Blacker in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, the United States
Supreme Court set up a constitutional dilemma that came to fruition in the
election contest.
971
As a practical matter, the Court recognized that the legal issues ensuing
from the presidential election sharpened the phenomenon of under-
votes. 972 Two percent of ballots cast nationwide in the presidential election
did not register a vote for president for any of various reasons.973 The Court
determined that the certified results, presumably of any state that has elected
to select electors by voting, only includes those votes in the certification
"meeting the properly established legal requirements." 974 The Court then
called for states to attempt to avoid the issues that have arisen in Florida by
avoiding punch card balloting and examining other voting mechanisms.
975
Turning to the legal issues presented, the Court began by examining the
dictates of the United States Constitution,976 and limiting its decision in Bush
v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board.977 Returning to McPherson v.
970. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 103.
971. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
972. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 103.
973. Id. The Court described some of those reasons as "deliberately choosing no
candidate at all" or types of "voter error" including, "voting for two candidates or
insufficiently marking a ballot." Id. Oddly, the Court termed these "overvotes" which
naturally raises a question of what "undervotes" are. However, in Florida, a party may contest
particular ballots, not just the result of an election. Cf. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49 (Fla.
1940); Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 75 So. 411 (Fla. 1917).
974. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 103. Without citation to a statute or other authority, there is
significant ambiguity in the "election results" to which the Court is referring. Id. Furthermore,
the failure of the Court to set forth authority for this proposition also raises questions of the
Court's meaning of "properly established legal requirements." Ma The Court does not answer
what legal requirements are indeed "properly established" or, for that matter, what 'legal
requirements" even are. Id.
975. See id. "After the current counting, it is likely legislative bodies nationwide will
examine ways to improve the mechanisms and machinery for voting." Bush I, 531 U.S. at
104.
976. Id. at 103-04.
977. Id. at 104.
The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the
President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide
election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral
College. U.S. Coast., Art. 11, § 1. This is the source for the statement in McPherson v.
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Blacker, the Court defined the state legislature's "plenary" authority to select
the manner of appointing electors.978 McPherson, the Court explained, only
stands for the proposition that there is no constitutional right to vote for
electors "unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as
the means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral
College. ' 979 The "plenary" authority of the state legislature is only to "select
the manner for appointing electors." 980  Once that manner of selecting
electors has been vested in the people, that right is "fundamental." 91 The
Court reiterated a statement from McPherson that the legislature can take
back the power to appoint electors, pursuant to Article I, Section 1, Clause
9822. Of course, this could not take place after election day.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892) that the state legislature's power to select the manner
for appointing electors is plenary ....
Id.
978. Id.
979. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104.
980. Id. This position is a significant recession from the implication of Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board where the Court vacated the Supreme Court of Florida's
decision in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I v. Harris and "counsel[ed] against any
construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law." Bush
v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000).
981. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 104. The Supreme Court of Florida did not need to rely on
the implicit federal constitutional basis for this proposition. Rather, the Florida Constitution's
political power provision has historically been construed to include a fundamental right to
vote. Accordingly, once the legislature grants the electorate the right to vote, then that right is
subject to the restrictions of the state constitution. However, prior to the United States
Supreme Court's remarkable construction of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United
States Constitution, one could have made a viable argument that the Florida Constitution's
political power provision limits the Florida Legislature from choosing any other manner of
selection of presidential electors than popular election. See FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also
discussion supra Part IV.B.
982. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 104. Pursuant to this statement, the Florida Legislature
attempted to revoke the power of the electorate to select electors after the election and
attempted to give that power to themselves. The reason for this unprecedented move was in
order to insure an "invulnerable" or "bulletproof slate of electors." Florida House of
Representatives Approves Its Own Republican Slate of Presidential Electors (National Public
Radio broadcast, Dec. 12, 2000). The decision to do so was immediately ceased at the last
minute based on the United States Supreme Court's issuance of the opinion in Bush If v.
Gore. However, by almost taking such an unprecedented step, the Florida Legislature placed
itself in the position of "changing the rules after election day" and eliminating Florida electors
from the "safe harbor" provisions of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code, subjecting
them to congressional scrutiny. Ironically, the Florida Legislature's action to insure an
"invulnerable" or "bulletproof slate of electors" would have done exactly the opposite,
bringing all the issues that had embroiled Florida onto the congressional floor.
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The Court then determined that the right to vote is protected by the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.983 Having granted
the right on "equal terms," the Court explained that a state is forbidden from
valuing one person's vote over another by "later arbitrary and disparate
treatment."984 The Court further explained that denying a person's vote is not
the only means of violating the clause; "debasement or dilution of the weight
of a citizen's vote" can accomplish the same result. 985 Therefore, the Court
determined that it must consider whether the recount procedures adopted by
the Supreme Court of Florida avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of
Florida citizens.
986
The United States Supreme Court's central proposition, that Florida
initially granted the right to vote "on equal terms," is subject to criticism.
The Florida Legislature gave the citizens of Florida the right to vote for
presidential electors.987 However, decisions regarding the systems with
which citizens would vote were delegated to the counties.98 Based on
varying considerations, including each county's population and finances,
each county's officials selected the voting system that they felt was most
appropriate. Over time, the voting systems changed and during the 2000
Presidential Election, the most populous counties, which usually include
Florida's urban minority areas, used antiquated "punch card" systems.
However, in the less populous, predominantly rural counties of Florida, often
dominated by Republican voters, the voting systems are often the more
modem "optical scanning" system. The difference between the error rates of
the two types of machines is significant. Across Florida, in the 2000
Presidential Election, the "punch card" system resulted in an undervote/non-
vote ratio of 1.5% (fifteen of every 1000 punch card ballots registered a non-
vote).989 However, in the same area, the "optical scanner" system resulted in
an undervote/non-vote ratio of 0.4% (four of every 1000 optically scanned
ballots registered a non-vote). 990 As one expert proffered for trial, "[tihe
probability that this increase in the undervote is attributable to mere chance
is practically zero."
991
983. Bush 1I, 531 U.S. at 104-05.
984. Id.
985. Id. at 105.
986. Id.
987. See FLA. STAT. § 103.011 (2000).
988. § 97.102.
989. Proffer of Direct Testimony of Professor Nicolas Hengartner at 2, Gore I v.
Harris, 2000 WL 1770257 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000) (No. 00-2808).
990. Id.
991. Id.
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Accordingly, while the Florida Legislature did grant all of Florida's
citizens the equal right to enter the poll and cast a vote, the legislature did
not take any steps to ensure that the right to have those votes counted was
granted "on equal terms." By delegating the selection of a voting system to
individual counties, the Florida Legislature allowed the institution of an
election system that would not grant all Florida citizens the equal right to
have their votes counted. Indeed, a person who lived in a poor urban area or
a populous county had a much higher likelihood of their vote not being
counted than a person living in a less populous county. The legislature's
decision to delegate the choice of what election system to use to the
counties, rather than to create a single, uniform election system, denied the
right of suffrage "'by a debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's
vote .... "'9'2 Most disturbing was that the debasement and dilution of votes
was inherent in Florida's election system. Thus, if an equal protection
problem existed under Florida's election system, it began in the legislature,
and it was consummated on election day.993 An election protest or contest
only magnified a deeply rooted systemic problem.
However, rather than look to the constitutionality of the Florida election
system as a whole, the United States Supreme Court focused on the counts of
the punch card ballots. The Court determined that the Supreme Court of
Florida's order to discern the intent of the voter from punch card ballots,
while an "unobjectionable ... abstract proposition and... starting
principle," does not have "specific standards to ensure its equal applica-
tion. Without citation, the Court determined that such uniform rules
were "practicable and ... necessary.995  The Court's basis for such
standards were that, while the law often sets forth the need to discern the
intent of an actor, the issue in this situation is "how to interpret the marks or
holes or scratches on an inanimate object, a piece of cardboard or pa-
per .... 996 The Court implied that such a determination is distinguishable
from "whether to believe a witness," because "the fact finder confronts a
thing, not a person. 997 Without specific rules, the Court determined that the
992. Bush 1l, 531 U.S. at 105 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964)).
993. The equal protection problem, which existed due to the disparate treatment of
votes resulting from unequal voting equipment, is currently being challenged in several states
(California, Georgia, Illinois, Florida, Missouri) on the basis of Bush II v. Gore. Palermo,
supra note 370.
994. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 106.
995. Id.
996. Id.
997. Id.
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ballots had been "unequal[ly] evaluat[ed]." 998 Based on Chief Justice Wells'
dissenting opinion that "county canvassing boards disagree" on whether to
count a "dimpled chad," the United States Supreme Court determined that
whether to accept or reject contested ballots would "vary not only from
county to county but indeed within a single county from one recount team to
another." 999 As examples, the Court set forth the testimony of a Miami-Dade
County monitor who testified that he observed the county canvassing board
members each apply different standards in defining a legal vote.1°°  The
Court also turned to Palm Beach County, which "switched to a [per se] rule"
during the counting process, an error that the Court claimed resulted in "a
court order that the county consider dimpled chads legal." 1°° 1
998. Id. The citation of the Court on this point referenced a statement made in dissent
by Chief Justice Wells in Gore III v. Harris, without reference to the record on appeal. The
Court made no additional citation to the record on appeal for this point.
999. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 106. The statement by the Court incorrectly referenced state
law. Chief Justice Wells' statement referred to a protest proceeding, where the county
canvassing board examined the ballots. With a large number of ballots, counting teams,
appointed by the county canvassing board with certain procedural safeguards, initially
examined the ballots. If the counting team could not come to a conclusive determination of
whether the ballot contained a legal vote, the ballot was presented to the county canvassing
board to make the determination of whether the ballot contained a legal vote. Therefore, the
Court's statement that the "standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots might
vary... from one recount team to another" was incorrect as a matter of Florida law, because
any remotely questionable ballot will be presented to the county canvassing board for a final
determination, coalescing any differing beliefs by the counting teams in the quasi-judicial
agent delegated the power to make such determinations by the Florida Legislature. Id. The
canvassing boards, chaired by a county court judge, were to determine a legal issue, not a fact
issue, i.e., what constituted a legal vote. Eventually, that decision would be reviewable by the
Supreme Court of Florida. See Delahunt v. Johnston, 671 N.E.2d 1241 (Mass. 1996)
(detailing that the disputed ballots were reviewed by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts).
1000. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 106.
1001. Id. at 106-07. The Court's statement does not effectively set forth the contents of
the order issued by the Fifteenth Circuit Court of Florida. Florida Democratic Party v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd., 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 35 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 2000). The Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board adopted a per se rule and counted ballots using that rule
rather than the "intent of the voter" standard. The Florida Democratic Party filed for
declaratory relief in the circuit court. In an oral order, which was followed by a written order,
the court ordered that the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board count the ballots under the
"intent of the voter" standard, not a per se rule. Id. at 35. Nowhere in the order did the court
state that "the county [must] consider dimpled chads legal," as the United States Supreme
Court stated. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 107. Rather, the court ordered that "[w]here the intention
of the voter can be fairly and satisfactorily ascertained, that intention should be given
effect." Florida Democratic Party, 8 Fla. L. Weekly at 36. However, "Palm Beach
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Oddly, the United States Supreme Court mandated that the Supreme
Court of Florida erred by not creating a new, more specific, standard after
election day.100 2 Thus, the Supreme Court of Florida erred by not construing
the "intent of the voter" standard with a "construction... that Congress
might perceive as a change in the law. '' 10°3 It must be emphasized that
Florida had well-developed law on the intent of the voter standard which had
emerged during the era of the paper ballot.1 °4 Certainly, it would not have
been a violation of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code to apply the
law for intent of the voter developed during the era of paper ballots to punch
card ballots. The only difference was the technology being used, a stylus
and a punch card instead of a pencil and a paper ballot. The Supreme Court
of Florida was giving clear direction on the intent of the voter with its
reference to Pullen v. Michigan in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I
v. Harris.t10 5 One can only presume that the remand of this case from the
United States Supreme Court,'W6 coupled with its admonition about title 3,
section 5 of the United States Code in the remand decision, intimidated the
Supreme Court of Florida, and thereby kept them from announcing an intent
County... began the process with a 1990 guideline which precluded counting completely
attached chads, switched to a rule that considered a vote to be legal if any light could be seen
through a chad, changed back to the 1990 rule, and then abandoned any pretense of a per se
rule, only to have a court order that the county consider dimpled chads legal. This is not a
process with sufficient guarantees of equal treatment." Bush II, 531 U.S. at 106-07.
1002. Id. at 108. The Supreme Court of Florida was given the opportunity to delineate a
more specific standard in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220
(Fla. 2000), and declined. The Supreme Court of Florida, likely because of what it perceived
as a warning not to engage in any action that "Congress might deem to be a change in the
law," declined to provide a more specific standard in the election contest. See Gore III v.
Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1270 (Fla. 2000); Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531
U.S. 70, 78 (2000).
1003. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 98; see id. at 78 ("Since [3 U.S.C.] § 5 contains a principle of
federal law that would assure finality of the State's determination if made pursuant to a state
law in effect before the election, a legislative wish to take advantage of the 'safe harbor'
would counsel against any construction of the Election Code that Congress might deem to be a
change in the law.").
1004. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 536 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1998); Boardman v. Esteva,
323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976); McAlpin v. State, 19 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1944); State v. Barber, 198
So. 49 (Fla. 1940); State v. Latham, 169 So. 597, 598 (Fla. 1936); Darby v. State ex rel.
McCollough, 75 So. 411 (Fla. 1917). See also Bush I v. Gore, 531 U.S. 1046 (2000)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
1005. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1238 (citing Pullen v.
Mulligan, 561 N.E.2d 585, 611 (Ill. 1990)).
1006. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000).
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of the voter standard for punch card and other machine assisted ballots
consistent with Florida law which existed prior to November 7,
2000. However, more questionable is the United States Supreme Court's
reasoning as to why the Supreme Court of Florida erred.
Essentially, the United States Supreme Court determined that a judge or
county canvassing board that examines a ballot confronts only a question of
fact, whether a certain marking exists on a ballot.1007 Accordingly, the ballot
examiner needs a specific rule rather than an abstract legal principle in order
to properly determine whether a ballot has a legal vote.'t° 8 This conclusion
ignores two important principles. First, in a protest, when a county
canvassing board makes a determination of whether a ballot has a "legal
vote," the canvassing board, a state agent, is functioning in a quasi-judicial
capacity, making a determination of a mixed question of law and
fact. Further, in a contest, a Florida circuit judge acts in a judicial capacity.
When considering whether sufficient "legal votes" were cast to "change or
place in doubt the outcome of the election,"1 9 if a judge examines a ballot
to determine whether there is a "legal vote," the judge, like the canvassing
board, is determining a question of law. 10 10 Under the Court's analogy,
questions of law remain with a judge and are not given to a
jury. Furthermore, there is no need for a clarified standard, as questions of
law are appealable de novo because the appealing party is claiming that the
determination of whether a "legal vote" was cast was erroneous as a matter
of law. A party appealing the determination does not argue the factual
question of whether a marking exists on a ballot, but that the voter did not
manifest an intention to vote for a particular candidate, a legal question.
Furthermore, that question is ultimately a matter solely of state law, making
the Supreme Court of Florida the final arbiter of the issue.011
The Court turned to two other cases that dealt with "arbitrary and
disparate treatment to voters in... different counties.' ' 012  In Gray v.
Sanders,1013 the Court determined that there was a violation. °14 The Court
1007. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 107.
1008. Id.
1009. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(7)(b) (2000).
1010. See discussion supra Part VII.B.
1011. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 235 (1992) ("It would be a strange rule of
federalism that ignores the view of the highest court of a State as to the meaning of its own
law."); Duckworth v. Egan, 492 U.S. 195, 211 (1989) (warning of the care that must be taken
by federal court when reviewing the judgments of state courts and that "the exercise of federal
power should not be undertaken lightly where no significant federal values are at stake").
1012.Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 107.
1013.372 U.S. 368 (1963).
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also set forth that it had relied on the propositions espoused in Gray, in the
context of the presidential selection process, in Moore v. Ogilvie, °15 where it
invalidated a county-based procedure that diluted the influence of citizens in
larger counties in the nominating process. I°' 6 The Court returned to the
principle that granting "one group... greater voting strength than another is
hostile to the one man, one vote basis of our representative government."
1017
The Court's use of precedent distracts from the true problem and turns
the real issue on its head. The Court's central proposition is that if hand
counts were allowed to occur and ballots that were not counted by machine
were counted as "legal votes," then votes that were counted by machine
1018would be diluted . First, if voters voted in the election, then their votes
should be counted if the intent of the voter can be discerned, even if the vote
is imperfectly cast under Florida law 1 9 Second, the Court's solution to the
"faux-dilution" of votes is to disenfranchise voters whose ballots were not
counted by machine.' 02  Such disenfranchisement disproportionately
affected punch card counties, counties with larger minority and indigent
populations. 1021
1014. Id. at 381.
1015.394 U.S. 814 (1969).
1016.Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 107.
1017. Id. (citing Moore, 394 U.S. at 819).
1018. Id. at 107-08.
1019. See Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 75 So. 411 (Fla. 1917) (counting and
including votes despite imperfect marking of ballot by voter); State ex rel. Carpenter v.
Barber, 198 So. 49 (Fla. 1940) (counting and including votes despite imperfect marking of
ballot by voter); Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720 (Fla. 1998)
(circuit court ordered a manual recount of ballots case with a writing instrument other than a
"No. 2 pencil," as required by the instructions, and included them in determining the result).
1020. See ALAN M. DERsHowrIz, SUPREME INJUSTICE: How THE HIGH COURT HIJACKED
ELECTION 2000, at 57-64, 75-81 (2001). Yet, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court
found no equal protection problem in allowing some manually tabulated votes from the protest
counts to be included in the certified totals, despite that the same "dilution" that the Court was
concerned about would occur from including such manually tabulated votes. See Bush II, 531
U.S. at 106-07.
1021. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIvIL RIGHTS, Voting Irregularities in Florida During
the 2000 Presidential Election (June 2001), at http:llwww.usccr.gov/pubs/vote2000/report/
main.htm (finding that disenfranchisement fell "most harshly on the shoulders of African
Americans" and "[p]oorer counties.., were more likely to use voting systems with higher
spoilage rates than affluent counties with significant white populations"). See also Bob
Drogin, 2 Florida Counties Show Election Day's Inequities, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2001, at A1
(comparing the spoilage rates and prosperousness of Gadsen county, one of Florida's poorest
counties where one in eight votes were not counted, to Leon county, home of the state capital
and two universities where less than two in 1000 votes were not counted); Stacey Singer &
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The Court determined that the Supreme Court of Florida "ratified"
unequal treatment of different groups by mandating that the Miami-Dade and
Palm Beach recounts be included in the certified results."" The Court
believed that, although not contested by Gore, the Supreme Court of Florida
mandated the inclusion of the Broward County recount as well.' 02 The
court was mistaken in this belief in that the Broward County hand count was
included in the certified election totals of Secretary Harris. 1024 However, the
Court believed including such totals violated the Equal Protection Clause
because the different counties used different standards.1025 As evidence of
this phenomenon the Court turned to Broward County's "uncover[ing]" of
three times more votes than Palm Beach County, although the populations of
the two counties were similar.'026 The Court ignored (as did the Supreme
Court of Florida) the record evidence of lawful votes not being counted by
the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, and the litigation required to
have that Board adopt a standard for counting lawful votes consistent with
Florida law as it existed on November 7, 2000.1027 Without analyzing the
evidence, the Court concluded that it was Broward County that was
performing the count incorrectly and not Palm Beach County. The Court's
analysis also fails to explain why it was ultimately permissible to include
John Maines, Many Disqualified Votes in Minority Areas, CHI. TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 2000, at 19
(News) (explaining that one-third of the disqualified votes were in predominately black areas
and attributing some of the problems to difficulties in punching out chads in the punch
cards). See also Dershowitz, supra note 1020, at 62-63.
1022.Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 107.
1023. Id.
1024. See Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
On November 9, 2000, a manual recount was requested on behalf of Vice President
Gore in four counties-Miami-Dade, Broward, Palm Beach and Volusia. Broward
County and Volusia County timely completed a manual recount. It is undisputed that
the results of the manual recounts in Volusia County and Broward County were in-
cluded in the statewide certifications.
Id. at 1258 n.16.
1025. Bush II, U.S. at 107. The United States Supreme Court did not refer to any
portion of the record in support of this proposition.
1026. Id.
1027. See Florida Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 8 Fla. L.
Weekly Supp. 35, 35 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 2000) (holding that the Palm Beach County
Canvassing Commission has the discretion to utilize whatever methodology it deems proper to
determine the true intention of the voter and it should not be restricted in that task.). See also
discussion supra Part VIII.B.
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Broward and Volusia Counties' recounted votes in the certified election
totals, while other counties would not be included.'
0
The Court then turned to the failure of the Supreme Court of Florida to
consider "overvotes" in those ballots that were included in a recount. 10 9
The Court presented two problems with not counting overvotes. First, a
voter who casts an "overvote," a ballot where the voter voted for more than
one candidate, disqualifying the ballot from being included in the results, is
being treated disparately because the "overvote" ballot is not counted by
hand under the Supreme Court of Florida's ruling, but undervotes would
be.' °30 This presumption ignores the possibility that an overvote could have
"the requisite indicia of intent" that could be discerned by a manual
examination. Second, a voter who casts a vote for two candidates, where
only one is read by the machine, improperly has his or her vote included in
the total, diluting the votes of those who correctly cast votes.1
0 32
There is a question of whether, under the Court's precedent, these
problems are an appropriate justification for an equal protection viola-
tion. The Court has rarely accepted statistical variations as justifications for
1033equal protection violations. Nor has the Court been willing to accept
equal protection violations without the action in question being proven to
have been enacted with a discriminatory purpose or invidious discrimina-
tion.10
34
1028. See Manual Recount of Ballots, Error in Voter Tabulation, Advisory Legal Op.
Fla. Att'y Gen. 2000-65 (Nov. 14, 2000). This is especially troublesome when it is apparent
that in addition to Broward and Volusia counties, several other counties conducted their own
hand recounts and included those votes in the certified totals. See Aff. of Achim Bergmann,
Florida Democratic Party v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 8 Fla. L. Weekly Supp. 35
(Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. 2000) (No. CLOO-11078) (listing those counties as Franklin, Gadsden,
Hamilton, Lafayette, Seminole, Union, and Taylor counties). It seems that votes counted by
hand could only be certified in the protest phase without a constitutional distinction as to why
a constitutional impediment arose in the contest phase.
1029. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 108.
1030. Id.
1031. id.
1032. Id.
1033. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (statistical study, assumed by
the Court to be true, that indicated a risk that blacks convicted of killing whites were
considerably more likely to receive the death sentence was not sufficient evidence to violate
equal protection and overturn petitioner's capital punishment sentence). For a more extensive
examination of this case and its relation to Bush H v. Gore, see Dershowitz, supra note 1020,
at 74-8 1.
1034. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613 (1982) (in election redistricting, discrimina-
tory intent was "a requisite to a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution"). Cf. Keyes v.
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Even if one accepts that this is an equal protection violation, the Court
ignores that the violations were present during the protest and poorly
substantiates why the concerns it presents are violations of the Equal
Protection Clause. The Court's first concern is that overvotes not being
counted could result in an inadequate vote count in some circumstances.
However, generally when a citizen votes for more than one candidate on a
ballot, the vote counting machine does not count a vote because of an
excessive number of votes existing on the ballot. Therefore, in almost every
circumstance, there is no reason to examine the ballot because there is no
way to establish which candidate the voter intended to vote for. 1035
However, in some circumstances, the voter may have placed an additional
indication establishing the candidate for which they intended to vote. For
example, a visual inspection of a ballot would probably yield a legal vote if
the voter marked both candidates, but wrote on the ballot "I want to vote for
George W. Bush for President." This concern is a valid equal protection
concern when all ballots are not counted in a manual recount. The Court's
second concern was that an overvoted ballot, where the second vote did not
register as a vote in the machine, would be counted as a "legal vote"
improperly. Again, this too is a valid equal protection concern when all
ballots are not counted in a manual recount. However, while these concerns
exist, in a traditional equal protection analysis, no violation would have been
found because, unlike the high number of undervotes, the number of these
votes were de minimus. As Justice Stevens said in his dissent, quoting
Justice Holmes, "[o]f course, as a general matter, 'the interpretation of
constitutional principles must not be too literal. We must remember that the
machinery of government would not work if it were not allowed a little play
Denver Sch. Dist., 413 U.S. 189, 203 (1973) ("the differentiating factor between de jure
segregation and so-called de facto segregation... is purpose or intent to segregate");
Massachusetts Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) ("'Discriminatory pur-
pose' . . . implies more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of consequences .... It
implies that the decisionmaker. . . selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least
in part 'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effect on an identifiable group."'); Bd.
of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (stating Americans with Disabilities Act was not
properly enacted under the Equal Protection Clause and could not abrogate state immunity
because Congress had not demonstrated a discriminatory purpose as well as a racially
disproportionate impact).
1035. This was certainly true in the case of the double voted butterfly ballots in Palm
Beach County where in approximately 19,120 instances people voted for more than one
presidential candidate. See Linda Kleindienst, 19,120 Ballots Invalidated, SuN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), Nov. 9,2000, at IA.
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in its joints. ' ' ' 1036 If an equal protection claim applies to this problem, then
"Florida's decision to leave to each county the determination of what
balloting system to employ-despite enormous differences in accuracy-
might run afoul of equal protection.
103 7
Furthermore, the Court's emphasis on the need to count "overvotes" is
somewhat misplaced.1°" First, ballots that registered more than one vote are
not counted because the voter has exceeded the number of allowed votes; a
manual recount would not provide a different result. The Court's second
concern was regarding ballots where the voter "marks two candidates, only
one of which is discernable by the machine." If these ballots result in a vote
counted that, upon visual inspection, should have been excluded, any exist-
ing equal protection concerns result from the Florida Legislature's and the
Florida Division of Election's choice of ballot counting machines. 10 39 There-
fore, again, the equal protection concerns did not arise from any determina-
tion by the Supreme Court of Florida, but existed on election day.1°
Indeed, Bush set forth the argument in the Supreme Court of Florida
that in order for a contest to be proper, all ballots that did not register a vote
must be counted in a contest proceeding, not just the particular ballots that a
candidate wants to contest; this was an argument that the court accepted.1°41
Yet, Bush argued to the United States Supreme Court that by providing the
1036. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Bain Peanut Co. of Tex.
v. Pinson, 282 U.S. 499, 501 (1931).
1037. Id. (footnote omitted). Indeed, plaintiffs are now testing the limits of Bush II v.
Gore, and the higher level of scrutiny required as indicated in Justice Stevens' dissent. See
Palermo, supra note 370.
1038. Although "overvotes" and "undervotes" imply that they are opposites, they are
completely separate creatures. "Undervotes" or non-votes are ballots that do not register a
vote when counted by machine. However, "overvotes" are ballots that "contain more than one
vote," requiring that they be discounted. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 107-08. The Court also implied
that its consideration of "overvotes" included ballots that were counted, but should not have
been because the second vote on the ballot was not discovered by the counting machine. Id. at
108. Oddly, the Court also felt it necessary to emphasize "overvotes" as "not a trivial
concern." Id.
1039. Id.
1040. Even under the Court's unique equal protection analysis, overvotes do not present
the same concerns as undervotes. See id. at 144-45 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (determining that
overvotes did not create equal protection concerns because it is undisputed that overvotes,
unlike undervotes, had been counted or recorded at least once).
1041. See Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1261 ("In addition to the relief requested
by appellants to count the Miami-Dade undervote, claims have been made by the various
appellees and intervenors that because this is a statewide election, statewide remedies would
be called for. As we discussed in this opinion, we agree."); see also supra note 870.
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statewide remedy that he argued for below, the Supreme Court of Florida
had violated the United States Constitution, essentially creating his own
constitutional issue.
1e42
The Court erred by ignoring the distinction between Florida's protest
and contest proceedings. In a protest proceeding, county canvassing boards
who chose to manually recount ballots had to "manually recount all
ballots."1 43 Doing so fulfilled the purpose of the protest, to ensure that the
certified total reflected the voters' expression on the ballots. However, Bush
If v. Gore was an appeal of a contest proceeding. In a contest, the candidate
set forth the grounds for which he believed he was entitled to the of-
fice. When particular ballots were at issue, the candidate contested those
individual ballots. The equal protection concerns set forth by the Court were
applicable in the protest proceedings, not the contest. However, the Court
refused to consider these constitutional issues when they were presented
during the protest) °44
Another equal protection problem presented by the Court was the
inclusion of incomplete recount numbers from Miami-Dade County.1 45 The
Court determined that the Supreme Court of Florida did not assure that the
recounts would be completed by the final certification deadline; however,
the Court interpreted the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion to permit
incomplete recounts to be included in the final certification. 1°46 The Court
attributed this equal protection problem to Vice President Gore's urging for
1042.Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 1046. Brief of Petitioners at 1, 11, 13, 19-21, 33-49, Bush II
v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (No. 00-949) (arguing "the majority of the Supreme Court of
Florida announced sweeping and novel procedures for recounting selected Florida
ballots .... [that] fails to adhere to Article H, s 1, cl. 2," characterizing the decision as a
"creation of a complex, non-uniform and novel system for further manual recounts," and
asserting that the "novel recount plan ... would, by definition, conflict with 3 U.S.C. § 5" and
violates Article II, and the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
1043. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5)(c) (2000).
1044. See Siegel II v. LePore, 531 U.S. 1005 (2000) (denying certiorari). Bush chose to
attack the constitutionality of the Florida Election Code and the recounts in federal court
rather than presenting those issues in the Florida courts. Accordingly, the protest proceedings
in the Supreme Court of Florida did not include a constitutional challenge. See Palm Beach
County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1228 n.10 (stating that the parties have
not raised the constitutionality of the Florida Election Code); Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd. II v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1281 n.7.
1045. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 108.
1046. Id. This, of course, was not correct insofar as the Supreme Court of Florida
required the statewide undervote recount be completed when the Supreme Court of Florida
ordered it.
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a "truncated contest period." 1°47  However, the Court determined that
expediency did not diminish or excuse the violation of equal protection
guarantees.t141
The Court also outlined practical difficulties with the ordered
recount.1°49 The Court determined that one such difficulty was the failure of
the Supreme Court of Florida to specify who would recount the ballots.0 50
This failure, stressed the Court, has "forced" a number of "county canvass-
ing boards... to pull together ad hoc teams comprised of judges from
various circuits who had no previous training in handling and interpreting
ballots. 1051 Any observers, set forth the Court, "were prohibited from
objecting during the recount."' 052 However, the Court overlooked the fact
that a manual recount in the election contest would be overseen by a single
judicial officer. 1053 Ironically, the potential problem of decentralized decision
making that the Court determined violated the Equal Protection Clause was
not present in an election contest, only in a protest, an area where the Court
declined to comment.10 54
The Court next attempted to limit its holding by specifying three
distinguishing characteristics of the Supreme Court of Florida's order. First,
this was a statewide recount.'055 Second, the recount was under the authority
of a single state officer.1 56 Third, the officer whose authority the recount
was being conducted under was a judicial officer.10 57 Therefore, because of
1047.1d. However, the Court mischaracterized the source of the "truncated contest
period." The reduced contest period necessarily resulted from the "clear abuse of discretion"
of Florida Secretary of State Harris. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Board II, 772 So. 2d
at 1289. Had Secretary Harris not attempted to frustrate the manual counts of the county
canvassing board, the litigation that diminished the election contest would not have been
necessary. Indeed, Vice President Gore may not have chosen to contest the election at
all. Obviously, the injunction of the Court further impeded and ultimately ended any chance
to count the uncounted votes.
1048. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 108.
1049. Id. at 109
1050. Id.
1051. Id.
1052. Id.
1053. See FIA. STAT. § 102.168 (2000).
1054. See Siegel II, 531 U.S. at 1005 (denying certiorari). Ultimately, the authority for
determining what constituted a legal vote belonged to the Supreme Court of Florida in both
the protest phase and the contest phase of the election dispute. See cases cited infra note
1064.
1055. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 109.
1056. Id.
1057. Id.
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the individual factual complexities that appear with each election individu-
ally, the Court limited its consideration of the issues specifically to the facts
before it.
While the Supreme Court of Florida did order a statewide recount, that
is hardly a distinguishable characteristic under the Florida Election Code.
Had a party requested each county to recount their ballots in the protest and
had that request been granted, then the same result would have occurred.' °5
Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Florida provided the opportunity to both
parties for a full statewide recount of the ballots,105 9 and if any time
constraints were the concern of the United States Supreme Court, they were
purely self-created.'"O Although the Court criticized the practice of a single
state officer undertaking the recount, such a practice would eliminate the
equal protection problems perceived by the Court by having a single person
make the ultimate legal decision of what is a "legal vote" rather than
"unequal evaluation" that "might vary... from one recount team to
another."'1 61  Furthermore, distinguishing because a judicial officer is
involved rather than a county canvassing board is hardly effective. When
determining what is a "legal vote," county canvassing boards are acting in a
quasi-judicial capacity in making determinations of law.1°62 There is no
basis to distinguish questions of law determined by an agency in a quasi-
judicial capacity and a judicial officer, especially when the ultimate
determination of what constituted a legal vote in either instance belonged to
the Supreme Court of Florida. 0 63 Therefore, limiting the case to its facts is
1058. See FLA. STAT. § 102.166(1) (2000).
1059. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1240 n.56;
Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1290 n.21.
1060. See Bush 1, 531 U.S. at 1046 (granting stay of contest manual recount order of
Supreme Court of Florida). See also id. at 1047 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The counting of
votes. . . does in my view threaten irreparable harm to petitioner, and to the country, by
casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election."). But see Boardman
v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1976) ('"e first take note that the real parties in interest
[in an election], not in a legal sense, but in realistic terms, are the voters.").
1061. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 106 ("[T he standards for accepting or rejecting contested
ballots might vary not only from county to county but indeed within a single county from one
recount team to another.").
1062. See discussion supra Part II.C.
1063. See State ex reL. Chappell v. Martinez, 536 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1988); Boardman v.
Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976); McAlpin v. State ex reL Avriett, 19 So. 2d 420 (Fla.
1944); State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 1998 So. 49 (Fla. 1940); State ex rel. Peacock v.
Latham, 169 So. 597 (Fla. 1936); Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough, 75 So. 411 (Fla. 1917).
See also discussion supra Part II.C.
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inappropriate. °10
Considering the equal protection problems that the Court identified, the
Court determined that "it is obvious" that a recount conforming to its
dictates could not be conducted "without substantial additional work.
10 65
The Court determined that before such a count could be conducted, the state
must first set forth a uniform, statewide standard for determining what is a
"legal vote."' 1066  Second, the state must create practical procedures for
implementing the uniform, statewide standard./°67 Third, the state must set
forth procedures for orderly judicial review of any disputes that may occur in
applying the uniform, statewide standard./°68 Fourth, undervotes and
overvotes must be screened out from valid votes, a procedure which,
according to the United States Supreme Court, must be approved by the
Florida Secretary of State to comply with the Florida Statutes. 1
69
1064. Bush I1, 531 U.S. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present
circumstances."). Indeed, one member of the Court who joined the Court's opinion has
established that he believes that it is inappropriate for the Court to limit any case to its
facts. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 596 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The
Supreme Court of the United States does not sit to announce 'unique' dispositions. Its
principal function is to establish precedent- that is, to set forth principles of law that every
court in America must follow."). For an expansive discussion of the ramifications of this
holding, see Dershowitz, supra note 1020, at 81-84, 122-32.
1065. Bush Il, 531 U.S. at 110.
1066. Id.
1067. Id.
1068. Id.
1069. Id. In a surprising and atypical move, the Court construed Florida law to
determine that the Secretary of State would have to approve the machines before they were
used to screen votes. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 110 ("If a recount of overvotes were also required,
perhaps even a second screening would be necessary. Use of the equipment for this purpose,
and any new software developed for it, would have to be evaluated for accuracy by the
Secretary of State, as required by FLA. STAT. § 101.015 (2000).") (emphasis added). However,
by giving such a novel meaning to section 101.015 of the Florida Statutes, the United States
Supreme Court runs afoul with its own construction of title 3, section 5 of the United States
Code by changing the rules in the middle of the game. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (2000).
Furthermore, since Bush II v. Gore, Rep. John Conyers, Jr. led the Democratic
Investigative Staff of the House Committee on the Judiciary to undertake a comprehensive
study of the 2000 Presidential Election, which determined that 38 states have laws that are
likely unconstitutional under Bush Ii v. Gore. See Democratic Investigative Staff, House
Judiciary Committee, How to Make Over One Million Votes Disappear: Electoral Slight of
Hand in the 2000 Presidential Election (Aug. 20, 2001); see also ALA. CODE § 17-13-2
(1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-676 (West 2001); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 7-5-315 (Michie
1987); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 15631 (2001); COL. REV. STAT. § 1-7-508 (2000); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 9-311 (West 2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-437(d) (2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18:1453 (West 2000); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A; § 696 (West 2000); MASS. GEN.
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The Court then turned to the Supreme Court of Florida's interpretation
that "the legislature intended the State's electors to 'participat[e] fully in the
federal election process.""'10  Therefore, the Court determined that the
Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the Florida Legislature to require
compliance with the "safe harbor" of title 3, section 5 of the United States
Code, requiring all 2000 Presidential Election controversies to be finally
resolved by December 12, 2000.1071 Since there is no recount procedure in
place satisfying the constitutional standard that the Court set forth on
December 12, 2000, the Court believed the proper remedy was to reverse the
order of a counting of the ballots.10 72 Furthermore, the Court determined that
there is simply not enough time to count the ballots and comply with the
deadline set in title 3, section 5 of the United States Code.
17 3
The Court's use of section 5 to set a December 12th deadline is
certainly questionable. Section 5, while ensuring that Congress must count
the votes of presidential electors, would not have limited Congress'
acceptance of the votes of presidential electors selected before December
18th. Therefore, Florida presidential electors could have participated "fully
in the federal election process" if they were selected before December
18th.' ° 74 The United States Supreme Court, by requiring a "conclusive
LAWS ch. 54, § 135A (2000); Mo. REv. STAT. § 115.453 (2000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
659:64 (2000); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:28-3 (2001); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 9-112 (McKinney2001);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-192.1, 163-175, 163-190, 163-169 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-
16-01 (2000); OrHO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3505.27, 3506.15 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 254.505 (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-1120 (Law. Co-op. 2000); S.D. ADMJN. R.
5:02:09:05 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-7-133 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20A-4-401
(2001); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17 § 2587 (2000); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-644, 24.2-628(B)(1)
(Michie 2000); WAsH. REV. CODE § 29.64.070 (2000); W. VA. CODE § 3-6-5 (1999); Wyo.
STAT. ANN. § 22-14-104 (Michie 2001). Hawaii has no recount statute and no procedure for
counting contested ballots. Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, and New Mexico have no
standards for determining unclear ballots. Ohio, while providing specific standards, appears
to abrogate the power to choose electors from the state legislature in violation of the principles
of Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion.
1070. Bush I, 531 U.S. at 109. The Supreme Court of Florida determined that returns
may only be rejected if their inclusion will "compromise the integrity of the electoral
process... by precluding Florida voters from participating fully in the federal electoral
process." Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. , 772 So. 2d at 1237.
1071. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 111.
1072. Id.
1073. Id. But see Bush I, 531 U.S. at 1046 (staying manual count).
1074. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1237.
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selection of electors" that Florida never expressed, sets forth a "legislative
wish" that simply never existed.
10 75
C. The Rehnquist Concurrence
Joining the per curiam opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas set forth additional reasons for their
decision to reverse the Supreme Court of Florida. 1176  The Chief Justice
began by distinguishing a presidential election from any other election.
10 77
By doing so, the Chief Justice implicitly justified intervention because,
based on this logic, the election of presidential electors creates a federal
question. However, the Chief Justice determined that the principles of
comity and respect for federalism require deference in most cases. 07  In the
instant case, however, that rule does not apply because of the specific
reference to state legislatures in Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United
1075. While title 3, section 5 of the United States Code is a federal law, whether the
Florida Legislature expressed a "legislative wish" to take advantage of its safe harbor is a
question of state law. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000)
("Since § 5 contains a principle of federal law that would assure finality to the State's
determination if made pursuant to a state law in effect before the election, a legislative with to
take advantage of the 'safe harbor' would counsel against any construction of the Election
Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law."). However, there is no statute in
the Florida Election Code that directly provides that the legislature wanted to take advantage
of the safe harbor provision. Nor did the Supreme Court of Florida state that such a
"legislative wish" existed prior to election day. Also, by claiming that a "legislative wish"
exists that the Florida Legislature never codified in a statute, the United States Supreme Court
violated its own construction of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code by "changing the
rules" after the election. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 110 (stating that the Supreme Court of
Florida's expression that the Secretary of State's and Division of Elections' discretion to
ignore amended returns was limited to ensuring Florida voters "participat[e] fully in the
federal electoral process" was a "legislative wish" to take advantage of the "safe harbor" of
title 3, section 5 of the United States Code requiring a conclusive selection of electors by
December 12). See also Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. II, 772 So. 2d at 1289-90.
Additionally, title 3, section 5 of the United States Code is a conditional statement. See
discussion supra Part IV.B. If the conditions are not met, then Congress does not have to
deem the electoral votes conclusive. ld However, by restricting the judicial process of the
state in order for Congress to consider electoral votes conclusive, the United States Supreme
Court's construction of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code affirms the antecedent and
becomes a restriction on the state rather than a restriction on Congress.
1076. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 111 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
1077. Id. at 112 ("We deal here not with an ordinary election, but with an election for
President of the United States.").
1078.Id.
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States Constitution.10 79 Therefore, the Chief Justice determined that the
statutes should be elevated in significance.080 To justify this elevated
treatment, the Chief Justice relied upon McPherson v. Blacker,081 where the
Chief Justice determined that clause 2 "'convey[s] the broadest power of
determination' and 'leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the
method' of appointment. 108 2 The Chief Justice determined that a "signifi-
cant departure" from the Florida Election Code presents a federal constitu-
tional question, justifying the United States Supreme Court's interven-
tion.10
83
The Chief Justice's method of establishing a federal question and
justifying federal intervention is not beyond question. While stating that the
instant case is one of "few exceptional cases" in which intervening in a
state's separation of powers is justified, the Chief Justice failed to present an
example of any other case where the Court has undertaken the same
action. Thus, the Chief Justice's implication was that the Court's action in
the instant case was rare, but not unprecedented. However, by not providing
another case where the Court took similar action, the practical effect is that
the Court provided not just a rare judgment, but a unique one.
Furthermore, the Chief Justice's use of McPherson v. Blacker to
support the elevated treatment he accords to the Florida Election Code
appears somewhat out of context in the Chief Justice's opinion. The Chief
Justice's opinion implies that McPherson specifically determined that the
Constitution "conveys the broadest power of determination" to the state
legislature. 085 First, as discussed at length above, the more reasonable
proposition is that Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States
1079. Id. Specifically, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that there are "a few exceptional
cases in which the Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on a particular branch of a
State's government." Id. However, the Chief Justice cited no other case that established that
such a determination is part of a select category rather than a unique determination.
1080. Bush i, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("[Tihe text of the election
law itself, and not just its interpretation by the courts of the States, takes on independent
significance.").
1081.146 U.S. 1 (1892).
1082. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J. concurring) (quoting McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1 (1892)).
1083. Id.
1084. The only case cited by the Chief Justice, other than McPherson was Erie Railroad
Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1983), which was cited in support of the general rule that
"decisions of state courts are definitive pronouncements of the will of the States as
sovereigns." Bush I, 531 U.S. at 112.
1085. Id. at 113.
2001]
181
: Nova Law Review 26, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
Constitution, was a reservation of power by the states, rather than a grant of
power by a newly formed federal government. 086 Second, in the portion of
McPherson quoted by the Chief Justice, the McPherson court was
contrasting the differing methods of selecting presidential electors and
contrasting it with those of congressional representatives.' °8  While the
constitution provided a specific method of selection for congressional
representatives, it did not infringe upon the flexibility that could be
exercised by a state in the selection of presidential electors by allowing the
citizens of the state, through its state representatives, to determine the
manner of selection. The McPherson court illustrated that the manner of
selection could be "by popular vote," by "general ticket," by plurality, or a
"majority ... alone [can] choose the electors.' ' 108 8  Above all else, when
selecting presidential electors, the McPherson court was clear that the
constitution recognizes that the people act through their representatives in
the state legislature, and leaves it to the state legislature exclusively to define
the method of effecting the object.', 08 9
Finally, the McPherson court also determined that the framers of the
constitution used "words in their natural sense" so that "resort to collateral
aids to interpretation is unnecessary."'' 0 90 Therefore, while discussing that
the meaning of the word "appoint" may not be an ideal description of a
popular election, the McPherson court established that "it is sufficiently
comprehensive to cover [popular election], and was manifestly used as
conveying the broadest power of determination."'091 The McPherson court
then turned to the use of the word "appoint" in the Articles of Confederation,
in a 1787 Congressional Resolution, and at the Constitutional Convention to
include popular elections.1t 92  Thus, the phrase "broadest power of
1086. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
1087. See McPherson, 146 U.S. at 27.
1088. Id.
1089. Id.
1090. Id.
1091. Id. at 27(emphasis added).
1092. McPherson, 146 U.S. at 27-28. Specifically, the McPherson court referred to
Section 5 of the Articles of Confederation which provides, in a similar fashion as Article 11,
Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution, that "'delegates shall be annually
appointed in such manner as the legislature of each state shall direct."' Id. The framers of the
Articles of Confederation were even more fearful of the dangers of a centralized, federal
government than the framers of the constitution, and yet used similar lan-
guage. Id. Furthermore, the McPherson court referred to another use of the word "appoint"
in a resolution of Congress of February 21, 1787, declaring it expedient that "a convention of
delegates who shall have been appointed by the several states." Id. at 28. Finally, the
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determination" does not describe the exclusive authority of the various state
legislatures, as the Chief Justice implied. Rather, the McPherson court's use
of the phrase "broadest power of determination" describes the extent of the
possible manners of selection of presidential electors.
Nonetheless, with this basis for federal intervention, Chief Justice
Rehnquist turned to title 3, section 5 of the United States Code.1093 The
Chief Justice determined that section 5 "informs [the] application of' Article
II, Section 1, Clause 2 to the Florida Election Code.194 The Chief Justice
characterized section 5 as making the state's selection of electors "'conclu-
sive' ... if the electors are chosen under laws enacted prior to election day,
and if the selection process is completed six days prior to the meeting of the
electoral college. ' 1095 According to the Chief Justice, section 5 set up two
conditions to Congress conclusively reading a state's determination of its
electors: first, that the electors be chosen under laws enacted prior to
election day, and second, that the state's selection process be completed
prior to election day.'0 96 Then the Chief Justice determined that the duty of
the Court is to construe Florida election law to protect the intent of the
Florida Legislature "to attain the 'safe harbor' provided by § 5" from any
contrary construction by Florida courts. 1 97
However, the Chief Justice's construction of title 3, section 5 of the
United States Code is not the only way to read the statute; it could also be
read as a restriction upon Congress when Congress counts the votes of the
electors from the several states. Thus, when Congress is counting the votes
of the electors, those votes may not be contested and must be considered
McPherson court referred to a use of the word "appoint" in a September 17, 1787 resolution at
the constitutional convention which expressed the opinion that Congress should have fixed a
day "on which electors should be appointed by the states which shall have ratified the
same." Id.
1093. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
1094. Id.
1095. Id. (quoting 3 U.S.C. § 5).
1096. Id.
1097. Id. The Chief Justice's only citation for this proposition was Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70 (2000). Further, the Chief Justice made no reference
to any provision in the Florida Election Code that exhibited the Florida Legislature's desire to
take advantage of the "safe harbor" provided by title 3, section 5 of the United States
Code. Yet, the Chief Justice refers to the specific portions of the Florida Election Code that
establish that "the [Florida] legislature has delegated the authority to run the elections and to
oversee election disputes to the Secretary of State... and to the state circuit courts" by citing
sections 97.012(l), 102.168(1), and 102.168(8) of the 2000 Florida Statutes. Bush II, 531
U.S. at 113-14.
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conclusive if the two conditions are met. Such a construction creates a
restriction on Congress, not the states, and would limit the federal judiciary
to determining federal separation of powers issues rather than making the
instant case one of "few exceptions" where the Court disregards "comity and
respect for federalism."' 98 Yet, the Chief Justice's construction puts the
Court into the position of questioning a state supreme court's construction of
the state's own law. This result is even more disconcerting when one reads
Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution as a
reservation of power to the states rather than a grant of federal power to the
states, as it becomes an infringement upon a power that the framers intended
to be controlled solely by state governments.1°9
Based on this construction of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code
and the fact that the election at issue is for presidential electors, the Chief
Justice concluded that the Court's duty in the instant case was to "determine
whether a state court has infringed upon the [state] legislature's authority"
by "examin[ing] the law of the State [of Florida] as it existed prior to the
action of the [Florida Supreme] court."" ° The Chief Justice then turned to a
series of cases to support the proposition that there are "areas in which the
Constitution requires [the United States Supreme] Court to undertake an
independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law."
110
'
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patter-
son1102 and Bouie v. City of Columbia, 0 3 used two landmark civil rights
1098. Id. at 112.
1099. See discussion supra Part IV.B. Surprisingly, a construction of the federal
constitution to limit federalist principles and such a strong federal seizure of power from the
states lies contrary to the vast majority of precedent established by the Rehnquist court, much
of which was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist himself. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995) (limiting federal exercise of the commerce clause to channels,
instrumentalities, and substantial affect on interstate commerce); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (finding that the only congressional abrogation of state sovereign
immunity can occur through amendments enacted after the Eleventh and that the Indian
Gaming and Regulatory Act was not a proper congressional action under the Fourteenth
Amendment sufficient to abrogate Florida's sovereign immunity); College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Post Secondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that Congress
cannot subject a state to suit pursuant to Article I, Section 8 patent power).
1100. Bush I, 531 U.S. at 114.
1101.1d.
1102.357 U.S. 449 (1958). This case concerned the right of the NAACP to organize in
Alabama. Id.
1103.378 U.S. 347 (1964). This case concerned the right of African Americans to
remain seated at the restaurant section of a store during normal business hours, and having no
prior notice that their actions would be considered a trespass. Id.
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cases to support his conclusion that the United States Supreme Court would
undertake an analysis of state law based upon his construction of title 3,
section 5 of the United States Code.'""4 Patterson is the most instructive. In
that case, the Attorney General of Alabama, on behalf of Alabama, sought to
enjoin the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) from conducting any activities in the State of Alabama, and to
oust the association from the State of Alabama.1105 The state's claim was
that the NAACP had failed to qualify to do business within the state by not
complying with a state statute requiring foreign corporations to file their
corporate charters with the Secretary of State and designate a place of
business and an agent to receive service of process. 1 0 6 The circuit court
ordered the NAACP to produce books and records, including the names and
addresses of all of the NAACP's Alabama members and agents. 107 With
respect to this order, the NAACP ultimately produced all the books and
records requested except its membership lists. 1 ° The NAACP refused to
produce the membership lists because it entailed a likelihood of a substantial
restraint upon its members' rights to freely associate. 0 9 An Alabama
Circuit Court held the NAACP in civil contempt for the failure to produce its
membership records, and the judgment of contempt was upheld by the
Supreme Court of Alabama on procedural grounds.1110 In addition, the
circuit court restrained the NAACP from engaging in further activities in the
state or taking any steps to qualify itself to do business in Alabama.1111
In the case against the NAACP, the United States Supreme Court left
undisturbed the state court injunction against the NAACP because the
question of the injunction was reviewable only after a disposition by the
Alabama appellate courts of an appeal from a final judgment entered by a
lower state court, an event which had not yet occurred.' The United States
Supreme Court did, however, reverse the Supreme Court of Alabama's
judgment with respect to the civil contempt. 1 The civil contempt was
allowed by the Supreme Court of Alabama because the court reasoned the
NAACP had chosen the wrong procedural writ to ask the court to overturn
1104. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 114-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
1105. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 452.
1106.Id.
1107. Id. at 453.
1108. Id. at 454.
1109. Id. at 458-460.
1110. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 445.
1111. Id. at 453.
1112. Id. at 466-467.
1113. Id. at 466.
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the contempt citation." 114 The NAACP chose certiorari when the Supreme
Court of Alabama ruled the appropriate writ was mandamus.'1 5 Because of
the Supreme Court of Alabama's holding, the United States Supreme Court
addressed Alabama state law on the issue of the appropriate state law
remedy for an appeal from a contempt citation, certiorari or mandamus.1
6
The United States Supreme Court found that the NAACP had a justifiable
reliance that the appropriate remedy under Alabama state law was a writ of
certiorari.11 7 As the United States Supreme Court noted:
That there was justified reliance here is further indicated by what
the Alabama Supreme Court said in disposing of petitioner's mo-
tion for a stay of the first contempt judgment in this case. This mo-
tion, which was filed prior to the final contempt judgment and
which stressed constitutional issues, recited that "[tlhe only way in
which the [Association] can seek a review of the validity of the or-
der upon which the adjudication of contempt is based [is] by filing
a petition for Writ of Certiorari in this Court." In denying the mo-
tion, 265 Ala. 356, 357, 91 So. 2d 220, 221, the Supreme Court
stated:
"It is the established rule of this Court that the proper method of
reviewing a judgment for civil contempt of the kind here involved
is by a petition for common law writ of certiorari .... "
"But the petitioner here has not applied for writ of certiorari, and
we do not feel that the petition [for a stay] presently before us war-
rants our interference with the judgment of the Circuit Court of
Montgomery County here sought to be stayed."
We hold that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's
federal claims."ll 8
The United States Supreme Court reviewed state law on the appeal
because it was a necessary part of the appeal concerning the NAACP's First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights to freely associate.1119 In this case, the
State of Alabama was attempting to obtain the membership lists of the
NAACP, and it was attempting to do so through judicial process in the state
courts of Alabama. n"" The state courts of Alabama were interpreting their
1114.Id. at 456.
1115. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 456.
1116. Id. at 457-58.
1117. Id. at 458 (alterations in original).
1118.Id.
1119. Id. at 459-61.
1120. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 453.
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state laws concerning corporations without regard to the United States
Constitution's guarantees of freedom of association.112 ' As the United States
Supreme Court said in that case, "[i]t is not of moment that the state has here
acted solely through its judicial branch, for whether legislative or judicial, it
is still the application of State power which we are asked to scrutinize."
' 22
In this case, it was the State of Alabama that was attempting to obtain
the membership lists."2 The Supreme Court of Alabama had made an
incorrect procedural decision favoring the State of Alabama and violating
the NAACP's rights. Unlike circumstances of Bush II v. Gore, where the
state election code "may well admit of more than one interpretation," '
interpretation of valid grounds to appeal an Alabama contempt citation was
not the subject matter of multiple interpretation."25 It is significant that in
the same case, the Supreme Court of Alabama had advised the NAACP that
certiorari was the appropriate writ to appeal a contempt citation
12 6
Unlike Patterson, there was no application of state power in Bush II v.
Gore. The Supreme Court of Florida was interpreting election laws reserved
to the state under Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the United States
Constitution.! 7 There was no state action being pursued by the State of
Florida as there was in Patterson. There was no need to review state law
absent state action. It is important to note that even in Patterson, the Court
deferred to the state supreme court and state law by refusing to reverse the
order enjoining the NAACP against operating in Alabama until the order
became a final judgment.1 28 The court cited the interlocutory nature of the
injunction order and the need for the Alabama appellate courts to review the
order before the United States Supreme Court would reverse a state court
ruling on state law."2 9 Certainly, Chief Justice Rehnquist in his concurring
opinion was not giving the same deference to the Supreme Court of Florida
when he supported an intercession prior to a completion of the state court
proceedings in Bush II v. Gore.1
1 30
1121. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I, amend. XIV, § 1.
1122. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 463.
1123.Id. at 451.
1124. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
1125. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 466.
1126. Id. at 458.
1127.Bush II, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The Florida Legislature
delegated the responsibility to reserve election contests for presidential elections to the courts
of Florida.
1128. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 467.
1129.Id.
1130. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 112 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
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In a footnote, the Chief Justice referred to the United States Supreme
Court's taking jurisprudence in order to substantiate the proposition that an
analysis of a federal constitutional issue often requires that the Court
examine the state law to resolve the issue.1131 The Chief Justice further
determined that constitutional protections would be meaningless if the
Court's inquiry could be concluded by a state court finding that state
property law accorded a plaintiff no rights.1132 While it is generally correct
that the Court sometimes must examine state law to explore a constitutional
issue, the Chief Justice's statement is truly one of state action. By
characterizing the instant case as akin to a "state supreme court holding that
state property law accorded the plaintiff no rights,' 1133 or one requiring "an
independent evaluation of state law in order to protect federal" rights,' the
Chief Justice was not saying that the Supreme Court of Florida improperly
deemed a government action unconstitutional. Rather, the Chief Justice
asserted that the Supreme Court of Florida is an unconstitutional actor.11
3 5
After substantiating federal intervention, the Chief Justice then turned
to the Florida Election Code, characterizing it as "a detailed, if not perfectly
crafted, statutory scheme."" 36 The Chief Justice then provided an overview
1131. Id. at 115 n.1.
1132.Id.
1133.Id.
1134. Id.
1135. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). This is one of the few cases
where the United States Supreme Court has charged a state's highest judicial body with acting
unconstitutionally, rather than erring in interpreting a government action as unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (finding that the Virginia Court of
Appeals erred by failing to follow the remand instructions to enter judgment for appellant). It
is little wonder that Justice Stevens criticized the majority and the concurring opinion for what
he perceived were conclusions with a strong political nature that would harm the nation's faith
in the judiciary, whether state or federal. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 123 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1136.Bush II, 531 U.S. at 116 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). After the extensive
conflicts that the Supreme Court of Florida found in the Florida Election Code, it is odd that
the Chief Justice would provide such a complementary description of the Florida Election
Code. See Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1231-36 (Fla.
2000); Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. II v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1284-89 (Fla.
2000). Perhaps by being so complimentary, the Chief Justice was attempting to establish that
the Florida Legislature had clearly established the manner of selection of presidential
electors. Therefore, the argument that the Florida Legislature never contemplated the instant
case could not be considered by Congress when determining whether to question Florida's
selection of presidential electors. Indeed, had the Chief Justice not considered the Florida
Election Code to be well-crafted, it would have justified the Supreme Court of Florida's
consideration of the Florida Election Code, and it would have provided Senators with a basis
for objecting to Florida's votes when they were counted in Congress.
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of the Florida Election Code, stressing that there is a separation of power
created by the Florida legislature in the code. 137 After summarizing the
general election procedure, the Chief Justice construed the Florida contest
period to "necessarily terminate on the date set by 3 U.S.C. § 5 for con-
cluding the State's 'final determination' of 'election controversies."' 138 The
Chief Justice's construction of title 3, section 5 of the United States Code as
applied to Florida law avoids the "if/then" construction of the statute. While
the Chief Justice's construction is one possible view of the statute, another
view of the statute is that if the conditions are not fulfilled by the date set in
section 5, then Congress may challenge the state's selection of presidential
electors. However, unlike the Chief Justice's view, the latter view provides
meaning to the conditional construction of the statute.
The Chief Justice discussed the underlying cases, starting with Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board I v. Harris.1131 Summarizing that decision,
the Chief Justice determined, without citation, that Florida law established
1137. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 135 (Rehnquist, C.L, concurring). While ceding deference to
the separation of powers in the Florida Election Code, the Chief Justice does not give
deference to the separation of powers in the Florida Constitution under which the Florida
Legislature created the code. See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 1; art. IV, § 1; art. V, § 1. The Chief
Justice also cites the Supreme Court of Florida's decision in Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d
259, 268 n.5 (Fla. 1975) for the proposition under Florida law that executive decisions are
presumptively correct. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 116 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). However, the
Chief Justice does not defer to the Supreme Court of Florida's determination of when
executive decisions go beyond their presumptive correctness and become impermissible. Id.
1138.Id. at 117.
1139. In a footnote, the Chief Justice pointed out that the initial decision, Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board , was vacated by the United States Supreme Court in Bush v. Palm
Beach County Canvassing Board, 531 U.S. 70 (Fla. 2000), and that the Supreme Court of
Florida had subsequently issued the same judgment in a new opinion on December 11,
2000. Id. at 117 n.2. However, the new opinion issued by the Supreme Court of Florida in
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board H was based upon the Florida Election Code, not the
Florida Constitution as the Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I opinion had been. Such a
change in analysis was surely affected by the Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board
opinion. "[lin the case of a law enacted by a state legislature applicable ... to the selection of
Presidential electors, the legislature is ... acting... by virtue of a direct grant of authority
made under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, of the United States Constitution," and "a legislative wish to
take advantage of this 'safe harbor' would counsel against any construction of [the Florida]
Election Code that Congress might deem to be a change in the law." Bush, 531 U.S. at 76; see
also Gore IV v. Harris, 773 So. 2d 524, 526 (Fla. 2000) ('The 'intent of the voter' standard
adopted by the Legislature was the standard in place as of November 7, 2000, and a more
expansive ruling would have raised an issue as to whether this Court would be substantially
rewriting the Code after the election, in violation of article II, section 1, clause 2 of the United
States Constitution and 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).").
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that "[t]he certified winner... enjoy[s] presumptive validity, making a
contest proceeding by the losing candidate an uphill battle.'' 40 The Chief
Justice then concluded that the Supreme Court of Florida, in Gore III v.
Harris, changed the law as enacted by the Florida Legislature by
"empt[ying] certification of virtually all legal consequence during the
contest. '  As the basis for this proposition, the Chief Justice referenced
the Supreme Court of Florida's determination that "canvassing boards'
decisions regarding whether to recount ballots past the certification
deadline.. . are to be reviewed de novo, although the Election Code clearly
vests discretion whether to recount in the boards, and sets strict deadlines
subject to the Secretary's rejection of late tallies and monetary fines for
tardiness."' 142
The Chief Justice's characterization of the Florida Election Code
implied that the Supreme Court of Florida's holdings were an extraordinary
alteration of the code. However, the alteration of the code that blurred the
lines between the protest and the contest were from the Florida Legisla-
ture. The Florida Legislature amended the Florida Election Code in 1999
making the contest provisions more similar to the protest provisions,
including allowing electors to contest an election and providing various
"grounds for contesting an election" that are similar to the issues presented
during the protest. 1 4 These amendments were central to the Supreme Court
of Florida's decisions.
Further, the Supreme Court of Florida's decision that the circuit court
review the determinations of the county canvassing boards de novo was
hardly novel. The Chief Justice's position, like the majority's, is best
1140. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 118 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
1141.3d.
1142. Id.
1143. Id. at 150 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Some of the bases for contesting an election
established by the 1999 amendments include: 1) misconduct, fraud, or corruption on the part
of any election official or any member of the canvassing board sufficient to change or place in
doubt the result of the election; 2) ineligibility of the successful candidate for the nomination
or office in dispute; 3) receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection of a number of legal
votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the result of the election; 4) proof that any elector,
election official, or canvassing board member was given or offered a bribe or reward in
money, property or any other thing of value for the purpose of procuring the successful
candidate's nomination or election or determining the result on any question submitted by
referendum; or 5) any other cause or allegation which, if sustained, would show that a person
other than the successful candidate was the person duly nominated or elected to the office in
question or that the outcome of the election on a question submitted by referendum was
contrary to the result declared by the canvassing board or election board. Id.
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summarized in the idea that the ballot is a tangible object that must be
examined; therefore, what appears on the ballot is a question of fact that
must be provided deference. However, the issue is not as simple as the Chief
Justice implies. While the casting of a ballot is a factual question, the ballot
itself is a document, similar to a contract, which is within a court's province
to interpret as a question of law. While the Florida Legislature has deemed
county canvassing boards as the bodies that would provide initial legal
interpretations, the final arbiter of legal interpretations lies with the Florida
courts.114
Having the status of a ballot be considered a legal determination is not
without precedent in the State of Florida. Under Florida's zoning scheme,
initial determinations are made by state agencies sitting in a quasi-judicial
capacity. When appealed to the Florida courts, factual determinations are
given considerable weight; however, legal determinations are considered de
novo. Furthermore, there is a substantial policy basis for considering the
question of whether a ballot constitutes a vote to be a legal ques-
tion. Historically, non-political entities have been deemed best suited to be
the ultimate arbiters of elections. If a partisan Secretary of State1141 or
partisan-composed' 1" county canvassing boards were to make the
determination on factual grounds, there is considerable danger that many
votes would not be counted. Yet, the Chief Justice determined that the
Florida courts erred by holding that whether a ballot has a vote is a legal
determination, requiring de novo review. Further, he did so without
providing justification. 147
1144. See discussion supra Part II.B.
1145. See Editorial, An Unseemly Mix of Data, MIAMI HERALD, Aug. 10, 2001, at 8B
(discussing Katherine Harris' duties as both Secretary of State and Florida Chair of George W.
Bush's presidential campaign, and having speeches on behalf of George W. Bush and official
statements of the Secretary of State as the chief elections officer appearing on the same
computer).
1146. Two of the three members of a county canvassing board are affiliated with a
political party. See FLA. STAT. § 102.141 (2000).
1147. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 118 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). The question of what
constitutes a legal vote being a question of law subject to de novo review is a different
question from whether or not a canvassing board should start a review of ballots. The latter is
a review which Florida law would afford discretion to the reviewing agency-in this case, the
canvassing board. Of course, once a canvassing board votes to commence a review of ballots,
stopping that review in the middle would constitute an unlawful act entitling a candidate to a
remedy. See Miami-Dade County Democratic Party v. Miami-Dade County Canvassing Bd.,
773 So. 2d 1179, 1180 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243,
1258 (Fla. 2000). The Supreme Court of Florida did not hold that a decision by the
canvassing board to commence or not commence a ballot review was a de novo review. It did
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The Chief Justice determined that the Supreme Court of Florida's
interpretation of the term "legal vote" departed from the Florida Legisla-
ture's intent in the Florida Election Code."" The Chief Justice claimed that
"Florida statutory law cannot reasonably be thought to require the counting
of improperly marked ballots."1149 Essentially, the Chief Justice decided that
the Supreme Court of Florida's determination that improperly marked ballots
must be counted was so far beyond reason that it required reversal. The
Chief Justice established as the basis for this conclusion that voters were
instructed how to properly vote, that the tabulating machines worked
"precisely in the manner designed,"" 50 and that the reason ballots were not
counted was due to the errors of voters to mark their ballots properly.
Therefore, the Chief Justice believed that the Supreme Court of Florida's
construction of Florida law, requiring the counting of votes not counted by
machine, should be outweighed by the determination of the Secretary of
State.15' The Chief Justice's reason for so strongly weighing the decision of
the Secretary of State is that the Florida Election Code authorizes, by law,
that the Secretary issue binding interpretations of the code." 52 Turning to
Florida case law, the Chief Justice determined that the Supreme Court of
Florida failed to defer to what the Chief Justice believed was a reasonable
interpretation of the Florida Election Code and, therefore, merited
reversal. 15 3 Finally, the Chief Justice determined that because a recount had
not been granted in the past in order to examine ballots that did not register a
vote in the machine count, such a count could not be undertaken absent
concurrence by the Florida Secretary of State." 54 For the Supreme Court of
Florida to determine otherwise was an impermissible departure from the
legislative scheme.1
55
hold that the review of the ballots themselves by a court of law, once the canvassing board
voted to conduct that review, was a de novo review. See Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1252; see
also discussion supra Part VIII.B. Chief Justice Rehnquist may have misinterpreted this part
of the Supreme Court of Florida's holding in his concurrence.
1148. Bush 11, 531 U.S. at 118-19 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
1149.Id.
1150. The Chief Justice made no reference to the portion of the record establishing this
proposition. Indeed, the record, if not contrary to this proposition, certainly demonstrates that
it is a disputed issue.
1151. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 119-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
1152. Id. at 118-19.
1153. Id.
1154. Id.
1155.Id.
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The Chief Justice's analysis is based upon the proposition that
tabulating machines worked properly and voter error was the sole basis for
any discrepancy in tabulation. This proposition was clearly disputed,1 156 and
has been the subject of considerable media attention and commentary. 151
Further, the Florida Legislature's revision of the Florida Election Code after
the election, including the elimination of punch card ballots, suggests that
the voting machines, not just voter error, contributed to problems in vote
tabulation"
58
Despite the obvious questions about the Chief Justice second-guessing
the Supreme Court of Florida's interpretation of Florida law, the Chief
Justice's analysis of the Florida Election Code ignored that it was enacted
under the restrictions of the Florida Constitution. Under the Florida
Constitution, Florida courts are ultimately responsible for interpretations of
the Florida law. 1159 While the Florida Legislature has delegated the
Secretary of State the initial responsibility of interpreting the election
code,16' the Chief Justice's analysis implied that in so doing, the Florida
Legislature had completely abrogated the Florida Judiciary's constitutional
power to interpret Florida law. By giving the Florida Election Code a level
of deference not traditionally accorded to statutes, the Chief Justice's
analysis essentially stated that the Florida Legislature properly gave an
executive officer and administrative agencies the ultimate authority to
interpret Florida law and, necessarily, the Florida Constitution. However,
this convoluted view of separation of powers does not consider that, in
enacting the election code, the Florida Legislature recognized that the
Florida courts would properly determine whether governmental action
violated the Florida Constitution and the legislature would not, acting
1156. Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr. at 1-22, Bush II v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)
(No. 00-949).
1157. See, e.g., Editorial, The Election is Over, but the Debate Isn't, VIRGINIAN-PMOT
(Norfolk), Dec. 14, 2000, at B10 ("Disparities in machine error rates far exceed any that might
have resulted from manual inspection."); E.J. Dionne, High Court Decision Regrettable,
DENVE POST, Dec. 12, 2000, at BI 1 (recognizing thousands of people may have been
disenfranchised by machine error). See also Dershowitz, supra note 1020, at 57-58
(criticizing the court for basing its opinion on the false premise that voter error was the sole
cause of spoiled ballots).
1158.Ch. 2001-40, §17, 2001 Fla. Laws 53, 58 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 101
(2001)).
1159. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 1. The Florida Constitution provides that "[tihe judicial
power shall be vested in a supreme court, district courts of appeal, circuit courts and county
courts." Id.
1160. See FLA. STAT. § 97.012(1) (2000).
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properly within its power, be able to completely abrogate the authority of
Florida courts to determine the constitutionality of government action."
61
The balance of power shifted, however, when the United States Supreme
Court introduced the title 3, section 5 of the United States Code issue into
the election contest in the remand of Palm Beach County Canvassing Board
I v. Harris.'
162
The Supreme Court of Florida interpreted the election statutes of
Florida consistent with Florida's constitutional edict that "all political power
is inherent in the people."' 1 63 Having been unanimously chastised by the
United States Supreme Court for looking to the Florida Constitution for
guidance in interpreting its election laws, a normal practice of statutory
construction,1 64 the Supreme Court of Florida was reluctant to return to the
constitution and its precedent in giving guidance in Gore III v. Harris as to a
standard for the intent of the voter. The failure of the Supreme Court of
Florida to set an intent of the voter standard consistent with its prior case law
1161. Yet, despite his insistence that the instant case presented separation of powers
issues that implicated federal law, the Chief Justice turned to Florida case law to justify his
conclusion. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 119-20 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Krivanek v.
Take Back Tampa Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840, 844 (Fla. 1993)). While the Chief
Justice's analysis of Krivanek is not beyond criticism, namely by the level of deference and the
point at which reversal of the Secretary's interpretations is still within the province of Florida
courts, in so doing, the Chief Justice demonstrates that the issue is, in reality, one for
disposition in state courts. Certainly, federal intervention is not appropriate just because a
state court embraces an interpretation of state law that a federal judge considers "peculiar"
while rejecting one that a federal judge considers "reasonable." Id. The Chief Justice again
assails another state law issue by deeming it "inconceivable" that there be a difference in the
ballots counted in the protest and contest phases. Id. at 119 n.4.
1162.772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000).
1163. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
1164. The Supreme Court of Florida "is committed to the proposition that it has a duty,
if reasonably possible and consistent with constitutional rights, to resolve all doubts as to the
validity of a statute in favor of its constitutionality and to construe it so as not to conflict with
the Constitution." Hancock v. Sapp, 225 So. 2d 411 (Fla. 1969); Rich v. Ryals, 212 So. 2d
641 (Fla. 1968). See also FLA. CONST. art. I (Declaration of Rights).
1165. Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1256-57 (Fla. 2000); Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd. , 772 So. 2d at 1236 ("The right of suffrage is the preeminent right contained
in the Declaration of Rights, for without this basic freedom all others would be diminished.").
"The declaration of rights expressly states that 'all political power is inherent in the people."
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1. "The right of the people to select their own officers is their sovereign
right, and the rule is against imposing unnecessary and unreasonable [restraints on that
right] ... unreasonable or unnecessary restraints on the elective process are prohib-
ited." Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. , 772 So. 2d at 1236 (quoting Treiman v.
Malmquist, 342 So. 2d 972, 975 (Fla.1977)).
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and the Florida Constitution, caused in great part by the remand decision of
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I, resulted in the opportunity
for the United States Supreme Court to find an equal protection violation for
the failure of the Supreme Court of Florida to declare Florida law on
standards to determine the intent of the voter.
The Supreme Court of Florida unanimously deferred to the Florida
Constitution provision that "all political power is inherent in the people"
' 1
"
66
in giving effect to Florida election laws and expounding upon the intent of
the voter standard. 167 The United States Supreme Court expressly and
unanimously scolded the Supreme Court of Florida for doing so in Bush v.
Palm Beach County Canvassing Board. 116 Having been told they would be
reversed in Palm Beach County Canvassing Board I, the Supreme Court of
Florida could not bring itself to annunciate an intent of the voter standard in
Gore 111.1169 If the theory of the per curiam decision in Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board, as articulated by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Bush
11 v. Gore, was intended to prevent the Supreme Court of Florida from
interpreting Florida law on the intent of the voter, these decisions certainly
did that. The Supreme Court of Florida ignored its own precedent in not
announcing an intent of the voter standard to determine legal votes.1 170 It is
hard to imagine an interpretation of the Darby v. State ex rel.
McCollough"171 line of cases in the context of the facts of the 2000
Presidential Election which would not have satisfied the concerns expressed
by the majority in Bush 1I v. Gore regarding equal protection. The
unexpressed concern was that if the Supreme Court of Florida had
established this standard, then that act would have violated Article II Section
I, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution and title 3, section 5 of the
United States Code. For reasons stated elsewhere, these authors do not
believe the establishment of the standard, and consistent with existing case
law, would have violated either.
B. The Dissents
The majority and Chief Justice Rehnquist's concerns with title 3,
section 5 of the United States Code case were answered eloquently and
1166. FLA. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
1167. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 1, 772 So. 2d at 1229.
1168.531 U.S. 70 (2000).
1169. Gore III, 772 So. 2d at 1256-57.
1170. See discussion supra Part II.C.
1171.75 So. 411 (Fla. 1917).
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simply by Justice Souter. In dismissive language, Justice Souter gave the
section 5 issue all the merit it deserves:
The 3 USC § 5 issue is not serious. That provision sets certain
conditions for treating a State's certification of Presidential electors
as conclusive in the event that a dispute over recognizing those
electors must be resolved in congress under 3 USC § 5. Conclu-
siveness requires selection under a legal scheme in place before the
election, with results determined at least six days before the date
set for casting electoral votes. But no state is required to confirm
to § 5 if it cannot do that (for whatever reason); the sanction for
failing to satisfy the conditions of § 5 is simply less of what has
been called its "safe harbor." And even that determination is to be
made, if anywhere, in the Congress.
1172
Justice Souter also made clear that the Supreme Court of Florida's
construction of the state statutory provisions governing contests did not
impermissibly change Florida law from what the Florida Legislature
provided and accordingly did not violate Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of
the federal constitution.
Again, in three concise paragraphs, Justice Souter explained why
Article II was not violated. These paragraphs bear repeating:
1. The statute does not define a "legal vote," the rejection of
which may affect the election. The State Supreme Court was there-
fore required to define it, and in doing that the court looked to an-
other election statute, § 101.5614(5), dealing with damaged or de-
fective ballots, which contains a provision that no vote shall be dis-
regarded "if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as
1172. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting). "Indeed, in 1960, Hawaii
appointed two slates of electors and Congress chose to count the one appointed on January 4,
1961, well after the Title 3 deadlines." Id. (citing to William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross,
Repairing the Electoral College, 22 J. LEGIs. 145, 166 n. 154 (1996)). 'Thus, nothing
prevents the majority, even if it properly found an equal protection violation, from ordering
relief appropriate to remedy that violation without depriving Florida voters of their right to
have their votes counted. As the majority notes, "'[a] desire for speed is not a general excuse
for ignoring equal protection guarantees."' Id. at 127 (alterations in original).
Republican electors were certified by the Acting Governor on November 28, 1960. A
recount was ordered to begin on December 13, 1960. Both Democratic and Republi-
can electors met on the appointed day to cast their votes. On January 4, 1961, the
newly elected Governor certified the Democratic electors. The certification was
received by Congress on January 6, the day the electoral votes were counted.
Id. at 127 n.5.
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determined by a canvassing board." The court read that objective
of looking to the voter's intent as indicating that the legislature
probably meant "legal vote" to mean a vote recorded on a ballot
indicating what the voter intended. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d
1243, 1256-1257 (2000). It is perfectly true that the majority
might have chosen a different reading. See, e.g., Brief for Respon-
dent Harris et al. 10 (defining "legal votes" as "votes properly exe-
cuted in accordance with the instructions provided to all registered
voters in advance of the election and in the polling places"). But
even so, there is no constitutional violation in following the major-
ity view; Article II is unconcerned with mere disagreements about
interpretive merits.
2. The Florida court next interpreted "rejection" to determine
what act in the counting process may be attacked in a contest.
Again, the statute does not define the term. The court majority
read the word to mean simply a failure to count. 772 So. 2d, at
1257. That reading is certainly within the bounds of common
sense, given the objective to give effect to a voter's intent if that
can be determined. A different reading, of course, is possible. The
majority might have concluded that "rejection" should refer to ma-
chine malfunction, or that a ballot should not be treated as "re-
ject[ed]" in the absence of wrongdoing by election officials, lest
contests be so easy to claim that every election will end up in one.
Cf. id. at 1266. (Wells, C. J., dissenting). There is, however, noth-
ing nonjudicial in the Florida majority's more hospitable reading.
3. The same is true about the court majority's understanding of
the phrase "votes sufficient to change or place in doubt" the result
of the election in Florida. The court held that if the uncounted bal-
lots were so numerous that it was reasonably possible that they
contained enough "legal" votes to swing the election, this contest
would be authorized by the statute.* While the majority might
have thought (as the trial judge did) that a probability, not a possi-
bility, should be necessary to justify a contest, that reading is not
required by the statute's text, which says nothing about probability.
Whatever people of good will and good sense may argue about the
merits of the Florida court's reading, there is no warrant for saying
that it transcends the limits of reasonable statutory interpretation to
the point of supplanting the statute enacted by the "legislature"
within the meaning of Article II.
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In sum, the interpretations by the Florida court raise no substan-
tial question under Article 11."73
Certainly the same logic and analysis would have applied to any
reasonable interpretation of what constituted legal votes, especially given
Florida's strong pronouncements in its constitutional, statutory, and
decisional law, which predated the 2000 Presidential Election.
1 74
Since Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer did not think the
section 5 issues were "serious" and did not think the interpretations of
Florida law by the Supreme Court of Florida raised substantial questions
under Article 11,1175 one must ask what happened to cause these four
members of the Court to join in the remand opinion in Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board, which said:
There are expressions in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida that may be read to indicate that it construed the Florida Elec-
tion Code without regard to the extent to which the Florida Consti-
tution could, consistent with Art. II, § 1, cl. 2, "circumscribe the
legislative power." The opinion states, for example, that "[t]o the
extent that the Legislature may enact laws regulating the electoral
process, those laws are valid only if they impose no 'unreasonable
or unnecessary' restraints on the right of suffrage" guaranteed by
the state constitution. 772 So. 2d at 1236. The opinion also states
that "because election laws are intended to facilitate the right of
suffrage, such laws must be liberally construed in favor of the citi-
zens' right to vote .... 1176
When just eight days later these members of the Court considered these
issues to not be "serious," Justice Breyer acknowledged the damage created
by the remand opinion when he said: "In light of our previous remand, the
Supreme Court of Florida may have been reluctant to adopt a more specific
standard than that provided for by the legislature for fear of exceeding its
authority under Article 11.,,1177 But he concluded by saying that an equal
1173. Id. at 131-33. Moreover, the Florida Legislature's own decision to employ a
unitary code for all elections indicated that it intended the Supreme Court of Florida to play
the same role in presidential elections that it has historically played in resolving electoral
disputes.
1174. See discussion infra Part X.
1175. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1176. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 77 (2000) (alterations
in original).
1177. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 145 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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protection problem existed, and that the Supreme Court of Florida could
have addressed the problem by adopting uniform standards under Florida
law.11
7 8
Both Justice Breyer and Justice Souter would have remanded with
instructions to have the Supreme Court of Florida establish uniform
standards for Florida counties to use when evaluating the several types of
ballots that prompted differing treatment.1 79  Obviously, neither saw an
Article II issue with respect to a remand. 10 The Court's per curiam opinion
clearly recognized that the Supreme Court of Florida had the authority to
correct the equal protection violation found by the United States Supreme
Court; as the per curian opinion said, "[i]nstead, we are presented with a
situation where a state court with the power to assure uniformity has ordered
a statewide recount with minimal procedural safeguards." 118 1 It is safe to say
that Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, who did not join Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence, did not see an Article Hl issue with respect to the
Supreme Court of Florida interpreting Florida law to give guidance on a
standard as to what constituted a legal vote.
1182
The per curiam decision did not remand for this purpose, however,
because it found that the Supreme Court of Florida had interpreted Florida
law to conclude that the Florida Legislature interceded to avail itself of the
safe harbor afforded by title 3, section 5 of the United States Code and have
the election process completed by December 12, 2000.1183 There was no
such prior decisional case law, legislative mandate, or Florida constitutional
pronouncement prior to November 7, 2000. The Supreme Court of Florida
in its opinions on the subject did not say there was a legislative instruction
1178. Id. at 145-46.
1179. Id. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting), 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
I agree that, in these very special circumstances, basic principles of fairness may well
have counseled the adoption of a uniform standard to address the problem....
An appropriate remedy would be, instead, to remand this case with instructions that,
even at this late date, would permit the Florida Supreme Court to require recounting all
undercounted votes in Florida, including those from Broward, Volusia, Palm Beach,
and Miami-Dade Counties, whether or not previously recounted prior to the end of the
protest period, and to do so in accordance with a single uniform standard.
Id. at 146 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1180. Id. at 134-35 (Souter, J., dissenting), 148-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1181. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added).
1182. Id. at 110.
1183.Id. at 110-12.
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on this issue. 1184 In short, the December 12th date was not mandated and did
not exist in Florida law.
The Supreme Court of Florida, in its decision of December 11, 2000 on
remand in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board""s said the
December 12th date was a reasonable date, holding "[a]lthough the Code
sets no specific deadline by which a manual recount must be completed, the
time required to complete a manual recount must be reasonable."
' 18 6
Certainly, if it was in the Supreme Court of Florida's authority, according to
the United States Supreme Court, to pick a "reasonable date" to end an
election contest, it surely was within their authority, given the election code,
prior Florida case law, and Florida's Constitution, to define what constituted
a legal vote. While the Supreme Court of Florida indicated December 12th
was a "reasonable date to end an election contest," the court never indicated
that the date was the mandatory date to end the election contest.
18 7
Mandating a date that did not previously exist in Florida law to end the post-
election controversy is a more dramatic change in the law than interpreting
prior legal precedents and applying them to current circumstances to
determine the intent of the voter and what constituted legal
votes. Accordingly, one must conclude the only violation of Article II and
title 3, section 5 of the United States Code was the United States Supreme
Court's mandated date to end the election contest.
Given the intellectual gymnastics being played with respect to Article II
and section 5, there is no doubt that an appropriate epitaph for Bush II v.
Gore was written by Justice Stevens in his dissent, when he said:
It is confidence in the men and women who administer the judicial
system that is the true backbone of the rule of law. Time will one
day heal the wound to that confidence that will be inflicted by to-
day's decision. One thing, however, is certain. Although we may
never know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of
this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly
1184.Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. I v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla.
2000); Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. II v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1286 n.17 (Fla.
2000); Gore III v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2000); Gore IV v. Harris, 773 So. 2d
524, 526, 528-529 (Fla. 2000).
1185.531 U.S. 70 (2000).
1186. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. 11, 772 So. 2d at 1285.
1187. Id. at 1286 n.17; Gore IV, 773 So. 2d at 524, 528-29.
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clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an impartial
guardian of the rule of law.118
8
X. REMAND OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA AND ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT
After dismissing the case by order on December 14, 2000,1189 the
Supreme Court of Florida expressed its views on the election controversy
one last time. The Supreme Court of Florida noted the "'intent of the voter'
standard adopted by the Legislature was the standard in place as of
November 7, 2000, and a more expansive ruling would have raised an issue
as to whether this court would be substantially rewriting the Code after the
election, in violation of article II, section 1, clause 2 of the United States
Constitution and 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). ' 190 The court was careful not to state
that if it had delivered a more expansive ruling on the intent of the voter
standard that it would have violated Article II Section 2, Clause 2 of the
United States Constitution and title 3, section 5 of the United States Code.
As discussed previously, given prior and longstanding Florida case law
on legal votes predating the election, it is hard to conclude that a ruling
citing Darby v. State ex rel. McCollough,u 9' Boardman v. Esteva,n 92 and
State ex rel. Chappell v. Martinez'193 as precedents would violate Article II
and section 5. The only difference between the precedents and the issue
confronted in Gore III v. Harris was that in the punch card counties, voters
used styluses instead of pencils to mark ballots. Accordingly, to determine
the intent of a voter, a judge would have to read the markings of the stylus
instead of the markings of the pencil. This would hardly be a decision in
violation of Article II or section 5.1194 It would have been the application of
precedent to current factual circumstances, hardly a novel jurisprudential
event. The Supreme Court of Florida was warded off in the remand opinion
of Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board from applying its
precedent to establish an intent of the voter standard to determine legal votes
in punch card and optiscan machines. However, the court would not
1188. Bush II, 531 U.S. at 128-29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1189. Gore III v. Harris was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Florida by an order on
December 14,2000. Gore IV, 773 So. 2d at 526 n.1.
1190. Id. at 526.
1191.75 So. 411 (Fla. 1917).
1192.323 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1976).
1193.536 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1988).
1194. See Bush II, 531 U.S. at 100; cf. id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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concede on remand from Bush H v. Gore, that to establish standards for the
determination of a legal vote would have conceivably violated Article
II. After all, the per curiam decision in Bush II v. Gore acknowledged that
the Supreme Court of Florida had the "power to assure uniformity.'
1 95
Notwithstanding this power, the Supreme Court of Florida chose to defer at
this time and have the Florida Legislature "develop a specific, uniform
standard necessary to ensure equal application and to secure the fundamental
right to vote throughout the state of Florida ....
On the other important issue that confronted the Supreme Court of
Florida in the election controversies, the court took great pains through its
per curiam decision to note that the United States Supreme Court "ultimately
mandated that any manual recount be concluded by December 12, 2000, as
provided in 3 USC § 5.'' 1197 The court left its final note to history that the
United States Supreme Court, not the Supreme Court of Florida, chose the
December 12, 2000 date. In so doing, the Supreme Court of Florida made it
abundantly clear that the arbitrary date chosen by the United States Supreme
Court was just that, not a date mandated by Florida law or the Supreme
Court of Florida. The Supreme Court of Florida made certain that it was
telling the Nation that they did not pick the December 12th date, Florida law
did not require the December 12th date, and only the United States Supreme
Court mandated that date without support of Florida law.' 98 This point was
punctuated by Justice Shaw in his concurring opinion." 99 As Justice Shaw
said:
First, in my opinion, December 12 was not a "drop-dead" date
under Florida law. In fact, I question whether any date prior to
January 6 is a drop-dead date under the Florida election scheme.
December 12 was simply a permissive "safe-harbor" date to which
1195. Id. at 109.
1196. Gore IV, 773 So. 2d at 526. It should be noted that in a concurring opinion
Justice Pariente pointed out that the United States Supreme Court decision in Bush II v. Gore
might have a sweeping implication for Florida and the way elections are conducted in Florida
in the future.
Until there is modernization and uniformity of voting systems that will minimize the
likelihood of a vote not being recorded and until punchcard systems are retired from
use, statewide disparity in voting systems could operate to disenfranchise a number of
otherwise eligible voters based upon their county of residency. This disparity, based
only on one's county of residence, might have constitutional implications.
Id. at 537 (Pariente, J., concurring).
1197. Id. at 526
1198. Id. at 526, 528.
1199. Id. at 527 (Shaw, J., concurring).
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the states could aspire. It certainly was not a mandatory contest
deadline under the plain language of the Florida Election Code
(i.e., it is not mentioned there) or this Court's prior rulings. 2'
Contrary to the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 525, 148 L.Ed.2d 388
(2000), our prior opinions discussed Title fII vis4i-vis the Florida
Secretary of State's authority to reject late returns arising from a
pre-certification protest action, not vis-h-vis a court's obligation to
stop a recount in a post-certification contest action. See Palm
Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1220
(Fla.2000); Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772
So.2d 1273 (Fla.2000). To mix these two actions is to confuse ap-
ples and oranges.
201
In its last act concerning the election controversies, the Supreme Court
of Florida was leaving no doubt as to who created new Florida law in the
election cases. It was the United States Supreme Court, when they mandated
December 12th to be the date the election contest had to end, a date not
authorized by Florida law. Under the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board1202 and Chief
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence in Bush II v. Gore,1203 it is ironic that
perhaps the only clear violation of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the
United States Constitution and title 3, section 5 of the United States Code
was committed when the United States Supreme Court mandated that
December 12, 2000 end the 2000 Presidential Election contest pursuant to
"Florida Law."
XI. CONCLUSION
Butterfly ballots, absentee ballots, absentee ballot applications,
undervotes, punch card ballots, chads, counts, and recounts are words that
the legal profession in Florida added to their lexicon in November and
December of 2000. We would like to say the courts, when confronted with a
legal problem, applied the presently existing facts to the law and processed a
just result. We cannot.
1200. Gore IV, 773 So. 2d at 528-29 (alterations in original).
1201.Id. at 529 n.12.
1202.531 U.S. 70 (2000).
1203.531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
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Our examination of these election cases lead us to conclude that the
courts often ignored or controverted existing and established law in order to
reach a desired result. Nowhere was this more true than in Bush II v.
Gore. In this case, process triumphed over justice. This should not have
happened; especially where the fundamental right to vote and have one's
vote counted was the subject matter of the controversy. There seems to have
been little dispute that a voter in a punch card machine county did not have
the same chance of having his or her vote counted as a voter in an optical
scanner county.12z 4 Yet, the outcome of the judicial process was to avoid
having these voters' votes counted! Justice avoided!
Hard cases make bad law. If an election contest occurs in the future, we
doubt Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Board1205 will be cited for the
proposition that supports supervisors of election allowing a partisan
advantage for a particular political party. We doubt Fladell v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Boardr2 °6 will be cited for the proposition that an issue
concerning a statewide contest can be litigated on its merits prematurely in
the wrong court. We doubt that Gore III v. Harris'207 will be cited for the
proposition that, notwithstanding the statute, a candidate for election can sit
on a canvassing board for the election in which that candidate was on the
ballot. We are hopeful that Bush II v. Gore will not be cited in some future
election contest for the proposition that all votes cannot be counted as it
would violate the Equal Protection Clause just because the computer touch
screen system recently installed failed and did not have the same recount
procedures as the optical scanner voting machines. 12 8 Certainly these
decisions will have little or no precedential value.
The authors know that the experiences of these cases will point the way
to a better democracy. Like the absurdities confronted by the holdings in
Dred Scott v. Sandford1209 and Korematsu v. United States,1210 the 2000
Presidential Election decisions have led and will lead to election reform,
both through legislation and litigation. The good news is our democracy will
emerge from this episode reforming its voting systems and seeking a just and
1204. Gore IV, 773 So. 2d at 530 (Pariente, J., Concurring).
1205.773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000).
1206.772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2000).
1207.772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000).
1208. Unfortunately, the recently revised Florida Election Code does not mandate one
type of machine to be used in future statewide elections, thereby leaving open the possibility
of facing a myriad of recount procedures for different machines in the future. See Fla. Stat.
§ 101.28 (2001).
1209.60 U.S. 393 (1856).
1210. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
[Vol. 26:647
204
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss3/1
Berger and Tobin
equitable election system. Steps have already begun. Litigation has
commenced using Bush II v. Gore as precedent to eliminate the unequal
treatment of recording votes on election day for voters who vote in counties
with punch card voting equipment. Legislation has been passed in
Florida as a first step towards what the authors hope will be further
legislative reform in Florida and throughout the nation. We remain
hopeful.1
212
1211. See Palermo, supra note 370.
1212.See Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, Ch. 2001-40, 2001 Fla. Laws
117. Florida law still does not require a uniform voting system, leaving the post-election
system created subject to potential attack under Bush I v. Gore. In addition, no reform
measures were taken to eliminate the delay period for acceptance of overseas ballots
notwithstanding the elimination of the second primary, or to require the Secretary of State or
the Attorney General to abstain from election politics for elections she will be monitoring or
certifying.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Presidential Election of 2000 brought international attention to the
means by which votes in Florida are counted in each election. Florida is
comprised of sixty-seven counties, each of which has a canvassing board
having the responsibility to certify the election results for its own county.
* Broward County Court Judge; Adjunct Professor, Florida Metropolitan
University; B.A., Jacksonville University; J.D., with honors, University of Florida.
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Although subject to much reviling' during the Florida Recount2 process, the
canvassing board system has been around in some form since the Florida
territorial era more than 170 years ago.
During the 2001 legislative session, the Florida Legislature passed
substantial legislation in an attempt to remedy the problems that came to
light during the Florida Recount. Notwithstanding the scorn earlier heaped
on the heads of the canvassers, the legislature did not touch the existing
county canvassing board structure. The purpose of this article is to set forth
the historical development of the Florida canvassing system; to summarize
the pertinent law as it existed on the eve of the Presidential Election of 2000;
to explain changes made to this law by the Florida Election Reform Act of
2001; and to provide a summary of the current chronological procedure for
the canvassing of returns by a county canvassing board.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The state's election canvassing system was not put into place at one
time or by one piece of legislation. Rather, the system has grown and
changed as experience revealed the need to address a particular area or
dispute. Legislative in nature, the canvassing scheme has also been subject in
much part to the political winds prevailing in the various Florida legislative
bodies, including: the Territorial Legislative Council, the early statehood
General Assembly, and the current State Legislature.
A. Territorial Days
The beginnings of the canvassing board system are seen in the earliest
laws of territorial Florida. Florida became a United States territory in 1821. 3
Several months thereafter, the United States Congress authorized the
1. See, e.g., Tom Collins, Bar Talk, MIAMI DAILY BUswSS REvIEw, Feb. 2, 2001, at
C1 (discussing criticism of canvassing boards that the recent "manual recount was politically
motivated"); Bob Drogin, Task Force Urges Stronger Federal Role in Elections, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 10, 2001, at 3A (referring to "Florida's nightmarish 2000
presidential election and ballot recount"); Letter from Mrs. Roger Jones to Judge Robert W.
Lee (Jan. 2, 2001) (on file with author) (from a concerned citizen arguing that the recount
should not have proceeded).
2. For ease of reference, the term "Florida Recount" shall be used in this article to
refer to the process by which presidential ballots in Florida were subject to review and recount
in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election.
3. TiE NEw HISTORY OF FLORIDA 207 (Michael Gannon, ed., 1996) [hereinafter
GANNON].
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territory to send a nonvoting delegate to Washington.4 As part of the
legislation providing for the election of the delegate, Congress further
provided a judicial process for the fledgling territory to handle any dispute
concerning this election.5 Thus began the historical involvement of the
Florida judiciary in election disputes.
In 1822, Florida justices of the peace were given the jurisdiction to
investigate any election contest concerning Florida's territorial delegate to
Congress. The justices of the peace would gather testimony to be compiled
and then transmitted directly to the Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives for Washington's disposition.6  One year later, the
Legislative Council, as the Florida Legislative body was called at that time,
provided that county judges were required to appoint "judges of the
election" who would review the ballots and certify the winner of the
territory-wide election of the Congressional delegate.7 These persons were
later referred to as "inspectors of election."
8
When the members of the Legislative Council became subject to
election, county judges saw their involvement increase as they were the
parties who decided where polling places would be located for the elections
of both the Council Members as well as the United States Delegate.9
However, justices of the peace, rather than county judges, presided over any
contest involving the election of a member of the Legislative Council, with
the testimony transmitted to the President of the Legislative Council for
action.10
In 1831, the Florida Legislative Council passed three relevant laws
regarding municipal elections: An Act to Incorporate the Town of
4. Id. at 211.
5. Id.
6. Act of Aug. 12, 1822, 1822 Fla. Territory Laws 9 (providing for the election of a
delegate to Congress).
7. Act of July 3, 1823, 1823 Fla. Territory Laws 91 (providing for the election of a
delegate to Congress).
8. Act of Nov. 22, 1828, 1828 Fla. Territory Laws 254 (concerning the election of
members of the legislative council of the Territory of Florida).
9. Act of Jan. 11, 1827, 1826-27 Fla. Territory Laws 88 (dividing the Territory of
Florida into thirteen election districts and providing for the election of members to the
legislative council); Act of Jan. 16, 1827, 1826-27 Fla. Territory Laws 109 (amending the Act
of Jan. 11, 1827 that divided the Territory of Florida into thirteen election districts and
provided for the election of members to the legislative council).
10. Act of Jan. 11, 1827, 1826-27 Fla. Territory Laws 88 (dividing the Territory of
Florida into thirteen election districts and providing for the election of members of the
legislative council).
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Monticello, in Jefferson County;1 An Act to Amend an Act Entitled, "An
Act to Incorporate the Town of Quincy;' ', 2 and An Act to Incorporate the
City of Fernandina.13 The Council gave the mayor of each town the duty to
appoint three "inspectors' ' 14 who had the job of supervising local elections
and
whose duty it shall be to receive the votes, and to cause the name of
every voter to be taken down and kept in a book for that purpose,
and to cause the poll to be opened ... and the names of the several
persons ... having the greatest number of votes shall be declared
and notice of their election given to each of them.15
At this point in Florida history, there was no requirement that the mayor
appoint a judge or other person trained in the law to these positions. Rather,
the mayor was merely directed to appoint discreet persons to perform this
responsibility. 16 Thus, while justices of the peace would compile evidence
in an election contest, the process of canvassing during early territorial days
generally directly involved persons other than members of the judiciary.
Two years later, the Legislative Council amended legislation providing
for the territory-wide election of a delegate to Congress, as well as other
territory officers.' 7 Under this legislation, the inspectors of election for all
territory offices were to be uniformly appointed by "the presiding justices or
judges of the county courts."18
11. Act of Feb. 7, 1831, 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 41-44 (incorporating the Town of
Monticello, in Jefferson County).
12. Act of Feb. 7, 1831, 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 44-45 (amending the Act of Nov.
21, 1828, that incorporated the Town of Quincy).
13. Act of Feb. 10, 1831, 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 63-67 (incorporating the City of
Femandina).
14. 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 43; 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 66. The word "intendant,"
used in these particular laws in lieu of the word "mayor," was frequently used in early
territorial laws and connoted the same position as mayor. Its use likely derives from the
territory's Spanish legal heritage. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 727 (5th ed. 1979) (referring
to Spanish term intendente); BANTAM NEW COLLEGE SPANISH AND ENGLISH DICTIONARY 196
(rev. ed. 1987) (defining intendente as "mayor").
15. 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 43.
16. 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 44.
17. Act of Feb. 17, 1833, ch. 675, 1833 Fla. Territory Laws 35-41 (providing for
holding an election for delegate to Congress from this Territory, members to the legislative
council, and certain other officers).
18. Id. at 35.
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The function of county courts to certify results of elections can be seen
from an early example in Florida's history. For the election of the members
of the 1835 Legislative Council, the Council amended territorial law to
require that the election be held in October rather than May. 19 The County
Judge in Mosquito County,20 however, did not receive notice that the law
had changed.2' Accordingly, in May he called the election and certified the
results to Tallahassee. The territorial government in turn notified the Judge
that the law had changed, "which fact it is presumed was not known in
[Mosquito] County."22 The winner of the Mosquito County election was not
recognized, and the Judge was directed to hold another election in October.
23
B. Early Statehood
In furtherance of the goal of Florida statehood, first expressed in the
Adams-De Onfs Treaty, 24 a group of Territory leaders and other prominent
citizens met in the gulf coast town of St. Joseph in 1838 to propose a
constitution and obtain congressional approval for statehood. 2 The
Legislative Council required that the county judges call an election for
delegates to the convention according to the number of delegates designated
for each county.26 The delegates proposed a constitution, which would
become Florida's first state constitution in 1845.
In 1843, the Legislative Council approved an Election Code proposed
by a "reviser" of territorial laws.27 Two years later, the year Florida became
19. Act of Feb. 7, 1835, ch. 845, 1835 Fla. Territory Laws 308 (changing the time of
holding the election for members of the legislative council).
20. Later, at statehood, the name of Mosquito County was changed to Orange County.
Act of Jan. 30, 1845, 1845 Fla. Territory Laws 56 (altering and changing the name of
Mosquito County to that of Orange).
21. Mosquito County in Central Florida was quite remote from Tallahassee during
this era of poor transportation and communication links.
22. Letter from George W. Walker to Judge of the County Court Mosquitoe [sic]
County (June 8, 1835) in 25 THE TERRrrORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNrr=n STATES at 162 (C.E.
Carter ed., 1960).
23. Id.
24. Treaty of Amity, Feb. 22, 1819, U.S.-Spain, art. 6, 1822 Fla. Territory Laws IV.
25. STUART B. McIvER, DREAmERS, SCHEMERS AND SCALAWAGS 95-99 (1994);
Florida History Internet Center, Florida History Internet Center Home Page, at
http://www.floridahistory.org (visited Feb. 2,2002).
26. Act of Jan. 30, 1838, 1838 Fla. Territory Laws 16 (calling a convention for the
purpose of organising [sic] a state government).
27. Act of Mar. 15, 1843, 1843 Fla. Territory Laws 34 (concerning the revised
statutes).
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a state, a new Elections Code was adopted which was patterned after the
previous territorial laws on the same subject.28  Inspectors of elections,
formerly appointed by mayors and county judges, were now uniformly
appointed by probate judges.29 If a person contested an election for a seat in
the General Assembly, the local probate judge was required to collect the
evidence on the subject and transmit it to either the Speaker of the House for
a seat in the State House of Representatives, or the President of the Senate
for a seat in the State Senate. 30
For local offices, a contest of the election was presented to a circuit
judge who was required to "proceed in a summary way, to hear and
determine the matters in issue, and to give judgment upon the rights of the
parties."'31 The remedy available in a successful contest was ouster of the
contested winner, with seating of the petitioning candidate.32 Notwithstand-
ing the establishment of a uniform Election Code at statehood, just five years
later the General Assembly once again began to allow mayors and city
councils to appoint the inspectors of elections of their own municipalities.33
Upon statehood, the position of county judge was abolished.34  The
state judicial system was then comprised of circuit and probate courts.35
Each county had a probate judge, who served as the head of the local
36election system. The operation of the canvassing board can be seen by
considering an illustrative vignette from Florida's secession movement. In
November 1860, the Florida General Assembly called a state convention for
the purpose of considering an act of secession from the United States.3 7
Governor Madison S. Perry was concerned that elected delegates from Key
28. An Act Relative to Elections in this State, art. IV, § 1, 1845 Fla. Laws at 79. From
1845 to 1868, counties were served by circuit judges and probate judges. County judges did
not again exist in name until 1868. See FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, §§ 16-18.
29. An Act Relative to Elections in this State, supra note 29.
30. Id.
31. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, 99 1-5,7-10.
32. Ch. , § 3, 1850-51 Fla. Laws 92 (amending an act incorporating the City of
St. Augustine).
33. Id. Ch. _._, § 5, 1850-51 Fla. Laws 90 (amending an act incorporating the City
of Apalachicola).
34. Compare Act of Sept. 18, 1822, 1822 Fla. Territory Laws 93 (authorising [sic) the
appointment of Justices of the Peace and defining their powers, and establishing county
courts) with FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. V, §§ 1-3, 11 (1845).
35. FLA, CONST. of 1838, art. V, §§ 1-3, 9 (1845).
36. Act of Jan. 5, 1847, Ch. 72-(No. 2), §§ 1-2, 1846-47 Fla. Laws 10-11
(amending the Act relative to elections in this state).
37. JOHN EDwIN JOHNS, FLORIDA IN THE CONFEDERACY 27 (photo. reprint 1983)
(1958) (U.N.C. doctoral dissertation).
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West, thought necessary to the success of the convention, would not arrive
on time. 8 Governor Perry called upon the Monroe County Probate Judge to
promptly canvass and certify the election delegates so that the delegates
could be placed on a steamer waiting to sail for the Florida Panhandle. 9 As
one historian noted, "[t]he Probate Judge and three other citizens of good
repute were to canvass the vote and issue certificates of election to the
winners in time for delegates to board the steamer.'"0 The Monroe County
Canvassing Board successfully performed the task requested by the
Governor.
At this time, canvassing laws began to more closely resemble those of
modem times. New election laws provided that the canvassing boards,
headed by the local probate judges, had a ten-day period to review and
certify election results.42 The canvassing boards further had the legal
obligation "'to ascertain the whole number of votes cast, and who had
received the highest number of... votes."'
43
C. Post-Civil War Era
As the Civil War and Reconstruction years passed, judges continued to
play a role in the certifying of elections as they had done in Florida for
decades. A new law made it a criminal offense for anyone, whether or not
on the canvassing board, to change a voter's ballot thereby not voting "as he
intended. ' 44 In the general election of 1870, however, the judiciary was
involved in a much different capacity in a heavily disputed statewide
election.45 For this election, the statewide canvassing board was controlled
by the Republicans.4 The Democrats believed that the canvassing board
was up to some type of mischief, and they sought an injunction in the Leon
County circuit court to prevent the canvassing board from canvassing the
returns and certifying any winners.47 Circuit Judge Pleasant W. White was
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Act of Dec. 17, 1861, 1861 Fla. Laws 35 (amending the laws of the State in
relation to elections).
43. WALTER W. MANLEY, H, ed., THE SUPREmE COURT OF FLORmA AND ITS
PREDECESSOR COURTS, 1821-1917, 245 (1997) [hereinafter MANLEY].
44. FLA. REv. STAT. § 5875 (1920). This particular law was adopted in 1868.
45. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 244-45.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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persuaded by the Democrat argument and accordingly issued the injunc-
tion.4 8 He presided over a grand jury investigation into whether "reports of
impending violence against the governor or other state officials" were
substantiated.49
The Republicans in turn approached a federal judge in Jacksonville,
claiming that Judge White's suspension of the count was in contravention of
federal voting rights laws.5 Rather than simply seeking to overturn Judge
White's order, however, the federal authorities indicted the judge and had a
federal court issue a warrant for his arrest, upon which he "was escorted to
Jacksonville by a U.S. Marshall."'" With Judge White "resting in a
Jacksonville jail," the canvassing board resumed its count and announced the
results of the election. 2
At the same time, to avoid further delays, the Republicans appealed
Judge White's issuance of the injunction to the Supreme Court of Florida.53
Before the tribunal could reach a decision, the state legislature enacted a law
abolishing the state canvassing board 4 The action had its desired effect
when the supreme court ruled that no action could be taken concerning a
board which no longer existed 5 Soon thereafter, the federal prosecution of
Judge White was dropped after the federal court determined the indictment
had been issued in error. 6 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida
decision established the principle that a court "could compel [canvassing
boards] to count all the ballots," so long as a canvassing board in fact
existed.57
Prominent election disputes involving the Florida judiciary continued
just a few years later in the general election of 1876. The statewide vote for
48. Id. at 244.
49. RALPH LEON PEEK, LAWLESSNE S AND THE RESTORATION OF ORDER IN FLORIDA,
1868-1871, at 163-64 (photo. reprint 1983) (1964) (U. F. doctoral dissertation) [hereinafter
PEEK).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 244.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 245.
55. Id.
57. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 245, citing State v. Gibbs, 13 Fla. 55, 72-73 (1869).
In Gibbs, the court noted how the Legislature repealed the law creating the state canvassing
board prior to the conclusion of this case.
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both the presidential and gubernatorial races ended up before the Supreme
Court of Florida. 58  Early results had revealed a razor-thin Democratic
victory in all state and national races.59  In Florida, the Democratic
presidential candidate led the Republican candidate by a margin of fewer
than one hundred votes.6° State law mandated the state canvassing board to
"ratify the tallies" for the election returns to be certified. Rather than
simply ratifying the tallies, however, the state canvassing board actually
passed on the validity of many of the ballots, resulting in a win for the
Republicans.62
The Democrats sought and were granted injunctive relief from the Leon
County circuit court requiring the canvassing board to merely tally the
election precinct returns without determining the legitimacy of any votes.63
NotwithstandinE the court's action, the state canvassing board disregarded
the court order. The matter made its way to the Supreme Court of Florida,
which was controlled by Republicans, and which "ordered state officials to
recount ballots and award the governor's chair to Democrat George F. Drew,
even though many of the same officials were [the Chief Justice's] political
and personal friends. ' 65  The state's presidential electoral votes were,
however, awarded to the Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes.
Notwithstanding the potential for chicanery, one Florida court historian
has noted that "[niumerous Floridians credited [Chief Justice] Randall and
his court colleagues with rising above party and politics to resolve the
dispute., 66 The Court further ruled that the duties of the canvassing board
were "strictly 'ministerial,' meaning that the state canvassers could only tally
the votes submitted by the county canvassers." 67 As a result, the supreme
court concluded that the state canvassing board did not have judicial power,
58. Id. at 252.
59. Id. at 251.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 251-52.
62. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 252.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 251-52.
65. Id. at 219.
66. Id. See also JOAN E. GILL & BETh R. READ, eds., BORN OF Tim SUN 67 (1975)
(concluding that the state canvassing board "acted so unfairly that the state supreme court
ordered a recount"); EDWARD C. WILLIAMSON, THE ERA OF THE DEMocRATic COUNTY LEADER:
FLORIDA POLrncs 1877-1893, 44 (photo. reprint 1983) (1954) (University of Florida doctoral
dissertation) (noting that a minority of the state canvassers ruled in favor of the Democratic
presidential candidate, Samuel Tilden) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON].
67. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 252.
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and therefore, a canvassing board could not "'determin[e] ... the legality of
a particular vote or election."
68
In 1877, the Florida Legislature amended the State's Election Code to
more clearly provide for a canvassing procedure. Each precinct within a
county was required to have three "inspectors of election," appointed by the
County Commission, who were required to be "intelligent and discreet
electors of such county, who can read and write. '69 They were also required
to be residents of the precinct for which they were appointed, and they could
not all belong to the same political party.70
On the day of each election, the inspectors at each precinct opened the
polls, confirmed that the ballot box was empty at the opening of the polls,
resolved any challenges to any voter qualifications, "maintain[ed] good
order" at the polls, closed the polls, canvassed the ballots at the precinct, and
completed a certificate of results to be forwarded to the county canvassing
board.71 In canvassing the ballots, the inspectors had the discretion to refuse
to count particular ballots if they did not appear to evidence the intention of
the person casting it to vote for a particular candidate, 2 a discretionary duty
later provided to the county canvassers. In exercising their discretion, the
decision of a majority of the inspectors would not be overturned, even if the
decision were erroneous, unless the ballots were rejected fraudulently, or
unless the rejected ballots would have changed the result of the election.
Each county canvassing board was comprised of the county judge, 75 the
76clerk of the circuit court, and a justice of the peace. The county judge and
the clerk collectively chose the justice of the peace who would serve on the
board.77 If either the county judge or the clerk failed or refused to act, the
68. Id. at 253 (citing State v, McLin, 16 Fla. 17, 43-45, 49, 52 (1876)).
69. Ch. 97, § 19, 1881 Fla. Laws 481, 489.
70. Ch. 97, § 19, 1881 Fla. Laws 481, 487.
71. Ch. 97, §§ 24,30,32-33,35, 1881 Fla. Laws 481,493-96.
72. State ex rel. Lilienthan v. Deane, 1 So. 698, 699 (Fla. 1887). In Deane, a
canvassing board refused to count a single ballot for a municipal election in the city of
Sanford. The board's exercise of discretion was upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida. Id.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 274-76.
74. Pickett v. Russell, 28 So. 764,770-71 (1900).
75. At this time in the State's history, each county had only a single county judge, but
at least two justices of the peace. FLA. REv. STAT. § 3357 (1920); FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 16-
17 (1885).
76. Ch. 97, § 36, 1881 Fla. Laws 481,496.
77. Id.
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county sheriff would act in either's place.78 Within six days of the election,
the county canvassing board was required to meet to "compile the result of
the election as shown by [the] inspectors' returns." 79 The county canvassing
board could not, however, reevaluate the propriety of any decision by the
precinct inspectors as to the casting of any individual vote.80
For any election involving more than a county or local race, within
thirty-five days of the election, the county canvassing board would in turn
forward its canvassing results to the state canvassing board. The state board
was comprised of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the State
Comptroller.81 As with the county canvassing boards, the state canvassing
board likewise had no discretion to evaluate the propriety of any tallies
82forwarded by the counties. The canvassing by the state board was merely a
"ministerial act."83 If a candidate for a state legislative seat was dissatisfied
with the results of a canvassing decision, the candidate was required to file
its election contest within twenty days for the General Assembly and twenty-
five days for the State Senate, "after the canvass by the Board of State
Canvassers." 84  Notwithstanding the implementation of a new uniform
election code, the County Canvassing Boards were not authorized to canvass
the returns of all elections. For instance, results from elections to authorize
bonds for count improvements were to be canvassed by the board of county
commissioners. 
5
During the years after the Civil War, the canvassing board officials,
such as the county judges and justices of the peace, were all appointed by the
governor, which soon led to the white establishment "ha[ving] complete
control of the election machinery., 8 6 In some counties, canvassing boards
"shamelessly manipulated voting and counting processes on election day."87
In particular, in the years following Reconstruction, county judges often
78. Ch. 97, § 36, 1881 Fla. Laws 481, 496. For an example of the appointment
procedure, see State ex rel. Bisbee v. Bd. of County Canvassers of Alachua County, 17 Fla. 9,
19 (1878).
79. Ch. 97, § 36, 1881 Fla. Laws 481,496.
80. Id.
81. Ch. 97, § 40, 1881 Fla. Laws 481, 497.
82. Id. at 498.
83. State ex rel. Drew v. McLin, 16 Fla. 17,43-44 (1876).
84. Ch. 97, §§ 44,48, 1881 Fla. Laws 481,498-99.
86. Charles Halsey Hildreth, A History of Gainesville, Florida 81 (1954)
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Florida) (on file with Nova Law Review).
87. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 299.
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ignored clearly fraudulent activity designed to disenfranchise black
citizens. The misconduct was somewhat ameliorated in 1870 and 1871 by
the enactment of a series of federal legislation 89 which held state officials,
including judges, criminally liable for violations of voting rights.9°
Nevertheless, not all corruption was eliminated, as was indicated in the
elections of 1878.
The congressional elections of 1878 saw Democrat Noble Hull run
against the Republican incumbent Horatio Bisbee, Jr., for the Second
Congressional District. 91 As the election returns came into Tallahassee, they
indicated a narrow lead for the Republican.92 The South Florida returns had
not yet been received, and Hull sent to Brevard County "an Orange County
lawyer, armed with $200 and the information that Hull must have over [a]
200 [vote] majority in Brevard" to win the race.93 Upon arrival in Brevard
County, however, the attorney discovered that the returns had already been
tallied and that Hull had won only by seventy-nine votes.94 The court clerk,
who possessed the returns, initially refused to alter them. 95 However, upon
receiving the amount of $140, the clerk "turned his office over to [the Hull
representatives] who raised Hull's vote" to a majority of 270 votes.96 The
altered returns were provided to the Brevard County canvassing board, who
certified them as the official Brevard returns.97 The canvassing board
members were subsequently arrested for election fraud and found guilty in
federal court in Jacksonville. 98  They each served more than a year in
prison. 99
88. See id.; Hildreth, supra note 86, at 81; PEEK, supra note 49, at 40.
89. 1871 Enforcement Act, 16 Stat. 140-46; 1871 An Act to Amend the Enforcement
Act, 16 Stat. 433-40; 1873 An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
17 Stat. 13-15. See also PEEK, supra note 49, at 169, 174-77,186-87, 190-92.
90. PEEK, supra note 49, at 204-08.
91. WILLLAMSON, supra note 66, at 74-75. Hull was the current lieutenant governor.
At that time, Florida was divided into only two congressional districts. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at81.
94. Id.
95. WLLtAMSON, supra note 66, at 81.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 81, 83.
98. Id. at 84.
99. Id. at 81, 84. Hull was seated as Congressman from the Florida Second
Congressional District. WHILAMSON, supra note 66 at 75. Legal proceedings to determine
the propriety of his election took almost his entire term, with his being unseated just a few
days before the end of his term and Bisbee taking the seat in his place. Id. at 83.
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Continuing corruption with the canvassing of votes was one of the
reasons for the emergence of a strong Independent party in the 1884
statewide elections. The Independents campaigned on a platform that
included the slogan "a free ballot, a full vote and a fair count."'1 The
Independent candidate for Lieutenant Governor, Jonathan C. Greeley,
accepted the group's nomination with a speech that echoed the slogan,
calling for "a free ballot, a full vote and a fair count."10 1 Although Greeley
gave the Democrats a strong challenge, he did not win.'0 2
The slogan of the Independents appeared to fall on deaf ears. Rather
than assure that election laws operated fairly, the legislature took steps to
further thwart a fair vote. In 1889, new laws implemented a confusing multi-
box system of balloting, along with a poll tax. 0 3 Only a single legislator
spoke out against the new laws.1' 4 State Senator Will Coulter of Levy
County argued that the State's "[e]lection laws should be plain and sim-
ple." 105 By 1892, the growth of the Farmers Alliance as a statewide political
force again led to calls for election reform. However, the Alliance was not
able to gain sufficient power to usurp the dominance of the Democratic
Party, who were firmly entrenched in their antireform position.16
In 1895, James Bryan Whitfield, future justice of the Supreme Court of
Florida, drafted a new general election law for the state.10 7 The composition
of the county canvassing boards was changed. Rather than the clerk of the
court and a justice of the peace serving with the county judge, the county
canvassing board was thereafter composed of the supervisor of voter
registration,108 the chair of the county commission, and the county judge.10 9
100. Id. at 183.
101. Id. at 182-84. The gubernatorial candidate was Frank W. Pope, who "had given
up [a] promising career within the Democratic Party to protest against the white supremacy
extremists of the Black Belt." Id. at 182. Greeley, on the other hand, was a former
Republican with reform leanings, who was president of a railroad and served as state senator
from Jacksonville. WILLIAMSON, supra note 66, at 182. Although the Independents lost the
election, they lost by less than 5000 votes and caried nine of the thirty-nine Florida counties:
Washington, Leon, Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, Nassau, Duval, Alachua, and Marion. Id.
at 207-08. Notwithstanding its strong showing, the Independent Party was not able to survive
its defeat. Id. at 210.
102. Id. at 207.
103. Id. at 270.
104. WMLIAMSON, supra note 66, at 271.
105. Id. at 270-71.
106. Id. at 318; GANNON, supra note 3, at 287.
107. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 349.
108. Now called the supervisor of elections. See infra text accompanying note 150.
109. FLA. STAT. § 102.14 (2002).
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Once again, however, the county canvassing board possessed no discretion-
ary authority to alter any decision of the precinct inspectors of election. 10
This was true even if ballots were found by the county can-vassing board
which were clearly not counted by the inspectors.' As for precinct
inspectors, a requirement was added that they be "fair minded" in addition to
the existing requirement that they be "intelligent" and "discreet."' 1 2 Finally,
the election inspectors were made subject to a fine if they revealed "how any
elector may have voted,"' 13 while county canvassing board members were
subject to fine or imprisonment if they "wilfully violate[d] any of the
provisions of law relating to canvassing the result of any election."
D. The Early Twentieth Century
Notwithstanding efforts to provide for a statewide uniform system of
canvassing elections, the Florida Legislature soon began once again to create
other types of canvassing mechanisms for specific types of elections. In
1899, the legislature provided a new canvassing procedure for elections to
consider taxes for school districts. In such an election, the local board of
public instruction served in the place of the county canvassing board.1 5 A
subsequent challenge to the school boards' authority as canvassing entities
was unsuccessful.'
16
Thereafter, in 1903, the legislature authorized the boards of county
commissioners to canvass the results of any election involving the creation
of any special tax road districts;' 7 in 1911, to canvass the results of any
election involving the creation of any special road and bridge districts;1 in
1917, to canvass the returns of any elections involving the levying of a
county tax for the creation of a tuberculosis hospital; 19 in 1919, reauthorized
to canvass the results of any election involving the relocation of a county
seat; 120 and in 1925, to canvass the results of an election involving a local
110. FLA. REv. STAT. § 287 (1920).
111. Bisbee, 17 Fla. at 18-19 (uncounted ballots found in a ballot box).
112. FLA. REV. STAT. § 249 (1920).
113. Id. § 5876.
114. Id. § 5880.
115. Id. § 564.
116. Pickett v. Russell, 28 So. 764, 770 (1900).
117. FLA. REv. STAT. § 1638 (1920).
118. Id.§ 1649.
119. Id. § 1818.
120. Id. § 1583.
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referendum to determine whether to permit livestock to "roam at large.
' 121
On occasion, elections were held in which the county canvassing board,
rather than the board of county commissioners, erroneously presided as
canvassers of a particular election.
One particular set of challenges took place in Polk County in the early
1900s in which a local prohibition option had been approved by the
electorate in a county referendum.1 State law had required the results of
the referendum to be canvassed by the board of county commissioners. 23 In
a series of criminal cases brought against those violating the prohibition law,
local judges declared the local prohibition laws to be "null and void"
because the "wet and dry election.., had been canvassed by the county
canvassing board, instead of by the county commissioners."'
'l
Notwithstanding Supreme Court of Florida rulings that the canvassing
boards did not at that time possess any authority to alter the returns as tallied
by the precinct boards of election, such a law did not prevent the canvassing
board from asking for recounts on occasion. One such incident occurred in
1913 during the Fort Lauderdale local elections in which the city council
served as canvassing entity after the election board had tallied the votes.'25
At the close of the polls, the election board had certified the results for all
city council seats, one of which involved a tally of ninety-two votes to
eighty-nine votes.126 One of the sitting council members, E.T. King,
requested a recount which was granted.127 However, the result was the
same. 
129
At this time, no statutory provision existed for the counting of ballots
that were improperly marked. As a result, improperly marked ballots were
generally not counted. In his first message to the Florida Legislature in
1913, Governor Park Trammell acknowledged the frequently resulting
unfairness and stated this problem as one he wanted to address during his
121. Ch. 10316--(No. 294), § 2, 1925 Fla. Laws 64, 64. See also Ch. 14715--(No.
77), § 12, 1931 Fla. Laws 187, 190-91. (authorizing the same procedure for a special election
in Marion County).
122. M. F. HETHERMINGTON, HISTORY OF POLK COUNTY, FLORIDA 30 (Arthur H.
Cawston ed., 1928).
123. Id. at 30-31.
124. Id.
125. Matthews Elected Mayor of City, FORT LAUDERALE SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 1913, at 1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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administration.' 29 In one of the first calls for election boards to determine
the voter's intent, the Governor stated:
[M]ere irregularities in marking the ballot, if the intention of the
voter is clearly indicated, should not be cause for throwing out the
ballot. The primary law should be so amended as to provide that
where a voter's intention is clear on the ballot, the vote should be
counted, though technically there might be an error in the marking
of the ticket. 130
Such a call for reform did not, however, result in immediate legislation.
The Florida Legislature more clearly provided a right of inspection in
1915, by which up to three persons were permitted "to be sufficiently near"
the ballots being counted so that the observers could determine "whether or
not the ballots are being correctly read and called, and the count of the votes
correctly tallied. 131
Beginning in 1917, absentee ballots were authorized by Florida law.
Such ballots were required to be filed directly with the county judge of the
county for which the absent elector was voting. 133 These ballots were not
opened until the canvassing board met to canvass the results of an elec-
tion.134 The canvassing board had the responsibility to open and tally these
ballots. 135 A decade later, the ballots were separated by precinct and
delivered to the appropriate poll election board.136 If the inspectors of
election determined that an absentee voter was not eligible to vote, the ballot
cast "shall not be deposited in said ballot box, but shall be left in the outer
envelope and by them delivered to the canvassing board... and also with a
notation on said envelope of their reasons for not depositing said ballot in
the ballot box.', 137 No provision was made, however, for a canvassing board
to overrule the decision of the inspectors.
In 1921, the legislature enacted a law requiring the county commission-
ers to publish in a local newspaper the names of the designated inspectors of
129. Park Trammell, First Message of the Governor to the Florida Legislature, Apr. 8,
1913, reprinted in FORT LAUDERDALE SENTINEL Apr. 18, 1913, at 7.
130. Id.
131. A. REv. STAT. § 5877 (1920).
132. Id. § 370-72.
133. Id. § 370.
134. Id. § 371.
135. Id. § 371.
136. Ch. 11824-(No. 17), § 2, 1927 Fla. Laws 116, 118.
137. Id.
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election at least fifteen days prior to the election. 138 In 1927, an unusual law
was enacted which transferred all the powers and duties of a supervisor of
elections from the supervisor to the county tax collector in any county which
had, "according to the State census of 1925, a population of not less than
13,600 and not more than 13,800.,,139 The only county meeting this
requirement under the 1925 census was Walton County, located in the
central western Florida Panhandle."4 As a result, the tax collector of Walton
County had a seat on the county's canvassing board.
Municipal elections generally did not involve the county canvassing
boards.1 41  Rather, the Florida Legislature, in creating or modifying
municipalities, typically designated the city council or commission as the
canvassing board for any municipal election. In 1927, such legislation was
adopted, for instance, for the city of DeLand, and in 1929 for the town of
Ormond.' 42
Voting equipment changes taking advantage of the latest technological
advances took place in 1929 when the Florida Legislature authorized
counties to "provide for the experimental use" of new voting machines.' 43
The enacting legislation authorized those voting machines which contained a
counter indicating how many persons have voted and which could "permit
the voter to vote for as many persons for an office as he is lawfully entitled
to vote for, but no more."' Upon closing of the polls, the board of elections
of each precinct prepared a "statement of canvass" which was prepared by
one member reading from each counter the total votes for each candidate or
proposition, and the other two members recording the figure on the
statement. 45 This procedure was to be done "in the presence of persons who
138. Id. at 116-20.
139. Ch. 12317-(No. 512), § 1, 1927 Fla. Laws 1254.
140. FLA. STATE CENSUS (1925) (on file in the Florida Collection at the Jacksonville
Public Library); telephone interview with Marty Sugden, Research Librarian in the Florida
Collection at the Jacksonville Public Library (Sept. 5, 2001) [both hereinafter collectively
referred to as 1925 CENsus].
141. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 125-28 (describing local Fort Lauderdale
election).
142. Ch. 12669--(No. 864), § 4, 1927 Fla. Laws 744, 748; Ch. 14278-(No. 714), § 4,
1929 Fla. Laws 1530, 1533. The role of the city council or commission as canvassing board
continued into the 1930s and 1940s. See, e.g., Ch. 19960-(No. 965), § 2, 1939 Fla. Laws
982 (pertaining to the canvassing of local elections in the city of Ocala).
143. Ch. 13893--(No. 329), § 4, 1929 Fla. Laws 715, 718.
144. Ch. 13893--(No. 329), § 2, 1929 Fla. Laws 715, 716.
145. Ch. 13893--(No. 329), § 23, 1929 Fla. Laws 715, 726.
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may be lawfully present at that time, giving full view of the counters."'" At
the end of the procedure, the figures were to be "compared with the numbers
on the counters of the machine."' 147 If reconciled, the results were announced
by the board chair, and then certified by the election board. The observers
were to be given "ample opportunity" to compare the results to assure no
corrections were necessary. The first six counties receiving specific
legislative authorization to use the voting machines, with county commission
approval, were Marion, Palm Beach, Pinellas, Nassau, Polk, and Volusia
Counties. 49
At the same time, the canvassing board structure was affected by a
legislative amendment. While the local canvassing boards were still
comprised of the county judge, the supervisor of elections, and the chair of
the board of county commissioners, the new law clarified that the chair of
the county commission was the person responsible for designating
replacements for the county judge and the supervisor of elections if either or
both of them were absent, sick, refused to act, or otherwise suffered a
disability preventing them from serving on the canvassing board. 50
In 1931, the Florida Legislature promulgated a new law implementing
procedures for elections to approve the issuance of bonds for "Counties,
Districts and Municipalities." 1' The new law provided a unique duty for the
canvassing board: to determine the number of "free-holders who are
qualified electors who are residing in such County, District or Municipal-
ity."' 52 Under the law, only freeholders could vote in bond referenda.
53
Moreover, as a threshold to the validity of the election, a majority of the
freeholders had to cast a vote. 54 Accordingly, before the results of a bond
referendum could be canvassed, the canvassing board had to first determine
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Ch. 13894--(No. 330), 1929 Fla. Laws 728. For the counties of Pinellas, Nassau,
Polk, and Volusia, the session law did not refer to the county by name. Rather, the law
referred to the county's population figure as it existed under the 1925 Florida census. Only
one county fit each population figure: 51,700 to 51,714 (Pinellas); 9600 to 9643 (Nassau);
63,900 to 63,925 (Polk); and 40,160 to 40,165 (Volusia). See 1925 CENSUS, supra note 140.
150. Ch. 13761-(No. 197) § 11, 1929 Fla. Laws 480,486.
152. Id.
154. Id.
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that a sufficient number of votes had been cast using lists that were to be
supplied by the pertinent governing authority.
155
The Florida Legislature of 1933 further adopted legislation providing
for the election of delegates to any convention that might be called by
Congress to propose amendments to the United States Constitution.55 The
returns of such elections were to be canvassed by the board of county
commissioners, rather than the county canvassing board.'57
The next year, the Supreme Court of Florida issued a decision which
seemed to echo back to Governor Trammell's plea to consider the intent of
the voter. In State ex rel. Hutchins v. Tucker,158 the high court ruled that
"substantial compliance" with ballot marking requirements was sufficient to
warrant the counting of a ballot.159 In this case, the court considered three
types of mis-marked ballots: 1) those in which a voter had pasted to the
ballot another sheet of paper which indicated the voter's choices; 2) those in
which a voter paper-clipped a similar sheet of paper to the ballot; and 3)
those in which a voter had merely enclosed an unattached sheet of paper in
the envelope with the ballot.' 60 The court determined that the first instance
was "substantial compliance," while the latter two were not.
61
The legislative session of 1935 spawned the creation of more laws
creating special canvassing mechanisms for particular elections. Although
the town or city councils of some municipalities were already authorized to
canvass the returns of local elections for the members of the council, such
enabling laws did not refer to anything other than these types of elections. 162
As a result, new legislation provided that a municipal election for the
creation of a local civil service board was to be canvassed by the local
municipality's "governing authority., 163 Further, the executive committees
of political parties conducting primary elections in certain municipalities had
the "optional" authority to appoint the members of the boards of elections,
rather than their appointment by the board of county commissioners. 64 At
155. Id. §§ 6, 12.
156. Ch. 16180--(No. 323), § 1, 1933 Fla. Laws 740.
157. Id. This particular law continues in effect as of the 2001 Florida legislative
session. See infra text accompanying note 316.
158. 143 So. 754 (Fla. 1932).
159. Id. at 757.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Ch. 16433--(No. 576), § 9, 1933 Fla. Laws 481, 484 (authorizing the
town council of the town of Frostproof to canvass the returns of its own elections).
163. Ch. 16864--(No. 93), § 25, 1935 Fla. Laws 271, 280.
164. Ch. 16989--(No. 218), § 5, 1935 Fla. Laws 477,479.
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the same time, the authority of the county commissioners to appoint the
members of the election boards in municipalities was removed, and this
power vested in the voters for each "city and town."' 65 The members were
to be elected for four-year terms.166 The statutory provisions concerning
absentee ballots were also amended to provide that any absentee ballots
received "after midnight of such Election Day shall be voided, and such
ballots destroyed by [the] Canvassing Board of the County in which
received.
' 167
The 1935 Florida Legislature implemented another piece of legislation
which altered the canvassing system in one of the state's most populous
counties, Duval.168 The new law abolished the Board of County Commis-
sioners and extended the jurisdiction of the Jacksonville City Council
throughout the entire county. 69 The result was that all duties previously
performed by the Board of County Commissioners fell to the City Commis-
sion, including having a member sit on the local canvassing board' 70 Six
years later, the legislature further affected the Jacksonville area by providing
that no one in Duval County could serve as an inspector of election if that
person were also a government employee or official.'
7
'
The 1937 Florida legislative session saw substantial change to the
election system in Florida. The City of Jacksonville became the first Florida
jurisdiction to have state-mandated voting machines for all city elections. 72
For all jurisdictions using voting machines, including those voluntarily
adopting the voting machine method, a new law required that the voter
produce identification and a signature as proof that the person was in fact the
person registered as the voter.173 The local clerk or inspector of election was
required to make a "fair and just comparison of the signatures.' 74 If the
inspector doubted the veracity of the signature, the voter was required to
165. Ch. 16983--(No. 212), § 1, 1935 Fla. Laws 468.
166. Id. § 2.
167. Ch. 16986--(No. 215), § 2, 1935 Fla. Laws 472, 474. For a discussion of the
enactment of the absentee ballot law, see supra text accompanying notes 135-41.
168. See generally Ch. 17566--(No. 795), § 1, 1935 Fla. Laws 156, 157.
169. Id.
170. Ch. 17566--(No. 795), art. I, §§ 1, 4, 8, 1935 Fla. Laws 156, 157-58; art. XIV,
§§ 1, 3, 1935 Fla. Laws 158, 199-200.
171. Ch. 21200--(No. 992), § 1, 1941 Fla. Laws 370.
172. Ch. 18618-(No. 912), § 1, 1937 Fla. Laws 778.
173. Ch. 18407--(No. 701), § 1, 1937 Fla. Laws 1338, 1338-39.
174. Id. § 2.
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complete an affidavit attesting to the voter's registration before the vote
would be accepted.'75
No provision was made in the law for any further review so long as the
person executed the requisite affidavit. 176 Upon the closing of the polls for a
general or special election, if the inspectors of election discovered that more
ballots had been cast than voters casting ballots, the inspectors were required
to "publicly draw out and destroy unopened and unexamined as many of
such ballots as shall be equal to the excess.' ' t77  The legislature also
definitively provided that the inspectors of election possessed "such police
powers as may be necessary to carry out" some specified duties of their
position.
178
Until 1937,179 a "protest" was not a legally cognizable challenge to an
election result.' 80 In 1937, the Florida Legislature provided the right to file a
protest of the canvass of returns if any voter believed the returns were
"erroneous or fraudulent."'' 1 The protest had to be filed with the canvassing
board, not the precinct inspectors of election.182 If a protest was filed, the
first action required was for the "Canvassing Board to examine the counters
on the voting machines," which were the subject of the dispute.183 The votes
appearing on the counters were "presumptively correct."' 18 The new statute
was silent on how the challenging voters might rebut the presumption, but
the statute retained the right to seek court intervention. 85
Notwithstanding earlier legislation that local inspectors of election be
subject to popular vote, the 1939 Florida Legislature authorized the
Auburndale City Council to appoint its own inspectors of election for
municipal elections, with the City Council serving as the canvassing
board. 186 A truly broad provision in the law also gave the right to any
defeated candidate to demand a recount.187 The law did not require that the
175. Id.
176. See id. §§ 1-2.
177. Ch. 17898-(No. 192), § 9, 1937 Fla. Laws 359, 362.
178. Ch. 17901--(No. 195), § 3, 1937 Fla. Laws 366, 368-69.
179. Ch. 18405-(No. 699), § 9, 1937 Ma. Laws 1327, 1334.
180. Compare Ch. 18405--(No. 699), § 9, 1937 Fla. Laws 1327, 1334 with State ex
rel. Drew v. McLin, 16 Fla. 17, 49 (1876).
181. Ch. 18405--(No. 699), § 9, 1937 Fla. Laws 1327, 1334.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Ch. 19689-(No. 694), § 7, 1939 Fla. Laws 33, 33-34.
187. Id. § 12.
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defeated candidate set forth a reason for the demand, nor did it provide
discretion to the City Council to deny the recount. 188 If requested, the
recount was mandatory. 8 9
The same legislative session saw the enactment of a statewide school
code which provided for the election of school board members in each
school district. '9 The County School Board was given the power to appoint
its own inspectors of elections.191 It was also designated the canvassing
board for purposes of these elections.' 92 A further enactment required that
the inspectors of election for all types of elections post the results of their
canvass at their polling place after concluding the tally.193 The posting must
be done conspicuously, so that "it will be subject to public inspection even
though the polling place be closed.' 94
By the 1940s, local municipal councils or commissions typically
continued to serve as the canvassing boards for municipal elections.' 95 In
Jacksonville, the city lost the right to have absentee voting in any municipal
election.196 However, as the nation faced the challenge of the Second World
War, this legislative aberration raised concerns of the need to facilitate the
ability of those serving in the military to more easily cast votes throughout
the state.197 The Florida Legislature responded by adopting a specific law
providing for the casting of absentee ballots by those in the armed forces.
198
All absentee ballots returned from the military were to be forwarded to the
appropriate county judge for holding.' 99 No later than the time of the closing
of the polls on election day, the county judge was required to deliver these
ballots to the canvassing board.200 The canvassing board then determined if
the ballots met the requirements imposed by the Florida Legislature, which
included a determination of whether the voter had also voted in person.201 If
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. Ch. 19355-(No. 360), art. V, § 1032(I)(e), 1939 Fla. Laws 910, 912.
191. Id. §§ 119(6), 1032(1)(e).
192. Id. § 1032(1)(g).
193. Ch. 19663--(No. 668), § 5, 1939 Fla. Laws 1612, 1618.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Ch. 21224--(No. 1016), § 1, 1941 Fla. Laws 450, 450-51 (referring to
the canvassing of municipal elections in the city of Fernandina).
196. Ch. 21314---(No. 1106), § 1, 1941 Fla. Laws 911.
197. Ch. 22014-(No. 380), § 1, 1943 Fla. Laws 729.
198. Ch. 22014--(No. 380), 1943 Fla. Laws 729.
199. Id. § 6.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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the canvassing board determined that the member of the military was not
registered to vote, the absentee vote could be counted, but only for the
federal elections of President and Vice President, Senators, and United
States Representatives.20 2
In 1941, the Supreme Court of Florida, in State ex rel. Carpenter v.
Barber, again considered how election boards and canvassing boards should
handle mismarked ballots.203 In Barber, the questioned ballot contained an
"X" for a candidate which was not contained within the space designated for
the "X" to be placed.2 The tribunal ruled that the canvassing board was
required to determine the "intention of the voter. .. from a study of the
ballot .... ,0 Upon review, "[i]f the will and intention of the voter can be
determined ... " the vote should be counted although the mark was
206
misplaced. Three years later, the same court considered a challenge to
ballots in which voters had used characters other than an "X" as instructed
on the ballot.20 7 For instance, some voters used a check mark (4).208 In a
decision which appeared to retreat somewhat from the voter's intent standard
expressed in Barber and earlier in Tucker,20 9 the Supreme Court of Florida in
McAlpin v. State ex rel. Avriett ruled that "all ballots marked with other
characters should not be counted.
' 210
During the 1943 legislative session, the Florida Legislature modified
the canvassing board structure for those counties having a population
211between 105,000 and 205,000 persons under the 1940 census. The only
212
county meeting these parameters was Hillsborough. Under the new law,
the legislature created a new County Election Board consisting of five
• 213
resident registered voters who had the responsibility to select the local•214
inspectors of election and to inspect the county's voting machines.
215
202. Id. § 7.
203. State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49 (Fla. 1940).
204. Id. at 50.
205. Id. at 51.
206. Id.
207. McAlpin v. State ex rel. Avriett, 19 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1944).
208. Id.
209. State ex rel. Hutchins v. Tucker, 143 So. 754 (Fla. 1932).
210. McAlpin, 19 So. 2d at 421.
211. Ch. 22195-(No. 561), 1943 Fla. Laws 1070.
212. U.S. CENSUS OFTHE STATE OFFLORIDA (1940).
213. Ch. 22195--(No. 561), § 2, 1943 Fla. Laws 1070, 1071.
214. Id. § 6(3).
215. Id. § 6(5).
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These members were appointed by the Governor for staggered terms.216 The
County Canvassing Board was restructured to include the County Election
Board, as well as the County Judge and the Supervisor of Elections.217 The
duties of the canvassing board did not change, however, as it still had no
authority to alter the tallies submitted by the local inspectors of election.21 8
Six years later, the jurisdictional limit of this legislation was amended to
apply only to those counties with populations between 135,000 and 270,000
under the 1945 state census. 2 19 The only county meeting this requirement
was Hillsborough. 220
E. Post-World War H Era
Absentee ballots were considered once again by the 1949 Florida
Legislature. 22 1  The duty of some canvassing boards to destroy illegal
absentee ballots222 was eliminated with a law requiring that the "election
inspection board" mark rejected absentee ballots by the notation "rejected as
illegal" across the face of the ballot.223 These ballots then had to be retained
as part of the election records for that election.224 The canvassing board's
duties for including absentee ballots differed depending on the type of voting
system used by the jurisdiction.22 5 If voting machines were used, the
canvassing board added the absentee ballot calculation results to the tallies
submitted by the precinct inspectors of election. 226 For those counties using
paper ballots, the absentee ballots were required to actually be placed in the
227
appropriate ballot box before counting. The legislature also expanded the
number of election inspectors statewide.228 Each polling place was
thereafter required to have two "election inspection boards" comprised each
of three inspectors and a clerk, each of whom must be able to read and write
216. Id.§2.
217. At that time, the various Florida supervisors of election were referred to as
"Supervisor[s] of Registration." Id. § 3.
218. Ch. 22195-(No. 561), §§ 2, 6(3), 6(5), 7, 1943 Fla. Laws 1070, 1070-77.
219. Ch. 25522-(No. 526), § 2, 1949 Fla. Laws 1211, 1212.
220. THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1947-48, at 165-71 (1946).
221. Ch. 25385-(No. 389), 1949 Fla. Laws 921.
222. See supra text accompanying note 167.
223. Ch. 25385--(No. 389), § 1, 1949 Fla. Laws 921, 926-27.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Ch. 25384--(No. 388), § 2, 1949 Fla. Laws 915, 916.
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the English language. 229 One board had to be at the polls during voting, and
the other tallied the votes when the polls closed.230 Each board could not
consist of members all of whom belonged to the same political party.231 The
names of the appointed inspectors were further required to be published in a
local newspaper. 232 For counties with populations of more than 100,000, the
counties could provide for even more inspection boards to assist in the
operation of the election. 23
A major review of Florida's election laws took place in 1951, when the
legislature adopted significant additions to existing law.234 While the law
recognized the continued use of a board of elections comprised of a clerk
and inspectors,235 the enactments specified a clear procedure for the tallying
of votes at the precincts, particularly for those precincts using voting
236
machines. The inspectors would tabulate the votes upon the closing of the
polls by one inspector reading aloud each machine total and another writing
down the result. 237 Each of these inspectors had another inspector standing
nearby to confirm the accuracy of the designated vote total.238 When the
tabulation was complete for each machine, the inspector teams would then
switch places with each team performing the opposite task.239  Each
inspection team was to be comprised of "two inspectors of opposite political
faith, whenever practicable." Inspectors of election were uniformly
appointed by the board of county commissioners, rather than have some
subject to popular election. 24' Each precinct continued to be required to
have two election boards, with each being comprised of "three inspectors
and a clerk."2 2 No election board could be comprised of persons all
belonging to the same political party. 243 For some counties, the number of
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Ch. 25384--(No. 388), § 2.
234. Ch. 26870--(No. 391), 1951 Fla. Laws 816.
235. Ch. 26870--(No. 391), § 4, 1951 Fla. Laws 845, 900; Id. § 6 at 906, 907.
236. Id. § 5.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Ch. 26870--(No. 391), § 5, 1951 Fla. Laws 860, 897.
240. Id.
241. id. § 6.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 907.
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election boards could be more or less, depending on the population of the
county or the number of voting machines used in the county.
The 1951 legislation further detailed a protest procedure by which any
voter was entitled to file a written protest with the canvassing board if the
voter believed the results were "erroneous and fraudulent." 5  The
canvassing board would handle the protest, however, by merely double-
checking the accuracy of the election boards' tallies.2 6  The new law
provided for no recount procedure.2 7 At the same time, the canvassing
board was delegated more duties concerning absentee ballots. After
determining the legality of each absentee ballot, the canvassing board was
responsible for adding the additional votes to the tallies on each precinct poll
book, and then adding the total of all these votes to the total for the
county.' 48 Canvassing boards were required to convene "on the third day
after any election, or sooner if the returns are received." 9 Any returns not
received by the third day were required to be ignored. 0  25
Finally responding to the call of Governor Trammell, ' and following
the lead set years earlier by the Supreme Court of Florida in Tucker22 and
Barber,25 3 the 1953 Florida legislative session saw the initial development of
a statutory "standard" for use in determining the propriety of particular
ballots.5 4 At that time, the law continued to provide for hand-marked ballots
for elections in certain counties.Z5 The legislation required the voter to use
an "X" to indicate the voter's choice. Ballots were often submitted,
however, in which the voter disregarded the requirement of an "X" and
instead indicated the choice by some other means. The new law provided
244. Id. See also Ch. 26690--(No. 211), § 2, 1951 Fla. Laws 386, 387 (involving
counties with populations between 3000 and 3200); Ch. 27134-(No. 655), § 1, 1951 Fla.
Laws 1499 (involving counties with populations between 200,000 and 300,000).
245. Ch. 26870-(No. 391), § 5, 1951 Fla. Laws 860, 899.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. § 5.
249. Id. § 6.
250. Ch. 26870-(No. 391), § 6, 1951 Fla. Laws 906, 911-12. This provision
foreshadowed a similar change in law made during the 2001 Florida legislative session. See
infra text accompanying notes 353-56, 391-95.
251. See supra text accompanying note 129-30.
252. State ex rel. Hutchins v. Tucker, 143 So. 745, 757 (Fla. 1932).
253. State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 50-51 (Fla. 1940).
254. Ch. 28030, 1953 Fla. Laws 164, 164-65.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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that the ballot should not be disregarded "so long as there is a clear
indication thereon to the election officials that the person marking such
ballot has made a definite choice.
' ' 58
Beginning in 1955, county judges were no longer required to be the
repositors of absentee ballots pending election day. This task fell more
appropriately to the supervisor of elections.259 , Two years later, the
canvassing board was again addressed, with the legislature providing that the
chair of each county commission would appoint a substitute commissioner to
sit on the canvassing board if either or both the county judge or supervisor of
elections could not sit.20 However, for those counties with a population
between 200,000 and 300,000 persons, a circuit judge would sit in place of
the absent county judge. 261 Again, the only county meeting this requirement
was Hillsborough.2 2 An amendment to the election code in 1959 provided
more specifically that each election board "possess[ed] full authority to
maintain order at the polls and enforce obedience to their lawful commands
during an election, and during the canvass and estimate of the votes.
' 263
The 1960s saw several additional revisions to the state's election code.
Voting machines became mandated in all Florida counties, as well as all
municipalities in counties in which the population exceeded 260,000
residents.2 4 The number of election boards for each precinct remained at
two, with the board of county commissioners entitled to reduce the number
to one if determined "necessary" by the commissioners in the exercise of
their discretion.265 Additionally, if the number of voters at the precinct
exceeded 1000, the supervisor of elections must appoint an additional
266board. The legislature also mandated training classes for all election
inspectors and clerks. 267 Acknowledging the increasing number of voters in
258. Id. The language of this provision foreshadowed the standard which would be
adopted by the Florida Legislature again almost five decades later arising out of the Florida
Recount. See infra text accompanying notes 340-42, 374-78.
259. Ch. 29934, § 24, 1955 Fla. Laws 877, 888.
260. Ch. 57-104, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws 162.
261. Ch. 57-463, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws 41.
262. U.S. CENSUS OFTHE STATE OFFLORIDA (1950).
263. Ch. 59-212, § 1, 1959 Fla. Laws 844. This provision had its genesis in legislation
adopted eight decades earlier that gave precinct inspectors the duty to maintain order at the
polls. See supra text accompanying note 71.
264. Ch. 61-481, § 1, 1961 Fla. Laws 1074, 1075.
265. Ch. 65-416, § 1, 1965 Fla. Laws 1488.
266. Id. at 1489.
267. Id. at 1488-90.
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the state, the legislature authorized canvassing boards to employ "clerical
help" to assist in the performance of the canvassing board tasks.2 68
The following decade saw two relevant pieces of legislation pass the
Florida Legislature. In 1973, the Electronic Voting Systems Act was
enacted to prescribe detailed procedures for the canvassing of returns from
automatic tabulating equipment. 269 In particular, the use of punchcard
ballots came into being, with the use of a punch legislatively intended to
"clearly indicate the intent of the voter."270 While the election board of each
precinct was delegated the responsibility to set up for use all voting devices
at the polls,271 the county canvassing board was required to confirm that the
total number of votes from each precinct was in fact an accurate count. 272 If
a punchcard ballot was damaged to the point where it could not be read by
the automatic tabulating machine, the canvassing board was mandated to
manually count the ballot.273 The legislature failed to provide a specific
standard for the canvassing board to determine how to count the vote.
Four years later, a second major piece of election legislation was
'274
enacted. This provision mandated that the canvassing board could not
disregard a damaged or defective ballot "if there is a clear indication of the
intent of the voter.' '275 The Legislature left this decision to the canvassing
276boards' discretion. This same piece of legislation eliminated the right of
local governing bodies to canvass the results of bond referenda when other
matters were on the ballot, giving this duty to the county canvassing
277boards. A clear provision was included which specified who would sit on
the canvassing board if a particular member could not or was not eligible to
sit.278 In particular, the chief judge appointed the replacement for the county
judge. 9 The chair of the board of county commissioners appointed the
substitute for the supervisor, who was required to be another member of the
board of county commissioners. The commissioners in turn would select a
268. Ch. 65-129, § 6, 1965 Fla. Laws 234, 237.
269. Ch. 73-156, § 3, 1973 Fla. Laws 248, 298.
270. Id. at 299.
271. Id. § 10.
272. Id. § 14(1).
273. Id. § 14(5)(b).
274. Ch. 77-175, § 20, 1977 Fla. Laws 903.
275. Id. § 20.
276. Id.
277. Id. § 12.
278. Id. § 26.
279. Ch. 77-175, § 26, 1977 Fla. Laws 903.
280. Id.
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substitute if the chair of the county commission could not sit, who again was
required to be one of its own members.2 Finally, if no county commis-
sioner was able or willing to serve on the canvassing board as a substitute,
the chief judge could appoint any "qualified elector of the county" to sit.282
This legislative act also included a mandatory machine recount by the
canvassing board for situations in which there were "obvious errors" on any
precinct returns, as well as any situation in which the results of the
tabulation reflected that a candidate or measure was eliminated by "one-half
of a percent less."
2 8 3
The Florida Legislature of the 1970s adopted a smattering of additional
legislation pertaining to the canvassing of elections.284 An early law
required the Division of Elections to "adopt uniform rules for the.. . use...
of voting machines."28 5 Later, the legislature designated the Secretary of
State as the chief election officer who was given the duty to "obtain and
maintain uniformity in the application, operation and interpretation of the
election laws.' 286  In 1976, the legislature authorized the Division of
Elections to provide advisory opinions in the application of the State's
election laws, which opinion was "binding on any person or organization
who sought the opinion or with reference to whom the opinion was
sought.2 97 A special act further chipped away at the authority of munici-
palities to serve as canvassing entities for local elections.2 8 The legislature
mandated that all municipal elections in Broward County be canvassed by
the county canvassing board, and not the municipalities' governing bodies.289
The early 1980s saw little legislative activity which affected the role of
the canvassing board. The 1984 Florida Legislature adopted legislation
which specified that the tallying duties of a precinct election board must be
performed open to the public. 290 The same act required all canvassing
boards to file with the Division of Elections after any election a report which
specifies any problems, "difficulties or unusual circumstances encountered
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Ch. 72-303, § 1, 1972 Fla. Laws 1135, 1136.
285. Id.
286. Ch. 75-98, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 196.
287. Ch. 76-233, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 532, 534.
288. Ch. 75-350, § 8, 1975 Fla. Laws 74, 75.
289. Id.
290. Ch. 84-302, § 17, 1984 Fla. Laws 1409, 1419-20.
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by the election board or canvassing board" during an election. 291 Two years
later, the Legislature added a proviso that all canvassing board meetings
must be held "in a building accessible to the public.,
292
By the end of the 1980s, the Florida Legislature enacted major
legislation which would have a primary role in the Florida Recount, the act
which authorized a manual recount. The new law made a manual recount
discretionary, but required that any request for a manual recount be filed
with the canvassing board "prior to the time the canvassing board adjourns
or within [seventy-two] hours after midnight of the date the election was
held, whichever occurs later.' 294 If a manual recount were authorized, the
person requesting the recount had the right to "choose three precincts to be
recounted."'295 If this partial recount revealed "an error in the vote tabulation
which could affect the outcome of the election," the canvassing board was
296required to conduct a manual recount of all the ballots. The statute did
not, however, define what "an error in the vote tabulation" meant.2 97 To
proceed with a manual recount, the canvassing board was required to appoint
counting teams who had the task of trying to determine how votes were
298
cast. If a counting team was unable to determine how a particular ballot
was cast, the ballot was to "be presented to the county canvassing board for
it to determine the voter's intent."299 Again, the statute did not provide any
standards for a canvassing board to use in determining the voter's intent.
291. Id. § 18. This statutory provision was one of the laws cited by Secretary of State
Katherine Harris as supporting her refusal to extend certification deadlines during the Florida
Recount. Because the county canvassing boards did not detail any problems in these reports
to the Division of Elections, Harris argued that the counties could not later allege that special
circumstances during the election authorized an extended certification deadline. See Letter
from Katherine Harris, Florida Secretary of State, to Broward County Canvassing Commission
[sic] (Nov. 15, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Harris Letter].
292. Ch. 86-33, § 4, 1986 Fla. Laws 98, 101.
293. Ch. 89-348, § 15, 1989 Fla. Laws 2226, 2230.
294. Id. § 15.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Ch. 89-348, § 15, 1989 Fla. Laws 2226, 2230. Almost all portions of this section
became controversial during the Florida Recount. For the most part, Republicans accused the
Democrats of being up to "some type of mischief" by resorting to the various procedures set
forth in this section. Ironically, however, it was Florida Governor Bob Martinez, a
Republican, who signed this legislation into law on July 5, 1989. Id. See also THE FLORMA
HANDBOOK 1999-2000, at 32 (A. Morris & J. Perry Morris, eds., 27th ed. 1999).
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The same year, the Florida Legislature also specified that members of
canvassing boards could personally be fined $200 per day for each day
election returns were submitted late.'O°
The canvassing board's discretionary authority to decide when to grant
a protest was clarified in an appellate decision arising out of a 1991 election
302for the City Commission of Oakland Park. In this race for a commission
seat, the challenging candidate lost by three votes, with the results reflecting
fifty-eight overvotes and forty-two undervotes out of a total of 2609 votes
cast.30 3 The candidate filed a protest with the county canvassing board, who
the appellate court noted "may, but is not obligated to, grant the request" for
a manual recount.304  The canvassing board denied the request.30 5  The
defeated candidate brought a lawsuit, and the circuit court issued a writ of
mandamus requiring the canvassing board to conduct a manual recount.
30 6
The appellate court quashed the issuance of the writ, holding that "the
decision whether or not to hold a manual recount of the votes [is] a matter to
be decided within the discretion of the canvassing board. 30 7
A final piece of legislation impacting the role of a canvassing board was
enacted in 1999. This act changed the deadline to request a manual recount
from the time the canvassing board adjourns, to "prior to the time the
canvassing board certifies the results for the office being protested or within
[seventy-two] hours after midnight of the date the election was held,
whichever occurs later."
308
301. Ch. 89-338, § 30, 1989 Fla. Laws 2139, 2162.
302. Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
303. Id. at 509.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Hogan, 607 So. 2d at 509-10. Interestingly, under the Florida Election Reform
Act of 2001, a machine recount would have been required in this case if it came before a
canvassing board today (one-half of one percent of the votes cast would be thirteen votes).
Further, if the machine recount resulted in a difference of from one to six votes, a manual
recount of the undervotes and overvotes would be mandated (one-quarter of one percent
would be six votes). A manual recount under these circumstances would be optional at the
candidate's request if the machine recount resulted in a difference of from seven to thirteen
votes. See Ch. 2001-40, §§ 41-42, Fla. Laws 117, 147-152 (amending FLA. STAT.
§§ 102.141, 102.166). See also infra text accompanying notes 362-73 for a discussion of
recount rights under the new law.
308. Ch. 99-339, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 3544-45.
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I. LEGISLATIVE SCHEME ON EVE OF 2000 ELECTION.
As the general election of 2000 arrived, the various county canvassing
boards of the state were guided generally by chapters 101 and 102 of the
Florida Statutes which set forth their duties for canvassing the returns and
handling any protests concerning the results. 309 Although the canvassing
process does involve some consideration of voting systems, the Florida
Legislature has made it clear that the custodian of the voting equipment is
the supervisor of elections, not the canvassing board.310 With a couple of
exceptions, the composition of current canvassing boards continues to be as
it has been since 1895: the chair of the county commission, the supervisor of
elections, and a county judge. 311 The county judge serves as chair.312
However, three special types of elections exist which are canvassed by
the entire board of county commissioners rather than the county canvassing
board. 313 The first type is a referendum to consider relocating the county
seat.314 The second is a referendum to determine whether to establish a
water and sewer district within the county. 315 The third is an election for
delegates to any convention that might be called by Congress to propose
amendments to the United States Constitution.316
One further type of election has an unusual canvassing method. For any
bond referendum that is on the ballot alone, without any other measure or
election on the ballot, the canvassing is conducted by "the governing author-
ity which called the referendum." 317 For instance, if the election involves
solely a county bond referendum, the board of county commissioners is the
309. FLA. STAT. §§ 102.141, 102.166 (2001).
310. § 101.34.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08; Beckstrom v. Volusia County
Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720, 722 n.2 (Fla. 1998); State v. Sarasota County, 197 So. 2d
521, 522 (Fla. 1967).
312. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(1) (2001).
313. The existence of different types of canvassing entities was held to be constitu-
tional under the 1885 Florida Constitution. Lasseter v. Bryan, 65 So. 590, 591 (Fla. 1914)
(board of county commissioners may serve as canvassing entity for referendum involving local
option to sell alcoholic beverages).
314. FLA. STAT. §§ 138.06-.09 (2001). This chapter of the Florida Statutes also
provides a different means to challenge the results of this type of election instead of the
"protest-contest" means provided for other types of elections. § 138.06.
315. FLA. STAT. § 153.08 (2001). This statute likewise contains a separate means to
contest the results of the election. §§ 153.58(1)(a), 153.59.
316. FLA. STAT. § 107.07 (2001). This law had its inception in 1933. See supra text
accompanying note 157.
317. FLA. STAT. § 100.271 (2001).
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canvassing authority, while a local bond referendum would be canvassed by
the city council or commission."'
IV. ELECTION REFORM ACT OF 2001
The controversy of the 2000 presidential election led to an outcry to
revamp the election laws of Florida to address the difficulties experienced
during the "Recount. 31 9  In response,320 the state conducted a series of
statewide hearings which culminated in the Florida Legislature's adoption of
the Florida Election Reform Act of 2001.321 The act was approved by
Governor Jeb Bush on May 10, 2001, with an effective date of January 2,
2002.322 The primary focus of the act concerns voting systems and recount
procedures.
323
In the Election Reform Act, notwithstanding the complaints by some of
the partisan nature of canvassing boards,3 the legislature left untouched the
local canvassing board structure.3 2 The legislature did, however, prescribe
new duties for canvassing boards, as well as redefining prior responsibili-
ties.326 The changes can be categorized as follows:
318. Id. In 1945, the Florida Legislature had provided that bond elections could not be
held at the same time as any other election. Ch. 22545-(No. 31), § 1, 1945 Fla. Laws 60.
319. Drogin, supra note 1, at 3A; JAKE TAPPER, DOWN AND DiTY: THE PLOT TO STEAL
THE PRESIDENCY 469 (2001) [hereinafter TAPPER]. See also Kent Kensill, Paper Hammers at
the Bushes, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 22, 2001, at 24A (asserting that problems
with election arose from "random mishaps which occur in all elections").
320. Mark Silva, Harris: There Was No Crisis, Just Close Vote, SUN-SmNTIEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), July 30,2001, at 6B; TAPPER, supra note 319, at 469.
321. Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, ch. 2001-40,2001 Fla. Laws 117.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 129.
324. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 1, at C6 (quoting party official who "scoffs at
the... assertion that Broward's speedy recount was not politically motivated.").
325. However, the state canvassing board and the Elections Canvassing Commission
were changed. Prior to the 2001 law, the state commission was comprised of the Governor,
the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Division of Elections. The new law modified
the membership to "the Governor and two members of the Cabinet selected by the Governor."
FLA. STAT. § 102.111(1) (2001).
326. Ch. 2001-40,2001 Fla. Laws 117.
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A. Tabulation Testing
Although the canvassing boards had previously been required to test the
accuracy of the county's voting system,a27 the new law requires that the
board
execute a written statement setting forth the tabulation devices
tested [for the newly required voting systems], the results of the
testing, the protective counter numbers, if applicable, of each tabu-
lation device, the number of the seal securing such tabulation de-
vice at the conclusion of testing, any problems reported to the
board as a result of the testing, and whether each device tested is
satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
As with the previous law, the test must be conducted "[o]n any day not more
than [ten] days prior to the election day., 329 The new law, however, more
clearly emphasizes that the tabulation testing is a public event, which must
be properly noticed.330 Because the new law permits voting systems to have
a tabulating mechanism that is either determined at a central site or at each
precinct, new sections of the law, discussed in more detail hereinafter,
further provide procedures for testing tabulation equipment, whether it be
331central or precinct on-site tabulating in nature. Under the Election Reform
Act of 2001, the resetting of the voting tabulating device, as well as its
sealing, must be witnessed by the canvassing board or its representative, as
well as the representatives of the political parties, and the candidates or their
representatives who attended the test.332
327. The actual testing of the tabulation system may be called something other than
"tabulation testing" in the counties. For instance, in Broward County, the tabulation testing is
referred to as the "logic and accuracy test."
328. Office of the State Courts Administrator, Supreme Court of Florida, ABSTRACTS
OF NEw LEGISLATION: 2001 REGULAR LEGISLATIVE SEssIoN OvERVIEw 27 (2001) [hereinafter
ABSTRACTS]; Ch. 2001-40, § 21, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 129.
329. FLA. STAT. § 101.5612(2) (2001).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See generally id.
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B. Provisional Ballots?'3
A new task falling to canvassing boards is to determine whether a
provisional ballot should be counted. Under the new law, a "provisional
ballot" is to be given to a voter at a poll if a question exists as to the right of
the voter to cast a ballot in the election or at that particular precinct. 31 The
canvassing board must determine if the elector casting the provisional ballot
was eligible to vote at the precinct, and further determine if the voter had
cast no other ballot in the election.335 In determining the propriety of a
provisional ballot, the canvassing board must also "compare the signature on
the provisional ballot envelope with the signature on the voter's registra-
tion. If the signature does not match, the canvassing board cannot count
the ballot even if the voter is in the proper precinct.337 Any provisional
ballot not accepted cannot be opened and must be marked "[r]ejected as
[illegal.,, 3 8 The canvassing board also retained the right to determine the
propriety of questionable ballots, including undervotes and overvotes,33 9 but
has a new standard to make this decision, with language borrowed from
legislation enacted almost fifty years earlier:uo "if there is a clear indication
on the ballot that the voter has made a definite choice as determined by the
canvassing board."' If the board can make such a determination, the ballot
cannot be "declared invalid or void."' ' 2
333. As of August 20, 2001, the statutory sections involving provisional ballots have
been placed on hold by the United States Department of Justice as possibly being a violation
of the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965. Under the federal law, all changes to Florida's
election laws must be approved by the federal government before taking effect. Brent
Kallestad, Voting Reform Faces a Hurdle, SUN-SNTImNL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 21, 2001, at
6B [hereinafter Kalestad].
334. FLA. STAT. § 101.048(2)(a) (2001).
335. Id. See also ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 28.
336. § 101.048(2)(b)(1).
337. § 101.048(2)(b)(2).
338. Id.
339. An overvote on a ballot reflects that the voter has selected more than one
candidate for a particular office. An undervote reflects that the voter has not selected any
candidate for a particular office. FLA. STAT. § 97.021 (2001). See also Martin Merzer,
'Overvotes' Leaned to Gore, HERALD (Miami), May 11, 2001, at 1A & 34A.
340. See Ch. 28030-(No. 10), 1953 Fla. Laws 164, amending FLA. STAT. § 101.011
(1951) (referring to the standard for determination of questionable hand-marked ballots). For
a discussion of this earlier legislation, see supra text accompanying notes 251-58.
341. F A. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (2001).
342. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 28.
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C. Early Release of Returns
Although a canvassing board may begin to canvass ballots before the
closing of the polls, as in the case of absentee ballots, no results of the
canvass can be released by anyone, including a canvassing board member,
until all polls are closed. To do so is a third degree felony.
D. Canvassing Procedure
Prior to the new law, ballots could be tabulated and reconciled at either
the precinct or at a central location. Effective September 2, 2002, the new
law permits ballots to be tabulated and reconciled at the precinct only.
Any discrepancies coming to light at the precincts are to be reported to the
canvassing board on forms to be provided. 345 The results of the on-site
precinct tabulation "may be transmitted via dedicated teleprocessing lines to
the main computer system for the purpose of compilation of complete
returns. ' 3 6 The Department of State was mandated to adopt administrative
rules to assure safe procedures for the on-site precinct reconciliation of the
ballots and the transmission of returns. 4 7 When the canvassing board
prepares the unofficial returns, which are to include the precinct returns,
absentee ballots, and provisional ballots, the board must consider whether
the unofficial returns contain a "counting error in which the vote tabulation
system failed to count votes that were properly marked in accordance with
the instructions on the ballot.'' 34 If a counting error is discovered, the
canvassing board has only two options: 1) correct the error and recount the
ballots with the vote tabulation system; or 2) request that the Department of
State verify the tabulation software affected.349
E. Canvassing Deadlines
For a primary election, a canvassing board has seven days to certify the
results of an election, but, for a general election, a canvassing board has
343. Id. § 101.5614(9).
344. See generally FLA. STAT. § 101.5614 (2001).
345. Id.
346. § 101.5614(3).
347. § 101.5614.
348. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(5) (2001).
349. Id. at (5)(a) & (b).
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eleven days.350  However, no later than noon of the day following any
election, a canvassing board must provide unofficial returns to the office of
the Secretary of State.351 These deadlines can only be extended in the case
of an emergency as defined by the Election Reform Act.352 If the deadline is
not met, and no emergency exists, the statewide Elections Canvassing
Commission must ignore the missing results. 353 This is quite a change from
the- prior law, which gave the Elections Canvassing Commission the
discretion to consider the late filed results even if no emergency existed.354
If an emergency does exist, the Election Canvassing Commission must set a
deadline for receipt of returns that will be filed late.
A possible problem could develop if a significant absentee ballot
response were generated in an election. The new Election Code permits
anyone to vote by absentee ballot;356 a requirement no longer exists that the
voter demonstrate "good cause" for voting absentee. 357 Further, up to four
days prior to the election may begin the canvassing board to process all
absentee ballots through the tabulating equipment,358 but must still have the
350. FLA. STAT. § 102.112 (2001).
351. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 28.
352. FLA. STAT. § 102.112(2001).
353. See also id. The issue of whether this particular provision violates the equal
protection clause is beyond the scope of this paper. Because each county is comprised of a
canvassing board of the same size (three members), it is quite possible that a canvassing board
in a large county will have a more difficult time meeting a canvassing deadline than a smaller
county. Florida counties currently range in population from 7021 residents to 2,253,362. TrE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2002, at 425 (2002). The Florida Secretary of State
Katherine Harris has, however, opined that the difference in size of counties should not be a
factor to consider when determining whether to extend a canvassing deadline. See Harris
Letter, supra note 291 (refusing to extend certification deadline for Broward County). The
effect of the legal principle announced in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-07 (2000) to this
new statute is at this point left to legal conjecture ("the right of suffrage can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise"). Id. at 105 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 (1964)); see also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 817 (1969) ("When a State
makes classifications of voters which favor residents of some counties over residents of other
counties, a justiciable controversy [under the equal protection clause] is presented."); J.
LMBERMAN, THE EvOLvING CONsTrnmoN 29 (1992) (access to ballot typically analyzed
under equal protection clause).
354. FLA. STAT. § 102.112 (2000).
355. § 102.112(4) (2001).
356. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 29.
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certified returns to Tallahassee in either seven or eleven days, as the case
may be.
359
F. Machine Recounts
A machine recount is mandatory "if the margin of victory is one-half of
a percent or less" for any election or judicial retention, unless the losing
party waives the recount in writing.36 If a recount is authorized, it must be
conducted in "each affected jurisdiction.' 361 For instance, in an election
crossing county lines, "all counties comprising the district of the candidacy
or ballot measure are required to recount. 362 As for procedures used by a
canvassing board during a recount, the Secretary of State is required to
adopt detailed rules prescribing additional recount procedures for
each certified vote system which shall be uniform to the extent
practicable, and at a minimum address the following areas: secu-
rity of ballots during the recount process; time and place of re-
counts; public observance of recounts; objections to ballot deter-
minations; record of recount proceedings; and procedures relating
to candidate and petitioner representatives.
363
G. Manual Recounts
The right to bring a protest before the canvassing board has been largely
repealed and replaced by a manual recount procedure which is triggered only
under certain specific sets of circumstances. 364  If a machine recount
indicates a margin of victory of one-quarter of one percent or less, the
canvassing board must conduct a manual recount of overvotes and
undervotes, regardless of whether any candidate asks for the recount. 365 A
manual recount of only the overvotes and undervotes is mandatory if the
election was decided by a margin of victory between one-quarter and one-
half of one percent of the vote.36 A manual recount of the overvotes and
undervotes is mandatory so long as the losing party requests a manual
359. Fla. Stat. § 102.112(2001).
360. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 29.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 28.
364. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(1) (2001).
365. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 28.
366. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(2)(a) (2001).
[Vol. 26:85 1
244
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss3/1
2002]
recount "in writing no later than the second day after the election."367 Partial
recounts are no longer authorized .3  In September 2001, the Division of
Elections proposed rules governing the conduct of a manual recount, which
were subsequently amended.369 In addition to following the standards set
forth by the Division of Elections for determining the propriety of a
questioned ballot, 37° the proposed rule requires that the canvassing board
"set aside"371 each challenged ballot, "with a notation of the precinct
number, the unique identifier number, how the ballot was counted, the
reasoning behind the challenge, and the name of the person bringing the
challenge." 372 The canvassing board is required to have "copies of the[e]
record" of the manual recount available to the public "within two weeks of
"373the recount.'
H. Standard of Ballot Review
For the review of any damaged ballot,374 or if a situation arises when a
manual recount is authorized, the canvassing board must count a ballot "if
there is a clear indication on the ballot that the voter has made a definite
choice... 75 However, the Secretary of State is mandated "to adopt
specific rules" which set forth "what constitutes a clear indication."3 76 If the
ballot does not clearly indicate that "the voter has made a definite choice"
377
for an office or ballot measure, the vote cannot be counted for any office or
378ballot measure for which there is no clear definite choice. Specific rules
required under this provision were proposed by the Division of Elections in
367. Id.
368. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 29.
369. Florida Department of State, Laws & Procedures, Recount Procedures Notice of
Change (to be codified as Fla. Admin. Code r. 1S-2.031), available at http://election.dos.state.
fl.us/laws/ProposedRulesnoticeO3l.shtmil [hereinafter Proposed Rule IS-2.031; see Uniform
Rules: Fix Flaws First, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale) Oct. 19, 2001, at 30A [hereinafter
Unifonn].
370. See infra text accompanying notes 372-76,458-62.
371. Proposed Rule 1S-2.031(l)(i) & (3)(1), supra note 369.
372. Id.
373. Id. rule lS-2.031(l)(1) & (2)(m).
374. Ft.A. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (2001).
375. Id.
376. AsTRACTs, supra note 328, at 28. This standard, similar to the prior standard,
was specifically upheld by the United States Supreme Court so long as adequate specific
guidelines were in place to make this decision. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000).
377. FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (2001).
378. § 101.5614(6).
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September 2001 and subsequently amended. 379  At least one critic has
charged that although most of the proposed rules in this area are "reasonable
and fair," some of the proposals are "way too lenient."
' 380
I. Other Matters
The Election Reform Act also addresses the requirement that voting
systems in Florida be fairly uniform and be limited to "electromechanical, or
electronic apparatus," thus outlawing punchcard ballots, lever machines, and
hand-counted paper ballots.3 81 This new requirement has little significance
on the direct role of the canvassing board.382 Nevertheless, the Florida
Legislature continues to provide that "substitute ballots" may be used if "the
required official ballots for a precinct are not delivered in time to be used on
election day.,
383
V. CURRENT CHRONOLOGICAL PROCEDURE
To better understand the overall effect of the statutory and rule changes
to the canvassing process, one should consider the current step-by-step
process in which a canvassing board engages. The responsibility of a
canvassing board for a particular electioh begins well before election day.
379. Florida Department of State, Laws & Procedures, Clear Indication of Voter's
Choice on a Ballot Notice of Change (2001) (to be codified as FLA. ADMIN. CODE rule IS-
2.027), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/laws/ProposedRules/notice027.shtml (last
visited Mar. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Proposed Rule 1S-2.027].
380. See Uniform, supra note 369, at 30A.
381. FLA. STAT. § 97.021(36) (2001). An "electronic or electromechanical voting
system" is defined as "a system of casting votes by use of voting devices or marking devices
and counting ballots by employing automatic tabulating equipment of data processing
equipment," and the term includes touchscreen systems. Id.
382. Other statutory changes enacted to address issues arising during the Florida
Recount, but not directly impacting upon the canvassing board's duties, include a requirement
that all voting systems use a feature which "reject[s] a ballot and provide[s] the elector an
opportunity to correct the ballot where the number of votes for an office or measure exceeds
the number which the voter is entitled to cast or where the tabulating equipment reads the
ballot as a ballot with no votes cast." FLA. STAT. § 101.5606 (2001). In other words, it
provides a feature that advises the voter that the cast ballot contains an overvote or an
undervote. Id. After being advised that the ballot contains an undervote or overvote, the voter
is free, however, to cast an uncorrected ballot. FLA. STAT. § 101.5608 (2001). If a voting
machine rejects a ballot, the poll worker "without examining the ballot, shall state the possible
reasons for the rejection and direct the voter to the instruction model .... § 101.5608(b).
383. FLA. STAT. § 101.43 (2001).
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A. Before Election Day
In facing a new election the canvassing board must conduct the "public
preelection test" by which the automatic tabulating equipment of the local
voting system is tested by use of a "preaudited group of ballots. ' 3 4 The
responsibility for providing notice of the test to candidates, party officials,
and the public falls upon the supervisor of elections. 385 The test must be
conducted no more than ten days prior to the election. 386  The testing
procedure differs depending on the type of tabulation equipment available in
the county, a central tabulation system, or a precinct on-site tabulation
387
system. Although the statute requires that "each member of the
canvassing board shall certify the accuracy of the test," it further provides in
apparent contradiction that "the canvassing board may designate one
member to represent it" at the test.
388
For a central tabulation system, preaudited ballots must be run through
the voting equipment until "an errorless count shall be made." 389 If the test
reveals an error, the canvassing board is responsible for ensuring that "the
cause therefore shall be corrected. ' 39  For a precinct on-site tabulation
system, the canvassing board is required to test a random sample of all
devices to be used in the election to consist of "at least 5 percent or 10 of the
devices, whichever is greater."391 If the canvassing board discovers an error
in any tested tabulating device, the board must "take steps to determine the
cause of the error, shall attempt to identify and test other devices that could
reasonably be expected to have the same error, and shall test a number of
additional devices sufficient to determine that all devices are satisfactory. 392
If the canvassing board is unable to find a device satisfactory, it "may
require that all devices to be tested or may declare that all devices are
unsatisfactory." 39
3
384. Ch. 2001-40, § 21, 2001 Fla. Laws 129, 130.
385. Id.
386. FLA. STAT. § 101.5612(2) (2001).
387. § 101.5612(3) & (4).
388. § 101.5612(2). The supervisor of elections must have already prepared a
"preaudited group of ballots" for the test which must include a number of overvoted ballots. §
101.5612(3).
389. § 101.5612(2).
390. Id.
391. § 101.5612(4)(a)(1).
392. § 101.5612(4)(a)(2).
393. Id.
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Upon completion of the tabulation testing, each tested device must be
reset and resealed. 394 This must be done in the presence of the "canvassing
board or its representative, the representatives of the political parties, and the
candidates or their representatives who attended the test."395 Records of all
testing procedures and results must be maintained "as part of the official
records of the election. 396
B. On Election Day, Before Polls Close
Upon convening on election day,391 the canvassing board needs to
promptly evaluate whether any emergency has arisen which may result in the
inability of the canvassing board to timely certify the returns.398 If so, the
canvassing board must determine whether such an occurrence meets the
definition of emergency as set forth in the Election Reform Act.399 This
analysis is of critical importance, because under the new law, late returns
may be accepted only in the instance of an emergency. 4W Any returns
submitted late without a statutory emergency arising must be ignored by the
statewide Elections Canvassing Commission.40' If the local canvassing
board believes an emergency exists that justifies the late filing of returns, the
canvassing board must request a new deadline from the Elections Canvass-
402ing Commission.
394. § 101.5612(4)(b).
395. Id.
396. § 101.5612(4)(e).
397. By this time, the local supervisor of elections is required to have already given at
least forty-eight hours prior notice of the convening of the canvassing meeting. FLA. STAT.
§ 102.141(2) (2001). Such notice must be given "by publication once in one or more
newspapers of general circulation in the county .... " Id.
398. Id.
399. FLA. STAT. § 101.732 (2001).
400. FLA. STAT. § 102.112(4) (2001).
401. This type of provision is not foreign to Florida election law. In 1951, the Florida
Legislature enacted statutes which barred the local canvassing boards from including any
precinct returns which were not timely submitted. See discussion supra text accompanying
note 250.
402. FLA. STAT. § 102.112 (4) (2001). Under earlier case law, the returns were deemed
timely submitted even if they were submitted by telephone to the Secretary of State. State ex
rel. Chappell v. Martinez, 536 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1988). The continuing viability of this
holding is in doubt because the earlier statute merely required that the returns be forwarded to
Tallahassee, whereas the current version of the statute requires that they befiled, and received.
The rationale of Chappell appears to continue to exist, however, because in neither the old
statute nor the new does the language explicitly require that the returns be in writing.
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The law requires that absentee and provisional ballots be canvassed
before other returns are canvassed.40 3 Under existing case law, the
canvassing board is not required to canvass ballots for those candidates who
are no longer eligible for office." The canvassing of absentee ballots may
begin "at 7 a.m. on the fourth day before the election, but not later than noon
on the day following the election. '405 If the canvassing board decides to
canvass absentee ballots before polls close on election day, no one must
release any results until the closing of the polls.4 6  The supervisor of
elections shall deliver to the board all absentee ballots received and kept by
the supervisor's office prior to election day.407 The slpervisor could have
already confirmed that the signature on each ballot matches the signature on
file for that voter, although this procedure may also be done at the time of
canvassing. 4°8 However, none of the absentee ballots may be opened until
the canvassing board convenes its session, whenever that may be.
If a review of the ballots indicates more than one absentee ballot has
been received from a voter, the canvassing board must determine "which
ballot, if any, is to be counted.' 410  To accept an absentee ballot, the
canvassing board must determine that: a) the ballot has been signed by the
voter;41 b) the ballot includes a postmark, or if an overseas voter, the date
412signed, which must be a date before the election; and c) the voter's ballot
has also been signed by a witness who is eighteen years of age of older.4
3
Any absentee ballot not meeting these requirements must be marked
"rejected as illegal.' 414
Additionally, by administrative rule, the Division of Elections has
authorized overseas voters to submit their ballots to the supervisor of
elections by fax, so long as they contain the voter's signature, the date of
signature, and the statement, "I understand that by faxing my voted ballot I
403. § 102.141(2) (2000) (amended by Fla. Laws ch. 2001-40, § 41).
404. Hancock v. Sapp, 225 So. 2d 411, 415 (Fla. 1969). In Hancock, a candidate for
office had accepted another public office prior to election day. The appellate court construed
this as evidence that the candidate intended to relinquish his right to the seat on the ballot.
405. FLA. STAT. § 101.68(2)(a) (2001).
406. Id.
407. § 101.67 (2001).
408. § 101.68(1) (2001).
409. Id.
410. § 101.6103(5) (2001).
411. § 101.65(6) (2001).
412. § 101.65 (2001).
413. Id.
414. § 101.68(2)(c)(1) (2001).
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am voluntarily waiving my right to a secret ballot."4 15 The canvassing board
should also consider whether the Elections Canvassing Commission has
declared an emergency, which would authorize the waiver for overseas
voters of some of the stringent requirements of absentee ballots. In such a
case, the state commission would have provided the necessary emergency
416
rules for the county canvassing board to consider. Court decisions have
established that "compliance with statutory requirements for absentee voting
[is] mandatory," with any deficiency "fatal to the ballot cast.' 41
7
The absentee ballots themselves are "open for public inspection...
while in the custody of the... county canvassing board at any reasonable
time.,, 418 A member of the public, however, is not permitted to handle any
ballot.4 9 If a person wants to inspect the absentee ballots, the supervisor is
required to "make a reasonable effort to notify all candidates whose names
appear on such ballots or ballot cards by telephone or otherwise of the time
and place of the inspection. ' 420 The inspection is a public proceeding.421 If
any voter believes an absentee ballot is illegal due to failure to meet
statutory requirements discussed above, that voter may "file with the
canvassing board a protest against the canvass of that ballot. ' 422 The protest
must specify "the precinct, the ballot, and the reason [the voter] believes the
ballot to be illegal. '423 This must be done before the ballot is removed from
the envelope or the right to protest the ballot will be lost.
4U
C. On Election Day, After Polls Close
Upon the closing of the polls, the canvassing board will begin to receive
the returns from the precincts. The canvassing board must consider any
discrepancies concerning the total number of ballots assigned to the precinct
415. Florida Dep't of State, Laws and Procedures, Electronic Transmission of Absentee
Ballots (to be codified at FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.030), available at
http://elections.dos.state.fl.us/laws/ProposedRules/1S2.030.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2002).
416. FLA. STAT. § 101.698 (2001).
417. Wood v. Diefenbach, 81 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1955); FLA. STAT. § 101.698 (2001).
418. FLA. STAT. § 101.572 (2001).
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. § 101.68 (2)(c)(2).
423. Id.
424. Id.
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as noted by the precinct workers on the transfer form.42s The canvassing
board must further evaluate any provisional ballot received to determine
whether the voter was entitled to vote in the precinct forwarding the ballot,
and further whether the voter's signature on the ballot envelope matches the
voter's registration.426 Ballots not meeting these two criteria must be marked
rejected as illegal.427  Further, the canvassing board must consider any
damaged ballots which could not be read by the tabulation equipment and
were not corrected by duplicate ballot to determine whether they contain a
"clear indication.., that the voter has made a definite choice for an office or
ballot measure." 28 However, other than these areas, the canvassing board
cannot review the propriety of any returns submitted by the precinct
elections boards.429 The compilation of the precinct returns is merely a
ministerial act to be performed by the canvassing board.430 The bifurcation
of duties between the precinct election boards and the county canvassing
board continues as it has for decades, as clearly expressed by the Supreme
Court of Florida in State ex rel. Barrs v. Pritchard
Election [precinct] inspectors, as such, have no power to declare
the result of an election, even in or for the particular precinct for
which they act. Their sole duty is to count, tally, tabulate, and re-
turn the votes as they find them to have been cast. The declaration
of the result is a duty confided to the canvassing board to which the
425. § 101.5614 (2001). In the new law, the precinct workers responsible for the
reconciliation and tabulation are referred to as the election board of each precinct, appointed
by the supervisor of elections. Id. See also Fla. Laws ch. 2001-40, § 26. The election board
for each precinct is responsible to open and close the polls at the precinct. The statute permits
a second election board for each precinct, so long as the first election board arrives at the
precinct not later than 6:00 a-m. on election day and stays until the closing of the polls. The
second election board would then be responsible to "count the votes cast." FLA. STAT.
§ 102.012(4) (2001). An election board is comprised of a clerk and additional inspectors.
§ 97.021(8) (2001).
426. § 101.048(2)(a).
427. FLA. STAT. § 101.048(2)(b)(2) (2001).
428. § 101.5614(5) (2001). As with the law in effect prior to the Election Reform Act,
damaged ballots can be corrected by election personnel so long as the duplicate ballot is made
"in the presence of witnesses." In lieu of a duplicate ballot, however, the damaged ballot may
be presented to the canvassing board for its determination. Id.
429. § 101.5614.
430. Gough v. State ex rel. Sauls, 55 So. 2d 111, 116 (Fla. 1951).
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election returns are required to be sent for the purpose of being
canvassed and there having the result declared and announced.43'
During the canvassing process, the canvassing board has the "full
authority to... enforce obedience to its lawful commands during.., the
canvass of the votes. ' 432 The Division of Elections has proposed rules which
further provide that public observers of any manual recount may not
"interfere or disturb the recount in any way. ' 433 Under the previous law, all
returns must have been transmitted from the precincts to the canvassing
board by noon of the next day.434 Under the new law, however, the returns
must be transmitted no later than 2:00 a.m. the next day, a much shorter
deadline which may pose some difficulty particularly in geographically large
counties with heavy voter turnout.
435
Once the canvassing board has completed the canvass, it is required to
issue unofficial returns to the Department of State no later than noon the day
after the election.4 36  Thereafter, before issuing official returns, the
canvassing board must determine whether: a) a counting error exists;437 b)
whether a machine recount is required;438 or c) whether a manual recount is
required.439
D. After Election Day
If the unofficial returns reveal to the canvassing board that a counting
error exists in the manner in which properly marked ballots have been
counted, the board's options are limited only to correcting the error and then
conducting a machine recount, or requesting that the Department of State
verify the county's tabulation software.4
431. State ex rel. Barrs v. Pritchard, 149 So. 58, 59 (Fla. 1933).
432. FLA. STAT. § 102.031(1) (2001).
433. Proposed Rule 1S-2.031(l)(a), (2)(g), supra note 369.
434. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(3) (2001).
435. § 102.141(3).
436. Ch. 2001-40, § 41, 2001 Fla. Laws 131,147 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 102.141 (2001)).
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Ch. 2001-40, § 42, 2001 Fla. Laws 137, 149 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 102.166 (2001)).
440. Ch. 2001-40, § 41, 2001 Fla. Laws 131, 147 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 102.141 (2001)).
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If the unofficial results reveal that any candidate or ballot measure was
"defeated or eliminated by one-half of a percent or less of the votes cast for
such office" or ballot measure, then the canvassing board must conduct a
machine recount unless the losing candidate requests in writing that the
recount not be done." 1 The operation of this provision can be viewed by
looking at a couple of examples. Assume in a particular race only 199 votes
are cast with a breakdown of 100 to 99. A single vote is not "one-half of a
percent or less of the votes" cast. Apparently then, no machine recount
could ever be required for a race involving this number of ballots cast or
less. Under the new law, it appears that a minimum of 201 votes must be cast
in a race before a machine recount could ever be required under the new
statutory provision. A breakdown of 101 to 100 would be within the
requisite "one-half of a percent or less of the votes:" one-half of a percent of
200 votes being one vote, and the difference between the closest breakdown
of 201 votes being a single vote.44 2
If a machine recount is necessitated, the board must then test the
tabulating equipment as previously provided if the county has voting
443
equipment that utilizes ballots. If the tabulation test indicates no error,
then the ballots are to be run back through the automatic tabulating
equipment. 4" If the test indicates no tabulating error, then the recount is
presumed to be the correct tally." 5 If an error in the tabulating equipment is
detected, then the procedure to be handled is the same as that for tabulating
the equipment at the beginning of canvass.446 If a county uses a system that
441. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000), amended by Fla. Laws ch. 2001-40, § 41. For
smaller elections, machine and manual recounts may be able to take place on the day of
election after polls close, although the detailed procedures now required make a manual
recount less likely to occur on the same day as the election. Id.
442. The question remains whether a court will construe this law as applying to all
numbers of votes cast, in order to pass constitutional muster. Florida courts recognize the
principle that "the Legislature in its enactments is always presumed to have intended to enact
constitutional acts." Gough v. State, 55 So. 2d 111, 116 (Fla. 1951). Additionally, in
construing the meaning of a new statute, Florida courts look primarily to the plain meaning of
the words used by the Legislature. Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000). By
using the plain meaning of the words in the statute, however, the new statute arguably runs
afoul of the legal principle at issue in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000) ("The right
to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection
applies as well to the manner of its exercise."). See also supra note 254 and discussion
contained therein.
443. FLA. STAT. § 101.5612 (2001).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
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does not use actual ballots, such as a touch-screen system, the canvassing
board conducting a machine recount must "examine the counters on the
precinct tabulators to ensure that the total of the returns on the precinct
tabulators equals the overall election return.' 7 If they do, the results are
presumed to be correct."
The second set of unofficial returns must be submitted "no later than
noon on the second day after any election.' ' 9 If the canvassing board
cannot complete the machine recount within this deadline, then the
canvassing board must submit the initial returns again as second unofficial
returns, together with "a detailed explanation of why it was unable to timely
complete the recount.'4 50 In conducting the machine recount, the canvassing
board must remember that it will be required to make reports of its
proceedings available to the general public.4 5
If a machine recount is conducted, and the second set of unofficial
returns indicates any candidate or ballot measure "was defeated or
eliminated by one-quarter of a percent or less," then a manual recount of the
entire undervotes and overvotes is mandated.452 If, however, the amended
returns indicate a defeat of "between one-quarter and one-half of a percent of
the votes cast," a manual recount of the entire undervotes and overvotes is
not required unless requested in writing by the "candidate, the political party
of such candidate, or any political committee that supports or opposes such
ballot measure.' 453  The written request is to be directed to the county
canvassing board for races within county boundaries, and to the State
Elections Canvassing Commission for races crossing county lines.45 This
procedure takes the place of the "protest" which was previously provided
under Florida law.
455
When conducting a manual recount, the canvassing board shall use
"counting teams of at least two electors," which are required to be "when
447. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(6)(b) (2001).
448. Id.
449. Id. § 102.141(6)(c) (2001).
450. Id.
451. Id. § 102.141(8) (2001).
452. FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2001).
453. Id. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(2)(a) (2001).
454. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(2)(b) (2001). In order to cull overvotes and undervotes, all
approved voting equipment must include the ability to sort while "simultaneously counting
votes" using hardware or software approved by the Department of State. Id. § 102.166(3)(a).
455. § 102.166. The word "protest" now no longer appears in the Florida election
lexicon except concerning a challenge to an absentee ballot. See supra text accompanying
note 316-18.
898 [Vol. 26:851
254
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss3/1
2002]
possible, members of at least two political parties. ' 456 If the counting team
cannot reach a decision on any particular ballot, the ballot is to be presented
to the county canvassing board for a determination. 57 The standard to be
used by the canvassing board in counting undervotes and overvotes in a
manual recount is if there is "a clear indication [on the ballot] that the voter
has made a definite choice.
'458
The Department of State was mandated to adopt rules specifying what
constitutes a clear indication.459 These rules were proposed in September
2001 and subsequently amended.40 As they affect the responsibility of a
county canvassing board, the rules appear to require the canvassing board to
answer a primary question in determining the propriety of a questioned
ballot: Is the ballot clear? For instance, if the voter does not substantially
fill in the oval on an optiscan sheet, the vote should still be counted if the
voter placed "any other mark... within the blank space... that clearly
indicates the voter intended the oval or arrow to be marked."461 Moreover, if
the voter attempts to change his or her mind by marking out an original
choice and choosing another candidate, the ballot should be counted so long
as the correction "is clearly evident in the space where the voter could
indicate a ballot choice" or that the correction is "indicated in a clear
fashion.' 462 Additionally, the proposed rules provide that the canvassing
board should ignore any stray marks on the ballot if they are "clearly
unrelated to the voter's intent."
For those counties adopting a direct recording voting system, rather
than the optical scan voting system, the task facing the canvassing board is
not quite as onerous because the absence of printed ballots shifts the focus
456. Id. § 102.166(6)(a) (2001).
457. Id. § 102.166(6)(b).
458. Id.
459. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(6)(c) (2001).
460. Proposed Rule 1S-2.027, supra note 369; see Uniform, supra note 369, at 30A.
Although the proposed rule purports to set forth standards for determining a voter's choice "in
a manual recount," the standards would appear, for uniformity sake, to be equally applicable
to those ballots reviewed by a canvassing board as part of the election itself: absentee ballots,
provisional ballots and damaged ballots. Legal counsel with the Division of Elections concurs
with this conclusion, acknowledging that the Division was not given the statutory authority to
address standards for any ballots other than those involving a manual recount. Telephone
Interview with Amy K. Tuck, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Division of Elections (Oct.
22, 2001) (Ms. Tuck is the attorney who drafted the proposed rule).
461. Proposed Rule 1S-2.027, supra note 369, rule 1S-2.027(1)(e).
462. Id. rule 1S-2.027(1)(i) & (0).
463. 1d rule 1S-2.027(l)(k) & (/).
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primarily to any write-in candidates, absentee ballots, and provisional
ballots.4" In either case, in determining the propriety of any ballot, the
canvassing board must set aside each challenged ballot "with a notation of
the precinct number, the unique identifier number, how the ballot was
counted, the reasoning behind the challenge, and the name of the person
bringing the challenge.
'
"
5
Under existing case law, canvassing boards are given some "latitude of
judgment" in making decisions.466 Moreover, a canvassing board's decision
on the validity of a ballot is "presumptively correct."467  If the board's
decision is "rational and not clearly outside legal requirements, [it] should be
upheld rather than substituted by the impression a particular judge or panel
of judges might deem appropriate.' Finally, a determination by a
canvassing board should not be overturned by a court unless "there are clear,
substantial departures from essential requirements of law.'
469
If a recount is conducted pursuant to the new law, the county canvass-
ing board must follow procedures that are to be promulgated by the
Department of State addressing several issues, including: 1) the security of
ballots during the recount; 2) the time and place of any recounts; 3) the
public observance of the recount; 4) any objections to ballot determinations;
5) any record of the recount proceedings; and 6) procedures concerning
candidate or other representatives. 470 In conducting the manual recount, the
canvassing board must remember that it will be required to make transcripts
of its proceedings available to the general public. 47'
Thereafter, when the returns are finally certified, the canvassing board
must issue in duplicate a certified return of election.472 The official return is
comprised of "the return printed by the automatic tabulating equipment, to
which has been added the return of write in, absentee and manually counted
votes and votes from provisional ballots." 473 The certificate is required to
contain "the total number of votes for each person nominated or elected, the
464. Id. rule lS-2.027(2).
465. Proposed Rule 1S-2.03 1 (1)(i) & (2)(i), supra note 369.
466. Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 268-69 n. 5 (Fla. 1975).
467. Id. at 269 n. 5.
468. Id.
469. Id. McLean v. Bellamy, 437 So. 2d 737, 746 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Anderson v. Canvassing & Election Bd. of Gadsen County, 399 So. 2d 1021, 1022-23 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
470. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5)(c) (2001).
471. § 102.141(8).
472. § 102.151.
473. § 101.5614(8).
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names of persons for whom such votes were cast, and the number of votes
cast for each candidate or nominee. ' 474 One copy of the certificate is to be
filed with the local supervisor of elections.4 75 The other copy goes to the
local government entity involved in the election, or to the Secretary of State
if the election crosses county lines. 476 For those elections crossing county
lines, the state Elections Canvassing Commission provides the statewide
ministerial act of compiling cumulative results.
4 7
If challenged beyond the recount stage in an election contest, the
canvassing board may be involved as a "proper party defendant" in the
circuit court.478 The canvassing board is not, however, an indispensable
party to such a lawsuit. 479 Nor is it a proper party to a lawsuit if the election
dispute does not involve claims of improper balloting or counting. so The
canvassing board itself has no standing to challenge the results of an
election.48' Its responsibilities involve the certifying of election results, with
any challenge left to other parties. 482 Even if a canvassing board is grossly
negligent in the manner in which it handles its responsibilities, the election
results as certified by the board will nonetheless be upheld so long as they
"reflect the will of the voters.' 48 3 However, if a canvassing board willfully
refuses to perform its duties, its members can be charged criminally."4
Another responsibility of the canvassing board that may occur after an
election is concluded is to retest any tabulating device that has previously
been determined to be unsatisfactory, and that has thereafter been "repro-
grammed, repaired, or replaced."485  As with pre-election testing, the
474. § 102.151.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. § 102.111(1). The duties of the statewide board are beyond the scope of this
article. For a brief discussion of the composition of the Elections Canvassing Commission,
see supra note 235.
478. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(4) (2001).
479. See FLA. STAT. § 102.168 (2002). See also FLA. STAT. § 102.171 (2001)
(mandating that contests involving general elections of members of the State Legislature shall
be determined according to the rules of each legislative body); Farmer v. Carson, 148 So. 557,
560 (Fla. 1933).
480. People Against Tax Revenue Mismgmt., Inc. v. Leon County Canvassing Bd., 573
So. 2d 31, 32-33 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
481. Morse v. Dade County Canvassing Bd., 456 So. 2d 1314, 1316 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
482. Id.
483. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720, 725 (Fla. 1998).
484. Overstreet v. Whiddon, 177 So. 701,703-05 (Fla. 1938).
485. § 101.5612(4)(d).
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subsequent testing may be attended by only a single authorized member of
the canvassing board.4  Before this subsequent testing, however, the
canvassing board must provide notice to all parties who were present at the
original testing.4 7 This may be done orally at the "close of the first testing,"
or may be subsequently done via telephone.4
8
VI. CONCLUSION
The Florida election canvassing system has developed gradually
throughout the State's history. The presidential election of 2000 provided an
impetus for vast changes to the canvassing system, although the structure of
the county canvassing boards remains intact. The Election Reform Act of
2001, designed to resolve controversy arising out of the presidential election,
is not, however, without criticism.489 An analysis of various provisions in
the new law, including the new proposed administrative rules, indicates
several unanswered questions, assuring future tweaking of the canvassing
system and continued development of the historical role of judges in the
process.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Within two months of the effective date of the Election Reform Act, litigation had
already been filed challenging the constitutionality of several of its provisions. Thus far,
however, the challenge has had little to do with provisions involving the responsibilities of the
county canvassing board. Ellis Berger, Group Sues over Legislature's Reforms, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 16, 2001, at 1 IA. Moreover, as of August 20, 2001, the
federal government temporarily halted the new statutory sections dealing with voter education,
voter registration lists, and provisional ballots. Kallestad, supra note 333, at 6B; Election
Reform: Answer Uncle Sam's Questions, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 25, 2001, at
14A.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rulings in the Florida state courts, with one exception, raised no major
issues this past year. A number of technical matters were resolved, and the
appeals courts continued the ongoing process of holding trial courts
accountable for the protection of constitutional rights and enforcement of
Florida statutory provisions. The Supreme Court of Florida rendered one
major opinion, however. It held that it was constitutional to close termina-
tion of parental rights proceedings against a challenge by the media that such
hearings should be public. The Florida Legislature was less active than it had
been in recent years, tightening several provisions and making just a few
substantive changes to services in the dependency field and to provisions of
the delinquency law governing delinquent acts.
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; J.D., Boston College, 1970; B.A., Colgate University, 1967. The author
thanks Mark Earles and Garrett Franzen for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
This article covers cases decided through June 30.
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
In re Gault,' decided thirty-four years ago, requires that juveniles be
provided counsel in delinquency cases and, if indigent, are entitled to an
2attorney paid for by the state. In juvenile law survey articles going back
almost one third of that time, this author has recounted the ongoing failure of
Florida trial courts to comply with Gault.3 In T.S. v. State ,4 a young teenager
pleaded guilty to violation of the City of Orlando's youth protection
ordinance, a curfew, which barred juveniles from certain areas of downtown
Orlando after midnight, and was placed in a Level Eight Facility.5 At the
plea hearing, the child was not represented by counsel and was not informed
of her right to counsel in violation of rule 8.165(a) of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure.6 The trial court made a brief comment that it had
explained to the child her rights under the constitution, to which she had
agreed, although the statement did not appear in the transcript.7 There were
written waivers of the right to counsel but they had not been witnessed .
Recognizing that there is a right to counsel at all critical stages of a juvenile
proceeding in Florida,9 the court held that a plea is a critical stage and
warrants the same guarantee of effective assistance of counsel as do trial
proceedings. 10 The court reversed."
In another right-to-counsel case, D.C.W. v. State,12 the child appeared
for arraignment in a delinquency proceeding at which the court gave a
speech to the group of juvenile defendants before him and informed them of
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id.
3. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000
REV. 91, 92 and n.2 (2000).
4. 773 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
5. Id. at 636.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. T.S., 773 So. 2d at 635 (citing A.D. v. State
App. 1999)).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 775 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Survey of Florida Law, 25 NovA L.
, 740 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
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their rights.'3 The appeals court held that the specific colloquy with the
child, to the effect that the child had heard and understood the speech to the
group, was inadequate to meet the requirements of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure. The court held that the colloquy about the right to
counsel must include an inquiry into the juvenile's comprehension of the
right to counsel and his capacity to waive the right in an intelligent and
understanding fashion.'5 The issue came up a third time in G.E.F. v. State.'
In that case, at the detention hearing, when asked whether the child wanted
an attorney, the father replied in the negative and the court made no further
inquiry.17 Then at the plea hearing, the only colloquy among the child, the
parent, and the court concerned the court stating that it had offered the child
an attorney, asking whether the parent could afford an attorney, and then
when the mother replied that she could not, the court explaining the right to
a public defender, and the parent decided to waive that right."8 The court
failed to make any further inquiry as required by rule 8.165 of the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which explicitly states what is necessary. The
appeals court reversed. 19
Under Florida law, prior juvenile delinquency adjudications may be
treated as convictions to enhance the classification of a subsequent
delinquency offense charge.' In State v. T.T.,2 a juvenile was charged with
a felony petit theft on the basis of prior convictions.2 In the T.T. case, the
prior delinquency proceedings resulted in withheld delinquency adjudica-
tions and not in convictions, and as a result the juvenile moved to dismiss the
delinquency charge. -  The trial court granted the motion and the First
District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that because there was no express
statutory language that a withheld adjudication may be considered a
conviction for purposes of charging a juvenile in a subsequent delinquency
proceeding as occurs with adults.2
13. Id.
14. Id. at 364 (citing FLA. R. JUv. P. 8.165(b)(2)).
15. Id.
16. 782 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 2001).
17. Id. at 952.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 985.228(6) (2001).
21. 773 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
22. Id. at 587.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing FIA. STAT. § 784.03(2) (1999)).
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Proper application of Florida's risk assessment instrument and other
standards for secure detention have been the subject of discussion in this
survey on a number of occasions.2z The risk assessment instrument is a tool
used by the court to determine whether a child may be held in secure
26 27detention. The issue before the court in J.J. v. Frier arose in the context
of the writ of habeas corpus to overturn a trial court order that a child be
held in secure detention. Florida Statutes provide that the court may order
a placement more restrictive than that demonstrated by the statistical results
of the risk assessment instrument.29 Under those circumstances, the court
shall state its clear and convincing reasons for the placement in writing.30 In
J.J., the appellate court described the pertinent statute as a "departure
provision." The trial court did not state in writing the reasons for exceeding
the risk assessment instrument, and all the appellate court had before it was a
transcript of the detention hearing.32 The appeals court understood the
statutory obligations of the court to be specific and aimed at controlling
juvenile detention.33 Therefore, it could not "casually dispense with the
writing requirement[s]. ' 34  The court added that the statutory provision
required the judge's reasons rather than a statement of evidence. 5 Thus, the
appellate assessment of the reasons given by the judge to validate a variation
from the risk assessment requirement of the statute is not a deferential
review, but rather de novo review.
36
Florida cities, like those in many jurisdictions, have passed juvenile
curfew ordinances.37 The constitutionality of the City of Pinellas Park's
25. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REv. 819,
831-34 (1999); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NOVA L.
REv. 179, 180-84 (1997); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21
NOVA L. REv. 189, 190-93 (1996); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida
Law, 20 NOvA L. REv. 191, 192-94 (1995).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 985.213(2)(b)1. (2001).
27. 765 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
28. Id. at 261.
29. FLA. STAT. § 985.215(2)0) (2001).
30. Id.
31. J.J., 765 So. 2d at 264.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 265.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. J.J., 765 So. 2d at 266.
37. See Michael J. Dale, Representing the Child Client, 3-38-3-41(2000).
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Juvenile Curfew Ordinance was before the Supreme Court of Florida in T.M.
v. State. 8 The ordinance made it unlawful for a juvenile to be or remain in a
public place or establishment between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. of the
following day on Sundays through Thursdays and 12:01 a.m. through 6:00
a.m. on Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.3 9 The child could be the
subject of a juvenile delinquency petition for violation of the ordinance.40
The supreme court reversed the Second District Court of Appeal without
ruling that the statute was or was not constitutional because the intermediate
appellate court had applied a heightened scrutiny test rather than the strict
scrutiny test.41 The Office of the Attorney General essentially conceded that
the wrong standard was applied and the case was remanded for application
of the strict scrutiny test.42
B. Dispositional Issues
At the close of the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency
proceeding, if the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been
proven, it may either enter an order of adjudication or withhold adjudica-
tion.43 When the court withholds adjudication, it shall place the child on
probation and set additional conditions such as restitution, community
service, curfew, urine monitoring, and driver's license revocation or
suspension, among others." When the court elects to adjudicate a child
delinquent, it may enter a disposition that the child be placed on probation.45
The issue before the appellate court in S.R.A. v. State6 was what length
of probation may be imposed upon a juvenile when the court withholds
adjudication of delinquency.47 The general rule in Florida is once the court
obtains jurisdiction over the juvenile under chapter 985, the court retains
38. 784 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2001).
39. Id. at 442-43.
40. Id. at 443.
41. Id. at 443-44.
42. Id. at 444.
43. FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)1. (2001).
44. § 985.228(4); FIA. R. Juv. P. 8.1 10(g) (2001).
45. §§ 985.03(43), 985.231. Until recently probation in Florida was known as
community control. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA.
L. REv 91, 96 (2000).
46. 766 So. 2d 277,278 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
47. Id
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jurisdiction until the child reaches the age of nineteen.48 When the court
adjudicates the child to be delinquent and places the child on probation,
Florida law explicitly limits the term of probation. 49 But for a second-degree
misdemeanor, the statute limits probation to the maximum sentence that
could be imposed if the juvenile were committed to the Department of
Juvenile Justice, which may not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment
that an adult could serve for the same offense. 50 However, where adjudica-
tion is withheld, chapter 985 allows an indeterminate probation sentence
until the juvenile turns nineteen.51 Several courts have previously upheld the
statutory provision for indeterminate probation in the withheld adjudication
setting. 2 On the other hand, the Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected the
53distinction in G.R.A. Deciding that the juvenile justice system area is
remedial in nature, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in S.R.A. upheld the
legislative prerogative, although certifying the conflict with the Fifth District
Court of Appeal.4 The Supreme Court of Florida subsequently approved the
S.R.A. decision without opinion.
55
The general rule in Florida is that the trial court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act
56
until the child reaches the age of nineteen. An exception occurs when the
court enters a disposition in which it commits the child to the Department of
Juvenile Justice when under certain circumstances the term of the commit-
ment shall be until the child is charged by the Department or until he or she
reaches the age of twenty-one.
57
In S.L.K. v. State, the trial court committed the child to a Level Eight
Department of Juvenile Justice program, suspending that commitment until
the child was accepted and completed a Level Six boot camp, and then
48. FLA. STAT. § 985.201(4)(a) (2001).
49. § 985.231(1)(a)l.a.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See M.B. v. State, 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); N.W. v. State,
736 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) reh'g granted, 744 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1999); M.G.
v. State, 696 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) overruled by G.R.A. v. State, 688 So.
2d 1027 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
53. 688 So. 2d at 1027.
54. S.R.A., 766 So. 2d at 280.
55. S.R.A. v. State, 772 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 2000).
56. See FLA. STAT. § 985.201(4)(a) (2001).
57. § 985.231(1)(a)(IV)d.3.
58. 776 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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retained jurisdiction over the child until he reached the age of twenty-one.59
The appellate court reversed because the Department of Juvenile Justice's
commitment statutory provision allows the retention of jurisdiction in the
event that the commitment extends until the child's twenty-first birthday, but
does not allow the court to continue to retain jurisdiction if the child is
discharged from the commitment prior to the age of twenty-one. 661
F.T. v. State involved an appeal from a delinquency adjudication
where the child was placed on probation. 62 As this section of the article
explains, in general, when a child is placed on probation after a delinquency
adjudication, the maximum sentence cannot exceed that for which an adult
would serve time for the same offense. The issue in F.T. was whether, under
the facts of the case, the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate a violation
63
of probation. The child had initially been placed on probation on July 6,
1998.6 The child subsequently admitted a violation of probation and on
February 5, 1999 was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation with a
suspended commitment to a Level Four facility.6 5 A second petition for
violation of probation was filed against the child on August 10, 1999 and
amended on September 23, 1999, and a hearing was held on October 7,
1999.66 The issue involved whether, in October 1999, the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider the affidavit of violation of probation.67 The
appellate court held that it did not because the one-year probation term, the
maximum term for the offense had the child been charged as an adult, had
68 69
expired. a Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
Florida's juvenile delinquency dispositional statute contains a provision
for dealing with juvenile sex offenders.70 The question in C.C.M. v. State71
was whether the sex offender probation conditions contained in the Florida
Statutes governing adult criminal defendants apply in juvenile delinquency
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1065.
61. 766 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1183.
64. Id. at 1182.
65. Id. at 1182-83.
66. F.T., 766 So. 2d at 1183.
67. l
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See FLA. STAT. § 985.03(31) (2001).
71. 782 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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proceedings.72 C.C.M. involved a thirteen-year-old who was found to have
committed a lewd and lascivious act upon another child. 3 At a review
hearing, after a dispositional hearing at which the child was committed to the
Department of Juvenile Justice for placement in a moderate risk residential
program, the court entered a modified order of adjudication and disposition,
imposing the sex offender probation conditions under the adult act.74 The
appellate court reversed, finding first that the adult statute containing
mandatory conditions of probation did not apply to juveniles because it was
silent as to its application to juveniles and because the content of the statute
also referred specifically to adult settings. 75 Although it found that the
statute applied exclusively to adults and juveniles sentenced as adults, the
appellate court commented in dicta that the lower court might have used its
discretion to impose adult-like conditions.76 However, it could not do so on
a mandatory basis because of the language of the adult probation statute.77
Because the court did not take discretionary authority at the time of the
original disposition, it was foreclosed from doing so at a later date.78
The juvenile delinquency disposition section of chapter 985 of the
Florida Statutes does not provide for what are often described in the adult
system as split sentences, whereby a judge orders commitment but suspends
the commitment and orders completion of a probation program.79 The First
District Court of Appeal recently rejected such an approach in Department
of Juvenile Justice v. K.B.80 In the K.B. case, the trial court ordered that if a
child failed to complete or violated a probation program through the
Tallahassee Marine Institute, the Department of Juvenile Justice would
immediately place the juvenile in a residential commitment facility without
the need for a probation violation proceeding.8' The appellate court
recognized that such an approach was creative, but that it was not available
within chapter 985.82 It then concluded, as other appellate courts have, that
72. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5) (2001).
73. C.C.M. v. State, 782 So. 2d 537, 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 539.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 539-40.
78. C.C.M., 782 So. 2d at 540.
79. FA. STAT. § 985.03 (2001).
80. 784 So. 2d 556, 557 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.231 (2000)).
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trial courts do not have unlimited discretion in establishing dispositions.8 3
They may not place juveniles in particular facilities." That is left to the
discretion of the Department of Juvenile Justice.8
C. Appellate Issues
A technical, but nonetheless important issue of appellate practice, came
before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in J.C.R. v. State.86 The issue
involved preservation of a right to appeal an order by a trial court withhold-
ing adjudication of delinquency but impermissibly placing the child under
"community control for an indeterminate amount of time not to exceed the
child's twenty-first birthday.... ."87 The state conceded that the court lacked
authority to set the term of community control beyond the child's nineteenth
birthday but argued that the issue was not preserved for appeal.88 Florida
law provides that the appeal must be timely and pursuant to the statute
governing criminal appeals and the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.89
However, the court concluded that because the sentence imposed in the case
was similar to one that exceeds statutory maximum, it is the type of
fundamental sentencing error that can be raised on appeal without preserva-
tion of rights.90
A second issue relates to the ability of the state to appeal from an order
denying its request to impose restitution liens in a delinquency proceeding.
In State v. M.K.,91 the appellate court held that it lacked jurisdiction because
"there is no statute or court rule authorizing the state to appeal the
[particular) order at issue." 92 Recognizing that the state's right to appeal is
purely statutory, the court could find nothing in chapter 985's list of orders
that can be appealed by the state which would allow an appeal in the
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 784 So. 2d at 557 (citing R.LB. v. State, 693 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1997)); Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. J.R., 716 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Dep't of HRS v. State, 616 So. 2d 91, 91-92 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing In re
K.A.B., 483 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
86. 785 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
87. Id. at 551.
88. Id.
89. See FLA. STAT. § 985.234(1) (2001); J.C.R., 785 So. 2d at 551 n.1.
90. J.C.R., 785 So. 2d at 551.
91. 786 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
92. Id. at 25.
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particular instance. 93 The court in M.K. then dismissed the appeal after
commenting that the problem had existed in the adult criminal appeal arena
but had been corrected by statute.
94
III.- DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, as it governs dependency proceed-
ings, is not a model of clarity and logic. 95 For example, none of the
subdivisions of the chapter are actually entitled "Dependency Proceed-
ings." 96 The definitional subpart of chapter 39 speaks of a child who is found
to be "dependent" and includes several categories of children.97 They are
children who have been abandoned, abused, or neglected, who have been
surrendered to the Department of Children and Families Services or to a
licensed child placing agency for purposes of adoption, who have been
voluntarily placed with a child caring agency or the Department, who have
no parent or legal custodian capable of providing supervision and care, or
who are in substantial risk of imminent abandonment, abuse, or neglect by a
parent or legal custodian.98 These categories of dependent children are then
further defined in the statute, 99 but lacking precision, have been the subject
of appellate review.
An abandoned child is defined in section 39.01(1) of the Florida
Statutes as being in a situation in which the parent or custodian, through his
or her absence, fails to provide for the child's support, fails to communicate
with the child, thus evidencing a willful rejection of parental obligations.'00
The facts must demonstrate to the court a settled purpose not to assume
parental duties.10 Incarceration may constitute abandonment. 02
The issue of how to evaluate abandonment as an evidentiary matter was
recently before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in S.C. v. Department of
93. Id. at 26 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.234(1)(b) (2000)).
94. Id. (citing State v. MacLeod, 600 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1992)).
95. C.f. ZJ.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 787 So. 2d 875, 878 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
96. But see Part II of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which is entitled
"Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings."
97. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14) (2001).
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. § 39.01(1).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Children & Families.10 3 The court recognized that there had to be a showing
of willful rejection of parental responsibilities or marginal efforts to support
and communicate with the child, such that there was a failure to evince the
settled purpose to assume parental duties.1°4 The appellate court's decision,
as one would expect, was fact driven. The court found that there was some
contact between the mother and the child while the child was not in the
mother's physical custody and that the mother did not fail to provide
financial support sufficient to establish abandonment because the husband
and wife were used to supporting the children fully whenever that parent had
custody of the child. °5 There had been no request for support made until the
dependency proceeding was filed by the paternal great-aunt and great-uncle
with whom the child periodically lived.106 The court concluded that the
pattern of conduct in evidence in the case was beneath the statutory
threshold for abandonment.107
Approximately ten years ago, the Supreme Court of Florida decided
Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,'0 in which it
held that permanent termination of a parent's rights to one child under
circumstances evidencing abuse and neglect may serve as grounds for
termination of parental rights to a different child.10 In M.F. v. Department
of Children & Families,1 the issue before the Supreme Court of Florida was
whether a court may base a final ruling of dependency "solely on the fact
that the parent committed a sex act on a different child." ''1 The court held
that a simple showing by the Department of Children and Family Services
"that a parent committed a sex act on one child does not by itself constitute
proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to
the child's sibling, as required by [Florida law]."" 2 The court recognized
that the act may be quite relevant, but it is not automatically dispositive of
the question of dependency, and therefore the court should focus on all the
103. 767 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
104. Id. at 582.
105. Id
106. Id.
107. Id
108. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
109. Id. at 571.
110. 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fa. 2000).
111. Id. at 1193.
112. Id. at 1194 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(11) (1997)).
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circumstances surrounding the petition in the particular case.13 The court
thus refused to apply a per se rule.
The application of dependency proceedings to cases involving domestic
violence was before the Fifth District in D.D. v. Department of Children &
Families.14 In that case, the appellate court affirmed an adjudication of
dependency in light of the trial court's finding of what Florida calls
"prospective neglect" based upon proof that the child witnessed multiple
incidents of domestic violence of both a physical and verbal nature, and that
the violence was proof of prospective neglect sufficient to support a
determination even in the absence of medical or other expert testimony.'
5
The appellate court first found that chapter 39's definition of neglect covers
the situation of domestic violence,' 6 and that the state need not wait for a
child to be neglected before instituting dependency proceedings. 1 7 Relying
upon an earlier Fourth District Court of Appeal opinion in D.H. v.
Department of Children & Families,"18 the court in D.D. held that the child
must view the acts of violence.1 9 The court then added that the child's
observation must be taken together with evidence indicating that the parents
would more likely than not resume their relationship in the future and thus
resume a cycle of domestic violence in the presence of the child in order to
prove prospective neglect for purposes of a finding of dependency.' °
Finally, the court held that, unlike in the termination of parental rights
setting, 12 the state need not prove in a dependency proceeding that there was
no prospect existing that the parent could improve his or her behavior1
2
The rationale is that there is a different standard of proof in a termination
case than in a dependency case because in the dependency proceeding, the
goal is to improve the parents' behavior for the purpose of reunification in
order to avoid termination.'
3
113. Id.
114. 773 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
115. Id. at 616.
116. Id. at 617; FLA. STAT. § 39.01(45) (2001).
117. Id. at 617.
118. 769 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
119. D.D.,773 So. 2dat 618.
120. Id.
121. See Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 547 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
122. D.D., 773 So. 2d at 618.
123. Id.
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Corporal punishment periodically forms the basis for a charge of
dependency1 24 In J.C. v. Department of Children & Families,"1 a stepfather
of one child, and father of a younger child, was charged with excessive
parental discipline.126 Noting that the stepfather, while not the biological
father of the older child, was in a position with approval of the mother to
discipline both children, dependency might flow to him.127 The allegations
of dependency were made related to physical, mental, and emotional injury
under chapter 39.128 Florida law allows for corporal discipline so long as it is
not excessive or abusive. 29 The court found that there was no evidence that
the bruises were significant or that they constituted temporary disfigure-
ment. 13  Nor was there any evidence that the children were likely to be
harmed if they were returned to their home.13' Finally, the court referred to
the Supreme Court ruling in Beagle v. Beagle,132 in which the high court, in
the context of grandparent visitation, relied upon the privacy provisions of
the Florida Constitution, which do not allow state involvement unless there
is a threat of harm
133
Florida, like other states, provides that in dependency proceedings,
hearsay statements of a child may be offered to prove abuse or neglect.
1 34
124. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L.
RE.. 91 (2001); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 28 NOVA L. REV.
819 (1999); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NovA L. REV.
179 (1997); Michael . Dale, Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NovA L. REv.
189 (1996); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REV.
191 (1995). Corporal punishment may also form the basis for a criminal charge. See
generally State v. MacDonald, 785 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 2001); Raiford v. State,
736 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that discipline of a child does not bar
prosecution for simple child abuse if the beating produces severe bruises enough to require
treatment at a hospital).
125. 773 So. 2d. 1220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
126. Id
127. Id. at 1220-21.
128. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30)(a) (2001).
129. J.C., 773 So. 2d at 1221 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30)(a)(4.) (2001)).
130. Id
131. Id. at 1222 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (2001)).
132. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
133. J.C., 773 So. 2d at 1222. For a discussion of Florida grandparent visitation law,
see Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA LREv. 91, 98-100
(2000).
134. See generally, Michael J. Dale, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, 1-38-341
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2001).
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However, under Florida law there must be other corroborative evidence of
the abuse or offense in order for the hearsay to be received in evidence.135 In
R. U. v. Department of Children & Families,136 the court recognized that the
corroborative evidence must tend "to confirm the unlawful sexual act," that
is to say, "the abuse or the offense., 137 The problem with the case at bar was
that the only evidence supporting the child's hearsay statements was other
hearsay statements made by the same child to the same therapist who
testified as to the original declarations.138 These other statements, the court
concluded, do not constitute other corroborating evidence within the
meaning of the Florida statute.1 39 The court concluded that the word "other"
refers to evidence derived from a source other than the child victim's own
statements. 4°
Florida provides by statute that a parent has a right to counsel in a
dependency proceeding.' 4 1 Despite the fact that counsel may be present and
may agree to the parents' consent to an adjudication of dependency of a
child, it is nonetheless incumbent upon the trial court to question the parent
concerning whether he or she understands the nature of the allegations
against him or her and the possible consequences of consent to the
dependency adjudication.' 42  Because the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure so require, 143 the court in LD.M. v. State'4 held that consent by
counsel alone without court colloquy with the mother on these issues was
reversible error. 145
The need to move a dependency case in order that there be timely
disposition and decision about what should happen to the child is contained146
both in Florida law and in federal funding statutes. The need to move
expeditiously was made clear in dicta in A.R. v. Department of Children &
135. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (2001).
136. 777 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
137. Id. at 1159.
138. Id. at 1160.
139. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23)(a)2.b. (2001)).
140. Id.
141. FLA. STAT. § 39.013 (2001). There is no constitutional right to counsel. See
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30-32 (1981).
142. § 39.013
143. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.325(c) (2001).
144. 779 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
145. Id. at 527.
146. Florida Adoption Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 63.012-63.235 (2001); Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1997).
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Families.147 After ruling that the evidence did not support a finding that the
mother's two children were dependent, the court explained that it was
"compelled to explicate a concern presented by this case even though our
reversal is not predicated on the point."'  The court then explained that the
record in the case contained no reason for a nearly eleven-month delay
between the commencement of the dependency hearing and its comple-
tion.' 49  Explaining that the delay was "indefensible" in light of the
fundamental nature of the interest at stake, and given that the legislature had
indicated that proceedings should be handled quickly and that the Supreme
Court had further enunciated time standards, the court concluded "[b]y
publication of this opinion, we hereby advise that delays such as those
involved in this case will not be countenanced."1 50
In K.R. v. Department of Children & Families,'15 the issue was whether
verbal arguments between parents may be sufficient to constitute neglect
within the statutory definition which would be adequate to support an
adjudication of dependency.152 The appellate court concluded that absent
evidence of injury or the risk of injury to the child, there could be no finding
of dependency. Specifically, there was no evidence of psychological
problems, which the child was experiencing, nor any deviation from normal
performance and behavior. 54 Recognizing that arguments are commonplace
and that they can be frequent and loud, verbal abuse between parents alone is
insufficient for state intervention. 
155
On the other hand, failure to protect a child from abuse may constitute
grounds for adjudication of dependency. In M.R. v. Department of Children
& Families Services,156 over a vigorous dissent, the appellate court upheld a
finding of dependency based upon a preponderance of the evidence that the
children had been abused and that the parents had failed to protect them
147. 784 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
148. Id. at 623.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 623-24.
151. 784 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
152. Id. at 598. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(43) (2001) (providing that neglect may involve
a significant impairment, an injury which may be defined as "an injury to the intellectual or
psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernable and substantial impairment in
the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior.").
153. K.R., 784 So. 2d at 598.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 783 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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from abuse. 157 The evidence was unrebutted that there had been vaginal
penetration of two children. 15 The issue before the court was whether the
father had sexually abused the children. 59 The court held that the evidence
showed that the children had been abused and that the parents had failed to
protect them even though there was no showing as to the cause of the
children's injuries. 6° Judge Jorgenson vehemently dissented stating that
"[b]y its decision today, the court established a new evidentiary standard in
dependency cases: 'if we can't figure out what happened, Dad must have
done it and Mom must have failed to stop it."" The detail of the
concurrence and the dissent demonstrate the factual difficulties that can arise
in intra family dependency proceedings.
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Florida law authorizes nine separate grounds for termination of parental
rights. 62 They include a voluntarily executed written surrender, abandon-
ment, conduct which demonstrates continuing involvement of the parent or
parents in the relationship with the child, which threatens the life, safety,
well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child irrespective
of the provision of services,163 the parent is incarcerated under certain
circumstances and for certain times subsequent to an adjudication of
dependency, the filing of a case plan, and continued abuse and neglect or
abandonment, egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or mental or
emotional health of the child or a sibling, subjection of the child to
aggravated child abuse, sexual abuse or battery or chronic abuse, commis-
sion or murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child or felonious
assault resulting in bodily injury to the child or another, and finally when
parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been involuntarily termi-
nated.'16 Several of the provisions of the Florida termination law relate to
the development and application of what is known as a "case plan." 16 A
157. Id. at 278.
158. Id. at 279.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 280.
161. M.R., 783 So. 2dat281.
162. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1) (2001).
163. Id.
164. § 39.806(1)(a).
165. § 39.601.
[Vol. 26:903
274
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss3/1
2002]
parent's failure to comply with the case plan for a period of twelve months
can result in termination of parental rights. 
166
The issue before the Third District Court of Appeal in J.M. v. Florida
Department of Children & Families167 was whether a termination of parental
rights petition was prematurely filed because the time period within which
the parents had to comply with the case plan had not passed.161 The Florida
termination statute provides for different case plan compliance time frames
dependent upon which ground for termination is alleged.1 9 Thus, for
example, if it is determined that continuing parent involvement with the
child threatens life, safety, and well-being, there is no requirement for any
particular period of time under a case plan. 17 On the other hand, a separate
section of the law provides that a petition may be filed when the child has
been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed, and the child
continues to be abused and neglected.171 Under those circumstances, there
must be a failure of the parent to substantially comply for a period of twelve
months after adjudication of the child as a dependent child. 172 This time
period begins to run after the disposition. 3 In J.M., the mother argued that
the six-month period had run.174 In fact, the petition was filed under the
section which did not contain a time frame. Under the facts of the. case, no
time frame was required although the case plan contained a six-month
period. The petition for termination of parental rights was filed eight months
later and the court therefore affirmed the termination.
175
A second case involving application of the case plan is ZJ.S. v.
Department of Children & Families. 17 The facts of the case are strange.
The case plan called for a goal of termination of parental rights and then set
forth tasks for the parent to complete which are the type of tasks required to
achieve reunification.1 77 At the same time, according to the appellate court,
no services were offered to the parent to assist in accomplishing any of the
166. § 39.806(1)(e).
167. 762 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
168. Id.
169. FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2001).
170. Id.
171. § 39.806(I)(e).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. J.M., 762 So. 2d at 1029-30.
175. Id.
176. 787 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
177. Id. at 876-77.
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tasks assigned.178  The appellate court reversed because the ground for
termination of parental rights urged by the Department was the failure to
comply with the case plan. The problem was that the section governing
compliance with the case plan deals with a situation where the case plan has
the goal of reunification.179 The Department conceded that it did not offer a
case plan with a goal of reunification with the result that it had to establish
one of the other bases for termination of parental rights. Because it only
sought to terminate parental rights on the basis of the case plan, it could not
meet the standard, and therefore the case was reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. 18
The issue of what to do when a strong bond exists between a parent and
children, but where termination of parental rights is in the child's best
interests, came before the Second District Court of Appeal in D. W. v.
Department of Children and Families.18 1 In that case the trial court upheld
the termination of parental rights, although it recognized that the children
were not likely to be adopted because of their age and special needs. The
court opined that the children's best interests would be served by continued
contact with the father as well as with the biological grandparents. The
appellate court noted that structured contact with the parent is provided by
Florida law. 8 2 The appellate court then remanded in order to allow the trial
court to obtain additional evidence prior to exercising discretion on the
question of future contact between the parent and children as well as the
right of grandparent contact, which is also protected by statute.
18 3
Because termination of parental rights involves such fundamental
interests,184 the process by which the rights are terminated is replete with
protections for the parties. In KS. ex rel. A.S. v. B.C.,185 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of termination of parental rights with
an important concurrence by Judge Sharpe. What disturbed Judge Sharpe
was that the evidence to support the finding of termination was hearsay.
Witnesses who testified lacked first hand knowledge of the facts. Two case
workers said that the parent had refused drug screenings as required by the
178. Id. at 877.
179. Id. at 878.
180. Id.
181. 763 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
182. See FLA. STAT. § 39.811(7)(b) (2001).
183. D.W.,763 So. 2d at498.
184. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 46-47.
185. 766 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
186. Id. at 1225-26 (Sharpe, J., concurring).
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case plans although one refusal had occurred before the case plans were
adopted, and neither worker was able to document any of from the case
file.18 7  Furthermore, the guardian ad litem who had recommended
termination had only seen the child with the parent once and based an
opinion that the parent acted inappropriately with the child upon observa-
tions of the mother's interactions with other children. 188 The court noted that
no hearsay objections were made below and thus the issue was not preserved
for appeal and waived.189 Significantly, in Florida termination cases,
children are not appointed counsel.19° They receive the assistance of
guardians ad litem on an ad hoc basis, and in this case the guardian testified.
Thus, the child had no lawyer. Furthermore, while parents are appointed
lawyers by statute in Florida,191 there is a cap on the amount that lawyers get
paid unless they can convince the court of the need for additional fees.' 92
The issue of whether Florida law, which requires a mandatory closure
of all hearings in termination of parental rights proceedings, violates either
the United States or the Florida Constitution was before the Supreme Court
of Florida in Natural Parents of J.B. v. Florida Department of Children &
Families Services. 93 The case was notorious, involving allegations that the
mother of the child suffered from Munchausen by Proxy Syndrome and
intentionally caused illness to the child involving many hospitalizations.'
94
Initially, at the dependency hearing stage, the parents sought closure of the
proceedings as well as a gag order to prohibit release of information, arguing
that closure was in the best interest of the child.195 The parents then changed
their position at the termination of parental rights stage claiming that the
Florida statute was unconstitutional in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16(a) of
the Florida Constitution. 96 The Court rejected all of the parents' arguments
187. Id. at 1225.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. FLA. STAT. § 39.807 (2001); see Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children
in Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769 (2001).
191. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2001).
192. § 39.0134(2).
193. 780 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2001).
194. Id. at 7.
195. Id. at 7-8.
196. Id
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and found that the statute was constitutional. 197 Judges Anstead and Pariente
dissented.
198
Discovery issues do not appear often in either dependency or
termination of parental rights appellate opinions. However, the ability to
take a deposition did come before the appeals court in S.S. v. Department of
Children & Families Services.'99 In that case, the parents were provided
with discovery, including a witness list as a result of what the court
described as continuing demands for discovery.m On the Wednesday before
a Monday trial, the Department of Children and Families Services filed an
amendment to its discovery response in which it disclosed previously
undisclosed taped statements of the parties as well as adding new witnesses,
including an expert witness.2°t On the morning of trial, the court allowed a
continuance until the early afternoon to take the deposition of the expert.20 2
When counsel for the parent, due to time constraints, only briefly spoke with
the expert, the attorney renewed a motion for a continuance, which was
denied, and the expert then testified.2 °3 Parental rights were then termi-
nated.204 On appeal, the Fourth District concluded that disclosure is required
under the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure of persons having informa-
tion relevant to the case.205 Furthermore, the court held that while the
juvenile rules do not provide for what is known as a Richardson hearing,206
based upon the Third District Court of Appeal ruling in B.M. v. Department
of Children & Families Services,0 7 if the failure to produce the material is
prejudicial, there must be a reversal. Such was the case in S.S v. Department
of Children & Family Services.20 8
Under Florida law, one of the grounds for termination of parental rights
is when parents are engaged in conduct that demonstrates that continuing
involvement of the parent threatens the life, safety, or well-being of the child
197. Id. at 11 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.467(4), renumbered by § 39.809(4)(200 1)).
198. J.B., 780 So. 2d at 12-17.
199. 784 So. 2d 479.
200. Id. at 479.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 480.
203. Id.
204. S.S., 784 So. 2d at 480.
205. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.245(b)(2)(A) (2001).
206. S.S., 784 So. 2d at 480; Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
207. 711 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
208. S.S., 784 So. 2d at 480.
[Vol. 26:903
278
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss3/1
2002]
irrespective of the provisions services. 2 9 In In re C.WW,210 the Second
District Court of Appeal, inter alia, discussed how the state may prove that
continuing involvement of a parent with a child may threaten a child's life,
211safety, or health irrespective of the provision of services. In that case, a
child was born prematurely with the presence of cocaine in its blood-
212
stream. As a result, the state filed a dependency petition and also sought a
judgment terminating parental rights. 3 The appeals court found that the
214trial court's order was not based upon the evidence in the record . It was
premised upon speculation by the trial court that the mother would fail to
215comply with the case plan which had a goal of reunification. The
appellate court held that speculation is not a valid basis for termination of
parental rights.2 6 In addition, there had to be a showing that any provision
of services would be futile or that the child would be threatened with harm
217despite the services provided to the parent. Because the trial court made
no finding and there was no evidence to support its determination,
apparently premised solely on the birth of a drug dependent child, the
218appeals court reversed. It noted further that in every reported Florida case
involving a newborn drug dependent child, there is a finding of a failed
attempt at a case plan or other evidence of abuse or neglect to support a
decision to terminate parental rights.219
V. STATUTORY CHANGES
A. Juvenile Delinquency
The legislature added language to the introductory provisions of chapter
985 providing that, among other things, it is the intent of the legislature to
preserve and strengthen a child's family ties. 220 The emotional, legal and
209. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c) (2001).
210. 788 So. 2d 1020 (FIa. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
211. Id. at 1023.
212. Id. at 1021-22.
213. Id. at 1022.
214. l at 1023.
215. In re C.W.W., 788 So. 2d at 1023.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1025.
219. Id. at 1024.
220. FLA. STAT. § 985.02(7) (2001).
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financial responsibilities of the child's caretaker shall continue while the
child is in the care of the Department of Juvenile Justice.221 Unfortunately,
with the exception of the caretaker's ongoing financial obligations, which
are enforceable against the caretaker,222 the language is simply laudatory and
thus unenforceable.
The legislature added a new paragraph to the definitional language of
chapter 985 providing for a "respite" placement for juveniles "charged with
domestic violence as an alternative to secure detention... when a shelter
bed for a child in need of services or a family in need of services... is
unavailable., 223 The legislature also amended chapter 985 to protect victims
224of youth crime while in school. When the court determines that a victim
or sibling of a victim attends or is eligible to attend the same school as the
child who committed the delinquent offense, the court may enter a no-
contact order in favor of the victim or sibling.= It may alternatively note in
its disposition order that the parents of the victim or sibling do not object to
226the offender attending the same school or riding the same bus.
The legislature passed a complicated scheme for the expunction of
nonjudicial arrest records of a minor who prior to filing the application for
expunction has never been charged with a criminal offense and who has
227successfully completed a pre-arrest diversion program. The child's parent,
or the child, if over eighteen, may file a signed application for expunction on
a form developed by the Department of Juvenile Justice, together with an
official written statement from the State Attorney certifying successful
completion of the program.Y18 The filing fee is $75.00 unless waived by the
executive director of the Department of Law Enforcement Operating Trust
Fund.229 The application must be filed within six months of successfully
completing the program. 23 Whether the parents of children who complete
the diversion can successfully complete this process remains to be seen.
In the programs operations area, the legislature has explicitly authorized
the department to contract with faith-based organizations to provide services
221. Id.
222. See § 985.02.
223. § 985.03(46).
224. § 985.23(1)(d).
225. Id.
226. §§ 985.23(4)(f) (2001), 985.23(1)(d).
227. § 943.0582.
228. § 943.0582(3).
229. § 943.0582(4).
230. § 943.0582(5).
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to children.2 3' It also provided that the Department collect and annually
report cost data for every program it operates or with which it contracts.
Included is the development of a cost effective model for each commitment
program.233 The model shall include an analysis of recidivism rates for each
provider among other kinds of evaluations. This information, if properly
collected and dissimilated, should prove helpful in analyzing dispositional
alternatives.
B. Dependency and Tennination of Parental Rights
As a probable result of legislative bargaining, the legislature introduced
a system which makes mandatory the assessment of every dependent child
eleven years of age or older who has been in licensed foster care and who
has been moved more than once for placement in a licensed residential
facility.235 The procedure, oddly, only applies in Districts Four, Eleven, and
Twelve, and in the "Suncoast Region. The Department of Children and
Families is obligated to report to the legislature every year on December 1st
about this group of children. 2 7 The underlying rationale for the amendment,
at least in part, is the need for this group of children to achieve stability and
pennanency.2 8  The entire approach is subject to the availability of
appropriations. 9 It is also unclear from both the legislative history and
discussions by this author with a legislative staff member to the Senate
Judiciary Committee whether there were any data or studies to support this
legislative initiativemu
Finally, the legislature added language governing adoptions to the
termination of parental rights post-disposition relief section of chapter 39.24
231. FLA. STAT. § 404 (2000).
232. § 985.412(3) (2001).
233. § 985.412(l)(b).
234. Id.
235. § 39.521.
236. § 39.521(5)(a).
237. See § 39.521(5)(e).
238. See § 39.521(5)(b).
239. § 39.521(5)(f).
240. For a study suggesting that foster care and therapeutic foster care are more
desirable and efficient than group/institutional care, see Richard P. Barth, Institutions vs.
Foster Homes: The Empirical Base for a Century of Action, School of Social Work,
University of North Carolina (Feb. 17, 2002).
241. § 39.812. Adoptions are generally covered in chapter 63 of the Florida Statutes.
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The new provision requires adoption petitions to be filed in the circuit in
which the termination of parental rights judgment was entered unless a
motion for a change of venue is granted. u2 The adoption petition may not be
filed until the termination of parental rights judgment becomes final 3. And
the petition must be accompanied by a form containing information about
the child's medical and social history.2 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The legislature made no expansive changes in either the juvenile justice
or child welfare systems. The appellate courts continue the process of
supervision of trial court statutory compliance with chapters 39 and 985. The
intermediate appellate courts have also continued a process of analysis of
unclear statutes. Finally, the Supreme Court of Florida, in a significant
ruling, held that termination of parental rights proceedings are not absolutely
open to the public.
245
242. § 39.812(5).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Natural Parents of J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families Services, 780 So. 2d
6 (Fla. 2001).
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Down for the Count: The Muhammad All Boxing Reform
Act and Its Shortcomings'
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I. INTRODUCTION
Though many perceive boxing as a sport, to the players,2 it is a way of
life.3 Boxing is a "story without words," yet its language is most refined.4
Boxing is the most physical and direct of any sport.5 Its objective is simple.
The goal: a knockout. 6  The threat of death inevitably exists, though its
possibility remains remote? Boxing is dangerous, harsh, and unforgiving.
8
Yet, boxing is personal.9
1. Special recognition goes to Charles E. Lomax, John S. Wirt, and Sherman W.
Smith, III for allowing the opportunity to further explore this topic. Special recognition also
goes to Michelle Killian for the helpful sources; Randall Jones for the interviews; and James
Groschel for the updates on boxing news.
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. See generally Michael Stephens, The Poetics of Boxing, in READING THE FIGHTS
259,259 (Joyce Carol Oates & Daniel Halpem eds., 1988).
4. JOYCE CAROL OATES, ON BOXING 11 (1987).
5. Id. at30.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 10.
8. ROBERT SELTZER, INSIDE BOXING 139 (Benjamin Matt ed., 2000).
9. OATES, supra note 4, at 8-9 (explaining that boxers bring "everything that is
themselves" to the fight).
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Dating back to the ancient Greeks, boxing may be the oldest sport in
existence.' Yet, despite its age, boxing has continued to operate outside any
central authority capable of enforcing minimum standards and uniform
rules.1 Prior to the 1994 Senate inquiry into professional boxing, it had been
approximately thirty years since the Senate's last boxing investiga-
tion.12 Now, thirty-seven years later, after years of minimal regulations, the
boxing world must comply with two pieces of legislation: the Professional
Boxing Safety Act of 199613 and the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act.'
4
The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act ("Ali Act"), passed in May 2000,
serves as an amendment to the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996.15
This Note illustrates the vast shortcomings of the Ali Act. Part II of
this Note discusses the individuals involved in effectuating a boxing match.
Parts III and IV examine the need for reform, and the Ali Act as its source.
This Note concludes that, although integrity may be lacking in the sport, the
Ali Act has not served the purpose of reinstating it.
]11. THE PLAYERS
A. The Boxer
Most boxers come from impoverished backgrounds.' 6 Boxing:
begins in ghettos, where life is cheap and physical well-being is at
risk in the food people eat and the absence of proper medical care
in their daily lives. It breeds in an environment where residents
carry knives and guns for protection, and fists are perceived as the
least potent of weapons.17
10. H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 8 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 329,
330.
11. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, CORRUPTION IN PROFESSIONAL
BOxING, S. REP. No. 103-408, at 28 (2d Sess. 1994).
12. Id. at 1.
13. Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. 111996).
14. Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. 11 1996),
amended by Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000).
15. See id.
16. OATES, supra note 4, at 85 (stating that about ninety-nine percent of boxers are
impoverished youths). See also THOMAS HAUSER, THE BLACK LIGHTS 9 (Univ. of Ark. Press
2000) (1986) ("Most fighters come from tough places; small beginnings where life is hard.").
17. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 13.
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To protect themselves and survive, they must know how to hurt others. 18
Some then turn it into a profession.19
The first individual necessary to effectuate a boxing match is the boxer.?
The boxer is the one entering the ring and the one placing himselfal in physical
peril. The boxer, as any other individual, is responsible for his own physical
well-being.2 He is the one physically training for the fight,23 undergoing the
medical procedures, and stepping on the scale at the weigh-in.25 When the bell
rings, he is the one in the ring, roped off from the rest of the world.26
18. Id. (statement of Michael Spinks, Montreal Olympic gold medalist and former
light heavyweight champion of the world).
19. See id.
20. Though boxers may be viewed as the most important individuals to effectuate a
boxing match, most often, the individuals not directly participating in the bout retain such
power as to make them the most important individuals to the boxing industry. See discussion
infra Part II.B-E.
21. Although many may believe boxing to be a man's sport, women have been
competing since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Jennifer Hargreaves, Bruising Peg
to Boxerobics: Gendered Boxing-Images and Meanings, in BOXER: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
WRrrINGS ON BoxiNG AND ViSuAL Cu TuRE 121, 125 (David Chandler et al. eds., 1996). See
also SELTZER, supra note 8, at 147-48 (describing Christy Martin as a "pioneer" and "the
most famous female boxer in the world").
22. See Symposium: Boxing at the Crossroads, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 193, 241
(2001) [hereinafter Symposium] ("[Tihe physical part is my responsibility.") (statement of
Evander Holyfield, Professional Boxer).
23. See SELTZER, supra note 8, at 29 ("Fighters are prisoners of their bodies, their
physiques the stone walls that trap them, that force them to fight in a certain style.").
24. 15 U.S.C. § 6304(1) (2000). See also Symposium, supra note 22, at 242 ("Every
time I fight they give me a brain scan ... .") (statement of Evander Holyfield).
25. A boxer is identified and limited by his weight class. See Interview with Randall
Jones, Production Assistant, Don King Productions, Inc., in Deerfield Beach, Fla. (July 27,
2001). Though the same pound delineations exist between the sanctioning organizations, they
are sometimes given different names. Id. For example, the World Boxing Council defines the
classes as follows: not over 105-strawweight; not over 108-ight flyweight; not over 112-
flyweight; not over 115-super flyweight; not over 118--bantamweight; not over 122-super
bantamweight; not over 126-featherweight; not over 130-super featherweight; not over
135-lightweight; not over 140-super lightweight; not over 147-welterweight; not over
154-super welterweight; not over 160-middleweight; not over 168-super middleweight;
not over 175-light heavyweight; not over 190---cruiserweight; over 190-heavyweight. Id.
See also Legislative Meeting of the Pa. State Athletic Comm'n in Ass'n with the Ass'n of
Boxing Comm'ns 202 (2000) [hereinafter Legislative Meeting] (explaining an experience in a
previous fight where the boxer did not want to get on the scale and how without which the
fight would not have taken place) (statement of Murad Muhammad, Promoter).
26. See SELTZER, supra note 8, at 9 ("Hell is not roped off. The ring is. And that may
be the only difference between the two venues.").
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The boxer is responsible for telling his comer men27 about his
suitability for the particular bout.28 Ultimately, it is the boxer who runs the
risk of falling at the hands of an opponent-of never coming out of the ring
29 30the way he entered it no more than forty-seven minutes ago.
B. The Manager, Trainer, and Cut Man
The manager is a boxer's primary business representative, representing him
and his interests in all business transactions that occur during their relationship.3'
In return for his services, the manager often retains thirty-three and one-third
percent of the boxer's purse for each bout.32 Though managers are not
particularly liked,3 they serve a vital function to the boxer. The choices the
27. See PHI. BERGER, PUNCH LINES: BERGER ON BOXING 157-58 (1993) (describing
the importance of the comer man) ("In his sixty seconds between rounds, the comer man
enforces or revises his fighter's strategy. He is the 'cut man,' doing a surgeon's work.... On
the comer man's instincts and advice, championships have been won and lost.").
28. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 241-42 ("[It's important for my comer to
know [if I am not feeling well] and it is important for the referee to know cause that's their job
to see and make observations where they should stop the fight or not.") (statement of Evander
Holyfield).
29. The longest professional men's bout is for a championship. Interview with
Randall Jones, Production Assistant, Don King Productions, Inc., in Deerfield Beach, Fla.
(July 18, 2001). It is scheduled for twelve rounds, each round consisting of three minutes,
with a one-minute rest between rounds. Id. The shortest professional men's bout is a four-
rounder. Id. Like all other men's bouts, each round consists of three minutes, with a one-
minute rest between rounds. Id. On the other hand, the longest professional women's bout,
and also for a championship, is a ten-rounder. Id. Each round consists of two minutes, with a
one-minute rest between rounds. Interview with Randall Jones, supra note 29. The shortest
bout in which a female can participate consists of four rounds, with the same time
specifications as for a ten-rounder. Id.
30. See Hugh Mcllvanney, Onward Virgin Soldier, in READING THE FIGHTS 185, 192-
94 (Joyce Carol Oates & Daniel Halpern eds., 1988) (describing the death of professional
boxer Johnny Owen after a twelfth round knockout); OATHS, supra note 4, at 89 (describing
the death of professional boxer Benny "Kid" Paret at the hands of Emile Griffith in a 1962
bout); Id. at 98 ("Between 1945 and 1985 at least three hundred seventy boxers have died in
the United States of injuries directly attributed to boxing.").
31. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 24.
32. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 213 (discussing the thirty-three and
one-third percent a manager generally takes from the purse of the boxer) (statement of Bob
Duffy).
33. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 34.
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manager makes, with and for the boxer, often direct the boxer's career.34
A good manager never places his fighter in a fight he does not think his
fighter can win. In a sport where "one or two losses can kill a fighter's
career,'' 36 managers must be cautious in choosing an opponent.3  To
maximize the effectiveness of the manager and the success of the boxer, it is
necessary that they share a good rapport.
3 8
In his capacity, the manager is responsible for selecting the boxer's
trainer.39 A boxer's trainer is crucial to his survival. ° "A great trainer is a
natural: he actually sees the moves and studies them, and he must have the
ability to convey techniques to his fighters. He must be a psychologist and a
mind reader, sometimes a father and a mother."41 Trainers must know their
fighters and their fighters' opponents.4
Physical labor is the first requirement to becoming a quality fighter. 3
The harder the boxer trains, the better he becomes." The goal of training is
to move quicker and get hit less.45 The trainer makes this possible.' Part of
being a good trainer, however, is telling the fighter at which point to stop
34. See BERGER, supra note 27, at 202 (quoting Shelley Finkel, Manager of Evander
Holyfield, as stating the manager's basic responsibility towards the boxer is the "[m]ost
money for the least risk.").
35. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 34.
36. Id. at 35.
37. Id. at 34. 'My job is to outwit people. Every fight requires that I be in there
looking for an edge. And if I can find an opponent who gives the appearance of being
formidable while posing no threat whatsoever to my fighter, that's fine." Id. (statement of
Emanuel Steward, Manager).
38. Id. ("You've got to love your fighter. Otherwise it's dangerous. You'll send him
out and get him mangled or killed.") (statement of Eddie Futch, former Manager of Joe
Frazier).
39. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 40.
40. Id.
41. ARLENE SCHULMAN, THE PRIZEFGHTERS: AN INTIMATE LOOK AT CHAMPIONS AND
CONTENDERS 33 (1994).
42. Id. at 100 ('No two fighters can do things the same way. Know their
shortcomings and their idiosyncrasies and their physical makeup. And... always make sure
you know about his opponent.") (statement of Ray Arcel, Trainer).
43. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 17.
44. See id. at 17-18. "Wasted talent is the oldest story in boxing. A fighter who
coasts in training betrays his dreams and his future." Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 29. As part of his training, a boxer often boxes with a sparring partner to
help him whet his skills. See generally BERGER, supra note 27, at 312.
46. A trainer "makes sure his fighter gets in shape. He'll be with [him] constantly.
Wakes him up in the morning. [G]oes to watch him run. Sits with him when he has breakfast.
Walks with him after breakfast. Et cetera, et cetera." BERGER, supra note 27, at 141.
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training. 7 The trainer can do everything to make his fighter the best, but
then the bell rings. Sometimes, his fighter gets hit with a devastating blow.
Yet, the trainer's responsibilities continue. The trainer must now encourage
his fighter to continue fighting.48
When the boxer retreats to his comer between rounds, it is then that the
cut man does his job.49 The cut man, like the trainer, must know the boxer.5
The cut man is as important to the fight as is the boxer.51 The cut man is
responsible for stopping the flow of blood from the fighter's face.52 He uses
tools such as cotton swabs, vaseline, and a paste-like substance to stop the
bleeding. 53 The cut man also uses Enswell54 to stop an eye from closing and
reduce the swelling.5 The fight often continues until the "third man in the
ring' '56 stops the bout or the final bell sounds.
C. The Promoter
"The promoter is one of the most erudite men in the fight game-and,,57 51
one of the shrewdest. What he is not, however, is well-liked. Much
47. Id. at 198 ("[The fighter] figures if work is good, more work is better. It's not so,
though. Sometimes you have to back off, so the fighter takes into the ring everything he's got
and doesn't leave it in the gym or on the road.") (statement of Eddie Futch, Trainer for
Riddick Bowe).
48. OATES, supra note 4, at 13.
49. See BERGER, supra note 27, at 158.
50. SCHULMAN, supra note 41, at 99 ("There is a secret to handling a fighter who is
cut and bruised.... Some fellas get a small cut and they think they're gonna bleed to death.
You have to know your fighter. Is the fighter able to handle the cut? ... The most sensitive
human beings in the world are boxers.") (statement of Ray Arcel).
51. See BERGER, supra note 27, at 141 ("Fights are lost for lack of a corner's skill in
these between-round crises.").
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Enswell is a flat, chilled iron bar that is fundamental in boxing. JACK NEwFIED,
ONLY IN AMERICA: THE LIFE AND CRIMES OF DON KING 285 (1995).
55. Id.
56. OATES, supra note 4, at 47. The "third man in the ring" is the referee---the
intermediary and the conscience of the fight. Id. He is often the only neutral and objective
observer. See id. "The referee holds the power of life and death at certain times since his
decision to terminate a fight, or to allow it to continue, can determine a boxer's fate." Id. at
48.
57. SELTZER, supra note 8, at 113. Today, women also serve as promoter to many
fighters. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 221 (statement of Jerry Izenberg introducing
Kathy Duva).
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condemnation is often cast upon the most successful promoters in the
business; however, these are the promoters for whom managers want their
fighters fighting.59
Though it may appear simple, boxing promotion entails many
intricacies. 60 In addition to matching two fighters to create a stimulating
bout, 61 promoters must be accomplished businessmen.62 The promoter must
cultivate and nurture relationships with fighters, managers, television
executives, the media, and sanctioning organizations.63 There are three
major sources of income for a promoter: the fight's live ate,64 the sale of
domestic and foreign television rights,65 and incidentals. This revenue,
however, does not necessarily mean that the promoter makes a profit.67 At
58. See HAUSER, supra note 16, at 69 (Univ. of Ark. Press 2000) (1986) (stating that,
perhaps more so than managers, "promoters are treated harshly by boxing scholars").
59. Id. at 56 ("Don King is a liar and a thief... .This guy wants all the money and all
the fighters.... If I was a fighter and needed a promotor [sic], who would I take? Don King.
The man is the best. Don King delivers.") (statement of Rich Giachetti, former Manager and
Trainer of Larry Holmes). See also BERGER, supra note 27, at 172 ("Even his most bitter
rivals credit [Don] King with the intelligence and cunning to survive in a cutthroat
business."); Boxing In and Out of the Ring (A&E television broadcast, July 22, 2001) ("Don
King is not really different from other boxing promoters. He's just better than anybody else.")
(statement of Thomas Hauser, Author and Boxing Historian).
60. See HAUSER, supra note 16, at 69.
61. Fighters are often matched by a matchmaker. See JAMES B. ROBERTS &
ALEXANDER G. SKUTr, Tim BOXING REGisTER: INTERNATiONAL BOXING HALL OF FAME
OFRCIAL RECORD BOOK 417 (1997). Matchmakers and promoters often work together to
match a fight that the public would want to see. See id. at 418.
62. See HAUSER, supra note 16, at 69.
63. Id. See also Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59 (explaining that
promoters put the fights together because they maintain relationships with the managers to
convince the fighters to fight and they work with the networks in agreeing upon a figure for
the broadcast) (statement of Ross Greenburg, President of HBO Sports).
64. Casinos generally pay the promoter a site fee to hold the fight at their arena.
HAUSER, supra note 16, at 70.
65. Often the promoters retain the revenue from their selling the domestic and foreign
television rights. See id.
66. Such incidental items include the sale of advertising on ring posts, video cassettes,
and fight programs. Id.
67. From this income, the promoter must pay the boxers' purses, other costs of the
promotion, and it's company overhead. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195
(statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, Associate General Counsel, Don King Productions, Inc.,
at p. 5).
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times, promoters sustain a loss from the promotion. 68  Nonetheless,professional boxing remains driven by money.69
D. The Sanctioning Organizations
The sanctioning organizations control championships, not lower level
boxing bouts.70  A bout must be sanctioned by one of the sanctioning
organizations before it can be considered a championship match or an
official title-elimination bout.71  The power of these "alphabet soup"
72
organizations stems from this influence. The fighters want these
organizations. 73 These organizations have the power to award the boxer a
title belt and allow him to call himself the champion. These organizations,
therefore, promulgate money for the fighters.7 They also "set their own
rules, establish their own medical and safety standards, make their own
rankings, and designate their own 'world champions.' ''76 Each sanctioning
organization is separate and distinct from the other.7 7 Further, because there
68. "Everybody thinks a promoter makes money in the first, second, third fight.
Sometimes we lose in ten just to make it on the 12th." Id. at 192 (statement of Murad
Muhammad).
69. PETER BACHO, BOXING IN BLACK AND WHITE 114 (1999). See also Symposium,
supra note 22, at 200 ("[Almateur boxing is a true sport. Professional prize fighting is a
business.") (statement of Mills Lane, Retired Boxing Referee and Retired Judge).
70. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 93.
71. See id.
72. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 250 (referring to the sanctioning organizations)
(statement of Jerry Izenberg, Sports Columnist); see also SELTZER, supra note 8, at 21
(naming some of the sanctioning organizations that sponsor championships) ('"Well ... there
is the IBF, the WBA, the WBC, the WBO, the IBO, the IBC, the WBF, the WBU, the .... ).
73. Symposium, supra note 22, at 249 (statement of Lou DiBella, Vice President of
HBO, Time Warner Sports).
74. See id. at 253 ("[Tlhe people most responsible for sustaining the meaning of those
pieces of plastic that aren't worth 20 bucks are the fighters themselves.") (statement of Lou
DiBella).
75. See id. at 256 (discussing the importance of a title belt) ("You are talking about a
guy making 17 million dollars, now because he lost for the first time in 8 years he is making 2
million dollars.... [T]hey said the belt don't make a difference but every time I get them belts
the money increased.") (statement of Evander Holyfield).
76. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 93.
77. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 217 ("There is no centralized authority in
boxing.") (statement of Max Kellerman, Boxing Broadcaster and Analyst). Though there are
many "little minor league [sanctioning organizations]," there are three major sanctioning
bodies. Id. at 206. The three major sanctioning organizations are the World Boxing
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are seventeen weight classes78 and numerous sanctioning organizations,7
there is often more than one champion for each weight class. There is not
just one world champion.80 Many credit the sanctioning organizations asbeing the "root of the problem" with boxing today.81
E. The Media
"Television revenues pay the purses. 82 The technology of television
has made boxing an even more lucrative business.83  Closed circuit
broadcasts have provided the players8 with an opportunity for a big
payday.85  Pay-per-view buys increase the possible number of viewers,
thereby increasing the profit margin of the event.86 The biggest payday in
boxing history was Holyfield/Tyson II, which has now become known as the
87infamous ear-biting fight. This event purportedly grossed over one
hundred million dollars, domestically, in one night on pay-per-view.8
Today, networks such as Home Box Office ("HBO") negotiate with
fighters for multi-fight deals-deals for a certain amount of years and a
Association (WBA), the World Boxing Council (WBC), and the International Boxing
Federation (IBF). See id. at 221.
78. See supra text accompanying note 25.
79. See discussion supra, note 77.
80. See SELTZER, supra note 8, at 21 ("[here are almost as many world champions
as there are fans to pay for their fights."); see also SCHULMAN, supra note 41, at 77 ("[I]nstead
of one World Series or one Super Bowl, there are several. And for each middleweight who
declares himself champion after his bout, there are four more sitting in the audience.").
81. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 200 (statement of Mills Lane, Retired Boxing
Referee and Retired Judge); see also statement of Jerry Izenberg (describing the presidents of
the three major sanctioning bodies). Id. at 206. "The major problem as I see it is the problem
raised by both Mills Lane and Jerry Izenberg and that is the sanctioning organizations. Quite
frankly they have to go. They are not honest. They are not fair. They are not moral." Id. at
209 (statement of Amos C. Saunders, Retired Presiding Judge). "[W]e are in this room and
everybody here has just about said that the sanctioning organizations are the problem." Id. at
222 (statement of Kathy Duva, Promoter).
82. SCHULtMAN, supra note 41, at 77. "Television represents money." Id.
83. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59. Television makes the money. Id.
(statement by Ron Scott Thomas, Matchmaker, Cedric Kushner Productions).
84. See discussion supra Part II.A-D.
85. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
86. Id.
87. Id. This Evander Holyfield and Mike Tyson rematch took place on June 28, 1997.
Interview with Randall Jones, supra note 29.
88. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
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certain number of fights.89 Networks, however, like to advertise fights as
"championships." 9 This makes the fights more appealing to the public and
generates more revenue.91 For a fight to be considered a championship,
however, it must be sanctioned by a sanctioning organization. 92 Sanctioning
organizations work with promoters to sanction the bout, the promoters with
the managers, and the managers with the fighters.93 One can see how each
player is vital to the success of the industry. One can also see how simple it
could be to corrupt the entire sport.94
This "commercialised [sic] system" has undoubtedly increased the
profit potential for boxers.95 However, it has also "severed [boxing's]
connection with a grass-roots culture in which its higher aspirations were
bred.
'29 6
F. The Fan
To the untrained viewer, most boxing matches appear savage.97 Though
spectators often see the courage, the skill goes undetected.98  As the
spectator becomes a fan, however, the design is unraveled. 99 Though a
"casual viewer will only react to the most obvious action, such as a
knockdown or a knockout," the true fan discerns the "careful steps the
winning boxer took to reach that point.''t° Just as in any other sport, a
boxing spectator often thinks that with proper training, he, too, could
become a professional boxer.101 To be a quality fighter, however, one must
have physical attributes, such as agility, timing, power, speed, and
89. Id. (statement of Ross Greenburg).
90. Id. (statement of Thomas Hauser).
91. See id.
92. See discussion supra Part II.D.
93. See discussion supra Part II.B-D.
94. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59 ("It only takes one person to corrupt
the whole system because then the others have to pay just to keep the playing field level.")
(statement of Doug Beavers, Former IBF Ratings Committee Chairman).
95. David Chandler, Introduction: The Pictures of Boxing, in BOXER: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS ON BOXING AND VISUAL CULTURE 13, 17 (David Chandler et al. eds.,
1996).
96. Id. See also ROBERTS, supra note 61, at 410 ("No other sport can so justifiably
blame television for a period of serious decline .....
97. OATES, supra note 4, at 100.
98. BACHO, supra note 69, at 111.
99. See OATES, supra note 4, at 100.
100. BACHO, supra note 69, at 111.
101. See HAUSER, supra note 16, at 12.
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endurance, "far beyond those of ordinary men."102 To the true fan and the
players, boxing "is more than a sport. It's a skill."' 0 3
I. THE NEED FOR REFORM
Professional prize fighting does not advance the "safety first" attitude
as amateur boxing does.'04 Professional boxing stresses heavy hitting.
105
There is no head gear, and smaller gloves are used, as compared to amateur
boxing. 0 6 Further, the regulation of boxing is left to the individual states.
10 7
In response to the safety issues prevalent within the boxing industry, the
Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 was passed. °8
Although the boxers now had some form of protection within the ring,
protection outside of the ring was a different story.1°9 Corruption in boxing
is an old story.' 10 It is the easiest sport to fix."' It only takes one bribe.'
2
In the past, boxing has been associated with organized crime. Some still
question its prevalence within the sport."
4
Though boxing is a multi-million dollar business, the money is often
divided between those outside the ring.115 "Anything seems to go in a
business in which larceny is sometimes mistaken for charm, and cheating for
cleverness ... [p]eople who should be in jail are looked upon as characters
instead of the scum they really are."'
16
102. Id. at 12-13.
103. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 12 (quoting Sugar Ray Leonard, former Professional
Boxer).
104. BACHO, supra note 69, at 113.
105. Id. at 114.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See generally Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II
1996).
109. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 57 ("The most insidious and dangerous enemies of
boxing have not been foes from without, but the terrible breakers-down on the inside. The
most serious threats to boxing always have come from within.") (statement of Nat Fleisher,
Publisher and Boxing Scholar).
110. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 58.
116. Id. at 57-58 (quoting Michael Katz, writer for the New York Times).
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Sanctioning organizations often endure much of the criticism'"7 because
they control the ratings." 8 In the past, The Ring magazine dictated the
ratings." 9  When its ratings became corrupted, however, sanctioning
organizations took over.im It was not long before those ratings became
corrupted also.1
Ratings are important because they dictate the value of the
fighter.122 The higher ranked he is, the more valuable to the industry-and
himself.123 Further, if a boxer is ranked within the top fifteen, he can fight
for the championship. 12 The problem arises because often, "ratings are for
sale."' 25 Just as often, however, promoters are buying. 26
Doug Beavers, former International Boxing Federation ("IBF') Ratings
Committee Chairman, served in more than one capacity. 27 He also served as
the "bagman" 128 for the organization. 29  When the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI') investigated the IBF a few years ago, they arrived at
Mr. Beavers' house to question him. 30 To their arrival, he responded,
"What took you so long?"' 1
Undoubtedly, the ratings are questionable, at best. In a sport where
the object is to knockout the opponent, it is always best "to heed the
referee's warning-'protect yourself at all times.'
1 33
117. See discussion supra Part II.D and note 81.
118. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
119. Id.
120. Id. (statement of Thomas Hauser).
121. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (statement of Jack Newfield, Boxing Historian).
126. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59 ("If their selling influence, he's
buying.") (statement of Jack Newfield about Cedric Kushner, Boxing Promoter).
127. See id.
128. "Bagman" is often the term used for an individual accepting bribes. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59. Mr. Beavers continued to explain
that, "It was like extortion. If you want to survive in the IBF, you gotta pay." Id.
132. Many often believe fights to be fixed. However, more often, it is not the fights
that are fixed-it is the ratings. Id.
133. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 57.
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IV. THE MUHAMMAD ALl BOXING REFORM ACT13
4
Four years after the passage of the Professional Boxing Safety Act of
1996, the Ali Act was passed. 35 Congress made several findings relative to
safety outside of the ring. 136 Congress found that: 1) boxing lacks a central
governing body; 2) state regulation is proper; 3) promoters can take
advantage of the industry by engaging in business with states having weaker
regulations; 4) rankings are susceptible to corruption; 5) common practices
of promoters and sanctioning organizations constitute restraints on trade; and
6) it is necessary to establish reform.1 37  In response to such findings,
Congress passed the Ali Act to protect professional boxers, assist boxing
commissions in providing oversight, and promote honorable competition.
The goal of any legislation directed towards boxing should be the health and
safety of its participants. 39 This is undisputed. However, this legislation,
though meritorious, is misdirected. The Ali Act is not without its strengths,
however.
A. The Strengths
The Ali Act is an effort to establish and enforce regulations to protect
the boxers and public interest.14° It is an effort to regulate boxing because
boxing "can't regulate itself."14 ' This law was intended to provide boxers
with greater control over their careers. 42 Through several provisions of the
Ali Act, boxers are economically protected.
134. Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. 11 1996),
amended by Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000).
135. The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act was passed on May 26, 2000. 15 U.S.C.
§6301 (2000).
136. H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 2 (1999).
137. Id.
138. H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 2 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 329,
329.
139. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 208 (statement of Amos C. Saunders).
140. See id. (statement of Paul Feeney, representative of Senator John McCain and co-
drafter of the Ali Act).
141. Id. at 214. ("Can boxing regulate itself? No, boxing can't regulate itself because
there are too many people right now who are benefiting from the system as it presently
exists.") (statement of Lou DiBella).
142. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 46.
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Section 7b of the Ali Act provides boxers with protection from coercive
contracts.143 This provision is intended to protect boxers from being forced
into long-term contracts as a condition to their being granted a fight.'"4 If
Boxer A, who is under a promotional contract with Promoter C, would like
to fight Boxer B, who is under a promotional contract with Promoter D,
145Promoter C can only ask for options up to twelve months on Boxer B in
the event that his boxer, Boxer A, loses.146 This would entitle Promoter C to
twelve months of promoting Boxer B, the winner of the bout. This provision
also provides that in the last three months of this twelve-month option,
Boxer B and Promoter C can freely negotiate for an extended promotional
contract or end their relationship. 147
However, this provision only applies if the boxer and promoter are
already under contract with each other for the particular bout.148 If, for
example, a promoter would like to set up a bout for a boxer in whom he
currently has no promotional interest, he can contract with the boxer for
more than the twelve-month period. 149 This provision prevents promoters
from coercing boxers into entering extended contracts to be granted fights. " °
If, however, the bout is a mandatory' 5' bout, the twelve-month option would
not apply.152 If one is the mandatory contender, he has earned his right to the
title fight and, therefore, will not be required to grant any future promotional
rights in exchange for the opportunity to the bout.153
143. 15 U.S.C. § 6307b (2000).
144. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 8 (statement of Paul Feeney). This does
not apply to boxer-manager contracts, however. Id. at 21 (statement of Greg Sirb, President of
the Association of Boxing Commissions).
145. "Options" refer to the granting of certain rights to a promoter as a condition
precedent to the boxer's participation in a bout with another boxer who is under a contract
with another promoter. See 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(a)(1)(A)(ii). In this example, the granting to
Promoter C of promotional rights over Boxer B.
146. Id. See also Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 21 (statement of Greg Sirb).
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(a)(3).
148. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 58 (statement of Greg Sirb).
149. See id. at 23 (statement of Greg Sirb).
150. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 630Th.
151. Mandatory bouts are defined by the sanctioning organizations. See § 6307b(b).
Mandatory bouts generally refer to bouts between the champion and the individual ranked
number two in the organization's ratings. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 24. The
number two ranked individual is also referred to as the number one contender. Id. at 30
(statement of Paul Feeney).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(b).
153. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 24.
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Section 7c of the Ali Act is also beneficial to the boxing indus-
try. Section 7c addresses the sanctioning organizations and the ratings
criteria. 54 It provides, in part, that a sanctioning organization not be entitled
to compensation:
until, with respect to a change in the rating of a boxer previously
rated by such organization in the top 10 boxers, the organization-
(1) posts a copy, within 7 days of such change, on its Internet
website or home page, if any, including an explanation of
such change, for a period of not less than 30 days; and
(2) provides a copy of the rating change and explanation to an
association to which at least a majority of the State boxing
commissions belong. 55
Section 7c provides that the boxers and the boxing industry 6be provided with
an explanation for a boxer's rise or fall in the ratings. This provision
makes it more difficult for the ratings system to be arbitrary. This section
also provides the boxers with an opportunity to appeal the ratings change.1
57
The boxer can submit a request to the sanctioning organization, to which the
sanctioning organization must provide the boxer with a written explanation
of the criteria used in evaluating him and the rationale for the change.
158
Sections 7b and 7c are undoubtedly beneficial to the boxers and the
boxing industry. However, these sections also have shortcomings. Section
7b does not make it illegal to enter into such contracts.15 9 Rather, it makes
the contract unenforceable.16 The contract can be entered into; however, if
the fighter later brings suit, the contract cannot be enforced against him. 61
This section, therefore, presupposes that the fighter will actually bring suit.
Further, under section 9, the fighter can bring a civil cause of action to
recover economic injury he suffers. 62  In a sport where "[a
PRIZEFIGHTER'S] life is a short one"163 a boxer may not want to endure
154. 15 U.S.C. § 6307c (2000).
155. § 6307c(c).
156. Id.
157. § 6307c(b).
158. § 6307c(b)(1)-(2).
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 6307b (2000).
160. Id.
161. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 26 (statement of Robert Gordon, co-drafter
of the Ali Act).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 6309(d) (2000).
163. SCHULMA, supra note 41, at 119.
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protracted litigation. He may, logically, remain under the coercive contract
so that he is at least guaranteed a certain number of bouts per year and,
therefore, a steady income.
Section 7c also has shortcomings. This section only applies to the
boxers "previously rated by such organization in the top 10.. . ."164 What
happens to the boxer ranked eleventh? Although he is still entitled to the
appeals process, he is not guaranteed notification of the change in his
ranking under the Ali Act. Boxers ranked in the top ten are worth more
money than those in the lower rankings. This is undisputed. However, the
Ali Act is not affording all boxers the same opportunities and protections.
The Ali Act is not protecting the boxers who need it most.
65
B. The Weaknesses
"[P]eople that know nothing about the sport of boxing.., now want[]
to change the tradition of the sport overnight. And that is not going to
happen."' 66 It is quite possible that the drafters of the Ali Act do not
understand the complexity involved in effectuating a boxing
match.167 Further, though one of the purposes is to protect the rights and
welfare of professional boxers,16 the boxers in need of the most protection
are not being protected by this legislation.
Section 8 of the Ali Act addresses the conflicts of interest within the
industry. 69 The Ali Act, in amending the Professional Boxing Safety Act of
1996, now provides for a "firewall" between promoters and managers.170
This firewall prevents a promoter and a manager from having financial
interest, direct or indirect, in the other's operations.17' This provision
appears to eliminate any conflict of interest between a promoter and manager
that may be prevalent within the industry. However, an exception exists.
This firewall "only applies to boxers participating in a boxing match of
10 rounds or more."'' 72 If a boxer is participating in a ten-round match, he is,
in all probability, already established within the industry. Further, if a boxer
164. 15 U.S.C. § 6307c(c).
165. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
166. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 35 (statement of Murad Muhammad).
167. Id. at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at p. 1).
168. See H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 2 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N.
329, 329.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 6308 (2000).
170. § 6308(b).
171. § 6308(b)(1).
172. § 6308(b)(2)(B).
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is participating in a match that is more than ten rounds, he is fighting in a
twelve-round bout-a championship bout. 73  These bouts are often
televised.1 74 "If [the boxer] is on pay-per-view, [he has] reached fame, and
with that you don't need protection. ,17P It is the boxers participating in the
four-round bouts that are in need of protection. However, the exception to
this provision effectively eliminates any such protection for the four-
rounder. A promoter is permitted to have a direct financial interest in the
management of a boxer who is participating in any bout with fewer than ten
rounds. This conflict of interest affects the purse the boxer ultimately
receives because the promoter and manager may be working together, when
they should be on opposite sides of the bargaining table. 76 The Committee
on Commerce rationalizes this exception by asserting that boxers participat-
ing in bouts with fewer than ten rounds cannot afford to have a separate
promoter and manager. 177 Therefore, the firewall provision would not apply.
Congress could have enacted a provision that would provide for an exception
in cases where an individual serves in both capacities to the boxer. Congress
has provided for an exception in cases where the boxer acts as his own
promoter or manager. Why not enact such exception where the promoter
is the manager? Nonetheless, Congress enacted a provision that eliminates
all boxers participating in under ten rounds of boxing from this firewall
protection. Consequently, this provision of the Ali Act only affects about
two percent of all fighters. 79 Further, the fighters to whom the protection
extends are world famous and affluent.1
80
This section also prohibits the promoter from paying for airline tickets
and hotel accommodations for the manager, although such compensation is
provided in connection with negotiations or the actual event-a practice that
is common in the boxing industry.18 1 Such accommodations are now deemed
indirect compensation, and illegal. Additionally, the fighter's manager
cannot serve as a commentator on the promoter's telecast, even though the
173. See supra note 29.
174. See supra Part II.E.
175. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59 (statement of Jack Newfield).
176. See supra Part II.B, C.
177. H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 16 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 329,
339.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 6308(b)(2)(A).
179. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 255 (statement of Marc Ratner, Executive
Director of the Nevada Athletic Commission).
180. See id.
181. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith,
III, at p. 9).
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promoter may be paying the fair market value for his services. 182 To do so,
would be to receive compensation from the promoter other than the
consideration due under the manager's contract with the boxer. 1 3 The Ali
Act makes such commentating illegal, thus prohibiting the manager from
being employed by a promoter, except as permitted under the manager's
contract with a boxer. The Ali Act is, therefore, limiting the right to contract
between the manager and promoter.
With the passage of the Ali Act, several other demands have been
placed upon promoters. Promoters are now required to disclose information
to the boxing commissions and boxers before they may be entitled to
compensation. 8 4 This requirement does not take into account the industry
standards.185 Section 7e of the Ali Act provides that, before he is to receive
any compensation, the promoter must provide the boxer with: 1) the amount
of any compensation the promoter has contracted to receive from the match;
2) all fees assessed against the boxer's purse; and 3) any reduction in the
boxer's purse contrary to previous contracts. 86 These requirements are
impossible to meet. Promoters seldom know, in advance, how much they
will receive from a match. 18 7 The revenue depends greatly upon the live
gate, the pay-per-view buys, and the closed circuit distribution.'88
Sometimes, these figures are not known until months after the event. 89
Also, promoters may have long-term distribution agreements with
foreign broadcasters.19 These agreements provide that payments are made
in fixed installments for a number of events to take place over a set period of
time.1 9' Therefore, a promoter receives income for events before they even
take place. In some instances, he receives income before he knows who
182. See id.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 6308(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).
184. § 6307e(a)-(b) (2000).
185. See generally Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman
W. Smith, III, at pp. 2-9).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 6307e(b).
187. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith,
III, at p. 2).
188. See supra Part II.C.
189. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at
pp. 2-3).
190. Id. (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at p. 3).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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will be fighting.193 If the Ali Act were strictly construed, these agreements
would not be permitted.
Furthermore, in many instances, promoters receive advances, site fees,
and letters of credit before the event takes place.194 These are necessary to
financially effectuate the event. However, under the Ali Act, these practices
are not permitted. Also, promoters do not always know who the undercard
boxers 195 are going to be until the weigh-in.196 This lack of knowledge is due
to injuries and replacements that continuously occur up until the day before
the event. 197 The Ali Act does not take the industry standards into account.
If the Ali Act were to be strictly construed, most boxing matches could not
occur.
The Ali Act does more than harm promoters, however. It also harms
boxers. 98 Boxers who come from impoverished backgrounds 99 have not
seen the money to which they are being exposed in the boxing world. 2
Disclosing the gross income promoters receive to boxers, hurts the boxer by
presenting them with a misleading impression.2°' The promoter assumes the
risk of a promotion.m 2 Sometimes the promotion earns a profit, sometimes it
sustains a loss.203 If the promoter makes a profit, it should be considered
"compensat[ion] for assuming that risk."'
Further, in disclosing to boxers the amount of revenue the promoter
receives, the boxers are not being informed of the expenses the promoter
must pay. m5 For example, from the revenue, the promoter must pay the
opponent's purse, the undercard boxers' purses, and other such expenses
193. Id.
194. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at
p.3).
195. "Undercard boxers" refer to the boxers not participating in the main event. See
id. Generally, an event consists of numerous bouts, including the main event. See id.
196. Id. (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at p. 4).
197. Id.
198. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 35 ("ITihis law, that has been written, is
hurting the boxer. It is not helping them. It is hurting them-hurting them tremendously.")
(statement of Murad Muhammad).
199. See supra Part l.A.
200. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 38 (statement of Murad Muhammad).
201. See id. at 195 (statement of Ron Stevens, Matchmaker, Cedric Kushner
Promotions).
202. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at
p. 5).
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. Id.
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206
associated with a promotion, including the promoter's overhead. In seeing
a promoter's gross revenue, boxers get a false sense of their true worth.2°7
They begin to believe that they have greater leverage than they actually
do. 208 This false sense of leverage could compromise the entire event.209
Because the disclosures only mandate the disclosure of income, the
provision is "meaningless.... Net receipts might mean something, but gross
receipts [are] totally meaningless. '21°
The Ali Act provides that the promoter must make these disclosures to
all the boxers he is promoting.21' If the promoter, in addition to a main event
fighter, has a contract with an undercard boxer, he must make the disclosures
to him also. The undercard boxer, however, is not as responsible for most of
the revenue the promoter receives. Most of the generated revenue is due to
the main event fight, not the undercard.21 2 Yet, the boxer does not see this.
He only sees the gross receipts for the entire event. Moreover, boxers and
promoters have adverse interests and bargain for the best possible contract.
Seldom are business adversaries entitled to opposition's financial informa-
tion. The boxer, therefore, should not be entitled to the promoter's revenue.
In addition to promoters making disclosures to boxers, they must also
213
make disclosures to the boxing commissions. To the boxing commissions,
promoters must disclose "all payments, gifts, or benefits the promoter is
providing to any sanctioning organization .... ,2 4  When organizing an
event, the promoter often contracts with the venue for complimentary rooms
and food for the fighters and sanctioning organizations. Before the event
206. Id.
207. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (explaining the boxer's
misperception when a promoter discloses his revenue) ("[T]he fighter is going to
say... hey... [y]ou are making $10 million. I deserve [$]50,000 here, not [$]5,000.")
(statement of Ron Stevens).
208. Id. at 157.
209. Id. ("[W]e would have... major trouble because you don't understand these
athletes .... [I]f they ever see the kind of money... grossed in a fight, I guarantee
you... that when that fighter reads that, I am not fighting.") (statement of Murad
Muhammad).
210. Id. at 151 (statement of Patrick English, Attorney for Main Events).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 6307e(b) (2000).
212. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 174 ("[T]he problem comes when.., we
are getting $6 million for... this fight. It is not coming from that four-round fight. It is
coming from the main event.") (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III).
213. 15 U.S.C. § 6307e(a).
214. § 6307e(a)(3)(B).
215. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at
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can take place, however, the promoter must disclose these figures to the
boxing commission. At that time, the promoter does not know the value of
the food or the value of the hotel room in which the member of the
sanctioning organization will be staying.1 6 Therefore, in practice, this
provision of the Ali Act could effectively prevent the event from occurring.
Promoters must also disclose a copy of any agreement a promoter has
217
with any boxer participating in the event. In common practice, many
agreements exist between a boxer and promoter.1 8 Promoters often have
merchandising agreements, personal management agreements, and several.... 219
expired bout agreements from which rights still extend. Under the Ali
Act, promoters must file all of these agreements with the Association of
Boxing Commissions ("ABC"). This provision is very broad. It is possible
that a promoter have twenty contracts for one boxer. 2o Although most of
these contracts have no relationship to the fight in question, if there are
rights extending from the contract, the promoter must disclose it.22' In
common practice, agreements may grant the boxer clip rights for his
22 223fights. 2 Though these rights are of de minimis value, the entire contract
must be disclosed to the ABC because rights still extend from it. This
requirement is extremely burdensome and bears no relationship to the
current boxing event.
With all the disclosures mandated, it appeared as if promoters were
opening their "entire books to the world."224 To counteract this fear, the Ali
Act also includes a confidentiality provision.225 This provision provides that
disclosures made under section 7e shall not be disclosed to the public
"except to the extent required in a legal, administrative, or judicial
proceeding." 22 Because some state law provides that information be made
public, the Ali Act provides an alternative. Section 7g provides that if state
law allows the information to be furnished to the public, the promoter can
216. Id. (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at p. 8).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 6307e(a)(1).
218. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 231.
219. Id. (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III).
220. Id. at 232 (statement of Patrick English).
221. Id. at 234.
222. Id.
223. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 234.
224. Id. at 180 (explaining his fear that the world would learn how the business is
done) (statement of Murad Muhammad).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 6307g (2000).
226. Id.
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choose to file the disclosures with the ABC.22 7  When perusing the
enforcement provision,22 however, it becomes evident that penalties are
provided for the violation of several sections, not including section 7e.
Therefore, the boxing commission can say they will keep the disclosures
confidential, but if they do not, they suffer no penalty. The ABC, however,
is under no requirement to make the disclosures public. 229 They can make
their own regulations 2'0 Therefore, promoters will undoubtedly file the
disclosures with the ABC.231  Consequently, the provision allowing the
promoters to file the disclosures with the state is superfluous.
The enforcement provision is also deficient of any foundation. Section
9 provides that the Attorney General of the United States may bring a civil
action against any individual who is reasonably believed to be in violation of
any provision of the Ali Act.2 2 An injunction may be granted to prevent the
233individual from continuing to engage in such activity. Further, if a
manager, promoter, matchmaker, or licensee violates any provision, he will
be fined not more than $20,000 and/or be imprisoned for not more than one
year.234 Though one year is an extensive period of time, a $20,000 maximum
fine may not discourage the affluent manager. It may be more beneficial to
him to take the risk of violating the Ali Act, than it may be for him to
conform.
However, section 9(b)(2) provides for harsher penalties.23 5  Upon
236conviction, any individual who violates certain provisions of the Ali Act
shall be:
imprisoned for not more than 1 year or fined not more than-
(A) $100,000; and
227. § 6307g(b).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 6309 (2000).
229. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 182 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 190 ("[A]s it stands, as the law is today-today-simply file it with the
ABC.") (statement of Buddy Embanato, Treasurer of the ABC).
232. 15 U.S.C. § 6309(a).
233. Id.
234. § 6309(b)(1).
235. See § 6309(b)(2).
236. These sections are: Protection from Coercive Contracts; Sanctioning
Organizations; Required Disclosures to State Boxing Commissions by Sanctioning
Organizations; Required Disclosures for Promoters; Required Disclosures for Judges and
Referees; and Judges and Referees. See 15 U.S.C. § 6309(b)(2). These penalties, however,
do not apply to Confidentiality or Conflict of Interest. See id.
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(B) if a violation occurs in connection with a professional
boxing match the gross revenues for which exceed
$2,000,000, an additional amount which bears the same ra-
tion to $100,000 as the amount of such revenues compared
to $2,000,000, or both.z 7
These criminal sanctions will mostly impact sanctioning organizations and
promotersY s Then, too, if one is found to have violated the conflict of
interest provision, he will be fined not more than $20,000 and/or imprisoned
for not more than one year.2 9 Boxers, if found to be in violation of any
provision, will be fined not more than $1000.m Though the boxer should be
responsible for himself, he is subject to the least fines.24
Section 9 also provides for civil sanctions. Under this enforcement
provision, a boxer can bring a civil cause of action if he has suffered
economic injury as a result of the violation of the Ali Act.242 States can also
bring a civil action on behalf of its residents to enjoin the match, enforce the
provisions of the Ali Act, obtain fines, or obtain other such relief the court
may deem necessary. z 3  This provision, however, also provides that
"[n]othing in this chapter authorizes the enforcement of any provision of this
chapter against the Federal Trade Commission, the United States Attorney
General, or the chief legal officer.., for.., acting or failing to act in an
official capacity."24  This exception effectively limits the reach of the Ali
Act on these individuals. Although it provides them with immunity from
prosecution for acting in their official capacity, it also provides them with
immunity for failing to act in their official capacity. They are denied the
incentive to comply with the letter of the law. If the chief legal officer of a
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. § 6309(b)(3). This provision only provides for such penalties against "[any
member or employee of a boxing commission, any person who administers or enforces State
boxing laws, and any member of the [ABC]..." because it was originally part of the
Professional Boxing and Safety Act of 1996. See § 6309(b)(2) (Supp. 111996). It, therefore,
does not provide criminal penalties if one violates the firewall provision because the firewall
provision was added as part of the Ali Act and no criminal sanction sections were added to
reflect the firewall addition. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 6309 (2000).
240. § 6309(b)(4).
241. "mhe fighter has to be responsible for himself cause we have brains, we think
for ourselves. Everybody always wants to point a finger at one person.... You can't only get
one person." Symposium, supra note 22, at 241 (statement of Evander Holyfield).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 6309(d).
243. § 6309(c).
244. § 6309(e)(1).
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state knows of a violation and does not inform the proper authorities, he is
under no threat of legal prosecution. He may opt to remain silent. This is
legal.
Lastly, the Ali Act raises concern for American promoters. 245 Because
boxing is an international sport, foreign promoters are common in the
business.246 However, they are not subject to the provisions of the Ali Act-
a United States law. The Ali Act, therefore, may place American promoters
at a disadvantage because foreign promoters will not be prohibited from
entering into certain financial arrangements that American promoters are
prohibited from entering.247 This legislation may, in effect, encourage
boxers or American promoters to do business abroad.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ali Act, though meritorious, provides boxers with little financial
protection. This legislation does not protect boxers as much as it provides
consequences for promoters.249 Furthermore, the boxers that the legislation
does reach are not the ones in need of the most protection. Rather, the Ali
Act protects the boxers that have already reached a level of success within
the profession. This legislation is premature and has not been carefully
considered.250 The Ali Act, in its hasty enactment, takes into account neither
the industry standards, nor the complexity involved in effectuating a boxing
match.
245. See H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 29 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N.
329, 351 (statement of Edolphus Towns & Bobby L. Rush).
246. See id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 235-36 (discussing the disclosure
provisions) ("[W]hat about managers who have contracts with fighters and a contract with the
network the fighter don't know nothing about? Now, how do [sic] the fighter gets [sic]
protected by that?") (statement of Murad Muhammad). Under the Ali Act, managers do not
have to disclose agreements to the fighters. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313 (2000).
The disclosure provisions only apply to sanctioning organizations, promoters, and judges and
referees. See §§ 6307d-6307f.
250. Paul Feeney, co-drafter of the Ali Act, acknowledged that he "would not be
surprised if [the disclosure provisions were] changed next year." Legislative Meeting, supra
note 25, at 148. Larry Hazzard, of the New Jersey Commission, also acknowledged that he
thought "we should go back now to the drawing board. . ." Id. at 248.
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Though this legislation does little more than impede the business of
promoters,25 one thing is certain-boxing will prevail.
Cristina E. Groschel
251. Id. at 52 ("My experience tells me... that if the new rules significantly curtail a
promoter's ability to make money, there will be no incentive to promote boxing.") (statement
of Ron Stevens).
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Presidential Election of 2000 brought international attention to the
means by which votes in Florida are counted in each election. Florida is
comprised of sixty-seven counties, each of which has a canvassing board
having the responsibility to certify the election results for its own county.
* Broward County Court Judge; Adjunct Professor, Florida Metropolitan
University; B.A., Jacksonville University; J.D., with honors, University of Florida.
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Although subject to much reviling' during the Florida Recount2 process, the
canvassing board system has been around in some form since the Florida
territorial era more than 170 years ago.
During the 2001 legislative session, the Florida Legislature passed
substantial legislation in an attempt to remedy the problems that came to
light during the Florida Recount. Notwithstanding the scorn earlier heaped
on the heads of the canvassers, the legislature did not touch the existing
county canvassing board structure. The purpose of this article is to set forth
the historical development of the Florida canvassing system; to summarize
the pertinent law as it existed on the eve of the Presidential Election of 2000;
to explain changes made to this law by the Florida Election Reform Act of
2001; and to provide a summary of the current chronological procedure for
the canvassing of returns by a county canvassing board.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The state's election canvassing system was not put into place at one
time or by one piece of legislation. Rather, the system has grown and
changed as experience revealed the need to address a particular area or
dispute. Legislative in nature, the canvassing scheme has also been subject in
much part to the political winds prevailing in the various Florida legislative
bodies, including: the Territorial Legislative Council, the early statehood
General Assembly, and the current State Legislature.
A. Territorial Days
The beginnings of the canvassing board system are seen in the earliest
laws of territorial Florida. Florida became a United States territory in 1821. 3
Several months thereafter, the United States Congress authorized the
1. See, e.g., Tom Collins, Bar Talk, MIAMI DAILY BUswSS REvIEw, Feb. 2, 2001, at
C1 (discussing criticism of canvassing boards that the recent "manual recount was politically
motivated"); Bob Drogin, Task Force Urges Stronger Federal Role in Elections, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 10, 2001, at 3A (referring to "Florida's nightmarish 2000
presidential election and ballot recount"); Letter from Mrs. Roger Jones to Judge Robert W.
Lee (Jan. 2, 2001) (on file with author) (from a concerned citizen arguing that the recount
should not have proceeded).
2. For ease of reference, the term "Florida Recount" shall be used in this article to
refer to the process by which presidential ballots in Florida were subject to review and recount
in the aftermath of the 2000 presidential election.
3. TiE NEw HISTORY OF FLORIDA 207 (Michael Gannon, ed., 1996) [hereinafter
GANNON].
[Vol. 26:851
310
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss3/1
2002]
territory to send a nonvoting delegate to Washington.4 As part of the
legislation providing for the election of the delegate, Congress further
provided a judicial process for the fledgling territory to handle any dispute
concerning this election.5 Thus began the historical involvement of the
Florida judiciary in election disputes.
In 1822, Florida justices of the peace were given the jurisdiction to
investigate any election contest concerning Florida's territorial delegate to
Congress. The justices of the peace would gather testimony to be compiled
and then transmitted directly to the Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives for Washington's disposition.6  One year later, the
Legislative Council, as the Florida Legislative body was called at that time,
provided that county judges were required to appoint "judges of the
election" who would review the ballots and certify the winner of the
territory-wide election of the Congressional delegate.7 These persons were
later referred to as "inspectors of election."
8
When the members of the Legislative Council became subject to
election, county judges saw their involvement increase as they were the
parties who decided where polling places would be located for the elections
of both the Council Members as well as the United States Delegate.9
However, justices of the peace, rather than county judges, presided over any
contest involving the election of a member of the Legislative Council, with
the testimony transmitted to the President of the Legislative Council for
action.10
In 1831, the Florida Legislative Council passed three relevant laws
regarding municipal elections: An Act to Incorporate the Town of
4. Id. at 211.
5. Id.
6. Act of Aug. 12, 1822, 1822 Fla. Territory Laws 9 (providing for the election of a
delegate to Congress).
7. Act of July 3, 1823, 1823 Fla. Territory Laws 91 (providing for the election of a
delegate to Congress).
8. Act of Nov. 22, 1828, 1828 Fla. Territory Laws 254 (concerning the election of
members of the legislative council of the Territory of Florida).
9. Act of Jan. 11, 1827, 1826-27 Fla. Territory Laws 88 (dividing the Territory of
Florida into thirteen election districts and providing for the election of members to the
legislative council); Act of Jan. 16, 1827, 1826-27 Fla. Territory Laws 109 (amending the Act
of Jan. 11, 1827 that divided the Territory of Florida into thirteen election districts and
provided for the election of members to the legislative council).
10. Act of Jan. 11, 1827, 1826-27 Fla. Territory Laws 88 (dividing the Territory of
Florida into thirteen election districts and providing for the election of members of the
legislative council).
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Monticello, in Jefferson County;1 An Act to Amend an Act Entitled, "An
Act to Incorporate the Town of Quincy;' ', 2 and An Act to Incorporate the
City of Fernandina.13 The Council gave the mayor of each town the duty to
appoint three "inspectors' ' 14 who had the job of supervising local elections
and
whose duty it shall be to receive the votes, and to cause the name of
every voter to be taken down and kept in a book for that purpose,
and to cause the poll to be opened ... and the names of the several
persons ... having the greatest number of votes shall be declared
and notice of their election given to each of them.15
At this point in Florida history, there was no requirement that the mayor
appoint a judge or other person trained in the law to these positions. Rather,
the mayor was merely directed to appoint discreet persons to perform this
responsibility. 16 Thus, while justices of the peace would compile evidence
in an election contest, the process of canvassing during early territorial days
generally directly involved persons other than members of the judiciary.
Two years later, the Legislative Council amended legislation providing
for the territory-wide election of a delegate to Congress, as well as other
territory officers.' 7 Under this legislation, the inspectors of election for all
territory offices were to be uniformly appointed by "the presiding justices or
judges of the county courts."18
11. Act of Feb. 7, 1831, 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 41-44 (incorporating the Town of
Monticello, in Jefferson County).
12. Act of Feb. 7, 1831, 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 44-45 (amending the Act of Nov.
21, 1828, that incorporated the Town of Quincy).
13. Act of Feb. 10, 1831, 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 63-67 (incorporating the City of
Femandina).
14. 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 43; 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 66. The word "intendant,"
used in these particular laws in lieu of the word "mayor," was frequently used in early
territorial laws and connoted the same position as mayor. Its use likely derives from the
territory's Spanish legal heritage. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 727 (5th ed. 1979) (referring
to Spanish term intendente); BANTAM NEW COLLEGE SPANISH AND ENGLISH DICTIONARY 196
(rev. ed. 1987) (defining intendente as "mayor").
15. 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 43.
16. 1831 Fla. Territory Laws 44.
17. Act of Feb. 17, 1833, ch. 675, 1833 Fla. Territory Laws 35-41 (providing for
holding an election for delegate to Congress from this Territory, members to the legislative
council, and certain other officers).
18. Id. at 35.
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The function of county courts to certify results of elections can be seen
from an early example in Florida's history. For the election of the members
of the 1835 Legislative Council, the Council amended territorial law to
require that the election be held in October rather than May. 19 The County
Judge in Mosquito County,20 however, did not receive notice that the law
had changed.2' Accordingly, in May he called the election and certified the
results to Tallahassee. The territorial government in turn notified the Judge
that the law had changed, "which fact it is presumed was not known in
[Mosquito] County."22 The winner of the Mosquito County election was not
recognized, and the Judge was directed to hold another election in October.
23
B. Early Statehood
In furtherance of the goal of Florida statehood, first expressed in the
Adams-De Onfs Treaty, 24 a group of Territory leaders and other prominent
citizens met in the gulf coast town of St. Joseph in 1838 to propose a
constitution and obtain congressional approval for statehood. 2 The
Legislative Council required that the county judges call an election for
delegates to the convention according to the number of delegates designated
for each county.26 The delegates proposed a constitution, which would
become Florida's first state constitution in 1845.
In 1843, the Legislative Council approved an Election Code proposed
by a "reviser" of territorial laws.27 Two years later, the year Florida became
19. Act of Feb. 7, 1835, ch. 845, 1835 Fla. Territory Laws 308 (changing the time of
holding the election for members of the legislative council).
20. Later, at statehood, the name of Mosquito County was changed to Orange County.
Act of Jan. 30, 1845, 1845 Fla. Territory Laws 56 (altering and changing the name of
Mosquito County to that of Orange).
21. Mosquito County in Central Florida was quite remote from Tallahassee during
this era of poor transportation and communication links.
22. Letter from George W. Walker to Judge of the County Court Mosquitoe [sic]
County (June 8, 1835) in 25 THE TERRrrORIAL PAPERS OF THE UNrr=n STATES at 162 (C.E.
Carter ed., 1960).
23. Id.
24. Treaty of Amity, Feb. 22, 1819, U.S.-Spain, art. 6, 1822 Fla. Territory Laws IV.
25. STUART B. McIvER, DREAmERS, SCHEMERS AND SCALAWAGS 95-99 (1994);
Florida History Internet Center, Florida History Internet Center Home Page, at
http://www.floridahistory.org (visited Feb. 2,2002).
26. Act of Jan. 30, 1838, 1838 Fla. Territory Laws 16 (calling a convention for the
purpose of organising [sic] a state government).
27. Act of Mar. 15, 1843, 1843 Fla. Territory Laws 34 (concerning the revised
statutes).
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a state, a new Elections Code was adopted which was patterned after the
previous territorial laws on the same subject.28  Inspectors of elections,
formerly appointed by mayors and county judges, were now uniformly
appointed by probate judges.29 If a person contested an election for a seat in
the General Assembly, the local probate judge was required to collect the
evidence on the subject and transmit it to either the Speaker of the House for
a seat in the State House of Representatives, or the President of the Senate
for a seat in the State Senate. 30
For local offices, a contest of the election was presented to a circuit
judge who was required to "proceed in a summary way, to hear and
determine the matters in issue, and to give judgment upon the rights of the
parties."'31 The remedy available in a successful contest was ouster of the
contested winner, with seating of the petitioning candidate.32 Notwithstand-
ing the establishment of a uniform Election Code at statehood, just five years
later the General Assembly once again began to allow mayors and city
councils to appoint the inspectors of elections of their own municipalities.33
Upon statehood, the position of county judge was abolished.34  The
state judicial system was then comprised of circuit and probate courts.35
Each county had a probate judge, who served as the head of the local
36election system. The operation of the canvassing board can be seen by
considering an illustrative vignette from Florida's secession movement. In
November 1860, the Florida General Assembly called a state convention for
the purpose of considering an act of secession from the United States.3 7
Governor Madison S. Perry was concerned that elected delegates from Key
28. An Act Relative to Elections in this State, art. IV, § 1, 1845 Fla. Laws at 79. From
1845 to 1868, counties were served by circuit judges and probate judges. County judges did
not again exist in name until 1868. See FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. VI, §§ 16-18.
29. An Act Relative to Elections in this State, supra note 29.
30. Id.
31. FLA. CONST. of 1868, art. IX, 99 1-5,7-10.
32. Ch. , § 3, 1850-51 Fla. Laws 92 (amending an act incorporating the City of
St. Augustine).
33. Id. Ch. _._, § 5, 1850-51 Fla. Laws 90 (amending an act incorporating the City
of Apalachicola).
34. Compare Act of Sept. 18, 1822, 1822 Fla. Territory Laws 93 (authorising [sic) the
appointment of Justices of the Peace and defining their powers, and establishing county
courts) with FLA. CONST. of 1838, art. V, §§ 1-3, 11 (1845).
35. FLA, CONST. of 1838, art. V, §§ 1-3, 9 (1845).
36. Act of Jan. 5, 1847, Ch. 72-(No. 2), §§ 1-2, 1846-47 Fla. Laws 10-11
(amending the Act relative to elections in this state).
37. JOHN EDwIN JOHNS, FLORIDA IN THE CONFEDERACY 27 (photo. reprint 1983)
(1958) (U.N.C. doctoral dissertation).
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West, thought necessary to the success of the convention, would not arrive
on time. 8 Governor Perry called upon the Monroe County Probate Judge to
promptly canvass and certify the election delegates so that the delegates
could be placed on a steamer waiting to sail for the Florida Panhandle. 9 As
one historian noted, "[t]he Probate Judge and three other citizens of good
repute were to canvass the vote and issue certificates of election to the
winners in time for delegates to board the steamer.'"0 The Monroe County
Canvassing Board successfully performed the task requested by the
Governor.
At this time, canvassing laws began to more closely resemble those of
modem times. New election laws provided that the canvassing boards,
headed by the local probate judges, had a ten-day period to review and
certify election results.42 The canvassing boards further had the legal
obligation "'to ascertain the whole number of votes cast, and who had
received the highest number of... votes."'
43
C. Post-Civil War Era
As the Civil War and Reconstruction years passed, judges continued to
play a role in the certifying of elections as they had done in Florida for
decades. A new law made it a criminal offense for anyone, whether or not
on the canvassing board, to change a voter's ballot thereby not voting "as he
intended. ' 44 In the general election of 1870, however, the judiciary was
involved in a much different capacity in a heavily disputed statewide
election.45 For this election, the statewide canvassing board was controlled
by the Republicans.4 The Democrats believed that the canvassing board
was up to some type of mischief, and they sought an injunction in the Leon
County circuit court to prevent the canvassing board from canvassing the
returns and certifying any winners.47 Circuit Judge Pleasant W. White was
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Act of Dec. 17, 1861, 1861 Fla. Laws 35 (amending the laws of the State in
relation to elections).
43. WALTER W. MANLEY, H, ed., THE SUPREmE COURT OF FLORmA AND ITS
PREDECESSOR COURTS, 1821-1917, 245 (1997) [hereinafter MANLEY].
44. FLA. REv. STAT. § 5875 (1920). This particular law was adopted in 1868.
45. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 244-45.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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persuaded by the Democrat argument and accordingly issued the injunc-
tion.4 8 He presided over a grand jury investigation into whether "reports of
impending violence against the governor or other state officials" were
substantiated.49
The Republicans in turn approached a federal judge in Jacksonville,
claiming that Judge White's suspension of the count was in contravention of
federal voting rights laws.5 Rather than simply seeking to overturn Judge
White's order, however, the federal authorities indicted the judge and had a
federal court issue a warrant for his arrest, upon which he "was escorted to
Jacksonville by a U.S. Marshall."'" With Judge White "resting in a
Jacksonville jail," the canvassing board resumed its count and announced the
results of the election. 2
At the same time, to avoid further delays, the Republicans appealed
Judge White's issuance of the injunction to the Supreme Court of Florida.53
Before the tribunal could reach a decision, the state legislature enacted a law
abolishing the state canvassing board 4 The action had its desired effect
when the supreme court ruled that no action could be taken concerning a
board which no longer existed 5 Soon thereafter, the federal prosecution of
Judge White was dropped after the federal court determined the indictment
had been issued in error. 6 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Florida
decision established the principle that a court "could compel [canvassing
boards] to count all the ballots," so long as a canvassing board in fact
existed.57
Prominent election disputes involving the Florida judiciary continued
just a few years later in the general election of 1876. The statewide vote for
48. Id. at 244.
49. RALPH LEON PEEK, LAWLESSNE S AND THE RESTORATION OF ORDER IN FLORIDA,
1868-1871, at 163-64 (photo. reprint 1983) (1964) (U. F. doctoral dissertation) [hereinafter
PEEK).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 244.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 245.
55. Id.
57. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 245, citing State v. Gibbs, 13 Fla. 55, 72-73 (1869).
In Gibbs, the court noted how the Legislature repealed the law creating the state canvassing
board prior to the conclusion of this case.
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both the presidential and gubernatorial races ended up before the Supreme
Court of Florida. 58  Early results had revealed a razor-thin Democratic
victory in all state and national races.59  In Florida, the Democratic
presidential candidate led the Republican candidate by a margin of fewer
than one hundred votes.6° State law mandated the state canvassing board to
"ratify the tallies" for the election returns to be certified. Rather than
simply ratifying the tallies, however, the state canvassing board actually
passed on the validity of many of the ballots, resulting in a win for the
Republicans.62
The Democrats sought and were granted injunctive relief from the Leon
County circuit court requiring the canvassing board to merely tally the
election precinct returns without determining the legitimacy of any votes.63
NotwithstandinE the court's action, the state canvassing board disregarded
the court order. The matter made its way to the Supreme Court of Florida,
which was controlled by Republicans, and which "ordered state officials to
recount ballots and award the governor's chair to Democrat George F. Drew,
even though many of the same officials were [the Chief Justice's] political
and personal friends. ' 65  The state's presidential electoral votes were,
however, awarded to the Republican candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes.
Notwithstanding the potential for chicanery, one Florida court historian
has noted that "[niumerous Floridians credited [Chief Justice] Randall and
his court colleagues with rising above party and politics to resolve the
dispute., 66 The Court further ruled that the duties of the canvassing board
were "strictly 'ministerial,' meaning that the state canvassers could only tally
the votes submitted by the county canvassers." 67 As a result, the supreme
court concluded that the state canvassing board did not have judicial power,
58. Id. at 252.
59. Id. at 251.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 251-52.
62. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 252.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 251-52.
65. Id. at 219.
66. Id. See also JOAN E. GILL & BETh R. READ, eds., BORN OF Tim SUN 67 (1975)
(concluding that the state canvassing board "acted so unfairly that the state supreme court
ordered a recount"); EDWARD C. WILLIAMSON, THE ERA OF THE DEMocRATic COUNTY LEADER:
FLORIDA POLrncs 1877-1893, 44 (photo. reprint 1983) (1954) (University of Florida doctoral
dissertation) (noting that a minority of the state canvassers ruled in favor of the Democratic
presidential candidate, Samuel Tilden) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON].
67. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 252.
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and therefore, a canvassing board could not "'determin[e] ... the legality of
a particular vote or election."
68
In 1877, the Florida Legislature amended the State's Election Code to
more clearly provide for a canvassing procedure. Each precinct within a
county was required to have three "inspectors of election," appointed by the
County Commission, who were required to be "intelligent and discreet
electors of such county, who can read and write. '69 They were also required
to be residents of the precinct for which they were appointed, and they could
not all belong to the same political party.70
On the day of each election, the inspectors at each precinct opened the
polls, confirmed that the ballot box was empty at the opening of the polls,
resolved any challenges to any voter qualifications, "maintain[ed] good
order" at the polls, closed the polls, canvassed the ballots at the precinct, and
completed a certificate of results to be forwarded to the county canvassing
board.71 In canvassing the ballots, the inspectors had the discretion to refuse
to count particular ballots if they did not appear to evidence the intention of
the person casting it to vote for a particular candidate, 2 a discretionary duty
later provided to the county canvassers. In exercising their discretion, the
decision of a majority of the inspectors would not be overturned, even if the
decision were erroneous, unless the ballots were rejected fraudulently, or
unless the rejected ballots would have changed the result of the election.
Each county canvassing board was comprised of the county judge, 75 the
76clerk of the circuit court, and a justice of the peace. The county judge and
the clerk collectively chose the justice of the peace who would serve on the
board.77 If either the county judge or the clerk failed or refused to act, the
68. Id. at 253 (citing State v, McLin, 16 Fla. 17, 43-45, 49, 52 (1876)).
69. Ch. 97, § 19, 1881 Fla. Laws 481, 489.
70. Ch. 97, § 19, 1881 Fla. Laws 481, 487.
71. Ch. 97, §§ 24,30,32-33,35, 1881 Fla. Laws 481,493-96.
72. State ex rel. Lilienthan v. Deane, 1 So. 698, 699 (Fla. 1887). In Deane, a
canvassing board refused to count a single ballot for a municipal election in the city of
Sanford. The board's exercise of discretion was upheld by the Supreme Court of Florida. Id.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 274-76.
74. Pickett v. Russell, 28 So. 764,770-71 (1900).
75. At this time in the State's history, each county had only a single county judge, but
at least two justices of the peace. FLA. REv. STAT. § 3357 (1920); FLA. CONST. art. V, §§ 16-
17 (1885).
76. Ch. 97, § 36, 1881 Fla. Laws 481,496.
77. Id.
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county sheriff would act in either's place.78 Within six days of the election,
the county canvassing board was required to meet to "compile the result of
the election as shown by [the] inspectors' returns." 79 The county canvassing
board could not, however, reevaluate the propriety of any decision by the
precinct inspectors as to the casting of any individual vote.80
For any election involving more than a county or local race, within
thirty-five days of the election, the county canvassing board would in turn
forward its canvassing results to the state canvassing board. The state board
was comprised of the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and the State
Comptroller.81 As with the county canvassing boards, the state canvassing
board likewise had no discretion to evaluate the propriety of any tallies
82forwarded by the counties. The canvassing by the state board was merely a
"ministerial act."83 If a candidate for a state legislative seat was dissatisfied
with the results of a canvassing decision, the candidate was required to file
its election contest within twenty days for the General Assembly and twenty-
five days for the State Senate, "after the canvass by the Board of State
Canvassers." 84  Notwithstanding the implementation of a new uniform
election code, the County Canvassing Boards were not authorized to canvass
the returns of all elections. For instance, results from elections to authorize
bonds for count improvements were to be canvassed by the board of county
commissioners. 
5
During the years after the Civil War, the canvassing board officials,
such as the county judges and justices of the peace, were all appointed by the
governor, which soon led to the white establishment "ha[ving] complete
control of the election machinery., 8 6 In some counties, canvassing boards
"shamelessly manipulated voting and counting processes on election day."87
In particular, in the years following Reconstruction, county judges often
78. Ch. 97, § 36, 1881 Fla. Laws 481, 496. For an example of the appointment
procedure, see State ex rel. Bisbee v. Bd. of County Canvassers of Alachua County, 17 Fla. 9,
19 (1878).
79. Ch. 97, § 36, 1881 Fla. Laws 481,496.
80. Id.
81. Ch. 97, § 40, 1881 Fla. Laws 481, 497.
82. Id. at 498.
83. State ex rel. Drew v. McLin, 16 Fla. 17,43-44 (1876).
84. Ch. 97, §§ 44,48, 1881 Fla. Laws 481,498-99.
86. Charles Halsey Hildreth, A History of Gainesville, Florida 81 (1954)
(unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Florida) (on file with Nova Law Review).
87. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 299.
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ignored clearly fraudulent activity designed to disenfranchise black
citizens. The misconduct was somewhat ameliorated in 1870 and 1871 by
the enactment of a series of federal legislation 89 which held state officials,
including judges, criminally liable for violations of voting rights.9°
Nevertheless, not all corruption was eliminated, as was indicated in the
elections of 1878.
The congressional elections of 1878 saw Democrat Noble Hull run
against the Republican incumbent Horatio Bisbee, Jr., for the Second
Congressional District. 91 As the election returns came into Tallahassee, they
indicated a narrow lead for the Republican.92 The South Florida returns had
not yet been received, and Hull sent to Brevard County "an Orange County
lawyer, armed with $200 and the information that Hull must have over [a]
200 [vote] majority in Brevard" to win the race.93 Upon arrival in Brevard
County, however, the attorney discovered that the returns had already been
tallied and that Hull had won only by seventy-nine votes.94 The court clerk,
who possessed the returns, initially refused to alter them. 95 However, upon
receiving the amount of $140, the clerk "turned his office over to [the Hull
representatives] who raised Hull's vote" to a majority of 270 votes.96 The
altered returns were provided to the Brevard County canvassing board, who
certified them as the official Brevard returns.97 The canvassing board
members were subsequently arrested for election fraud and found guilty in
federal court in Jacksonville. 98  They each served more than a year in
prison. 99
88. See id.; Hildreth, supra note 86, at 81; PEEK, supra note 49, at 40.
89. 1871 Enforcement Act, 16 Stat. 140-46; 1871 An Act to Amend the Enforcement
Act, 16 Stat. 433-40; 1873 An Act to Enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
17 Stat. 13-15. See also PEEK, supra note 49, at 169, 174-77,186-87, 190-92.
90. PEEK, supra note 49, at 204-08.
91. WILLLAMSON, supra note 66, at 74-75. Hull was the current lieutenant governor.
At that time, Florida was divided into only two congressional districts. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at81.
94. Id.
95. WLLtAMSON, supra note 66, at 81.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 81, 83.
98. Id. at 84.
99. Id. at 81, 84. Hull was seated as Congressman from the Florida Second
Congressional District. WHILAMSON, supra note 66 at 75. Legal proceedings to determine
the propriety of his election took almost his entire term, with his being unseated just a few
days before the end of his term and Bisbee taking the seat in his place. Id. at 83.
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Continuing corruption with the canvassing of votes was one of the
reasons for the emergence of a strong Independent party in the 1884
statewide elections. The Independents campaigned on a platform that
included the slogan "a free ballot, a full vote and a fair count."'1 The
Independent candidate for Lieutenant Governor, Jonathan C. Greeley,
accepted the group's nomination with a speech that echoed the slogan,
calling for "a free ballot, a full vote and a fair count."10 1 Although Greeley
gave the Democrats a strong challenge, he did not win.'0 2
The slogan of the Independents appeared to fall on deaf ears. Rather
than assure that election laws operated fairly, the legislature took steps to
further thwart a fair vote. In 1889, new laws implemented a confusing multi-
box system of balloting, along with a poll tax. 0 3 Only a single legislator
spoke out against the new laws.1' 4 State Senator Will Coulter of Levy
County argued that the State's "[e]lection laws should be plain and sim-
ple." 105 By 1892, the growth of the Farmers Alliance as a statewide political
force again led to calls for election reform. However, the Alliance was not
able to gain sufficient power to usurp the dominance of the Democratic
Party, who were firmly entrenched in their antireform position.16
In 1895, James Bryan Whitfield, future justice of the Supreme Court of
Florida, drafted a new general election law for the state.10 7 The composition
of the county canvassing boards was changed. Rather than the clerk of the
court and a justice of the peace serving with the county judge, the county
canvassing board was thereafter composed of the supervisor of voter
registration,108 the chair of the county commission, and the county judge.10 9
100. Id. at 183.
101. Id. at 182-84. The gubernatorial candidate was Frank W. Pope, who "had given
up [a] promising career within the Democratic Party to protest against the white supremacy
extremists of the Black Belt." Id. at 182. Greeley, on the other hand, was a former
Republican with reform leanings, who was president of a railroad and served as state senator
from Jacksonville. WILLIAMSON, supra note 66, at 182. Although the Independents lost the
election, they lost by less than 5000 votes and caried nine of the thirty-nine Florida counties:
Washington, Leon, Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, Nassau, Duval, Alachua, and Marion. Id.
at 207-08. Notwithstanding its strong showing, the Independent Party was not able to survive
its defeat. Id. at 210.
102. Id. at 207.
103. Id. at 270.
104. WMLIAMSON, supra note 66, at 271.
105. Id. at 270-71.
106. Id. at 318; GANNON, supra note 3, at 287.
107. MANLEY, supra note 43, at 349.
108. Now called the supervisor of elections. See infra text accompanying note 150.
109. FLA. STAT. § 102.14 (2002).
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Once again, however, the county canvassing board possessed no discretion-
ary authority to alter any decision of the precinct inspectors of election. 10
This was true even if ballots were found by the county can-vassing board
which were clearly not counted by the inspectors.' As for precinct
inspectors, a requirement was added that they be "fair minded" in addition to
the existing requirement that they be "intelligent" and "discreet."' 1 2 Finally,
the election inspectors were made subject to a fine if they revealed "how any
elector may have voted,"' 13 while county canvassing board members were
subject to fine or imprisonment if they "wilfully violate[d] any of the
provisions of law relating to canvassing the result of any election."
D. The Early Twentieth Century
Notwithstanding efforts to provide for a statewide uniform system of
canvassing elections, the Florida Legislature soon began once again to create
other types of canvassing mechanisms for specific types of elections. In
1899, the legislature provided a new canvassing procedure for elections to
consider taxes for school districts. In such an election, the local board of
public instruction served in the place of the county canvassing board.1 5 A
subsequent challenge to the school boards' authority as canvassing entities
was unsuccessful.'
16
Thereafter, in 1903, the legislature authorized the boards of county
commissioners to canvass the results of any election involving the creation
of any special tax road districts;' 7 in 1911, to canvass the results of any
election involving the creation of any special road and bridge districts;1 in
1917, to canvass the returns of any elections involving the levying of a
county tax for the creation of a tuberculosis hospital; 19 in 1919, reauthorized
to canvass the results of any election involving the relocation of a county
seat; 120 and in 1925, to canvass the results of an election involving a local
110. FLA. REv. STAT. § 287 (1920).
111. Bisbee, 17 Fla. at 18-19 (uncounted ballots found in a ballot box).
112. FLA. REV. STAT. § 249 (1920).
113. Id. § 5876.
114. Id. § 5880.
115. Id. § 564.
116. Pickett v. Russell, 28 So. 764, 770 (1900).
117. FLA. REv. STAT. § 1638 (1920).
118. Id.§ 1649.
119. Id. § 1818.
120. Id. § 1583.
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referendum to determine whether to permit livestock to "roam at large.
' 121
On occasion, elections were held in which the county canvassing board,
rather than the board of county commissioners, erroneously presided as
canvassers of a particular election.
One particular set of challenges took place in Polk County in the early
1900s in which a local prohibition option had been approved by the
electorate in a county referendum.1 State law had required the results of
the referendum to be canvassed by the board of county commissioners. 23 In
a series of criminal cases brought against those violating the prohibition law,
local judges declared the local prohibition laws to be "null and void"
because the "wet and dry election.., had been canvassed by the county
canvassing board, instead of by the county commissioners."'
'l
Notwithstanding Supreme Court of Florida rulings that the canvassing
boards did not at that time possess any authority to alter the returns as tallied
by the precinct boards of election, such a law did not prevent the canvassing
board from asking for recounts on occasion. One such incident occurred in
1913 during the Fort Lauderdale local elections in which the city council
served as canvassing entity after the election board had tallied the votes.'25
At the close of the polls, the election board had certified the results for all
city council seats, one of which involved a tally of ninety-two votes to
eighty-nine votes.126 One of the sitting council members, E.T. King,
requested a recount which was granted.127 However, the result was the
same. 
129
At this time, no statutory provision existed for the counting of ballots
that were improperly marked. As a result, improperly marked ballots were
generally not counted. In his first message to the Florida Legislature in
1913, Governor Park Trammell acknowledged the frequently resulting
unfairness and stated this problem as one he wanted to address during his
121. Ch. 10316--(No. 294), § 2, 1925 Fla. Laws 64, 64. See also Ch. 14715--(No.
77), § 12, 1931 Fla. Laws 187, 190-91. (authorizing the same procedure for a special election
in Marion County).
122. M. F. HETHERMINGTON, HISTORY OF POLK COUNTY, FLORIDA 30 (Arthur H.
Cawston ed., 1928).
123. Id. at 30-31.
124. Id.
125. Matthews Elected Mayor of City, FORT LAUDERALE SENTINEL, Apr. 4, 1913, at 1.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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administration.' 29 In one of the first calls for election boards to determine
the voter's intent, the Governor stated:
[M]ere irregularities in marking the ballot, if the intention of the
voter is clearly indicated, should not be cause for throwing out the
ballot. The primary law should be so amended as to provide that
where a voter's intention is clear on the ballot, the vote should be
counted, though technically there might be an error in the marking
of the ticket. 130
Such a call for reform did not, however, result in immediate legislation.
The Florida Legislature more clearly provided a right of inspection in
1915, by which up to three persons were permitted "to be sufficiently near"
the ballots being counted so that the observers could determine "whether or
not the ballots are being correctly read and called, and the count of the votes
correctly tallied. 131
Beginning in 1917, absentee ballots were authorized by Florida law.
Such ballots were required to be filed directly with the county judge of the
county for which the absent elector was voting. 133 These ballots were not
opened until the canvassing board met to canvass the results of an elec-
tion.134 The canvassing board had the responsibility to open and tally these
ballots. 135 A decade later, the ballots were separated by precinct and
delivered to the appropriate poll election board.136 If the inspectors of
election determined that an absentee voter was not eligible to vote, the ballot
cast "shall not be deposited in said ballot box, but shall be left in the outer
envelope and by them delivered to the canvassing board... and also with a
notation on said envelope of their reasons for not depositing said ballot in
the ballot box.', 137 No provision was made, however, for a canvassing board
to overrule the decision of the inspectors.
In 1921, the legislature enacted a law requiring the county commission-
ers to publish in a local newspaper the names of the designated inspectors of
129. Park Trammell, First Message of the Governor to the Florida Legislature, Apr. 8,
1913, reprinted in FORT LAUDERDALE SENTINEL Apr. 18, 1913, at 7.
130. Id.
131. A. REv. STAT. § 5877 (1920).
132. Id. § 370-72.
133. Id. § 370.
134. Id. § 371.
135. Id. § 371.
136. Ch. 11824-(No. 17), § 2, 1927 Fla. Laws 116, 118.
137. Id.
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election at least fifteen days prior to the election. 138 In 1927, an unusual law
was enacted which transferred all the powers and duties of a supervisor of
elections from the supervisor to the county tax collector in any county which
had, "according to the State census of 1925, a population of not less than
13,600 and not more than 13,800.,,139 The only county meeting this
requirement under the 1925 census was Walton County, located in the
central western Florida Panhandle."4 As a result, the tax collector of Walton
County had a seat on the county's canvassing board.
Municipal elections generally did not involve the county canvassing
boards.1 41  Rather, the Florida Legislature, in creating or modifying
municipalities, typically designated the city council or commission as the
canvassing board for any municipal election. In 1927, such legislation was
adopted, for instance, for the city of DeLand, and in 1929 for the town of
Ormond.' 42
Voting equipment changes taking advantage of the latest technological
advances took place in 1929 when the Florida Legislature authorized
counties to "provide for the experimental use" of new voting machines.' 43
The enacting legislation authorized those voting machines which contained a
counter indicating how many persons have voted and which could "permit
the voter to vote for as many persons for an office as he is lawfully entitled
to vote for, but no more."' Upon closing of the polls, the board of elections
of each precinct prepared a "statement of canvass" which was prepared by
one member reading from each counter the total votes for each candidate or
proposition, and the other two members recording the figure on the
statement. 45 This procedure was to be done "in the presence of persons who
138. Id. at 116-20.
139. Ch. 12317-(No. 512), § 1, 1927 Fla. Laws 1254.
140. FLA. STATE CENSUS (1925) (on file in the Florida Collection at the Jacksonville
Public Library); telephone interview with Marty Sugden, Research Librarian in the Florida
Collection at the Jacksonville Public Library (Sept. 5, 2001) [both hereinafter collectively
referred to as 1925 CENsus].
141. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 125-28 (describing local Fort Lauderdale
election).
142. Ch. 12669--(No. 864), § 4, 1927 Fla. Laws 744, 748; Ch. 14278-(No. 714), § 4,
1929 Fla. Laws 1530, 1533. The role of the city council or commission as canvassing board
continued into the 1930s and 1940s. See, e.g., Ch. 19960-(No. 965), § 2, 1939 Fla. Laws
982 (pertaining to the canvassing of local elections in the city of Ocala).
143. Ch. 13893--(No. 329), § 4, 1929 Fla. Laws 715, 718.
144. Ch. 13893--(No. 329), § 2, 1929 Fla. Laws 715, 716.
145. Ch. 13893--(No. 329), § 23, 1929 Fla. Laws 715, 726.
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may be lawfully present at that time, giving full view of the counters."'" At
the end of the procedure, the figures were to be "compared with the numbers
on the counters of the machine."' 147 If reconciled, the results were announced
by the board chair, and then certified by the election board. The observers
were to be given "ample opportunity" to compare the results to assure no
corrections were necessary. The first six counties receiving specific
legislative authorization to use the voting machines, with county commission
approval, were Marion, Palm Beach, Pinellas, Nassau, Polk, and Volusia
Counties. 49
At the same time, the canvassing board structure was affected by a
legislative amendment. While the local canvassing boards were still
comprised of the county judge, the supervisor of elections, and the chair of
the board of county commissioners, the new law clarified that the chair of
the county commission was the person responsible for designating
replacements for the county judge and the supervisor of elections if either or
both of them were absent, sick, refused to act, or otherwise suffered a
disability preventing them from serving on the canvassing board. 50
In 1931, the Florida Legislature promulgated a new law implementing
procedures for elections to approve the issuance of bonds for "Counties,
Districts and Municipalities." 1' The new law provided a unique duty for the
canvassing board: to determine the number of "free-holders who are
qualified electors who are residing in such County, District or Municipal-
ity."' 52 Under the law, only freeholders could vote in bond referenda.
53
Moreover, as a threshold to the validity of the election, a majority of the
freeholders had to cast a vote. 54 Accordingly, before the results of a bond
referendum could be canvassed, the canvassing board had to first determine
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Ch. 13894--(No. 330), 1929 Fla. Laws 728. For the counties of Pinellas, Nassau,
Polk, and Volusia, the session law did not refer to the county by name. Rather, the law
referred to the county's population figure as it existed under the 1925 Florida census. Only
one county fit each population figure: 51,700 to 51,714 (Pinellas); 9600 to 9643 (Nassau);
63,900 to 63,925 (Polk); and 40,160 to 40,165 (Volusia). See 1925 CENSUS, supra note 140.
150. Ch. 13761-(No. 197) § 11, 1929 Fla. Laws 480,486.
152. Id.
154. Id.
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that a sufficient number of votes had been cast using lists that were to be
supplied by the pertinent governing authority.
155
The Florida Legislature of 1933 further adopted legislation providing
for the election of delegates to any convention that might be called by
Congress to propose amendments to the United States Constitution.55 The
returns of such elections were to be canvassed by the board of county
commissioners, rather than the county canvassing board.'57
The next year, the Supreme Court of Florida issued a decision which
seemed to echo back to Governor Trammell's plea to consider the intent of
the voter. In State ex rel. Hutchins v. Tucker,158 the high court ruled that
"substantial compliance" with ballot marking requirements was sufficient to
warrant the counting of a ballot.159 In this case, the court considered three
types of mis-marked ballots: 1) those in which a voter had pasted to the
ballot another sheet of paper which indicated the voter's choices; 2) those in
which a voter paper-clipped a similar sheet of paper to the ballot; and 3)
those in which a voter had merely enclosed an unattached sheet of paper in
the envelope with the ballot.' 60 The court determined that the first instance
was "substantial compliance," while the latter two were not.
61
The legislative session of 1935 spawned the creation of more laws
creating special canvassing mechanisms for particular elections. Although
the town or city councils of some municipalities were already authorized to
canvass the returns of local elections for the members of the council, such
enabling laws did not refer to anything other than these types of elections. 162
As a result, new legislation provided that a municipal election for the
creation of a local civil service board was to be canvassed by the local
municipality's "governing authority., 163 Further, the executive committees
of political parties conducting primary elections in certain municipalities had
the "optional" authority to appoint the members of the boards of elections,
rather than their appointment by the board of county commissioners. 64 At
155. Id. §§ 6, 12.
156. Ch. 16180--(No. 323), § 1, 1933 Fla. Laws 740.
157. Id. This particular law continues in effect as of the 2001 Florida legislative
session. See infra text accompanying note 316.
158. 143 So. 754 (Fla. 1932).
159. Id. at 757.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Ch. 16433--(No. 576), § 9, 1933 Fla. Laws 481, 484 (authorizing the
town council of the town of Frostproof to canvass the returns of its own elections).
163. Ch. 16864--(No. 93), § 25, 1935 Fla. Laws 271, 280.
164. Ch. 16989--(No. 218), § 5, 1935 Fla. Laws 477,479.
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the same time, the authority of the county commissioners to appoint the
members of the election boards in municipalities was removed, and this
power vested in the voters for each "city and town."' 65 The members were
to be elected for four-year terms.166 The statutory provisions concerning
absentee ballots were also amended to provide that any absentee ballots
received "after midnight of such Election Day shall be voided, and such
ballots destroyed by [the] Canvassing Board of the County in which
received.
' 167
The 1935 Florida Legislature implemented another piece of legislation
which altered the canvassing system in one of the state's most populous
counties, Duval.168 The new law abolished the Board of County Commis-
sioners and extended the jurisdiction of the Jacksonville City Council
throughout the entire county. 69 The result was that all duties previously
performed by the Board of County Commissioners fell to the City Commis-
sion, including having a member sit on the local canvassing board' 70 Six
years later, the legislature further affected the Jacksonville area by providing
that no one in Duval County could serve as an inspector of election if that
person were also a government employee or official.'
7
'
The 1937 Florida legislative session saw substantial change to the
election system in Florida. The City of Jacksonville became the first Florida
jurisdiction to have state-mandated voting machines for all city elections. 72
For all jurisdictions using voting machines, including those voluntarily
adopting the voting machine method, a new law required that the voter
produce identification and a signature as proof that the person was in fact the
person registered as the voter.173 The local clerk or inspector of election was
required to make a "fair and just comparison of the signatures.' 74 If the
inspector doubted the veracity of the signature, the voter was required to
165. Ch. 16983--(No. 212), § 1, 1935 Fla. Laws 468.
166. Id. § 2.
167. Ch. 16986--(No. 215), § 2, 1935 Fla. Laws 472, 474. For a discussion of the
enactment of the absentee ballot law, see supra text accompanying notes 135-41.
168. See generally Ch. 17566--(No. 795), § 1, 1935 Fla. Laws 156, 157.
169. Id.
170. Ch. 17566--(No. 795), art. I, §§ 1, 4, 8, 1935 Fla. Laws 156, 157-58; art. XIV,
§§ 1, 3, 1935 Fla. Laws 158, 199-200.
171. Ch. 21200--(No. 992), § 1, 1941 Fla. Laws 370.
172. Ch. 18618-(No. 912), § 1, 1937 Fla. Laws 778.
173. Ch. 18407--(No. 701), § 1, 1937 Fla. Laws 1338, 1338-39.
174. Id. § 2.
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complete an affidavit attesting to the voter's registration before the vote
would be accepted.'75
No provision was made in the law for any further review so long as the
person executed the requisite affidavit. 176 Upon the closing of the polls for a
general or special election, if the inspectors of election discovered that more
ballots had been cast than voters casting ballots, the inspectors were required
to "publicly draw out and destroy unopened and unexamined as many of
such ballots as shall be equal to the excess.' ' t77  The legislature also
definitively provided that the inspectors of election possessed "such police
powers as may be necessary to carry out" some specified duties of their
position.
178
Until 1937,179 a "protest" was not a legally cognizable challenge to an
election result.' 80 In 1937, the Florida Legislature provided the right to file a
protest of the canvass of returns if any voter believed the returns were
"erroneous or fraudulent."'' 1 The protest had to be filed with the canvassing
board, not the precinct inspectors of election.182 If a protest was filed, the
first action required was for the "Canvassing Board to examine the counters
on the voting machines," which were the subject of the dispute.183 The votes
appearing on the counters were "presumptively correct."' 18 The new statute
was silent on how the challenging voters might rebut the presumption, but
the statute retained the right to seek court intervention. 85
Notwithstanding earlier legislation that local inspectors of election be
subject to popular vote, the 1939 Florida Legislature authorized the
Auburndale City Council to appoint its own inspectors of election for
municipal elections, with the City Council serving as the canvassing
board. 186 A truly broad provision in the law also gave the right to any
defeated candidate to demand a recount.187 The law did not require that the
175. Id.
176. See id. §§ 1-2.
177. Ch. 17898-(No. 192), § 9, 1937 Fla. Laws 359, 362.
178. Ch. 17901--(No. 195), § 3, 1937 Fla. Laws 366, 368-69.
179. Ch. 18405-(No. 699), § 9, 1937 Ma. Laws 1327, 1334.
180. Compare Ch. 18405--(No. 699), § 9, 1937 Fla. Laws 1327, 1334 with State ex
rel. Drew v. McLin, 16 Fla. 17, 49 (1876).
181. Ch. 18405--(No. 699), § 9, 1937 Fla. Laws 1327, 1334.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Ch. 19689-(No. 694), § 7, 1939 Fla. Laws 33, 33-34.
187. Id. § 12.
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defeated candidate set forth a reason for the demand, nor did it provide
discretion to the City Council to deny the recount. 188 If requested, the
recount was mandatory. 8 9
The same legislative session saw the enactment of a statewide school
code which provided for the election of school board members in each
school district. '9 The County School Board was given the power to appoint
its own inspectors of elections.191 It was also designated the canvassing
board for purposes of these elections.' 92 A further enactment required that
the inspectors of election for all types of elections post the results of their
canvass at their polling place after concluding the tally.193 The posting must
be done conspicuously, so that "it will be subject to public inspection even
though the polling place be closed.' 94
By the 1940s, local municipal councils or commissions typically
continued to serve as the canvassing boards for municipal elections.' 95 In
Jacksonville, the city lost the right to have absentee voting in any municipal
election.196 However, as the nation faced the challenge of the Second World
War, this legislative aberration raised concerns of the need to facilitate the
ability of those serving in the military to more easily cast votes throughout
the state.197 The Florida Legislature responded by adopting a specific law
providing for the casting of absentee ballots by those in the armed forces.
198
All absentee ballots returned from the military were to be forwarded to the
appropriate county judge for holding.' 99 No later than the time of the closing
of the polls on election day, the county judge was required to deliver these
ballots to the canvassing board.200 The canvassing board then determined if
the ballots met the requirements imposed by the Florida Legislature, which
included a determination of whether the voter had also voted in person.201 If
188. See id.
189. Id.
190. Ch. 19355-(No. 360), art. V, § 1032(I)(e), 1939 Fla. Laws 910, 912.
191. Id. §§ 119(6), 1032(1)(e).
192. Id. § 1032(1)(g).
193. Ch. 19663--(No. 668), § 5, 1939 Fla. Laws 1612, 1618.
194. Id.
195. See, e.g., Ch. 21224--(No. 1016), § 1, 1941 Fla. Laws 450, 450-51 (referring to
the canvassing of municipal elections in the city of Fernandina).
196. Ch. 21314---(No. 1106), § 1, 1941 Fla. Laws 911.
197. Ch. 22014-(No. 380), § 1, 1943 Fla. Laws 729.
198. Ch. 22014--(No. 380), 1943 Fla. Laws 729.
199. Id. § 6.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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the canvassing board determined that the member of the military was not
registered to vote, the absentee vote could be counted, but only for the
federal elections of President and Vice President, Senators, and United
States Representatives.20 2
In 1941, the Supreme Court of Florida, in State ex rel. Carpenter v.
Barber, again considered how election boards and canvassing boards should
handle mismarked ballots.203 In Barber, the questioned ballot contained an
"X" for a candidate which was not contained within the space designated for
the "X" to be placed.2 The tribunal ruled that the canvassing board was
required to determine the "intention of the voter. .. from a study of the
ballot .... ,0 Upon review, "[i]f the will and intention of the voter can be
determined ... " the vote should be counted although the mark was
206
misplaced. Three years later, the same court considered a challenge to
ballots in which voters had used characters other than an "X" as instructed
on the ballot.20 7 For instance, some voters used a check mark (4).208 In a
decision which appeared to retreat somewhat from the voter's intent standard
expressed in Barber and earlier in Tucker,20 9 the Supreme Court of Florida in
McAlpin v. State ex rel. Avriett ruled that "all ballots marked with other
characters should not be counted.
' 210
During the 1943 legislative session, the Florida Legislature modified
the canvassing board structure for those counties having a population
211between 105,000 and 205,000 persons under the 1940 census. The only
212
county meeting these parameters was Hillsborough. Under the new law,
the legislature created a new County Election Board consisting of five
• 213
resident registered voters who had the responsibility to select the local•214
inspectors of election and to inspect the county's voting machines.
215
202. Id. § 7.
203. State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49 (Fla. 1940).
204. Id. at 50.
205. Id. at 51.
206. Id.
207. McAlpin v. State ex rel. Avriett, 19 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1944).
208. Id.
209. State ex rel. Hutchins v. Tucker, 143 So. 754 (Fla. 1932).
210. McAlpin, 19 So. 2d at 421.
211. Ch. 22195-(No. 561), 1943 Fla. Laws 1070.
212. U.S. CENSUS OFTHE STATE OFFLORIDA (1940).
213. Ch. 22195--(No. 561), § 2, 1943 Fla. Laws 1070, 1071.
214. Id. § 6(3).
215. Id. § 6(5).
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These members were appointed by the Governor for staggered terms.216 The
County Canvassing Board was restructured to include the County Election
Board, as well as the County Judge and the Supervisor of Elections.217 The
duties of the canvassing board did not change, however, as it still had no
authority to alter the tallies submitted by the local inspectors of election.21 8
Six years later, the jurisdictional limit of this legislation was amended to
apply only to those counties with populations between 135,000 and 270,000
under the 1945 state census. 2 19 The only county meeting this requirement
was Hillsborough. 220
E. Post-World War H Era
Absentee ballots were considered once again by the 1949 Florida
Legislature. 22 1  The duty of some canvassing boards to destroy illegal
absentee ballots222 was eliminated with a law requiring that the "election
inspection board" mark rejected absentee ballots by the notation "rejected as
illegal" across the face of the ballot.223 These ballots then had to be retained
as part of the election records for that election.224 The canvassing board's
duties for including absentee ballots differed depending on the type of voting
system used by the jurisdiction.22 5 If voting machines were used, the
canvassing board added the absentee ballot calculation results to the tallies
submitted by the precinct inspectors of election. 226 For those counties using
paper ballots, the absentee ballots were required to actually be placed in the
227
appropriate ballot box before counting. The legislature also expanded the
number of election inspectors statewide.228 Each polling place was
thereafter required to have two "election inspection boards" comprised each
of three inspectors and a clerk, each of whom must be able to read and write
216. Id.§2.
217. At that time, the various Florida supervisors of election were referred to as
"Supervisor[s] of Registration." Id. § 3.
218. Ch. 22195-(No. 561), §§ 2, 6(3), 6(5), 7, 1943 Fla. Laws 1070, 1070-77.
219. Ch. 25522-(No. 526), § 2, 1949 Fla. Laws 1211, 1212.
220. THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 1947-48, at 165-71 (1946).
221. Ch. 25385-(No. 389), 1949 Fla. Laws 921.
222. See supra text accompanying note 167.
223. Ch. 25385--(No. 389), § 1, 1949 Fla. Laws 921, 926-27.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Ch. 25384--(No. 388), § 2, 1949 Fla. Laws 915, 916.
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the English language. 229 One board had to be at the polls during voting, and
the other tallied the votes when the polls closed.230 Each board could not
consist of members all of whom belonged to the same political party.231 The
names of the appointed inspectors were further required to be published in a
local newspaper. 232 For counties with populations of more than 100,000, the
counties could provide for even more inspection boards to assist in the
operation of the election. 23
A major review of Florida's election laws took place in 1951, when the
legislature adopted significant additions to existing law.234 While the law
recognized the continued use of a board of elections comprised of a clerk
and inspectors,235 the enactments specified a clear procedure for the tallying
of votes at the precincts, particularly for those precincts using voting
236
machines. The inspectors would tabulate the votes upon the closing of the
polls by one inspector reading aloud each machine total and another writing
down the result. 237 Each of these inspectors had another inspector standing
nearby to confirm the accuracy of the designated vote total.238 When the
tabulation was complete for each machine, the inspector teams would then
switch places with each team performing the opposite task.239  Each
inspection team was to be comprised of "two inspectors of opposite political
faith, whenever practicable." Inspectors of election were uniformly
appointed by the board of county commissioners, rather than have some
subject to popular election. 24' Each precinct continued to be required to
have two election boards, with each being comprised of "three inspectors
and a clerk."2 2 No election board could be comprised of persons all
belonging to the same political party. 243 For some counties, the number of
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Ch. 25384--(No. 388), § 2.
234. Ch. 26870--(No. 391), 1951 Fla. Laws 816.
235. Ch. 26870--(No. 391), § 4, 1951 Fla. Laws 845, 900; Id. § 6 at 906, 907.
236. Id. § 5.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Ch. 26870--(No. 391), § 5, 1951 Fla. Laws 860, 897.
240. Id.
241. id. § 6.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 907.
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election boards could be more or less, depending on the population of the
county or the number of voting machines used in the county.
The 1951 legislation further detailed a protest procedure by which any
voter was entitled to file a written protest with the canvassing board if the
voter believed the results were "erroneous and fraudulent." 5  The
canvassing board would handle the protest, however, by merely double-
checking the accuracy of the election boards' tallies.2 6  The new law
provided for no recount procedure.2 7 At the same time, the canvassing
board was delegated more duties concerning absentee ballots. After
determining the legality of each absentee ballot, the canvassing board was
responsible for adding the additional votes to the tallies on each precinct poll
book, and then adding the total of all these votes to the total for the
county.' 48 Canvassing boards were required to convene "on the third day
after any election, or sooner if the returns are received." 9 Any returns not
received by the third day were required to be ignored. 0  25
Finally responding to the call of Governor Trammell, ' and following
the lead set years earlier by the Supreme Court of Florida in Tucker22 and
Barber,25 3 the 1953 Florida legislative session saw the initial development of
a statutory "standard" for use in determining the propriety of particular
ballots.5 4 At that time, the law continued to provide for hand-marked ballots
for elections in certain counties.Z5 The legislation required the voter to use
an "X" to indicate the voter's choice. Ballots were often submitted,
however, in which the voter disregarded the requirement of an "X" and
instead indicated the choice by some other means. The new law provided
244. Id. See also Ch. 26690--(No. 211), § 2, 1951 Fla. Laws 386, 387 (involving
counties with populations between 3000 and 3200); Ch. 27134-(No. 655), § 1, 1951 Fla.
Laws 1499 (involving counties with populations between 200,000 and 300,000).
245. Ch. 26870-(No. 391), § 5, 1951 Fla. Laws 860, 899.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. § 5.
249. Id. § 6.
250. Ch. 26870-(No. 391), § 6, 1951 Fla. Laws 906, 911-12. This provision
foreshadowed a similar change in law made during the 2001 Florida legislative session. See
infra text accompanying notes 353-56, 391-95.
251. See supra text accompanying note 129-30.
252. State ex rel. Hutchins v. Tucker, 143 So. 745, 757 (Fla. 1932).
253. State ex rel. Carpenter v. Barber, 198 So. 49, 50-51 (Fla. 1940).
254. Ch. 28030, 1953 Fla. Laws 164, 164-65.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
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that the ballot should not be disregarded "so long as there is a clear
indication thereon to the election officials that the person marking such
ballot has made a definite choice.
' ' 58
Beginning in 1955, county judges were no longer required to be the
repositors of absentee ballots pending election day. This task fell more
appropriately to the supervisor of elections.259 , Two years later, the
canvassing board was again addressed, with the legislature providing that the
chair of each county commission would appoint a substitute commissioner to
sit on the canvassing board if either or both the county judge or supervisor of
elections could not sit.20 However, for those counties with a population
between 200,000 and 300,000 persons, a circuit judge would sit in place of
the absent county judge. 261 Again, the only county meeting this requirement
was Hillsborough.2 2 An amendment to the election code in 1959 provided
more specifically that each election board "possess[ed] full authority to
maintain order at the polls and enforce obedience to their lawful commands
during an election, and during the canvass and estimate of the votes.
' 263
The 1960s saw several additional revisions to the state's election code.
Voting machines became mandated in all Florida counties, as well as all
municipalities in counties in which the population exceeded 260,000
residents.2 4 The number of election boards for each precinct remained at
two, with the board of county commissioners entitled to reduce the number
to one if determined "necessary" by the commissioners in the exercise of
their discretion.265 Additionally, if the number of voters at the precinct
exceeded 1000, the supervisor of elections must appoint an additional
266board. The legislature also mandated training classes for all election
inspectors and clerks. 267 Acknowledging the increasing number of voters in
258. Id. The language of this provision foreshadowed the standard which would be
adopted by the Florida Legislature again almost five decades later arising out of the Florida
Recount. See infra text accompanying notes 340-42, 374-78.
259. Ch. 29934, § 24, 1955 Fla. Laws 877, 888.
260. Ch. 57-104, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws 162.
261. Ch. 57-463, § 1, 1957 Fla. Laws 41.
262. U.S. CENSUS OFTHE STATE OFFLORIDA (1950).
263. Ch. 59-212, § 1, 1959 Fla. Laws 844. This provision had its genesis in legislation
adopted eight decades earlier that gave precinct inspectors the duty to maintain order at the
polls. See supra text accompanying note 71.
264. Ch. 61-481, § 1, 1961 Fla. Laws 1074, 1075.
265. Ch. 65-416, § 1, 1965 Fla. Laws 1488.
266. Id. at 1489.
267. Id. at 1488-90.
877
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the state, the legislature authorized canvassing boards to employ "clerical
help" to assist in the performance of the canvassing board tasks.2 68
The following decade saw two relevant pieces of legislation pass the
Florida Legislature. In 1973, the Electronic Voting Systems Act was
enacted to prescribe detailed procedures for the canvassing of returns from
automatic tabulating equipment. 269 In particular, the use of punchcard
ballots came into being, with the use of a punch legislatively intended to
"clearly indicate the intent of the voter."270 While the election board of each
precinct was delegated the responsibility to set up for use all voting devices
at the polls,271 the county canvassing board was required to confirm that the
total number of votes from each precinct was in fact an accurate count. 272 If
a punchcard ballot was damaged to the point where it could not be read by
the automatic tabulating machine, the canvassing board was mandated to
manually count the ballot.273 The legislature failed to provide a specific
standard for the canvassing board to determine how to count the vote.
Four years later, a second major piece of election legislation was
'274
enacted. This provision mandated that the canvassing board could not
disregard a damaged or defective ballot "if there is a clear indication of the
intent of the voter.' '275 The Legislature left this decision to the canvassing
276boards' discretion. This same piece of legislation eliminated the right of
local governing bodies to canvass the results of bond referenda when other
matters were on the ballot, giving this duty to the county canvassing
277boards. A clear provision was included which specified who would sit on
the canvassing board if a particular member could not or was not eligible to
sit.278 In particular, the chief judge appointed the replacement for the county
judge. 9 The chair of the board of county commissioners appointed the
substitute for the supervisor, who was required to be another member of the
board of county commissioners. The commissioners in turn would select a
268. Ch. 65-129, § 6, 1965 Fla. Laws 234, 237.
269. Ch. 73-156, § 3, 1973 Fla. Laws 248, 298.
270. Id. at 299.
271. Id. § 10.
272. Id. § 14(1).
273. Id. § 14(5)(b).
274. Ch. 77-175, § 20, 1977 Fla. Laws 903.
275. Id. § 20.
276. Id.
277. Id. § 12.
278. Id. § 26.
279. Ch. 77-175, § 26, 1977 Fla. Laws 903.
280. Id.
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substitute if the chair of the county commission could not sit, who again was
required to be one of its own members.2 Finally, if no county commis-
sioner was able or willing to serve on the canvassing board as a substitute,
the chief judge could appoint any "qualified elector of the county" to sit.282
This legislative act also included a mandatory machine recount by the
canvassing board for situations in which there were "obvious errors" on any
precinct returns, as well as any situation in which the results of the
tabulation reflected that a candidate or measure was eliminated by "one-half
of a percent less."
2 8 3
The Florida Legislature of the 1970s adopted a smattering of additional
legislation pertaining to the canvassing of elections.284 An early law
required the Division of Elections to "adopt uniform rules for the.. . use...
of voting machines."28 5 Later, the legislature designated the Secretary of
State as the chief election officer who was given the duty to "obtain and
maintain uniformity in the application, operation and interpretation of the
election laws.' 286  In 1976, the legislature authorized the Division of
Elections to provide advisory opinions in the application of the State's
election laws, which opinion was "binding on any person or organization
who sought the opinion or with reference to whom the opinion was
sought.2 97 A special act further chipped away at the authority of munici-
palities to serve as canvassing entities for local elections.2 8 The legislature
mandated that all municipal elections in Broward County be canvassed by
the county canvassing board, and not the municipalities' governing bodies.289
The early 1980s saw little legislative activity which affected the role of
the canvassing board. The 1984 Florida Legislature adopted legislation
which specified that the tallying duties of a precinct election board must be
performed open to the public. 290 The same act required all canvassing
boards to file with the Division of Elections after any election a report which
specifies any problems, "difficulties or unusual circumstances encountered
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. See Ch. 72-303, § 1, 1972 Fla. Laws 1135, 1136.
285. Id.
286. Ch. 75-98, § 1, 1975 Fla. Laws 196.
287. Ch. 76-233, § 3, 1976 Fla. Laws 532, 534.
288. Ch. 75-350, § 8, 1975 Fla. Laws 74, 75.
289. Id.
290. Ch. 84-302, § 17, 1984 Fla. Laws 1409, 1419-20.
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by the election board or canvassing board" during an election. 291 Two years
later, the Legislature added a proviso that all canvassing board meetings
must be held "in a building accessible to the public.,
292
By the end of the 1980s, the Florida Legislature enacted major
legislation which would have a primary role in the Florida Recount, the act
which authorized a manual recount. The new law made a manual recount
discretionary, but required that any request for a manual recount be filed
with the canvassing board "prior to the time the canvassing board adjourns
or within [seventy-two] hours after midnight of the date the election was
held, whichever occurs later.' 294 If a manual recount were authorized, the
person requesting the recount had the right to "choose three precincts to be
recounted."'295 If this partial recount revealed "an error in the vote tabulation
which could affect the outcome of the election," the canvassing board was
296required to conduct a manual recount of all the ballots. The statute did
not, however, define what "an error in the vote tabulation" meant.2 97 To
proceed with a manual recount, the canvassing board was required to appoint
counting teams who had the task of trying to determine how votes were
298
cast. If a counting team was unable to determine how a particular ballot
was cast, the ballot was to "be presented to the county canvassing board for
it to determine the voter's intent."299 Again, the statute did not provide any
standards for a canvassing board to use in determining the voter's intent.
291. Id. § 18. This statutory provision was one of the laws cited by Secretary of State
Katherine Harris as supporting her refusal to extend certification deadlines during the Florida
Recount. Because the county canvassing boards did not detail any problems in these reports
to the Division of Elections, Harris argued that the counties could not later allege that special
circumstances during the election authorized an extended certification deadline. See Letter
from Katherine Harris, Florida Secretary of State, to Broward County Canvassing Commission
[sic] (Nov. 15, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter Harris Letter].
292. Ch. 86-33, § 4, 1986 Fla. Laws 98, 101.
293. Ch. 89-348, § 15, 1989 Fla. Laws 2226, 2230.
294. Id. § 15.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See id.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Ch. 89-348, § 15, 1989 Fla. Laws 2226, 2230. Almost all portions of this section
became controversial during the Florida Recount. For the most part, Republicans accused the
Democrats of being up to "some type of mischief" by resorting to the various procedures set
forth in this section. Ironically, however, it was Florida Governor Bob Martinez, a
Republican, who signed this legislation into law on July 5, 1989. Id. See also THE FLORMA
HANDBOOK 1999-2000, at 32 (A. Morris & J. Perry Morris, eds., 27th ed. 1999).
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The same year, the Florida Legislature also specified that members of
canvassing boards could personally be fined $200 per day for each day
election returns were submitted late.'O°
The canvassing board's discretionary authority to decide when to grant
a protest was clarified in an appellate decision arising out of a 1991 election
302for the City Commission of Oakland Park. In this race for a commission
seat, the challenging candidate lost by three votes, with the results reflecting
fifty-eight overvotes and forty-two undervotes out of a total of 2609 votes
cast.30 3 The candidate filed a protest with the county canvassing board, who
the appellate court noted "may, but is not obligated to, grant the request" for
a manual recount.304  The canvassing board denied the request.30 5  The
defeated candidate brought a lawsuit, and the circuit court issued a writ of
mandamus requiring the canvassing board to conduct a manual recount.
30 6
The appellate court quashed the issuance of the writ, holding that "the
decision whether or not to hold a manual recount of the votes [is] a matter to
be decided within the discretion of the canvassing board. 30 7
A final piece of legislation impacting the role of a canvassing board was
enacted in 1999. This act changed the deadline to request a manual recount
from the time the canvassing board adjourns, to "prior to the time the
canvassing board certifies the results for the office being protested or within
[seventy-two] hours after midnight of the date the election was held,
whichever occurs later."
308
301. Ch. 89-338, § 30, 1989 Fla. Laws 2139, 2162.
302. Broward County Canvassing Bd. v. Hogan, 607 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
303. Id. at 509.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Hogan, 607 So. 2d at 509-10. Interestingly, under the Florida Election Reform
Act of 2001, a machine recount would have been required in this case if it came before a
canvassing board today (one-half of one percent of the votes cast would be thirteen votes).
Further, if the machine recount resulted in a difference of from one to six votes, a manual
recount of the undervotes and overvotes would be mandated (one-quarter of one percent
would be six votes). A manual recount under these circumstances would be optional at the
candidate's request if the machine recount resulted in a difference of from seven to thirteen
votes. See Ch. 2001-40, §§ 41-42, Fla. Laws 117, 147-152 (amending FLA. STAT.
§§ 102.141, 102.166). See also infra text accompanying notes 362-73 for a discussion of
recount rights under the new law.
308. Ch. 99-339, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws 3544-45.
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I. LEGISLATIVE SCHEME ON EVE OF 2000 ELECTION.
As the general election of 2000 arrived, the various county canvassing
boards of the state were guided generally by chapters 101 and 102 of the
Florida Statutes which set forth their duties for canvassing the returns and
handling any protests concerning the results. 309 Although the canvassing
process does involve some consideration of voting systems, the Florida
Legislature has made it clear that the custodian of the voting equipment is
the supervisor of elections, not the canvassing board.310 With a couple of
exceptions, the composition of current canvassing boards continues to be as
it has been since 1895: the chair of the county commission, the supervisor of
elections, and a county judge. 311 The county judge serves as chair.312
However, three special types of elections exist which are canvassed by
the entire board of county commissioners rather than the county canvassing
board. 313 The first type is a referendum to consider relocating the county
seat.314 The second is a referendum to determine whether to establish a
water and sewer district within the county. 315 The third is an election for
delegates to any convention that might be called by Congress to propose
amendments to the United States Constitution.316
One further type of election has an unusual canvassing method. For any
bond referendum that is on the ballot alone, without any other measure or
election on the ballot, the canvassing is conducted by "the governing author-
ity which called the referendum." 317 For instance, if the election involves
solely a county bond referendum, the board of county commissioners is the
309. FLA. STAT. §§ 102.141, 102.166 (2001).
310. § 101.34.
311. See supra text accompanying notes 107-08; Beckstrom v. Volusia County
Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720, 722 n.2 (Fla. 1998); State v. Sarasota County, 197 So. 2d
521, 522 (Fla. 1967).
312. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(1) (2001).
313. The existence of different types of canvassing entities was held to be constitu-
tional under the 1885 Florida Constitution. Lasseter v. Bryan, 65 So. 590, 591 (Fla. 1914)
(board of county commissioners may serve as canvassing entity for referendum involving local
option to sell alcoholic beverages).
314. FLA. STAT. §§ 138.06-.09 (2001). This chapter of the Florida Statutes also
provides a different means to challenge the results of this type of election instead of the
"protest-contest" means provided for other types of elections. § 138.06.
315. FLA. STAT. § 153.08 (2001). This statute likewise contains a separate means to
contest the results of the election. §§ 153.58(1)(a), 153.59.
316. FLA. STAT. § 107.07 (2001). This law had its inception in 1933. See supra text
accompanying note 157.
317. FLA. STAT. § 100.271 (2001).
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canvassing authority, while a local bond referendum would be canvassed by
the city council or commission."'
IV. ELECTION REFORM ACT OF 2001
The controversy of the 2000 presidential election led to an outcry to
revamp the election laws of Florida to address the difficulties experienced
during the "Recount. 31 9  In response,320 the state conducted a series of
statewide hearings which culminated in the Florida Legislature's adoption of
the Florida Election Reform Act of 2001.321 The act was approved by
Governor Jeb Bush on May 10, 2001, with an effective date of January 2,
2002.322 The primary focus of the act concerns voting systems and recount
procedures.
323
In the Election Reform Act, notwithstanding the complaints by some of
the partisan nature of canvassing boards,3 the legislature left untouched the
local canvassing board structure.3 2 The legislature did, however, prescribe
new duties for canvassing boards, as well as redefining prior responsibili-
ties.326 The changes can be categorized as follows:
318. Id. In 1945, the Florida Legislature had provided that bond elections could not be
held at the same time as any other election. Ch. 22545-(No. 31), § 1, 1945 Fla. Laws 60.
319. Drogin, supra note 1, at 3A; JAKE TAPPER, DOWN AND DiTY: THE PLOT TO STEAL
THE PRESIDENCY 469 (2001) [hereinafter TAPPER]. See also Kent Kensill, Paper Hammers at
the Bushes, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 22, 2001, at 24A (asserting that problems
with election arose from "random mishaps which occur in all elections").
320. Mark Silva, Harris: There Was No Crisis, Just Close Vote, SUN-SmNTIEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), July 30,2001, at 6B; TAPPER, supra note 319, at 469.
321. Florida Election Reform Act of 2001, ch. 2001-40,2001 Fla. Laws 117.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 129.
324. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 1, at C6 (quoting party official who "scoffs at
the... assertion that Broward's speedy recount was not politically motivated.").
325. However, the state canvassing board and the Elections Canvassing Commission
were changed. Prior to the 2001 law, the state commission was comprised of the Governor,
the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Division of Elections. The new law modified
the membership to "the Governor and two members of the Cabinet selected by the Governor."
FLA. STAT. § 102.111(1) (2001).
326. Ch. 2001-40,2001 Fla. Laws 117.
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A. Tabulation Testing
Although the canvassing boards had previously been required to test the
accuracy of the county's voting system,a27 the new law requires that the
board
execute a written statement setting forth the tabulation devices
tested [for the newly required voting systems], the results of the
testing, the protective counter numbers, if applicable, of each tabu-
lation device, the number of the seal securing such tabulation de-
vice at the conclusion of testing, any problems reported to the
board as a result of the testing, and whether each device tested is
satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
As with the previous law, the test must be conducted "[o]n any day not more
than [ten] days prior to the election day., 329 The new law, however, more
clearly emphasizes that the tabulation testing is a public event, which must
be properly noticed.330 Because the new law permits voting systems to have
a tabulating mechanism that is either determined at a central site or at each
precinct, new sections of the law, discussed in more detail hereinafter,
further provide procedures for testing tabulation equipment, whether it be
331central or precinct on-site tabulating in nature. Under the Election Reform
Act of 2001, the resetting of the voting tabulating device, as well as its
sealing, must be witnessed by the canvassing board or its representative, as
well as the representatives of the political parties, and the candidates or their
representatives who attended the test.332
327. The actual testing of the tabulation system may be called something other than
"tabulation testing" in the counties. For instance, in Broward County, the tabulation testing is
referred to as the "logic and accuracy test."
328. Office of the State Courts Administrator, Supreme Court of Florida, ABSTRACTS
OF NEw LEGISLATION: 2001 REGULAR LEGISLATIVE SEssIoN OvERVIEw 27 (2001) [hereinafter
ABSTRACTS]; Ch. 2001-40, § 21, 2001 Fla. Laws 117, 129.
329. FLA. STAT. § 101.5612(2) (2001).
330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See generally id.
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B. Provisional Ballots?'3
A new task falling to canvassing boards is to determine whether a
provisional ballot should be counted. Under the new law, a "provisional
ballot" is to be given to a voter at a poll if a question exists as to the right of
the voter to cast a ballot in the election or at that particular precinct. 31 The
canvassing board must determine if the elector casting the provisional ballot
was eligible to vote at the precinct, and further determine if the voter had
cast no other ballot in the election.335 In determining the propriety of a
provisional ballot, the canvassing board must also "compare the signature on
the provisional ballot envelope with the signature on the voter's registra-
tion. If the signature does not match, the canvassing board cannot count
the ballot even if the voter is in the proper precinct.337 Any provisional
ballot not accepted cannot be opened and must be marked "[r]ejected as
[illegal.,, 3 8 The canvassing board also retained the right to determine the
propriety of questionable ballots, including undervotes and overvotes,33 9 but
has a new standard to make this decision, with language borrowed from
legislation enacted almost fifty years earlier:uo "if there is a clear indication
on the ballot that the voter has made a definite choice as determined by the
canvassing board."' If the board can make such a determination, the ballot
cannot be "declared invalid or void."' ' 2
333. As of August 20, 2001, the statutory sections involving provisional ballots have
been placed on hold by the United States Department of Justice as possibly being a violation
of the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965. Under the federal law, all changes to Florida's
election laws must be approved by the federal government before taking effect. Brent
Kallestad, Voting Reform Faces a Hurdle, SUN-SNTImNL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 21, 2001, at
6B [hereinafter Kalestad].
334. FLA. STAT. § 101.048(2)(a) (2001).
335. Id. See also ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 28.
336. § 101.048(2)(b)(1).
337. § 101.048(2)(b)(2).
338. Id.
339. An overvote on a ballot reflects that the voter has selected more than one
candidate for a particular office. An undervote reflects that the voter has not selected any
candidate for a particular office. FLA. STAT. § 97.021 (2001). See also Martin Merzer,
'Overvotes' Leaned to Gore, HERALD (Miami), May 11, 2001, at 1A & 34A.
340. See Ch. 28030-(No. 10), 1953 Fla. Laws 164, amending FLA. STAT. § 101.011
(1951) (referring to the standard for determination of questionable hand-marked ballots). For
a discussion of this earlier legislation, see supra text accompanying notes 251-58.
341. F A. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (2001).
342. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 28.
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C. Early Release of Returns
Although a canvassing board may begin to canvass ballots before the
closing of the polls, as in the case of absentee ballots, no results of the
canvass can be released by anyone, including a canvassing board member,
until all polls are closed. To do so is a third degree felony.
D. Canvassing Procedure
Prior to the new law, ballots could be tabulated and reconciled at either
the precinct or at a central location. Effective September 2, 2002, the new
law permits ballots to be tabulated and reconciled at the precinct only.
Any discrepancies coming to light at the precincts are to be reported to the
canvassing board on forms to be provided. 345 The results of the on-site
precinct tabulation "may be transmitted via dedicated teleprocessing lines to
the main computer system for the purpose of compilation of complete
returns. ' 3 6 The Department of State was mandated to adopt administrative
rules to assure safe procedures for the on-site precinct reconciliation of the
ballots and the transmission of returns. 4 7 When the canvassing board
prepares the unofficial returns, which are to include the precinct returns,
absentee ballots, and provisional ballots, the board must consider whether
the unofficial returns contain a "counting error in which the vote tabulation
system failed to count votes that were properly marked in accordance with
the instructions on the ballot.'' 34 If a counting error is discovered, the
canvassing board has only two options: 1) correct the error and recount the
ballots with the vote tabulation system; or 2) request that the Department of
State verify the tabulation software affected.349
E. Canvassing Deadlines
For a primary election, a canvassing board has seven days to certify the
results of an election, but, for a general election, a canvassing board has
343. Id. § 101.5614(9).
344. See generally FLA. STAT. § 101.5614 (2001).
345. Id.
346. § 101.5614(3).
347. § 101.5614.
348. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(5) (2001).
349. Id. at (5)(a) & (b).
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eleven days.350  However, no later than noon of the day following any
election, a canvassing board must provide unofficial returns to the office of
the Secretary of State.351 These deadlines can only be extended in the case
of an emergency as defined by the Election Reform Act.352 If the deadline is
not met, and no emergency exists, the statewide Elections Canvassing
Commission must ignore the missing results. 353 This is quite a change from
the- prior law, which gave the Elections Canvassing Commission the
discretion to consider the late filed results even if no emergency existed.354
If an emergency does exist, the Election Canvassing Commission must set a
deadline for receipt of returns that will be filed late.
A possible problem could develop if a significant absentee ballot
response were generated in an election. The new Election Code permits
anyone to vote by absentee ballot;356 a requirement no longer exists that the
voter demonstrate "good cause" for voting absentee. 357 Further, up to four
days prior to the election may begin the canvassing board to process all
absentee ballots through the tabulating equipment,358 but must still have the
350. FLA. STAT. § 102.112 (2001).
351. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 28.
352. FLA. STAT. § 102.112(2001).
353. See also id. The issue of whether this particular provision violates the equal
protection clause is beyond the scope of this paper. Because each county is comprised of a
canvassing board of the same size (three members), it is quite possible that a canvassing board
in a large county will have a more difficult time meeting a canvassing deadline than a smaller
county. Florida counties currently range in population from 7021 residents to 2,253,362. TrE
WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 2002, at 425 (2002). The Florida Secretary of State
Katherine Harris has, however, opined that the difference in size of counties should not be a
factor to consider when determining whether to extend a canvassing deadline. See Harris
Letter, supra note 291 (refusing to extend certification deadline for Broward County). The
effect of the legal principle announced in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104-07 (2000) to this
new statute is at this point left to legal conjecture ("the right of suffrage can be denied by a
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly
prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise"). Id. at 105 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533, 555 (1964)); see also Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 817 (1969) ("When a State
makes classifications of voters which favor residents of some counties over residents of other
counties, a justiciable controversy [under the equal protection clause] is presented."); J.
LMBERMAN, THE EvOLvING CONsTrnmoN 29 (1992) (access to ballot typically analyzed
under equal protection clause).
354. FLA. STAT. § 102.112 (2000).
355. § 102.112(4) (2001).
356. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 29.
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certified returns to Tallahassee in either seven or eleven days, as the case
may be.
359
F. Machine Recounts
A machine recount is mandatory "if the margin of victory is one-half of
a percent or less" for any election or judicial retention, unless the losing
party waives the recount in writing.36 If a recount is authorized, it must be
conducted in "each affected jurisdiction.' 361 For instance, in an election
crossing county lines, "all counties comprising the district of the candidacy
or ballot measure are required to recount. 362 As for procedures used by a
canvassing board during a recount, the Secretary of State is required to
adopt detailed rules prescribing additional recount procedures for
each certified vote system which shall be uniform to the extent
practicable, and at a minimum address the following areas: secu-
rity of ballots during the recount process; time and place of re-
counts; public observance of recounts; objections to ballot deter-
minations; record of recount proceedings; and procedures relating
to candidate and petitioner representatives.
363
G. Manual Recounts
The right to bring a protest before the canvassing board has been largely
repealed and replaced by a manual recount procedure which is triggered only
under certain specific sets of circumstances. 364  If a machine recount
indicates a margin of victory of one-quarter of one percent or less, the
canvassing board must conduct a manual recount of overvotes and
undervotes, regardless of whether any candidate asks for the recount. 365 A
manual recount of only the overvotes and undervotes is mandatory if the
election was decided by a margin of victory between one-quarter and one-
half of one percent of the vote.36 A manual recount of the overvotes and
undervotes is mandatory so long as the losing party requests a manual
359. Fla. Stat. § 102.112(2001).
360. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 29.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. Id. at 28.
364. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(1) (2001).
365. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 28.
366. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(2)(a) (2001).
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recount "in writing no later than the second day after the election."367 Partial
recounts are no longer authorized .3  In September 2001, the Division of
Elections proposed rules governing the conduct of a manual recount, which
were subsequently amended.369 In addition to following the standards set
forth by the Division of Elections for determining the propriety of a
questioned ballot, 37° the proposed rule requires that the canvassing board
"set aside"371 each challenged ballot, "with a notation of the precinct
number, the unique identifier number, how the ballot was counted, the
reasoning behind the challenge, and the name of the person bringing the
challenge." 372 The canvassing board is required to have "copies of the[e]
record" of the manual recount available to the public "within two weeks of
"373the recount.'
H. Standard of Ballot Review
For the review of any damaged ballot,374 or if a situation arises when a
manual recount is authorized, the canvassing board must count a ballot "if
there is a clear indication on the ballot that the voter has made a definite
choice... 75 However, the Secretary of State is mandated "to adopt
specific rules" which set forth "what constitutes a clear indication."3 76 If the
ballot does not clearly indicate that "the voter has made a definite choice"
377
for an office or ballot measure, the vote cannot be counted for any office or
378ballot measure for which there is no clear definite choice. Specific rules
required under this provision were proposed by the Division of Elections in
367. Id.
368. ABSTRACTS, supra note 328, at 29.
369. Florida Department of State, Laws & Procedures, Recount Procedures Notice of
Change (to be codified as Fla. Admin. Code r. 1S-2.031), available at http://election.dos.state.
fl.us/laws/ProposedRulesnoticeO3l.shtmil [hereinafter Proposed Rule IS-2.031; see Uniform
Rules: Fix Flaws First, Sun-Sentinel (Ft. Lauderdale) Oct. 19, 2001, at 30A [hereinafter
Unifonn].
370. See infra text accompanying notes 372-76,458-62.
371. Proposed Rule 1S-2.031(l)(i) & (3)(1), supra note 369.
372. Id.
373. Id. rule lS-2.031(l)(1) & (2)(m).
374. Ft.A. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (2001).
375. Id.
376. AsTRACTs, supra note 328, at 28. This standard, similar to the prior standard,
was specifically upheld by the United States Supreme Court so long as adequate specific
guidelines were in place to make this decision. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000).
377. FLA. STAT. § 101.5614(5) (2001).
378. § 101.5614(6).
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September 2001 and subsequently amended. 379  At least one critic has
charged that although most of the proposed rules in this area are "reasonable
and fair," some of the proposals are "way too lenient."
' 380
I. Other Matters
The Election Reform Act also addresses the requirement that voting
systems in Florida be fairly uniform and be limited to "electromechanical, or
electronic apparatus," thus outlawing punchcard ballots, lever machines, and
hand-counted paper ballots.3 81 This new requirement has little significance
on the direct role of the canvassing board.382 Nevertheless, the Florida
Legislature continues to provide that "substitute ballots" may be used if "the
required official ballots for a precinct are not delivered in time to be used on
election day.,
383
V. CURRENT CHRONOLOGICAL PROCEDURE
To better understand the overall effect of the statutory and rule changes
to the canvassing process, one should consider the current step-by-step
process in which a canvassing board engages. The responsibility of a
canvassing board for a particular electioh begins well before election day.
379. Florida Department of State, Laws & Procedures, Clear Indication of Voter's
Choice on a Ballot Notice of Change (2001) (to be codified as FLA. ADMIN. CODE rule IS-
2.027), available at http://election.dos.state.fl.us/laws/ProposedRules/notice027.shtml (last
visited Mar. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Proposed Rule 1S-2.027].
380. See Uniform, supra note 369, at 30A.
381. FLA. STAT. § 97.021(36) (2001). An "electronic or electromechanical voting
system" is defined as "a system of casting votes by use of voting devices or marking devices
and counting ballots by employing automatic tabulating equipment of data processing
equipment," and the term includes touchscreen systems. Id.
382. Other statutory changes enacted to address issues arising during the Florida
Recount, but not directly impacting upon the canvassing board's duties, include a requirement
that all voting systems use a feature which "reject[s] a ballot and provide[s] the elector an
opportunity to correct the ballot where the number of votes for an office or measure exceeds
the number which the voter is entitled to cast or where the tabulating equipment reads the
ballot as a ballot with no votes cast." FLA. STAT. § 101.5606 (2001). In other words, it
provides a feature that advises the voter that the cast ballot contains an overvote or an
undervote. Id. After being advised that the ballot contains an undervote or overvote, the voter
is free, however, to cast an uncorrected ballot. FLA. STAT. § 101.5608 (2001). If a voting
machine rejects a ballot, the poll worker "without examining the ballot, shall state the possible
reasons for the rejection and direct the voter to the instruction model .... § 101.5608(b).
383. FLA. STAT. § 101.43 (2001).
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A. Before Election Day
In facing a new election the canvassing board must conduct the "public
preelection test" by which the automatic tabulating equipment of the local
voting system is tested by use of a "preaudited group of ballots. ' 3 4 The
responsibility for providing notice of the test to candidates, party officials,
and the public falls upon the supervisor of elections. 385 The test must be
conducted no more than ten days prior to the election. 386  The testing
procedure differs depending on the type of tabulation equipment available in
the county, a central tabulation system, or a precinct on-site tabulation
387
system. Although the statute requires that "each member of the
canvassing board shall certify the accuracy of the test," it further provides in
apparent contradiction that "the canvassing board may designate one
member to represent it" at the test.
388
For a central tabulation system, preaudited ballots must be run through
the voting equipment until "an errorless count shall be made." 389 If the test
reveals an error, the canvassing board is responsible for ensuring that "the
cause therefore shall be corrected. ' 39  For a precinct on-site tabulation
system, the canvassing board is required to test a random sample of all
devices to be used in the election to consist of "at least 5 percent or 10 of the
devices, whichever is greater."391 If the canvassing board discovers an error
in any tested tabulating device, the board must "take steps to determine the
cause of the error, shall attempt to identify and test other devices that could
reasonably be expected to have the same error, and shall test a number of
additional devices sufficient to determine that all devices are satisfactory. 392
If the canvassing board is unable to find a device satisfactory, it "may
require that all devices to be tested or may declare that all devices are
unsatisfactory." 39
3
384. Ch. 2001-40, § 21, 2001 Fla. Laws 129, 130.
385. Id.
386. FLA. STAT. § 101.5612(2) (2001).
387. § 101.5612(3) & (4).
388. § 101.5612(2). The supervisor of elections must have already prepared a
"preaudited group of ballots" for the test which must include a number of overvoted ballots. §
101.5612(3).
389. § 101.5612(2).
390. Id.
391. § 101.5612(4)(a)(1).
392. § 101.5612(4)(a)(2).
393. Id.
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Upon completion of the tabulation testing, each tested device must be
reset and resealed. 394 This must be done in the presence of the "canvassing
board or its representative, the representatives of the political parties, and the
candidates or their representatives who attended the test."395 Records of all
testing procedures and results must be maintained "as part of the official
records of the election. 396
B. On Election Day, Before Polls Close
Upon convening on election day,391 the canvassing board needs to
promptly evaluate whether any emergency has arisen which may result in the
inability of the canvassing board to timely certify the returns.398 If so, the
canvassing board must determine whether such an occurrence meets the
definition of emergency as set forth in the Election Reform Act.399 This
analysis is of critical importance, because under the new law, late returns
may be accepted only in the instance of an emergency. 4W Any returns
submitted late without a statutory emergency arising must be ignored by the
statewide Elections Canvassing Commission.40' If the local canvassing
board believes an emergency exists that justifies the late filing of returns, the
canvassing board must request a new deadline from the Elections Canvass-
402ing Commission.
394. § 101.5612(4)(b).
395. Id.
396. § 101.5612(4)(e).
397. By this time, the local supervisor of elections is required to have already given at
least forty-eight hours prior notice of the convening of the canvassing meeting. FLA. STAT.
§ 102.141(2) (2001). Such notice must be given "by publication once in one or more
newspapers of general circulation in the county .... " Id.
398. Id.
399. FLA. STAT. § 101.732 (2001).
400. FLA. STAT. § 102.112(4) (2001).
401. This type of provision is not foreign to Florida election law. In 1951, the Florida
Legislature enacted statutes which barred the local canvassing boards from including any
precinct returns which were not timely submitted. See discussion supra text accompanying
note 250.
402. FLA. STAT. § 102.112 (4) (2001). Under earlier case law, the returns were deemed
timely submitted even if they were submitted by telephone to the Secretary of State. State ex
rel. Chappell v. Martinez, 536 So. 2d 1007 (Fla. 1988). The continuing viability of this
holding is in doubt because the earlier statute merely required that the returns be forwarded to
Tallahassee, whereas the current version of the statute requires that they befiled, and received.
The rationale of Chappell appears to continue to exist, however, because in neither the old
statute nor the new does the language explicitly require that the returns be in writing.
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The law requires that absentee and provisional ballots be canvassed
before other returns are canvassed.40 3 Under existing case law, the
canvassing board is not required to canvass ballots for those candidates who
are no longer eligible for office." The canvassing of absentee ballots may
begin "at 7 a.m. on the fourth day before the election, but not later than noon
on the day following the election. '405 If the canvassing board decides to
canvass absentee ballots before polls close on election day, no one must
release any results until the closing of the polls.4 6  The supervisor of
elections shall deliver to the board all absentee ballots received and kept by
the supervisor's office prior to election day.407 The slpervisor could have
already confirmed that the signature on each ballot matches the signature on
file for that voter, although this procedure may also be done at the time of
canvassing. 4°8 However, none of the absentee ballots may be opened until
the canvassing board convenes its session, whenever that may be.
If a review of the ballots indicates more than one absentee ballot has
been received from a voter, the canvassing board must determine "which
ballot, if any, is to be counted.' 410  To accept an absentee ballot, the
canvassing board must determine that: a) the ballot has been signed by the
voter;41 b) the ballot includes a postmark, or if an overseas voter, the date
412signed, which must be a date before the election; and c) the voter's ballot
has also been signed by a witness who is eighteen years of age of older.4
3
Any absentee ballot not meeting these requirements must be marked
"rejected as illegal.' 414
Additionally, by administrative rule, the Division of Elections has
authorized overseas voters to submit their ballots to the supervisor of
elections by fax, so long as they contain the voter's signature, the date of
signature, and the statement, "I understand that by faxing my voted ballot I
403. § 102.141(2) (2000) (amended by Fla. Laws ch. 2001-40, § 41).
404. Hancock v. Sapp, 225 So. 2d 411, 415 (Fla. 1969). In Hancock, a candidate for
office had accepted another public office prior to election day. The appellate court construed
this as evidence that the candidate intended to relinquish his right to the seat on the ballot.
405. FLA. STAT. § 101.68(2)(a) (2001).
406. Id.
407. § 101.67 (2001).
408. § 101.68(1) (2001).
409. Id.
410. § 101.6103(5) (2001).
411. § 101.65(6) (2001).
412. § 101.65 (2001).
413. Id.
414. § 101.68(2)(c)(1) (2001).
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am voluntarily waiving my right to a secret ballot."4 15 The canvassing board
should also consider whether the Elections Canvassing Commission has
declared an emergency, which would authorize the waiver for overseas
voters of some of the stringent requirements of absentee ballots. In such a
case, the state commission would have provided the necessary emergency
416
rules for the county canvassing board to consider. Court decisions have
established that "compliance with statutory requirements for absentee voting
[is] mandatory," with any deficiency "fatal to the ballot cast.' 41
7
The absentee ballots themselves are "open for public inspection...
while in the custody of the... county canvassing board at any reasonable
time.,, 418 A member of the public, however, is not permitted to handle any
ballot.4 9 If a person wants to inspect the absentee ballots, the supervisor is
required to "make a reasonable effort to notify all candidates whose names
appear on such ballots or ballot cards by telephone or otherwise of the time
and place of the inspection. ' 420 The inspection is a public proceeding.421 If
any voter believes an absentee ballot is illegal due to failure to meet
statutory requirements discussed above, that voter may "file with the
canvassing board a protest against the canvass of that ballot. ' 422 The protest
must specify "the precinct, the ballot, and the reason [the voter] believes the
ballot to be illegal. '423 This must be done before the ballot is removed from
the envelope or the right to protest the ballot will be lost.
4U
C. On Election Day, After Polls Close
Upon the closing of the polls, the canvassing board will begin to receive
the returns from the precincts. The canvassing board must consider any
discrepancies concerning the total number of ballots assigned to the precinct
415. Florida Dep't of State, Laws and Procedures, Electronic Transmission of Absentee
Ballots (to be codified at FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.030), available at
http://elections.dos.state.fl.us/laws/ProposedRules/1S2.030.shtml (last visited Mar. 23, 2002).
416. FLA. STAT. § 101.698 (2001).
417. Wood v. Diefenbach, 81 So. 2d 777 (Fla. 1955); FLA. STAT. § 101.698 (2001).
418. FLA. STAT. § 101.572 (2001).
419. Id.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. § 101.68 (2)(c)(2).
423. Id.
424. Id.
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as noted by the precinct workers on the transfer form.42s The canvassing
board must further evaluate any provisional ballot received to determine
whether the voter was entitled to vote in the precinct forwarding the ballot,
and further whether the voter's signature on the ballot envelope matches the
voter's registration.426 Ballots not meeting these two criteria must be marked
rejected as illegal.427  Further, the canvassing board must consider any
damaged ballots which could not be read by the tabulation equipment and
were not corrected by duplicate ballot to determine whether they contain a
"clear indication.., that the voter has made a definite choice for an office or
ballot measure." 28 However, other than these areas, the canvassing board
cannot review the propriety of any returns submitted by the precinct
elections boards.429 The compilation of the precinct returns is merely a
ministerial act to be performed by the canvassing board.430 The bifurcation
of duties between the precinct election boards and the county canvassing
board continues as it has for decades, as clearly expressed by the Supreme
Court of Florida in State ex rel. Barrs v. Pritchard
Election [precinct] inspectors, as such, have no power to declare
the result of an election, even in or for the particular precinct for
which they act. Their sole duty is to count, tally, tabulate, and re-
turn the votes as they find them to have been cast. The declaration
of the result is a duty confided to the canvassing board to which the
425. § 101.5614 (2001). In the new law, the precinct workers responsible for the
reconciliation and tabulation are referred to as the election board of each precinct, appointed
by the supervisor of elections. Id. See also Fla. Laws ch. 2001-40, § 26. The election board
for each precinct is responsible to open and close the polls at the precinct. The statute permits
a second election board for each precinct, so long as the first election board arrives at the
precinct not later than 6:00 a-m. on election day and stays until the closing of the polls. The
second election board would then be responsible to "count the votes cast." FLA. STAT.
§ 102.012(4) (2001). An election board is comprised of a clerk and additional inspectors.
§ 97.021(8) (2001).
426. § 101.048(2)(a).
427. FLA. STAT. § 101.048(2)(b)(2) (2001).
428. § 101.5614(5) (2001). As with the law in effect prior to the Election Reform Act,
damaged ballots can be corrected by election personnel so long as the duplicate ballot is made
"in the presence of witnesses." In lieu of a duplicate ballot, however, the damaged ballot may
be presented to the canvassing board for its determination. Id.
429. § 101.5614.
430. Gough v. State ex rel. Sauls, 55 So. 2d 111, 116 (Fla. 1951).
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election returns are required to be sent for the purpose of being
canvassed and there having the result declared and announced.43'
During the canvassing process, the canvassing board has the "full
authority to... enforce obedience to its lawful commands during.., the
canvass of the votes. ' 432 The Division of Elections has proposed rules which
further provide that public observers of any manual recount may not
"interfere or disturb the recount in any way. ' 433 Under the previous law, all
returns must have been transmitted from the precincts to the canvassing
board by noon of the next day.434 Under the new law, however, the returns
must be transmitted no later than 2:00 a.m. the next day, a much shorter
deadline which may pose some difficulty particularly in geographically large
counties with heavy voter turnout.
435
Once the canvassing board has completed the canvass, it is required to
issue unofficial returns to the Department of State no later than noon the day
after the election.4 36  Thereafter, before issuing official returns, the
canvassing board must determine whether: a) a counting error exists;437 b)
whether a machine recount is required;438 or c) whether a manual recount is
required.439
D. After Election Day
If the unofficial returns reveal to the canvassing board that a counting
error exists in the manner in which properly marked ballots have been
counted, the board's options are limited only to correcting the error and then
conducting a machine recount, or requesting that the Department of State
verify the county's tabulation software.4
431. State ex rel. Barrs v. Pritchard, 149 So. 58, 59 (Fla. 1933).
432. FLA. STAT. § 102.031(1) (2001).
433. Proposed Rule 1S-2.031(l)(a), (2)(g), supra note 369.
434. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(3) (2001).
435. § 102.141(3).
436. Ch. 2001-40, § 41, 2001 Fla. Laws 131,147 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 102.141 (2001)).
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. Ch. 2001-40, § 42, 2001 Fla. Laws 137, 149 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 102.166 (2001)).
440. Ch. 2001-40, § 41, 2001 Fla. Laws 131, 147 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 102.141 (2001)).
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If the unofficial results reveal that any candidate or ballot measure was
"defeated or eliminated by one-half of a percent or less of the votes cast for
such office" or ballot measure, then the canvassing board must conduct a
machine recount unless the losing candidate requests in writing that the
recount not be done." 1 The operation of this provision can be viewed by
looking at a couple of examples. Assume in a particular race only 199 votes
are cast with a breakdown of 100 to 99. A single vote is not "one-half of a
percent or less of the votes" cast. Apparently then, no machine recount
could ever be required for a race involving this number of ballots cast or
less. Under the new law, it appears that a minimum of 201 votes must be cast
in a race before a machine recount could ever be required under the new
statutory provision. A breakdown of 101 to 100 would be within the
requisite "one-half of a percent or less of the votes:" one-half of a percent of
200 votes being one vote, and the difference between the closest breakdown
of 201 votes being a single vote.44 2
If a machine recount is necessitated, the board must then test the
tabulating equipment as previously provided if the county has voting
443
equipment that utilizes ballots. If the tabulation test indicates no error,
then the ballots are to be run back through the automatic tabulating
equipment. 4" If the test indicates no tabulating error, then the recount is
presumed to be the correct tally." 5 If an error in the tabulating equipment is
detected, then the procedure to be handled is the same as that for tabulating
the equipment at the beginning of canvass.446 If a county uses a system that
441. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(4) (2000), amended by Fla. Laws ch. 2001-40, § 41. For
smaller elections, machine and manual recounts may be able to take place on the day of
election after polls close, although the detailed procedures now required make a manual
recount less likely to occur on the same day as the election. Id.
442. The question remains whether a court will construe this law as applying to all
numbers of votes cast, in order to pass constitutional muster. Florida courts recognize the
principle that "the Legislature in its enactments is always presumed to have intended to enact
constitutional acts." Gough v. State, 55 So. 2d 111, 116 (Fla. 1951). Additionally, in
construing the meaning of a new statute, Florida courts look primarily to the plain meaning of
the words used by the Legislature. Sieniarecki v. State, 756 So. 2d 68, 75 (Fla. 2000). By
using the plain meaning of the words in the statute, however, the new statute arguably runs
afoul of the legal principle at issue in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105-06 (2000) ("The right
to vote is protected in more than the initial allocation of the franchise. Equal protection
applies as well to the manner of its exercise."). See also supra note 254 and discussion
contained therein.
443. FLA. STAT. § 101.5612 (2001).
444. Id.
445. Id.
446. Id.
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does not use actual ballots, such as a touch-screen system, the canvassing
board conducting a machine recount must "examine the counters on the
precinct tabulators to ensure that the total of the returns on the precinct
tabulators equals the overall election return.' 7 If they do, the results are
presumed to be correct."
The second set of unofficial returns must be submitted "no later than
noon on the second day after any election.' ' 9 If the canvassing board
cannot complete the machine recount within this deadline, then the
canvassing board must submit the initial returns again as second unofficial
returns, together with "a detailed explanation of why it was unable to timely
complete the recount.'4 50 In conducting the machine recount, the canvassing
board must remember that it will be required to make reports of its
proceedings available to the general public.4 5
If a machine recount is conducted, and the second set of unofficial
returns indicates any candidate or ballot measure "was defeated or
eliminated by one-quarter of a percent or less," then a manual recount of the
entire undervotes and overvotes is mandated.452 If, however, the amended
returns indicate a defeat of "between one-quarter and one-half of a percent of
the votes cast," a manual recount of the entire undervotes and overvotes is
not required unless requested in writing by the "candidate, the political party
of such candidate, or any political committee that supports or opposes such
ballot measure.' 453  The written request is to be directed to the county
canvassing board for races within county boundaries, and to the State
Elections Canvassing Commission for races crossing county lines.45 This
procedure takes the place of the "protest" which was previously provided
under Florida law.
455
When conducting a manual recount, the canvassing board shall use
"counting teams of at least two electors," which are required to be "when
447. FLA. STAT. § 102.141(6)(b) (2001).
448. Id.
449. Id. § 102.141(6)(c) (2001).
450. Id.
451. Id. § 102.141(8) (2001).
452. FLA. STAT. § 102.166 (2001).
453. Id. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(2)(a) (2001).
454. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(2)(b) (2001). In order to cull overvotes and undervotes, all
approved voting equipment must include the ability to sort while "simultaneously counting
votes" using hardware or software approved by the Department of State. Id. § 102.166(3)(a).
455. § 102.166. The word "protest" now no longer appears in the Florida election
lexicon except concerning a challenge to an absentee ballot. See supra text accompanying
note 316-18.
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possible, members of at least two political parties. ' 456 If the counting team
cannot reach a decision on any particular ballot, the ballot is to be presented
to the county canvassing board for a determination. 57 The standard to be
used by the canvassing board in counting undervotes and overvotes in a
manual recount is if there is "a clear indication [on the ballot] that the voter
has made a definite choice.
'458
The Department of State was mandated to adopt rules specifying what
constitutes a clear indication.459 These rules were proposed in September
2001 and subsequently amended.40 As they affect the responsibility of a
county canvassing board, the rules appear to require the canvassing board to
answer a primary question in determining the propriety of a questioned
ballot: Is the ballot clear? For instance, if the voter does not substantially
fill in the oval on an optiscan sheet, the vote should still be counted if the
voter placed "any other mark... within the blank space... that clearly
indicates the voter intended the oval or arrow to be marked."461 Moreover, if
the voter attempts to change his or her mind by marking out an original
choice and choosing another candidate, the ballot should be counted so long
as the correction "is clearly evident in the space where the voter could
indicate a ballot choice" or that the correction is "indicated in a clear
fashion.' 462 Additionally, the proposed rules provide that the canvassing
board should ignore any stray marks on the ballot if they are "clearly
unrelated to the voter's intent."
For those counties adopting a direct recording voting system, rather
than the optical scan voting system, the task facing the canvassing board is
not quite as onerous because the absence of printed ballots shifts the focus
456. Id. § 102.166(6)(a) (2001).
457. Id. § 102.166(6)(b).
458. Id.
459. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(6)(c) (2001).
460. Proposed Rule 1S-2.027, supra note 369; see Uniform, supra note 369, at 30A.
Although the proposed rule purports to set forth standards for determining a voter's choice "in
a manual recount," the standards would appear, for uniformity sake, to be equally applicable
to those ballots reviewed by a canvassing board as part of the election itself: absentee ballots,
provisional ballots and damaged ballots. Legal counsel with the Division of Elections concurs
with this conclusion, acknowledging that the Division was not given the statutory authority to
address standards for any ballots other than those involving a manual recount. Telephone
Interview with Amy K. Tuck, Assistant General Counsel, Florida Division of Elections (Oct.
22, 2001) (Ms. Tuck is the attorney who drafted the proposed rule).
461. Proposed Rule 1S-2.027, supra note 369, rule 1S-2.027(1)(e).
462. Id. rule 1S-2.027(1)(i) & (0).
463. 1d rule 1S-2.027(l)(k) & (/).
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primarily to any write-in candidates, absentee ballots, and provisional
ballots.4" In either case, in determining the propriety of any ballot, the
canvassing board must set aside each challenged ballot "with a notation of
the precinct number, the unique identifier number, how the ballot was
counted, the reasoning behind the challenge, and the name of the person
bringing the challenge.
'
"
5
Under existing case law, canvassing boards are given some "latitude of
judgment" in making decisions.466 Moreover, a canvassing board's decision
on the validity of a ballot is "presumptively correct."467  If the board's
decision is "rational and not clearly outside legal requirements, [it] should be
upheld rather than substituted by the impression a particular judge or panel
of judges might deem appropriate.' Finally, a determination by a
canvassing board should not be overturned by a court unless "there are clear,
substantial departures from essential requirements of law.'
469
If a recount is conducted pursuant to the new law, the county canvass-
ing board must follow procedures that are to be promulgated by the
Department of State addressing several issues, including: 1) the security of
ballots during the recount; 2) the time and place of any recounts; 3) the
public observance of the recount; 4) any objections to ballot determinations;
5) any record of the recount proceedings; and 6) procedures concerning
candidate or other representatives. 470 In conducting the manual recount, the
canvassing board must remember that it will be required to make transcripts
of its proceedings available to the general public. 47'
Thereafter, when the returns are finally certified, the canvassing board
must issue in duplicate a certified return of election.472 The official return is
comprised of "the return printed by the automatic tabulating equipment, to
which has been added the return of write in, absentee and manually counted
votes and votes from provisional ballots." 473 The certificate is required to
contain "the total number of votes for each person nominated or elected, the
464. Id. rule lS-2.027(2).
465. Proposed Rule 1S-2.03 1 (1)(i) & (2)(i), supra note 369.
466. Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 268-69 n. 5 (Fla. 1975).
467. Id. at 269 n. 5.
468. Id.
469. Id. McLean v. Bellamy, 437 So. 2d 737, 746 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983);
Anderson v. Canvassing & Election Bd. of Gadsen County, 399 So. 2d 1021, 1022-23 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
470. FLA. STAT. § 102.166(5)(c) (2001).
471. § 102.141(8).
472. § 102.151.
473. § 101.5614(8).
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names of persons for whom such votes were cast, and the number of votes
cast for each candidate or nominee. ' 474 One copy of the certificate is to be
filed with the local supervisor of elections.4 75 The other copy goes to the
local government entity involved in the election, or to the Secretary of State
if the election crosses county lines. 476 For those elections crossing county
lines, the state Elections Canvassing Commission provides the statewide
ministerial act of compiling cumulative results.
4 7
If challenged beyond the recount stage in an election contest, the
canvassing board may be involved as a "proper party defendant" in the
circuit court.478 The canvassing board is not, however, an indispensable
party to such a lawsuit. 479 Nor is it a proper party to a lawsuit if the election
dispute does not involve claims of improper balloting or counting. so The
canvassing board itself has no standing to challenge the results of an
election.48' Its responsibilities involve the certifying of election results, with
any challenge left to other parties. 482 Even if a canvassing board is grossly
negligent in the manner in which it handles its responsibilities, the election
results as certified by the board will nonetheless be upheld so long as they
"reflect the will of the voters.' 48 3 However, if a canvassing board willfully
refuses to perform its duties, its members can be charged criminally."4
Another responsibility of the canvassing board that may occur after an
election is concluded is to retest any tabulating device that has previously
been determined to be unsatisfactory, and that has thereafter been "repro-
grammed, repaired, or replaced."485  As with pre-election testing, the
474. § 102.151.
475. Id.
476. Id.
477. § 102.111(1). The duties of the statewide board are beyond the scope of this
article. For a brief discussion of the composition of the Elections Canvassing Commission,
see supra note 235.
478. FLA. STAT. § 102.168(4) (2001).
479. See FLA. STAT. § 102.168 (2002). See also FLA. STAT. § 102.171 (2001)
(mandating that contests involving general elections of members of the State Legislature shall
be determined according to the rules of each legislative body); Farmer v. Carson, 148 So. 557,
560 (Fla. 1933).
480. People Against Tax Revenue Mismgmt., Inc. v. Leon County Canvassing Bd., 573
So. 2d 31, 32-33 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
481. Morse v. Dade County Canvassing Bd., 456 So. 2d 1314, 1316 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1984).
482. Id.
483. Beckstrom v. Volusia County Canvassing Bd., 707 So. 2d 720, 725 (Fla. 1998).
484. Overstreet v. Whiddon, 177 So. 701,703-05 (Fla. 1938).
485. § 101.5612(4)(d).
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subsequent testing may be attended by only a single authorized member of
the canvassing board.4  Before this subsequent testing, however, the
canvassing board must provide notice to all parties who were present at the
original testing.4 7 This may be done orally at the "close of the first testing,"
or may be subsequently done via telephone.4
8
VI. CONCLUSION
The Florida election canvassing system has developed gradually
throughout the State's history. The presidential election of 2000 provided an
impetus for vast changes to the canvassing system, although the structure of
the county canvassing boards remains intact. The Election Reform Act of
2001, designed to resolve controversy arising out of the presidential election,
is not, however, without criticism.489 An analysis of various provisions in
the new law, including the new proposed administrative rules, indicates
several unanswered questions, assuring future tweaking of the canvassing
system and continued development of the historical role of judges in the
process.
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. Id.
489. Within two months of the effective date of the Election Reform Act, litigation had
already been filed challenging the constitutionality of several of its provisions. Thus far,
however, the challenge has had little to do with provisions involving the responsibilities of the
county canvassing board. Ellis Berger, Group Sues over Legislature's Reforms, SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 16, 2001, at 1 IA. Moreover, as of August 20, 2001, the
federal government temporarily halted the new statutory sections dealing with voter education,
voter registration lists, and provisional ballots. Kallestad, supra note 333, at 6B; Election
Reform: Answer Uncle Sam's Questions, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Aug. 25, 2001, at
14A.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Rulings in the Florida state courts, with one exception, raised no major
issues this past year. A number of technical matters were resolved, and the
appeals courts continued the ongoing process of holding trial courts
accountable for the protection of constitutional rights and enforcement of
Florida statutory provisions. The Supreme Court of Florida rendered one
major opinion, however. It held that it was constitutional to close termina-
tion of parental rights proceedings against a challenge by the media that such
hearings should be public. The Florida Legislature was less active than it had
been in recent years, tightening several provisions and making just a few
substantive changes to services in the dependency field and to provisions of
the delinquency law governing delinquent acts.
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; J.D., Boston College, 1970; B.A., Colgate University, 1967. The author
thanks Mark Earles and Garrett Franzen for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
This article covers cases decided through June 30.
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II. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
A. Adjudicatory Issues
In re Gault,' decided thirty-four years ago, requires that juveniles be
provided counsel in delinquency cases and, if indigent, are entitled to an
2attorney paid for by the state. In juvenile law survey articles going back
almost one third of that time, this author has recounted the ongoing failure of
Florida trial courts to comply with Gault.3 In T.S. v. State ,4 a young teenager
pleaded guilty to violation of the City of Orlando's youth protection
ordinance, a curfew, which barred juveniles from certain areas of downtown
Orlando after midnight, and was placed in a Level Eight Facility.5 At the
plea hearing, the child was not represented by counsel and was not informed
of her right to counsel in violation of rule 8.165(a) of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure.6 The trial court made a brief comment that it had
explained to the child her rights under the constitution, to which she had
agreed, although the statement did not appear in the transcript.7 There were
written waivers of the right to counsel but they had not been witnessed .
Recognizing that there is a right to counsel at all critical stages of a juvenile
proceeding in Florida,9 the court held that a plea is a critical stage and
warrants the same guarantee of effective assistance of counsel as do trial
proceedings. 10 The court reversed."
In another right-to-counsel case, D.C.W. v. State,12 the child appeared
for arraignment in a delinquency proceeding at which the court gave a
speech to the group of juvenile defendants before him and informed them of
1. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. Id.
3. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000
REV. 91, 92 and n.2 (2000).
4. 773 So. 2d 635 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
5. Id. at 636.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. T.S., 773 So. 2d at 635 (citing A.D. v. State
App. 1999)).
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. 775 So. 2d 363 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Survey of Florida Law, 25 NovA L.
, 740 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
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their rights.'3 The appeals court held that the specific colloquy with the
child, to the effect that the child had heard and understood the speech to the
group, was inadequate to meet the requirements of the Florida Rules of
Juvenile Procedure. The court held that the colloquy about the right to
counsel must include an inquiry into the juvenile's comprehension of the
right to counsel and his capacity to waive the right in an intelligent and
understanding fashion.'5 The issue came up a third time in G.E.F. v. State.'
In that case, at the detention hearing, when asked whether the child wanted
an attorney, the father replied in the negative and the court made no further
inquiry.17 Then at the plea hearing, the only colloquy among the child, the
parent, and the court concerned the court stating that it had offered the child
an attorney, asking whether the parent could afford an attorney, and then
when the mother replied that she could not, the court explaining the right to
a public defender, and the parent decided to waive that right."8 The court
failed to make any further inquiry as required by rule 8.165 of the Florida
Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which explicitly states what is necessary. The
appeals court reversed. 19
Under Florida law, prior juvenile delinquency adjudications may be
treated as convictions to enhance the classification of a subsequent
delinquency offense charge.' In State v. T.T.,2 a juvenile was charged with
a felony petit theft on the basis of prior convictions.2 In the T.T. case, the
prior delinquency proceedings resulted in withheld delinquency adjudica-
tions and not in convictions, and as a result the juvenile moved to dismiss the
delinquency charge. -  The trial court granted the motion and the First
District Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that because there was no express
statutory language that a withheld adjudication may be considered a
conviction for purposes of charging a juvenile in a subsequent delinquency
proceeding as occurs with adults.2
13. Id.
14. Id. at 364 (citing FLA. R. JUv. P. 8.165(b)(2)).
15. Id.
16. 782 So. 2d 951 (Fla. 2d Dist. App. 2001).
17. Id. at 952.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. FLA. STAT. § 985.228(6) (2001).
21. 773 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
22. Id. at 587.
23. Id.
24. Id. (citing FIA. STAT. § 784.03(2) (1999)).
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Proper application of Florida's risk assessment instrument and other
standards for secure detention have been the subject of discussion in this
survey on a number of occasions.2z The risk assessment instrument is a tool
used by the court to determine whether a child may be held in secure
26 27detention. The issue before the court in J.J. v. Frier arose in the context
of the writ of habeas corpus to overturn a trial court order that a child be
held in secure detention. Florida Statutes provide that the court may order
a placement more restrictive than that demonstrated by the statistical results
of the risk assessment instrument.29 Under those circumstances, the court
shall state its clear and convincing reasons for the placement in writing.30 In
J.J., the appellate court described the pertinent statute as a "departure
provision." The trial court did not state in writing the reasons for exceeding
the risk assessment instrument, and all the appellate court had before it was a
transcript of the detention hearing.32 The appeals court understood the
statutory obligations of the court to be specific and aimed at controlling
juvenile detention.33 Therefore, it could not "casually dispense with the
writing requirement[s]. ' 34  The court added that the statutory provision
required the judge's reasons rather than a statement of evidence. 5 Thus, the
appellate assessment of the reasons given by the judge to validate a variation
from the risk assessment requirement of the statute is not a deferential
review, but rather de novo review.
36
Florida cities, like those in many jurisdictions, have passed juvenile
curfew ordinances.37 The constitutionality of the City of Pinellas Park's
25. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 23 NOVA L. REv. 819,
831-34 (1999); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NOVA L.
REv. 179, 180-84 (1997); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21
NOVA L. REv. 189, 190-93 (1996); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida
Law, 20 NOvA L. REv. 191, 192-94 (1995).
26. See FLA. STAT. § 985.213(2)(b)1. (2001).
27. 765 So. 2d 260 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
28. Id. at 261.
29. FLA. STAT. § 985.215(2)0) (2001).
30. Id.
31. J.J., 765 So. 2d at 264.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 265.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. J.J., 765 So. 2d at 266.
37. See Michael J. Dale, Representing the Child Client, 3-38-3-41(2000).
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Juvenile Curfew Ordinance was before the Supreme Court of Florida in T.M.
v. State. 8 The ordinance made it unlawful for a juvenile to be or remain in a
public place or establishment between 11:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. of the
following day on Sundays through Thursdays and 12:01 a.m. through 6:00
a.m. on Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays.3 9 The child could be the
subject of a juvenile delinquency petition for violation of the ordinance.40
The supreme court reversed the Second District Court of Appeal without
ruling that the statute was or was not constitutional because the intermediate
appellate court had applied a heightened scrutiny test rather than the strict
scrutiny test.41 The Office of the Attorney General essentially conceded that
the wrong standard was applied and the case was remanded for application
of the strict scrutiny test.42
B. Dispositional Issues
At the close of the adjudicatory stage of a juvenile delinquency
proceeding, if the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been
proven, it may either enter an order of adjudication or withhold adjudica-
tion.43 When the court withholds adjudication, it shall place the child on
probation and set additional conditions such as restitution, community
service, curfew, urine monitoring, and driver's license revocation or
suspension, among others." When the court elects to adjudicate a child
delinquent, it may enter a disposition that the child be placed on probation.45
The issue before the appellate court in S.R.A. v. State6 was what length
of probation may be imposed upon a juvenile when the court withholds
adjudication of delinquency.47 The general rule in Florida is once the court
obtains jurisdiction over the juvenile under chapter 985, the court retains
38. 784 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2001).
39. Id. at 442-43.
40. Id. at 443.
41. Id. at 443-44.
42. Id. at 444.
43. FLA. STAT. § 985.231(1)(a)1. (2001).
44. § 985.228(4); FIA. R. Juv. P. 8.1 10(g) (2001).
45. §§ 985.03(43), 985.231. Until recently probation in Florida was known as
community control. Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA.
L. REv 91, 96 (2000).
46. 766 So. 2d 277,278 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
47. Id
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jurisdiction until the child reaches the age of nineteen.48 When the court
adjudicates the child to be delinquent and places the child on probation,
Florida law explicitly limits the term of probation. 49 But for a second-degree
misdemeanor, the statute limits probation to the maximum sentence that
could be imposed if the juvenile were committed to the Department of
Juvenile Justice, which may not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment
that an adult could serve for the same offense. 50 However, where adjudica-
tion is withheld, chapter 985 allows an indeterminate probation sentence
until the juvenile turns nineteen.51 Several courts have previously upheld the
statutory provision for indeterminate probation in the withheld adjudication
setting. 2 On the other hand, the Fifth District Court of Appeal rejected the
53distinction in G.R.A. Deciding that the juvenile justice system area is
remedial in nature, the Fourth District Court of Appeal in S.R.A. upheld the
legislative prerogative, although certifying the conflict with the Fifth District
Court of Appeal.4 The Supreme Court of Florida subsequently approved the
S.R.A. decision without opinion.
55
The general rule in Florida is that the trial court has exclusive original
jurisdiction over a child who is alleged to have committed a delinquent act
56
until the child reaches the age of nineteen. An exception occurs when the
court enters a disposition in which it commits the child to the Department of
Juvenile Justice when under certain circumstances the term of the commit-
ment shall be until the child is charged by the Department or until he or she
reaches the age of twenty-one.
57
In S.L.K. v. State, the trial court committed the child to a Level Eight
Department of Juvenile Justice program, suspending that commitment until
the child was accepted and completed a Level Six boot camp, and then
48. FLA. STAT. § 985.201(4)(a) (2001).
49. § 985.231(1)(a)l.a.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See M.B. v. State, 693 So. 2d 1066 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1997); N.W. v. State,
736 So. 2d 710 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1999) reh'g granted, 744 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 1999); M.G.
v. State, 696 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1997) overruled by G.R.A. v. State, 688 So.
2d 1027 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
53. 688 So. 2d at 1027.
54. S.R.A., 766 So. 2d at 280.
55. S.R.A. v. State, 772 So. 2d 1217 (Fla. 2000).
56. See FLA. STAT. § 985.201(4)(a) (2001).
57. § 985.231(1)(a)(IV)d.3.
58. 776 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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retained jurisdiction over the child until he reached the age of twenty-one.59
The appellate court reversed because the Department of Juvenile Justice's
commitment statutory provision allows the retention of jurisdiction in the
event that the commitment extends until the child's twenty-first birthday, but
does not allow the court to continue to retain jurisdiction if the child is
discharged from the commitment prior to the age of twenty-one. 661
F.T. v. State involved an appeal from a delinquency adjudication
where the child was placed on probation. 62 As this section of the article
explains, in general, when a child is placed on probation after a delinquency
adjudication, the maximum sentence cannot exceed that for which an adult
would serve time for the same offense. The issue in F.T. was whether, under
the facts of the case, the trial court had jurisdiction to adjudicate a violation
63
of probation. The child had initially been placed on probation on July 6,
1998.6 The child subsequently admitted a violation of probation and on
February 5, 1999 was adjudicated delinquent and placed on probation with a
suspended commitment to a Level Four facility.6 5 A second petition for
violation of probation was filed against the child on August 10, 1999 and
amended on September 23, 1999, and a hearing was held on October 7,
1999.66 The issue involved whether, in October 1999, the trial court had
jurisdiction to consider the affidavit of violation of probation.67 The
appellate court held that it did not because the one-year probation term, the
maximum term for the offense had the child been charged as an adult, had
68 69
expired. a Thus, the trial court lacked jurisdiction.
Florida's juvenile delinquency dispositional statute contains a provision
for dealing with juvenile sex offenders.70 The question in C.C.M. v. State71
was whether the sex offender probation conditions contained in the Florida
Statutes governing adult criminal defendants apply in juvenile delinquency
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1065.
61. 766 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1183.
64. Id. at 1182.
65. Id. at 1182-83.
66. F.T., 766 So. 2d at 1183.
67. l
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See FLA. STAT. § 985.03(31) (2001).
71. 782 So. 2d 537 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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proceedings.72 C.C.M. involved a thirteen-year-old who was found to have
committed a lewd and lascivious act upon another child. 3 At a review
hearing, after a dispositional hearing at which the child was committed to the
Department of Juvenile Justice for placement in a moderate risk residential
program, the court entered a modified order of adjudication and disposition,
imposing the sex offender probation conditions under the adult act.74 The
appellate court reversed, finding first that the adult statute containing
mandatory conditions of probation did not apply to juveniles because it was
silent as to its application to juveniles and because the content of the statute
also referred specifically to adult settings. 75 Although it found that the
statute applied exclusively to adults and juveniles sentenced as adults, the
appellate court commented in dicta that the lower court might have used its
discretion to impose adult-like conditions.76 However, it could not do so on
a mandatory basis because of the language of the adult probation statute.77
Because the court did not take discretionary authority at the time of the
original disposition, it was foreclosed from doing so at a later date.78
The juvenile delinquency disposition section of chapter 985 of the
Florida Statutes does not provide for what are often described in the adult
system as split sentences, whereby a judge orders commitment but suspends
the commitment and orders completion of a probation program.79 The First
District Court of Appeal recently rejected such an approach in Department
of Juvenile Justice v. K.B.80 In the K.B. case, the trial court ordered that if a
child failed to complete or violated a probation program through the
Tallahassee Marine Institute, the Department of Juvenile Justice would
immediately place the juvenile in a residential commitment facility without
the need for a probation violation proceeding.8' The appellate court
recognized that such an approach was creative, but that it was not available
within chapter 985.82 It then concluded, as other appellate courts have, that
72. FLA. STAT. § 948.03(5) (2001).
73. C.C.M. v. State, 782 So. 2d 537, 538 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 539.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 539-40.
78. C.C.M., 782 So. 2d at 540.
79. FA. STAT. § 985.03 (2001).
80. 784 So. 2d 556, 557 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
81. Id.
82. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.231 (2000)).
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trial courts do not have unlimited discretion in establishing dispositions.8 3
They may not place juveniles in particular facilities." That is left to the
discretion of the Department of Juvenile Justice.8
C. Appellate Issues
A technical, but nonetheless important issue of appellate practice, came
before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in J.C.R. v. State.86 The issue
involved preservation of a right to appeal an order by a trial court withhold-
ing adjudication of delinquency but impermissibly placing the child under
"community control for an indeterminate amount of time not to exceed the
child's twenty-first birthday.... ."87 The state conceded that the court lacked
authority to set the term of community control beyond the child's nineteenth
birthday but argued that the issue was not preserved for appeal.88 Florida
law provides that the appeal must be timely and pursuant to the statute
governing criminal appeals and the Florida Rules of Appellate Procedure.89
However, the court concluded that because the sentence imposed in the case
was similar to one that exceeds statutory maximum, it is the type of
fundamental sentencing error that can be raised on appeal without preserva-
tion of rights.90
A second issue relates to the ability of the state to appeal from an order
denying its request to impose restitution liens in a delinquency proceeding.
In State v. M.K.,91 the appellate court held that it lacked jurisdiction because
"there is no statute or court rule authorizing the state to appeal the
[particular) order at issue." 92 Recognizing that the state's right to appeal is
purely statutory, the court could find nothing in chapter 985's list of orders
that can be appealed by the state which would allow an appeal in the
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 784 So. 2d at 557 (citing R.LB. v. State, 693 So. 2d 130, 131 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1997)); Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. J.R., 716 So. 2d 872 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998);
Dep't of HRS v. State, 616 So. 2d 91, 91-92 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing In re
K.A.B., 483 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1998)).
86. 785 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
87. Id. at 551.
88. Id.
89. See FLA. STAT. § 985.234(1) (2001); J.C.R., 785 So. 2d at 551 n.1.
90. J.C.R., 785 So. 2d at 551.
91. 786 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
92. Id. at 25.
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particular instance. 93 The court in M.K. then dismissed the appeal after
commenting that the problem had existed in the adult criminal appeal arena
but had been corrected by statute.
94
III.- DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes, as it governs dependency proceed-
ings, is not a model of clarity and logic. 95 For example, none of the
subdivisions of the chapter are actually entitled "Dependency Proceed-
ings." 96 The definitional subpart of chapter 39 speaks of a child who is found
to be "dependent" and includes several categories of children.97 They are
children who have been abandoned, abused, or neglected, who have been
surrendered to the Department of Children and Families Services or to a
licensed child placing agency for purposes of adoption, who have been
voluntarily placed with a child caring agency or the Department, who have
no parent or legal custodian capable of providing supervision and care, or
who are in substantial risk of imminent abandonment, abuse, or neglect by a
parent or legal custodian.98 These categories of dependent children are then
further defined in the statute, 99 but lacking precision, have been the subject
of appellate review.
An abandoned child is defined in section 39.01(1) of the Florida
Statutes as being in a situation in which the parent or custodian, through his
or her absence, fails to provide for the child's support, fails to communicate
with the child, thus evidencing a willful rejection of parental obligations.'00
The facts must demonstrate to the court a settled purpose not to assume
parental duties.10 Incarceration may constitute abandonment. 02
The issue of how to evaluate abandonment as an evidentiary matter was
recently before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in S.C. v. Department of
93. Id. at 26 (citing FLA. STAT. § 985.234(1)(b) (2000)).
94. Id. (citing State v. MacLeod, 600 So. 2d 1096 (Fla. 1992)).
95. C.f. ZJ.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 787 So. 2d 875, 878 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2001).
96. But see Part II of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure, which is entitled
"Dependency and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings."
97. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(14) (2001).
98. Id.
99. See id.
100. § 39.01(1).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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Children & Families.10 3 The court recognized that there had to be a showing
of willful rejection of parental responsibilities or marginal efforts to support
and communicate with the child, such that there was a failure to evince the
settled purpose to assume parental duties.1°4 The appellate court's decision,
as one would expect, was fact driven. The court found that there was some
contact between the mother and the child while the child was not in the
mother's physical custody and that the mother did not fail to provide
financial support sufficient to establish abandonment because the husband
and wife were used to supporting the children fully whenever that parent had
custody of the child. °5 There had been no request for support made until the
dependency proceeding was filed by the paternal great-aunt and great-uncle
with whom the child periodically lived.106 The court concluded that the
pattern of conduct in evidence in the case was beneath the statutory
threshold for abandonment.107
Approximately ten years ago, the Supreme Court of Florida decided
Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,'0 in which it
held that permanent termination of a parent's rights to one child under
circumstances evidencing abuse and neglect may serve as grounds for
termination of parental rights to a different child.10 In M.F. v. Department
of Children & Families,1 the issue before the Supreme Court of Florida was
whether a court may base a final ruling of dependency "solely on the fact
that the parent committed a sex act on a different child." ''1 The court held
that a simple showing by the Department of Children and Family Services
"that a parent committed a sex act on one child does not by itself constitute
proof that the parent poses a substantial risk of imminent abuse or neglect to
the child's sibling, as required by [Florida law]."" 2 The court recognized
that the act may be quite relevant, but it is not automatically dispositive of
the question of dependency, and therefore the court should focus on all the
103. 767 So. 2d 579 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
104. Id. at 582.
105. Id
106. Id.
107. Id
108. 577 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 1991).
109. Id. at 571.
110. 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fa. 2000).
111. Id. at 1193.
112. Id. at 1194 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(11) (1997)).
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circumstances surrounding the petition in the particular case.13 The court
thus refused to apply a per se rule.
The application of dependency proceedings to cases involving domestic
violence was before the Fifth District in D.D. v. Department of Children &
Families.14 In that case, the appellate court affirmed an adjudication of
dependency in light of the trial court's finding of what Florida calls
"prospective neglect" based upon proof that the child witnessed multiple
incidents of domestic violence of both a physical and verbal nature, and that
the violence was proof of prospective neglect sufficient to support a
determination even in the absence of medical or other expert testimony.'
5
The appellate court first found that chapter 39's definition of neglect covers
the situation of domestic violence,' 6 and that the state need not wait for a
child to be neglected before instituting dependency proceedings. 1 7 Relying
upon an earlier Fourth District Court of Appeal opinion in D.H. v.
Department of Children & Families,"18 the court in D.D. held that the child
must view the acts of violence.1 9 The court then added that the child's
observation must be taken together with evidence indicating that the parents
would more likely than not resume their relationship in the future and thus
resume a cycle of domestic violence in the presence of the child in order to
prove prospective neglect for purposes of a finding of dependency.' °
Finally, the court held that, unlike in the termination of parental rights
setting, 12 the state need not prove in a dependency proceeding that there was
no prospect existing that the parent could improve his or her behavior1
2
The rationale is that there is a different standard of proof in a termination
case than in a dependency case because in the dependency proceeding, the
goal is to improve the parents' behavior for the purpose of reunification in
order to avoid termination.'
3
113. Id.
114. 773 So. 2d 615 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
115. Id. at 616.
116. Id. at 617; FLA. STAT. § 39.01(45) (2001).
117. Id. at 617.
118. 769 So. 2d 424 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
119. D.D.,773 So. 2dat 618.
120. Id.
121. See Palmer v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 547 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
122. D.D., 773 So. 2d at 618.
123. Id.
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Corporal punishment periodically forms the basis for a charge of
dependency1 24 In J.C. v. Department of Children & Families,"1 a stepfather
of one child, and father of a younger child, was charged with excessive
parental discipline.126 Noting that the stepfather, while not the biological
father of the older child, was in a position with approval of the mother to
discipline both children, dependency might flow to him.127 The allegations
of dependency were made related to physical, mental, and emotional injury
under chapter 39.128 Florida law allows for corporal discipline so long as it is
not excessive or abusive. 29 The court found that there was no evidence that
the bruises were significant or that they constituted temporary disfigure-
ment. 13  Nor was there any evidence that the children were likely to be
harmed if they were returned to their home.13' Finally, the court referred to
the Supreme Court ruling in Beagle v. Beagle,132 in which the high court, in
the context of grandparent visitation, relied upon the privacy provisions of
the Florida Constitution, which do not allow state involvement unless there
is a threat of harm
133
Florida, like other states, provides that in dependency proceedings,
hearsay statements of a child may be offered to prove abuse or neglect.
1 34
124. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L.
RE.. 91 (2001); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law Issues in Florida in 1998, 28 NOVA L. REV.
819 (1999); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1997 Survey of Florida Law, 22 NovA L. REV.
179 (1997); Michael . Dale, Juvenile Law: 1996 Survey of Florida Law, 21 NovA L. REv.
189 (1996); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L. REV.
191 (1995). Corporal punishment may also form the basis for a criminal charge. See
generally State v. MacDonald, 785 So. 2d 640 (Fla. 2d Dist Ct. App. 2001); Raiford v. State,
736 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that discipline of a child does not bar
prosecution for simple child abuse if the beating produces severe bruises enough to require
treatment at a hospital).
125. 773 So. 2d. 1220 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
126. Id
127. Id. at 1220-21.
128. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30)(a) (2001).
129. J.C., 773 So. 2d at 1221 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30)(a)(4.) (2001)).
130. Id
131. Id. at 1222 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (2001)).
132. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
133. J.C., 773 So. 2d at 1222. For a discussion of Florida grandparent visitation law,
see Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA LREv. 91, 98-100
(2000).
134. See generally, Michael J. Dale, REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT, 1-38-341
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 2001).
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However, under Florida law there must be other corroborative evidence of
the abuse or offense in order for the hearsay to be received in evidence.135 In
R. U. v. Department of Children & Families,136 the court recognized that the
corroborative evidence must tend "to confirm the unlawful sexual act," that
is to say, "the abuse or the offense., 137 The problem with the case at bar was
that the only evidence supporting the child's hearsay statements was other
hearsay statements made by the same child to the same therapist who
testified as to the original declarations.138 These other statements, the court
concluded, do not constitute other corroborating evidence within the
meaning of the Florida statute.1 39 The court concluded that the word "other"
refers to evidence derived from a source other than the child victim's own
statements. 4°
Florida provides by statute that a parent has a right to counsel in a
dependency proceeding.' 4 1 Despite the fact that counsel may be present and
may agree to the parents' consent to an adjudication of dependency of a
child, it is nonetheless incumbent upon the trial court to question the parent
concerning whether he or she understands the nature of the allegations
against him or her and the possible consequences of consent to the
dependency adjudication.' 42  Because the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedure so require, 143 the court in LD.M. v. State'4 held that consent by
counsel alone without court colloquy with the mother on these issues was
reversible error. 145
The need to move a dependency case in order that there be timely
disposition and decision about what should happen to the child is contained146
both in Florida law and in federal funding statutes. The need to move
expeditiously was made clear in dicta in A.R. v. Department of Children &
135. FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23) (2001).
136. 777 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
137. Id. at 1159.
138. Id. at 1160.
139. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 90.803(23)(a)2.b. (2001)).
140. Id.
141. FLA. STAT. § 39.013 (2001). There is no constitutional right to counsel. See
Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 30-32 (1981).
142. § 39.013
143. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.325(c) (2001).
144. 779 So. 2d 526 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
145. Id. at 527.
146. Florida Adoption Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 63.012-63.235 (2001); Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (1997).
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Families.147 After ruling that the evidence did not support a finding that the
mother's two children were dependent, the court explained that it was
"compelled to explicate a concern presented by this case even though our
reversal is not predicated on the point."'  The court then explained that the
record in the case contained no reason for a nearly eleven-month delay
between the commencement of the dependency hearing and its comple-
tion.' 49  Explaining that the delay was "indefensible" in light of the
fundamental nature of the interest at stake, and given that the legislature had
indicated that proceedings should be handled quickly and that the Supreme
Court had further enunciated time standards, the court concluded "[b]y
publication of this opinion, we hereby advise that delays such as those
involved in this case will not be countenanced."1 50
In K.R. v. Department of Children & Families,'15 the issue was whether
verbal arguments between parents may be sufficient to constitute neglect
within the statutory definition which would be adequate to support an
adjudication of dependency.152 The appellate court concluded that absent
evidence of injury or the risk of injury to the child, there could be no finding
of dependency. Specifically, there was no evidence of psychological
problems, which the child was experiencing, nor any deviation from normal
performance and behavior. 54 Recognizing that arguments are commonplace
and that they can be frequent and loud, verbal abuse between parents alone is
insufficient for state intervention. 
155
On the other hand, failure to protect a child from abuse may constitute
grounds for adjudication of dependency. In M.R. v. Department of Children
& Families Services,156 over a vigorous dissent, the appellate court upheld a
finding of dependency based upon a preponderance of the evidence that the
children had been abused and that the parents had failed to protect them
147. 784 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
148. Id. at 623.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 623-24.
151. 784 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
152. Id. at 598. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(43) (2001) (providing that neglect may involve
a significant impairment, an injury which may be defined as "an injury to the intellectual or
psychological capacity of a child as evidenced by a discernable and substantial impairment in
the ability to function within the normal range of performance and behavior.").
153. K.R., 784 So. 2d at 598.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 783 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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from abuse. 157 The evidence was unrebutted that there had been vaginal
penetration of two children. 15 The issue before the court was whether the
father had sexually abused the children. 59 The court held that the evidence
showed that the children had been abused and that the parents had failed to
protect them even though there was no showing as to the cause of the
children's injuries. 6° Judge Jorgenson vehemently dissented stating that
"[b]y its decision today, the court established a new evidentiary standard in
dependency cases: 'if we can't figure out what happened, Dad must have
done it and Mom must have failed to stop it."" The detail of the
concurrence and the dissent demonstrate the factual difficulties that can arise
in intra family dependency proceedings.
IV. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
Florida law authorizes nine separate grounds for termination of parental
rights. 62 They include a voluntarily executed written surrender, abandon-
ment, conduct which demonstrates continuing involvement of the parent or
parents in the relationship with the child, which threatens the life, safety,
well-being, or physical, mental or emotional health of the child irrespective
of the provision of services,163 the parent is incarcerated under certain
circumstances and for certain times subsequent to an adjudication of
dependency, the filing of a case plan, and continued abuse and neglect or
abandonment, egregious conduct that threatens the life, safety, or mental or
emotional health of the child or a sibling, subjection of the child to
aggravated child abuse, sexual abuse or battery or chronic abuse, commis-
sion or murder or voluntary manslaughter of another child or felonious
assault resulting in bodily injury to the child or another, and finally when
parental rights of the parent to a sibling have been involuntarily termi-
nated.'16 Several of the provisions of the Florida termination law relate to
the development and application of what is known as a "case plan." 16 A
157. Id. at 278.
158. Id. at 279.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 280.
161. M.R., 783 So. 2dat281.
162. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1) (2001).
163. Id.
164. § 39.806(1)(a).
165. § 39.601.
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parent's failure to comply with the case plan for a period of twelve months
can result in termination of parental rights. 
166
The issue before the Third District Court of Appeal in J.M. v. Florida
Department of Children & Families167 was whether a termination of parental
rights petition was prematurely filed because the time period within which
the parents had to comply with the case plan had not passed.161 The Florida
termination statute provides for different case plan compliance time frames
dependent upon which ground for termination is alleged.1 9 Thus, for
example, if it is determined that continuing parent involvement with the
child threatens life, safety, and well-being, there is no requirement for any
particular period of time under a case plan. 17 On the other hand, a separate
section of the law provides that a petition may be filed when the child has
been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed, and the child
continues to be abused and neglected.171 Under those circumstances, there
must be a failure of the parent to substantially comply for a period of twelve
months after adjudication of the child as a dependent child. 172 This time
period begins to run after the disposition. 3 In J.M., the mother argued that
the six-month period had run.174 In fact, the petition was filed under the
section which did not contain a time frame. Under the facts of the. case, no
time frame was required although the case plan contained a six-month
period. The petition for termination of parental rights was filed eight months
later and the court therefore affirmed the termination.
175
A second case involving application of the case plan is ZJ.S. v.
Department of Children & Families. 17 The facts of the case are strange.
The case plan called for a goal of termination of parental rights and then set
forth tasks for the parent to complete which are the type of tasks required to
achieve reunification.1 77 At the same time, according to the appellate court,
no services were offered to the parent to assist in accomplishing any of the
166. § 39.806(1)(e).
167. 762 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
168. Id.
169. FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2001).
170. Id.
171. § 39.806(I)(e).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. J.M., 762 So. 2d at 1029-30.
175. Id.
176. 787 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
177. Id. at 876-77.
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tasks assigned.178  The appellate court reversed because the ground for
termination of parental rights urged by the Department was the failure to
comply with the case plan. The problem was that the section governing
compliance with the case plan deals with a situation where the case plan has
the goal of reunification.179 The Department conceded that it did not offer a
case plan with a goal of reunification with the result that it had to establish
one of the other bases for termination of parental rights. Because it only
sought to terminate parental rights on the basis of the case plan, it could not
meet the standard, and therefore the case was reversed and remanded for
further proceedings. 18
The issue of what to do when a strong bond exists between a parent and
children, but where termination of parental rights is in the child's best
interests, came before the Second District Court of Appeal in D. W. v.
Department of Children and Families.18 1 In that case the trial court upheld
the termination of parental rights, although it recognized that the children
were not likely to be adopted because of their age and special needs. The
court opined that the children's best interests would be served by continued
contact with the father as well as with the biological grandparents. The
appellate court noted that structured contact with the parent is provided by
Florida law. 8 2 The appellate court then remanded in order to allow the trial
court to obtain additional evidence prior to exercising discretion on the
question of future contact between the parent and children as well as the
right of grandparent contact, which is also protected by statute.
18 3
Because termination of parental rights involves such fundamental
interests,184 the process by which the rights are terminated is replete with
protections for the parties. In KS. ex rel. A.S. v. B.C.,185 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment of termination of parental rights with
an important concurrence by Judge Sharpe. What disturbed Judge Sharpe
was that the evidence to support the finding of termination was hearsay.
Witnesses who testified lacked first hand knowledge of the facts. Two case
workers said that the parent had refused drug screenings as required by the
178. Id. at 877.
179. Id. at 878.
180. Id.
181. 763 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
182. See FLA. STAT. § 39.811(7)(b) (2001).
183. D.W.,763 So. 2d at498.
184. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 46-47.
185. 766 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
186. Id. at 1225-26 (Sharpe, J., concurring).
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case plans although one refusal had occurred before the case plans were
adopted, and neither worker was able to document any of from the case
file.18 7  Furthermore, the guardian ad litem who had recommended
termination had only seen the child with the parent once and based an
opinion that the parent acted inappropriately with the child upon observa-
tions of the mother's interactions with other children. 188 The court noted that
no hearsay objections were made below and thus the issue was not preserved
for appeal and waived.189 Significantly, in Florida termination cases,
children are not appointed counsel.19° They receive the assistance of
guardians ad litem on an ad hoc basis, and in this case the guardian testified.
Thus, the child had no lawyer. Furthermore, while parents are appointed
lawyers by statute in Florida,191 there is a cap on the amount that lawyers get
paid unless they can convince the court of the need for additional fees.' 92
The issue of whether Florida law, which requires a mandatory closure
of all hearings in termination of parental rights proceedings, violates either
the United States or the Florida Constitution was before the Supreme Court
of Florida in Natural Parents of J.B. v. Florida Department of Children &
Families Services. 93 The case was notorious, involving allegations that the
mother of the child suffered from Munchausen by Proxy Syndrome and
intentionally caused illness to the child involving many hospitalizations.'
94
Initially, at the dependency hearing stage, the parents sought closure of the
proceedings as well as a gag order to prohibit release of information, arguing
that closure was in the best interest of the child.195 The parents then changed
their position at the termination of parental rights stage claiming that the
Florida statute was unconstitutional in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 16(a) of
the Florida Constitution. 96 The Court rejected all of the parents' arguments
187. Id. at 1225.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. FLA. STAT. § 39.807 (2001); see Michael J. Dale, Providing Counsel to Children
in Dependency Proceedings in Florida, 25 NOVA L. REV. 769 (2001).
191. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2001).
192. § 39.0134(2).
193. 780 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 2001).
194. Id. at 7.
195. Id. at 7-8.
196. Id
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and found that the statute was constitutional. 197 Judges Anstead and Pariente
dissented.
198
Discovery issues do not appear often in either dependency or
termination of parental rights appellate opinions. However, the ability to
take a deposition did come before the appeals court in S.S. v. Department of
Children & Families Services.'99 In that case, the parents were provided
with discovery, including a witness list as a result of what the court
described as continuing demands for discovery.m On the Wednesday before
a Monday trial, the Department of Children and Families Services filed an
amendment to its discovery response in which it disclosed previously
undisclosed taped statements of the parties as well as adding new witnesses,
including an expert witness.2°t On the morning of trial, the court allowed a
continuance until the early afternoon to take the deposition of the expert.20 2
When counsel for the parent, due to time constraints, only briefly spoke with
the expert, the attorney renewed a motion for a continuance, which was
denied, and the expert then testified.2 °3 Parental rights were then termi-
nated.204 On appeal, the Fourth District concluded that disclosure is required
under the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure of persons having informa-
tion relevant to the case.205 Furthermore, the court held that while the
juvenile rules do not provide for what is known as a Richardson hearing,206
based upon the Third District Court of Appeal ruling in B.M. v. Department
of Children & Families Services,0 7 if the failure to produce the material is
prejudicial, there must be a reversal. Such was the case in S.S v. Department
of Children & Family Services.20 8
Under Florida law, one of the grounds for termination of parental rights
is when parents are engaged in conduct that demonstrates that continuing
involvement of the parent threatens the life, safety, or well-being of the child
197. Id. at 11 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.467(4), renumbered by § 39.809(4)(200 1)).
198. J.B., 780 So. 2d at 12-17.
199. 784 So. 2d 479.
200. Id. at 479.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 480.
203. Id.
204. S.S., 784 So. 2d at 480.
205. See FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.245(b)(2)(A) (2001).
206. S.S., 784 So. 2d at 480; Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
207. 711 So. 2d 616 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
208. S.S., 784 So. 2d at 480.
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irrespective of the provisions services. 2 9 In In re C.WW,210 the Second
District Court of Appeal, inter alia, discussed how the state may prove that
continuing involvement of a parent with a child may threaten a child's life,
211safety, or health irrespective of the provision of services. In that case, a
child was born prematurely with the presence of cocaine in its blood-
212
stream. As a result, the state filed a dependency petition and also sought a
judgment terminating parental rights. 3 The appeals court found that the
214trial court's order was not based upon the evidence in the record . It was
premised upon speculation by the trial court that the mother would fail to
215comply with the case plan which had a goal of reunification. The
appellate court held that speculation is not a valid basis for termination of
parental rights.2 6 In addition, there had to be a showing that any provision
of services would be futile or that the child would be threatened with harm
217despite the services provided to the parent. Because the trial court made
no finding and there was no evidence to support its determination,
apparently premised solely on the birth of a drug dependent child, the
218appeals court reversed. It noted further that in every reported Florida case
involving a newborn drug dependent child, there is a finding of a failed
attempt at a case plan or other evidence of abuse or neglect to support a
decision to terminate parental rights.219
V. STATUTORY CHANGES
A. Juvenile Delinquency
The legislature added language to the introductory provisions of chapter
985 providing that, among other things, it is the intent of the legislature to
preserve and strengthen a child's family ties. 220 The emotional, legal and
209. FLA. STAT. § 39.806(1)(c) (2001).
210. 788 So. 2d 1020 (FIa. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
211. Id. at 1023.
212. Id. at 1021-22.
213. Id. at 1022.
214. l at 1023.
215. In re C.W.W., 788 So. 2d at 1023.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 1025.
219. Id. at 1024.
220. FLA. STAT. § 985.02(7) (2001).
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financial responsibilities of the child's caretaker shall continue while the
child is in the care of the Department of Juvenile Justice.221 Unfortunately,
with the exception of the caretaker's ongoing financial obligations, which
are enforceable against the caretaker,222 the language is simply laudatory and
thus unenforceable.
The legislature added a new paragraph to the definitional language of
chapter 985 providing for a "respite" placement for juveniles "charged with
domestic violence as an alternative to secure detention... when a shelter
bed for a child in need of services or a family in need of services... is
unavailable., 223 The legislature also amended chapter 985 to protect victims
224of youth crime while in school. When the court determines that a victim
or sibling of a victim attends or is eligible to attend the same school as the
child who committed the delinquent offense, the court may enter a no-
contact order in favor of the victim or sibling.= It may alternatively note in
its disposition order that the parents of the victim or sibling do not object to
226the offender attending the same school or riding the same bus.
The legislature passed a complicated scheme for the expunction of
nonjudicial arrest records of a minor who prior to filing the application for
expunction has never been charged with a criminal offense and who has
227successfully completed a pre-arrest diversion program. The child's parent,
or the child, if over eighteen, may file a signed application for expunction on
a form developed by the Department of Juvenile Justice, together with an
official written statement from the State Attorney certifying successful
completion of the program.Y18 The filing fee is $75.00 unless waived by the
executive director of the Department of Law Enforcement Operating Trust
Fund.229 The application must be filed within six months of successfully
completing the program. 23 Whether the parents of children who complete
the diversion can successfully complete this process remains to be seen.
In the programs operations area, the legislature has explicitly authorized
the department to contract with faith-based organizations to provide services
221. Id.
222. See § 985.02.
223. § 985.03(46).
224. § 985.23(1)(d).
225. Id.
226. §§ 985.23(4)(f) (2001), 985.23(1)(d).
227. § 943.0582.
228. § 943.0582(3).
229. § 943.0582(4).
230. § 943.0582(5).
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to children.2 3' It also provided that the Department collect and annually
report cost data for every program it operates or with which it contracts.
Included is the development of a cost effective model for each commitment
program.233 The model shall include an analysis of recidivism rates for each
provider among other kinds of evaluations. This information, if properly
collected and dissimilated, should prove helpful in analyzing dispositional
alternatives.
B. Dependency and Tennination of Parental Rights
As a probable result of legislative bargaining, the legislature introduced
a system which makes mandatory the assessment of every dependent child
eleven years of age or older who has been in licensed foster care and who
has been moved more than once for placement in a licensed residential
facility.235 The procedure, oddly, only applies in Districts Four, Eleven, and
Twelve, and in the "Suncoast Region. The Department of Children and
Families is obligated to report to the legislature every year on December 1st
about this group of children. 2 7 The underlying rationale for the amendment,
at least in part, is the need for this group of children to achieve stability and
pennanency.2 8  The entire approach is subject to the availability of
appropriations. 9 It is also unclear from both the legislative history and
discussions by this author with a legislative staff member to the Senate
Judiciary Committee whether there were any data or studies to support this
legislative initiativemu
Finally, the legislature added language governing adoptions to the
termination of parental rights post-disposition relief section of chapter 39.24
231. FLA. STAT. § 404 (2000).
232. § 985.412(3) (2001).
233. § 985.412(l)(b).
234. Id.
235. § 39.521.
236. § 39.521(5)(a).
237. See § 39.521(5)(e).
238. See § 39.521(5)(b).
239. § 39.521(5)(f).
240. For a study suggesting that foster care and therapeutic foster care are more
desirable and efficient than group/institutional care, see Richard P. Barth, Institutions vs.
Foster Homes: The Empirical Base for a Century of Action, School of Social Work,
University of North Carolina (Feb. 17, 2002).
241. § 39.812. Adoptions are generally covered in chapter 63 of the Florida Statutes.
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The new provision requires adoption petitions to be filed in the circuit in
which the termination of parental rights judgment was entered unless a
motion for a change of venue is granted. u2 The adoption petition may not be
filed until the termination of parental rights judgment becomes final 3. And
the petition must be accompanied by a form containing information about
the child's medical and social history.2 4
VI. CONCLUSION
The legislature made no expansive changes in either the juvenile justice
or child welfare systems. The appellate courts continue the process of
supervision of trial court statutory compliance with chapters 39 and 985. The
intermediate appellate courts have also continued a process of analysis of
unclear statutes. Finally, the Supreme Court of Florida, in a significant
ruling, held that termination of parental rights proceedings are not absolutely
open to the public.
245
242. § 39.812(5).
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Natural Parents of J.B. v. Fla. Dep't of Children & Families Services, 780 So. 2d
6 (Fla. 2001).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Though many perceive boxing as a sport, to the players,2 it is a way of
life.3 Boxing is a "story without words," yet its language is most refined.4
Boxing is the most physical and direct of any sport.5 Its objective is simple.
The goal: a knockout. 6  The threat of death inevitably exists, though its
possibility remains remote? Boxing is dangerous, harsh, and unforgiving.
8
Yet, boxing is personal.9
1. Special recognition goes to Charles E. Lomax, John S. Wirt, and Sherman W.
Smith, III for allowing the opportunity to further explore this topic. Special recognition also
goes to Michelle Killian for the helpful sources; Randall Jones for the interviews; and James
Groschel for the updates on boxing news.
2. See discussion infra Part II.
3. See generally Michael Stephens, The Poetics of Boxing, in READING THE FIGHTS
259,259 (Joyce Carol Oates & Daniel Halpem eds., 1988).
4. JOYCE CAROL OATES, ON BOXING 11 (1987).
5. Id. at30.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 10.
8. ROBERT SELTZER, INSIDE BOXING 139 (Benjamin Matt ed., 2000).
9. OATES, supra note 4, at 8-9 (explaining that boxers bring "everything that is
themselves" to the fight).
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Dating back to the ancient Greeks, boxing may be the oldest sport in
existence.' Yet, despite its age, boxing has continued to operate outside any
central authority capable of enforcing minimum standards and uniform
rules.1 Prior to the 1994 Senate inquiry into professional boxing, it had been
approximately thirty years since the Senate's last boxing investiga-
tion.12 Now, thirty-seven years later, after years of minimal regulations, the
boxing world must comply with two pieces of legislation: the Professional
Boxing Safety Act of 199613 and the Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act.'
4
The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act ("Ali Act"), passed in May 2000,
serves as an amendment to the Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996.15
This Note illustrates the vast shortcomings of the Ali Act. Part II of
this Note discusses the individuals involved in effectuating a boxing match.
Parts III and IV examine the need for reform, and the Ali Act as its source.
This Note concludes that, although integrity may be lacking in the sport, the
Ali Act has not served the purpose of reinstating it.
]11. THE PLAYERS
A. The Boxer
Most boxers come from impoverished backgrounds.' 6 Boxing:
begins in ghettos, where life is cheap and physical well-being is at
risk in the food people eat and the absence of proper medical care
in their daily lives. It breeds in an environment where residents
carry knives and guns for protection, and fists are perceived as the
least potent of weapons.17
10. H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 8 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 329,
330.
11. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, CORRUPTION IN PROFESSIONAL
BOxING, S. REP. No. 103-408, at 28 (2d Sess. 1994).
12. Id. at 1.
13. Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. 111996).
14. Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. 11 1996),
amended by Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000).
15. See id.
16. OATES, supra note 4, at 85 (stating that about ninety-nine percent of boxers are
impoverished youths). See also THOMAS HAUSER, THE BLACK LIGHTS 9 (Univ. of Ark. Press
2000) (1986) ("Most fighters come from tough places; small beginnings where life is hard.").
17. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 13.
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To protect themselves and survive, they must know how to hurt others. 18
Some then turn it into a profession.19
The first individual necessary to effectuate a boxing match is the boxer.?
The boxer is the one entering the ring and the one placing himselfal in physical
peril. The boxer, as any other individual, is responsible for his own physical
well-being.2 He is the one physically training for the fight,23 undergoing the
medical procedures, and stepping on the scale at the weigh-in.25 When the bell
rings, he is the one in the ring, roped off from the rest of the world.26
18. Id. (statement of Michael Spinks, Montreal Olympic gold medalist and former
light heavyweight champion of the world).
19. See id.
20. Though boxers may be viewed as the most important individuals to effectuate a
boxing match, most often, the individuals not directly participating in the bout retain such
power as to make them the most important individuals to the boxing industry. See discussion
infra Part II.B-E.
21. Although many may believe boxing to be a man's sport, women have been
competing since the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Jennifer Hargreaves, Bruising Peg
to Boxerobics: Gendered Boxing-Images and Meanings, in BOXER: AN ANTHOLOGY OF
WRrrINGS ON BoxiNG AND ViSuAL Cu TuRE 121, 125 (David Chandler et al. eds., 1996). See
also SELTZER, supra note 8, at 147-48 (describing Christy Martin as a "pioneer" and "the
most famous female boxer in the world").
22. See Symposium: Boxing at the Crossroads, 11 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 193, 241
(2001) [hereinafter Symposium] ("[Tihe physical part is my responsibility.") (statement of
Evander Holyfield, Professional Boxer).
23. See SELTZER, supra note 8, at 29 ("Fighters are prisoners of their bodies, their
physiques the stone walls that trap them, that force them to fight in a certain style.").
24. 15 U.S.C. § 6304(1) (2000). See also Symposium, supra note 22, at 242 ("Every
time I fight they give me a brain scan ... .") (statement of Evander Holyfield).
25. A boxer is identified and limited by his weight class. See Interview with Randall
Jones, Production Assistant, Don King Productions, Inc., in Deerfield Beach, Fla. (July 27,
2001). Though the same pound delineations exist between the sanctioning organizations, they
are sometimes given different names. Id. For example, the World Boxing Council defines the
classes as follows: not over 105-strawweight; not over 108-ight flyweight; not over 112-
flyweight; not over 115-super flyweight; not over 118--bantamweight; not over 122-super
bantamweight; not over 126-featherweight; not over 130-super featherweight; not over
135-lightweight; not over 140-super lightweight; not over 147-welterweight; not over
154-super welterweight; not over 160-middleweight; not over 168-super middleweight;
not over 175-light heavyweight; not over 190---cruiserweight; over 190-heavyweight. Id.
See also Legislative Meeting of the Pa. State Athletic Comm'n in Ass'n with the Ass'n of
Boxing Comm'ns 202 (2000) [hereinafter Legislative Meeting] (explaining an experience in a
previous fight where the boxer did not want to get on the scale and how without which the
fight would not have taken place) (statement of Murad Muhammad, Promoter).
26. See SELTZER, supra note 8, at 9 ("Hell is not roped off. The ring is. And that may
be the only difference between the two venues.").
20021
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The boxer is responsible for telling his comer men27 about his
suitability for the particular bout.28 Ultimately, it is the boxer who runs the
risk of falling at the hands of an opponent-of never coming out of the ring
29 30the way he entered it no more than forty-seven minutes ago.
B. The Manager, Trainer, and Cut Man
The manager is a boxer's primary business representative, representing him
and his interests in all business transactions that occur during their relationship.3'
In return for his services, the manager often retains thirty-three and one-third
percent of the boxer's purse for each bout.32 Though managers are not
particularly liked,3 they serve a vital function to the boxer. The choices the
27. See PHI. BERGER, PUNCH LINES: BERGER ON BOXING 157-58 (1993) (describing
the importance of the comer man) ("In his sixty seconds between rounds, the comer man
enforces or revises his fighter's strategy. He is the 'cut man,' doing a surgeon's work.... On
the comer man's instincts and advice, championships have been won and lost.").
28. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 241-42 ("[It's important for my comer to
know [if I am not feeling well] and it is important for the referee to know cause that's their job
to see and make observations where they should stop the fight or not.") (statement of Evander
Holyfield).
29. The longest professional men's bout is for a championship. Interview with
Randall Jones, Production Assistant, Don King Productions, Inc., in Deerfield Beach, Fla.
(July 18, 2001). It is scheduled for twelve rounds, each round consisting of three minutes,
with a one-minute rest between rounds. Id. The shortest professional men's bout is a four-
rounder. Id. Like all other men's bouts, each round consists of three minutes, with a one-
minute rest between rounds. Id. On the other hand, the longest professional women's bout,
and also for a championship, is a ten-rounder. Id. Each round consists of two minutes, with a
one-minute rest between rounds. Interview with Randall Jones, supra note 29. The shortest
bout in which a female can participate consists of four rounds, with the same time
specifications as for a ten-rounder. Id.
30. See Hugh Mcllvanney, Onward Virgin Soldier, in READING THE FIGHTS 185, 192-
94 (Joyce Carol Oates & Daniel Halpern eds., 1988) (describing the death of professional
boxer Johnny Owen after a twelfth round knockout); OATHS, supra note 4, at 89 (describing
the death of professional boxer Benny "Kid" Paret at the hands of Emile Griffith in a 1962
bout); Id. at 98 ("Between 1945 and 1985 at least three hundred seventy boxers have died in
the United States of injuries directly attributed to boxing.").
31. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 24.
32. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 213 (discussing the thirty-three and
one-third percent a manager generally takes from the purse of the boxer) (statement of Bob
Duffy).
33. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 34.
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manager makes, with and for the boxer, often direct the boxer's career.34
A good manager never places his fighter in a fight he does not think his
fighter can win. In a sport where "one or two losses can kill a fighter's
career,'' 36 managers must be cautious in choosing an opponent.3  To
maximize the effectiveness of the manager and the success of the boxer, it is
necessary that they share a good rapport.
3 8
In his capacity, the manager is responsible for selecting the boxer's
trainer.39 A boxer's trainer is crucial to his survival. ° "A great trainer is a
natural: he actually sees the moves and studies them, and he must have the
ability to convey techniques to his fighters. He must be a psychologist and a
mind reader, sometimes a father and a mother."41 Trainers must know their
fighters and their fighters' opponents.4
Physical labor is the first requirement to becoming a quality fighter. 3
The harder the boxer trains, the better he becomes." The goal of training is
to move quicker and get hit less.45 The trainer makes this possible.' Part of
being a good trainer, however, is telling the fighter at which point to stop
34. See BERGER, supra note 27, at 202 (quoting Shelley Finkel, Manager of Evander
Holyfield, as stating the manager's basic responsibility towards the boxer is the "[m]ost
money for the least risk.").
35. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 34.
36. Id. at 35.
37. Id. at 34. 'My job is to outwit people. Every fight requires that I be in there
looking for an edge. And if I can find an opponent who gives the appearance of being
formidable while posing no threat whatsoever to my fighter, that's fine." Id. (statement of
Emanuel Steward, Manager).
38. Id. ("You've got to love your fighter. Otherwise it's dangerous. You'll send him
out and get him mangled or killed.") (statement of Eddie Futch, former Manager of Joe
Frazier).
39. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 40.
40. Id.
41. ARLENE SCHULMAN, THE PRIZEFGHTERS: AN INTIMATE LOOK AT CHAMPIONS AND
CONTENDERS 33 (1994).
42. Id. at 100 ('No two fighters can do things the same way. Know their
shortcomings and their idiosyncrasies and their physical makeup. And... always make sure
you know about his opponent.") (statement of Ray Arcel, Trainer).
43. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 17.
44. See id. at 17-18. "Wasted talent is the oldest story in boxing. A fighter who
coasts in training betrays his dreams and his future." Id. at 18.
45. Id. at 29. As part of his training, a boxer often boxes with a sparring partner to
help him whet his skills. See generally BERGER, supra note 27, at 312.
46. A trainer "makes sure his fighter gets in shape. He'll be with [him] constantly.
Wakes him up in the morning. [G]oes to watch him run. Sits with him when he has breakfast.
Walks with him after breakfast. Et cetera, et cetera." BERGER, supra note 27, at 141.
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training. 7 The trainer can do everything to make his fighter the best, but
then the bell rings. Sometimes, his fighter gets hit with a devastating blow.
Yet, the trainer's responsibilities continue. The trainer must now encourage
his fighter to continue fighting.48
When the boxer retreats to his comer between rounds, it is then that the
cut man does his job.49 The cut man, like the trainer, must know the boxer.5
The cut man is as important to the fight as is the boxer.51 The cut man is
responsible for stopping the flow of blood from the fighter's face.52 He uses
tools such as cotton swabs, vaseline, and a paste-like substance to stop the
bleeding. 53 The cut man also uses Enswell54 to stop an eye from closing and
reduce the swelling.5 The fight often continues until the "third man in the
ring' '56 stops the bout or the final bell sounds.
C. The Promoter
"The promoter is one of the most erudite men in the fight game-and,,57 51
one of the shrewdest. What he is not, however, is well-liked. Much
47. Id. at 198 ("[The fighter] figures if work is good, more work is better. It's not so,
though. Sometimes you have to back off, so the fighter takes into the ring everything he's got
and doesn't leave it in the gym or on the road.") (statement of Eddie Futch, Trainer for
Riddick Bowe).
48. OATES, supra note 4, at 13.
49. See BERGER, supra note 27, at 158.
50. SCHULMAN, supra note 41, at 99 ("There is a secret to handling a fighter who is
cut and bruised.... Some fellas get a small cut and they think they're gonna bleed to death.
You have to know your fighter. Is the fighter able to handle the cut? ... The most sensitive
human beings in the world are boxers.") (statement of Ray Arcel).
51. See BERGER, supra note 27, at 141 ("Fights are lost for lack of a corner's skill in
these between-round crises.").
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Enswell is a flat, chilled iron bar that is fundamental in boxing. JACK NEwFIED,
ONLY IN AMERICA: THE LIFE AND CRIMES OF DON KING 285 (1995).
55. Id.
56. OATES, supra note 4, at 47. The "third man in the ring" is the referee---the
intermediary and the conscience of the fight. Id. He is often the only neutral and objective
observer. See id. "The referee holds the power of life and death at certain times since his
decision to terminate a fight, or to allow it to continue, can determine a boxer's fate." Id. at
48.
57. SELTZER, supra note 8, at 113. Today, women also serve as promoter to many
fighters. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 221 (statement of Jerry Izenberg introducing
Kathy Duva).
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condemnation is often cast upon the most successful promoters in the
business; however, these are the promoters for whom managers want their
fighters fighting.59
Though it may appear simple, boxing promotion entails many
intricacies. 60 In addition to matching two fighters to create a stimulating
bout, 61 promoters must be accomplished businessmen.62 The promoter must
cultivate and nurture relationships with fighters, managers, television
executives, the media, and sanctioning organizations.63 There are three
major sources of income for a promoter: the fight's live ate,64 the sale of
domestic and foreign television rights,65 and incidentals. This revenue,
however, does not necessarily mean that the promoter makes a profit.67 At
58. See HAUSER, supra note 16, at 69 (Univ. of Ark. Press 2000) (1986) (stating that,
perhaps more so than managers, "promoters are treated harshly by boxing scholars").
59. Id. at 56 ("Don King is a liar and a thief... .This guy wants all the money and all
the fighters.... If I was a fighter and needed a promotor [sic], who would I take? Don King.
The man is the best. Don King delivers.") (statement of Rich Giachetti, former Manager and
Trainer of Larry Holmes). See also BERGER, supra note 27, at 172 ("Even his most bitter
rivals credit [Don] King with the intelligence and cunning to survive in a cutthroat
business."); Boxing In and Out of the Ring (A&E television broadcast, July 22, 2001) ("Don
King is not really different from other boxing promoters. He's just better than anybody else.")
(statement of Thomas Hauser, Author and Boxing Historian).
60. See HAUSER, supra note 16, at 69.
61. Fighters are often matched by a matchmaker. See JAMES B. ROBERTS &
ALEXANDER G. SKUTr, Tim BOXING REGisTER: INTERNATiONAL BOXING HALL OF FAME
OFRCIAL RECORD BOOK 417 (1997). Matchmakers and promoters often work together to
match a fight that the public would want to see. See id. at 418.
62. See HAUSER, supra note 16, at 69.
63. Id. See also Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59 (explaining that
promoters put the fights together because they maintain relationships with the managers to
convince the fighters to fight and they work with the networks in agreeing upon a figure for
the broadcast) (statement of Ross Greenburg, President of HBO Sports).
64. Casinos generally pay the promoter a site fee to hold the fight at their arena.
HAUSER, supra note 16, at 70.
65. Often the promoters retain the revenue from their selling the domestic and foreign
television rights. See id.
66. Such incidental items include the sale of advertising on ring posts, video cassettes,
and fight programs. Id.
67. From this income, the promoter must pay the boxers' purses, other costs of the
promotion, and it's company overhead. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195
(statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, Associate General Counsel, Don King Productions, Inc.,
at p. 5).
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times, promoters sustain a loss from the promotion. 68  Nonetheless,professional boxing remains driven by money.69
D. The Sanctioning Organizations
The sanctioning organizations control championships, not lower level
boxing bouts.70  A bout must be sanctioned by one of the sanctioning
organizations before it can be considered a championship match or an
official title-elimination bout.71  The power of these "alphabet soup"
72
organizations stems from this influence. The fighters want these
organizations. 73 These organizations have the power to award the boxer a
title belt and allow him to call himself the champion. These organizations,
therefore, promulgate money for the fighters.7 They also "set their own
rules, establish their own medical and safety standards, make their own
rankings, and designate their own 'world champions.' ''76 Each sanctioning
organization is separate and distinct from the other.7 7 Further, because there
68. "Everybody thinks a promoter makes money in the first, second, third fight.
Sometimes we lose in ten just to make it on the 12th." Id. at 192 (statement of Murad
Muhammad).
69. PETER BACHO, BOXING IN BLACK AND WHITE 114 (1999). See also Symposium,
supra note 22, at 200 ("[Almateur boxing is a true sport. Professional prize fighting is a
business.") (statement of Mills Lane, Retired Boxing Referee and Retired Judge).
70. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 93.
71. See id.
72. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 250 (referring to the sanctioning organizations)
(statement of Jerry Izenberg, Sports Columnist); see also SELTZER, supra note 8, at 21
(naming some of the sanctioning organizations that sponsor championships) ('"Well ... there
is the IBF, the WBA, the WBC, the WBO, the IBO, the IBC, the WBF, the WBU, the .... ).
73. Symposium, supra note 22, at 249 (statement of Lou DiBella, Vice President of
HBO, Time Warner Sports).
74. See id. at 253 ("[Tlhe people most responsible for sustaining the meaning of those
pieces of plastic that aren't worth 20 bucks are the fighters themselves.") (statement of Lou
DiBella).
75. See id. at 256 (discussing the importance of a title belt) ("You are talking about a
guy making 17 million dollars, now because he lost for the first time in 8 years he is making 2
million dollars.... [T]hey said the belt don't make a difference but every time I get them belts
the money increased.") (statement of Evander Holyfield).
76. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 93.
77. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 217 ("There is no centralized authority in
boxing.") (statement of Max Kellerman, Boxing Broadcaster and Analyst). Though there are
many "little minor league [sanctioning organizations]," there are three major sanctioning
bodies. Id. at 206. The three major sanctioning organizations are the World Boxing
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are seventeen weight classes78 and numerous sanctioning organizations,7
there is often more than one champion for each weight class. There is not
just one world champion.80 Many credit the sanctioning organizations asbeing the "root of the problem" with boxing today.81
E. The Media
"Television revenues pay the purses. 82 The technology of television
has made boxing an even more lucrative business.83  Closed circuit
broadcasts have provided the players8 with an opportunity for a big
payday.85  Pay-per-view buys increase the possible number of viewers,
thereby increasing the profit margin of the event.86 The biggest payday in
boxing history was Holyfield/Tyson II, which has now become known as the
87infamous ear-biting fight. This event purportedly grossed over one
hundred million dollars, domestically, in one night on pay-per-view.8
Today, networks such as Home Box Office ("HBO") negotiate with
fighters for multi-fight deals-deals for a certain amount of years and a
Association (WBA), the World Boxing Council (WBC), and the International Boxing
Federation (IBF). See id. at 221.
78. See supra text accompanying note 25.
79. See discussion supra, note 77.
80. See SELTZER, supra note 8, at 21 ("[here are almost as many world champions
as there are fans to pay for their fights."); see also SCHULMAN, supra note 41, at 77 ("[I]nstead
of one World Series or one Super Bowl, there are several. And for each middleweight who
declares himself champion after his bout, there are four more sitting in the audience.").
81. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 200 (statement of Mills Lane, Retired Boxing
Referee and Retired Judge); see also statement of Jerry Izenberg (describing the presidents of
the three major sanctioning bodies). Id. at 206. "The major problem as I see it is the problem
raised by both Mills Lane and Jerry Izenberg and that is the sanctioning organizations. Quite
frankly they have to go. They are not honest. They are not fair. They are not moral." Id. at
209 (statement of Amos C. Saunders, Retired Presiding Judge). "[W]e are in this room and
everybody here has just about said that the sanctioning organizations are the problem." Id. at
222 (statement of Kathy Duva, Promoter).
82. SCHULtMAN, supra note 41, at 77. "Television represents money." Id.
83. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59. Television makes the money. Id.
(statement by Ron Scott Thomas, Matchmaker, Cedric Kushner Productions).
84. See discussion supra Part II.A-D.
85. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
86. Id.
87. Id. This Evander Holyfield and Mike Tyson rematch took place on June 28, 1997.
Interview with Randall Jones, supra note 29.
88. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
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certain number of fights.89 Networks, however, like to advertise fights as
"championships." 9 This makes the fights more appealing to the public and
generates more revenue.91 For a fight to be considered a championship,
however, it must be sanctioned by a sanctioning organization. 92 Sanctioning
organizations work with promoters to sanction the bout, the promoters with
the managers, and the managers with the fighters.93 One can see how each
player is vital to the success of the industry. One can also see how simple it
could be to corrupt the entire sport.94
This "commercialised [sic] system" has undoubtedly increased the
profit potential for boxers.95 However, it has also "severed [boxing's]
connection with a grass-roots culture in which its higher aspirations were
bred.
'29 6
F. The Fan
To the untrained viewer, most boxing matches appear savage.97 Though
spectators often see the courage, the skill goes undetected.98  As the
spectator becomes a fan, however, the design is unraveled. 99 Though a
"casual viewer will only react to the most obvious action, such as a
knockdown or a knockout," the true fan discerns the "careful steps the
winning boxer took to reach that point.''t° Just as in any other sport, a
boxing spectator often thinks that with proper training, he, too, could
become a professional boxer.101 To be a quality fighter, however, one must
have physical attributes, such as agility, timing, power, speed, and
89. Id. (statement of Ross Greenburg).
90. Id. (statement of Thomas Hauser).
91. See id.
92. See discussion supra Part II.D.
93. See discussion supra Part II.B-D.
94. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59 ("It only takes one person to corrupt
the whole system because then the others have to pay just to keep the playing field level.")
(statement of Doug Beavers, Former IBF Ratings Committee Chairman).
95. David Chandler, Introduction: The Pictures of Boxing, in BOXER: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF WRITINGS ON BOXING AND VISUAL CULTURE 13, 17 (David Chandler et al. eds.,
1996).
96. Id. See also ROBERTS, supra note 61, at 410 ("No other sport can so justifiably
blame television for a period of serious decline .....
97. OATES, supra note 4, at 100.
98. BACHO, supra note 69, at 111.
99. See OATES, supra note 4, at 100.
100. BACHO, supra note 69, at 111.
101. See HAUSER, supra note 16, at 12.
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endurance, "far beyond those of ordinary men."102 To the true fan and the
players, boxing "is more than a sport. It's a skill."' 0 3
I. THE NEED FOR REFORM
Professional prize fighting does not advance the "safety first" attitude
as amateur boxing does.'04 Professional boxing stresses heavy hitting.
105
There is no head gear, and smaller gloves are used, as compared to amateur
boxing. 0 6 Further, the regulation of boxing is left to the individual states.
10 7
In response to the safety issues prevalent within the boxing industry, the
Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996 was passed. °8
Although the boxers now had some form of protection within the ring,
protection outside of the ring was a different story.1°9 Corruption in boxing
is an old story.' 10 It is the easiest sport to fix."' It only takes one bribe.'
2
In the past, boxing has been associated with organized crime. Some still
question its prevalence within the sport."
4
Though boxing is a multi-million dollar business, the money is often
divided between those outside the ring.115 "Anything seems to go in a
business in which larceny is sometimes mistaken for charm, and cheating for
cleverness ... [p]eople who should be in jail are looked upon as characters
instead of the scum they really are."'
16
102. Id. at 12-13.
103. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 12 (quoting Sugar Ray Leonard, former Professional
Boxer).
104. BACHO, supra note 69, at 113.
105. Id. at 114.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See generally Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. II
1996).
109. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 57 ("The most insidious and dangerous enemies of
boxing have not been foes from without, but the terrible breakers-down on the inside. The
most serious threats to boxing always have come from within.") (statement of Nat Fleisher,
Publisher and Boxing Scholar).
110. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 58.
116. Id. at 57-58 (quoting Michael Katz, writer for the New York Times).
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Sanctioning organizations often endure much of the criticism'"7 because
they control the ratings." 8 In the past, The Ring magazine dictated the
ratings." 9  When its ratings became corrupted, however, sanctioning
organizations took over.im It was not long before those ratings became
corrupted also.1
Ratings are important because they dictate the value of the
fighter.122 The higher ranked he is, the more valuable to the industry-and
himself.123 Further, if a boxer is ranked within the top fifteen, he can fight
for the championship. 12 The problem arises because often, "ratings are for
sale."' 25 Just as often, however, promoters are buying. 26
Doug Beavers, former International Boxing Federation ("IBF') Ratings
Committee Chairman, served in more than one capacity. 27 He also served as
the "bagman" 128 for the organization. 29  When the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI') investigated the IBF a few years ago, they arrived at
Mr. Beavers' house to question him. 30 To their arrival, he responded,
"What took you so long?"' 1
Undoubtedly, the ratings are questionable, at best. In a sport where
the object is to knockout the opponent, it is always best "to heed the
referee's warning-'protect yourself at all times.'
1 33
117. See discussion supra Part II.D and note 81.
118. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
119. Id.
120. Id. (statement of Thomas Hauser).
121. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. Id.
125. Id. (statement of Jack Newfield, Boxing Historian).
126. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59 ("If their selling influence, he's
buying.") (statement of Jack Newfield about Cedric Kushner, Boxing Promoter).
127. See id.
128. "Bagman" is often the term used for an individual accepting bribes. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59. Mr. Beavers continued to explain
that, "It was like extortion. If you want to survive in the IBF, you gotta pay." Id.
132. Many often believe fights to be fixed. However, more often, it is not the fights
that are fixed-it is the ratings. Id.
133. HAUSER, supra note 16, at 57.
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IV. THE MUHAMMAD ALl BOXING REFORM ACT13
4
Four years after the passage of the Professional Boxing Safety Act of
1996, the Ali Act was passed. 35 Congress made several findings relative to
safety outside of the ring. 136 Congress found that: 1) boxing lacks a central
governing body; 2) state regulation is proper; 3) promoters can take
advantage of the industry by engaging in business with states having weaker
regulations; 4) rankings are susceptible to corruption; 5) common practices
of promoters and sanctioning organizations constitute restraints on trade; and
6) it is necessary to establish reform.1 37  In response to such findings,
Congress passed the Ali Act to protect professional boxers, assist boxing
commissions in providing oversight, and promote honorable competition.
The goal of any legislation directed towards boxing should be the health and
safety of its participants. 39 This is undisputed. However, this legislation,
though meritorious, is misdirected. The Ali Act is not without its strengths,
however.
A. The Strengths
The Ali Act is an effort to establish and enforce regulations to protect
the boxers and public interest.14° It is an effort to regulate boxing because
boxing "can't regulate itself."14 ' This law was intended to provide boxers
with greater control over their careers. 42 Through several provisions of the
Ali Act, boxers are economically protected.
134. Professional Boxing Safety Act of 1996, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (Supp. 11 1996),
amended by Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6301 (2000).
135. The Muhammad Ali Boxing Reform Act was passed on May 26, 2000. 15 U.S.C.
§6301 (2000).
136. H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 2 (1999).
137. Id.
138. H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 2 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 329,
329.
139. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 208 (statement of Amos C. Saunders).
140. See id. (statement of Paul Feeney, representative of Senator John McCain and co-
drafter of the Ali Act).
141. Id. at 214. ("Can boxing regulate itself? No, boxing can't regulate itself because
there are too many people right now who are benefiting from the system as it presently
exists.") (statement of Lou DiBella).
142. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 46.
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Section 7b of the Ali Act provides boxers with protection from coercive
contracts.143 This provision is intended to protect boxers from being forced
into long-term contracts as a condition to their being granted a fight.'"4 If
Boxer A, who is under a promotional contract with Promoter C, would like
to fight Boxer B, who is under a promotional contract with Promoter D,
145Promoter C can only ask for options up to twelve months on Boxer B in
the event that his boxer, Boxer A, loses.146 This would entitle Promoter C to
twelve months of promoting Boxer B, the winner of the bout. This provision
also provides that in the last three months of this twelve-month option,
Boxer B and Promoter C can freely negotiate for an extended promotional
contract or end their relationship. 147
However, this provision only applies if the boxer and promoter are
already under contract with each other for the particular bout.148 If, for
example, a promoter would like to set up a bout for a boxer in whom he
currently has no promotional interest, he can contract with the boxer for
more than the twelve-month period. 149 This provision prevents promoters
from coercing boxers into entering extended contracts to be granted fights. " °
If, however, the bout is a mandatory' 5' bout, the twelve-month option would
not apply.152 If one is the mandatory contender, he has earned his right to the
title fight and, therefore, will not be required to grant any future promotional
rights in exchange for the opportunity to the bout.153
143. 15 U.S.C. § 6307b (2000).
144. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 8 (statement of Paul Feeney). This does
not apply to boxer-manager contracts, however. Id. at 21 (statement of Greg Sirb, President of
the Association of Boxing Commissions).
145. "Options" refer to the granting of certain rights to a promoter as a condition
precedent to the boxer's participation in a bout with another boxer who is under a contract
with another promoter. See 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(a)(1)(A)(ii). In this example, the granting to
Promoter C of promotional rights over Boxer B.
146. Id. See also Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 21 (statement of Greg Sirb).
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(a)(3).
148. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 58 (statement of Greg Sirb).
149. See id. at 23 (statement of Greg Sirb).
150. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 630Th.
151. Mandatory bouts are defined by the sanctioning organizations. See § 6307b(b).
Mandatory bouts generally refer to bouts between the champion and the individual ranked
number two in the organization's ratings. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 24. The
number two ranked individual is also referred to as the number one contender. Id. at 30
(statement of Paul Feeney).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 6307b(b).
153. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 24.
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Section 7c of the Ali Act is also beneficial to the boxing indus-
try. Section 7c addresses the sanctioning organizations and the ratings
criteria. 54 It provides, in part, that a sanctioning organization not be entitled
to compensation:
until, with respect to a change in the rating of a boxer previously
rated by such organization in the top 10 boxers, the organization-
(1) posts a copy, within 7 days of such change, on its Internet
website or home page, if any, including an explanation of
such change, for a period of not less than 30 days; and
(2) provides a copy of the rating change and explanation to an
association to which at least a majority of the State boxing
commissions belong. 55
Section 7c provides that the boxers and the boxing industry 6be provided with
an explanation for a boxer's rise or fall in the ratings. This provision
makes it more difficult for the ratings system to be arbitrary. This section
also provides the boxers with an opportunity to appeal the ratings change.1
57
The boxer can submit a request to the sanctioning organization, to which the
sanctioning organization must provide the boxer with a written explanation
of the criteria used in evaluating him and the rationale for the change.
158
Sections 7b and 7c are undoubtedly beneficial to the boxers and the
boxing industry. However, these sections also have shortcomings. Section
7b does not make it illegal to enter into such contracts.15 9 Rather, it makes
the contract unenforceable.16 The contract can be entered into; however, if
the fighter later brings suit, the contract cannot be enforced against him. 61
This section, therefore, presupposes that the fighter will actually bring suit.
Further, under section 9, the fighter can bring a civil cause of action to
recover economic injury he suffers. 62  In a sport where "[a
PRIZEFIGHTER'S] life is a short one"163 a boxer may not want to endure
154. 15 U.S.C. § 6307c (2000).
155. § 6307c(c).
156. Id.
157. § 6307c(b).
158. § 6307c(b)(1)-(2).
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 6307b (2000).
160. Id.
161. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 26 (statement of Robert Gordon, co-drafter
of the Ali Act).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 6309(d) (2000).
163. SCHULMA, supra note 41, at 119.
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protracted litigation. He may, logically, remain under the coercive contract
so that he is at least guaranteed a certain number of bouts per year and,
therefore, a steady income.
Section 7c also has shortcomings. This section only applies to the
boxers "previously rated by such organization in the top 10.. . ."164 What
happens to the boxer ranked eleventh? Although he is still entitled to the
appeals process, he is not guaranteed notification of the change in his
ranking under the Ali Act. Boxers ranked in the top ten are worth more
money than those in the lower rankings. This is undisputed. However, the
Ali Act is not affording all boxers the same opportunities and protections.
The Ali Act is not protecting the boxers who need it most.
65
B. The Weaknesses
"[P]eople that know nothing about the sport of boxing.., now want[]
to change the tradition of the sport overnight. And that is not going to
happen."' 66 It is quite possible that the drafters of the Ali Act do not
understand the complexity involved in effectuating a boxing
match.167 Further, though one of the purposes is to protect the rights and
welfare of professional boxers,16 the boxers in need of the most protection
are not being protected by this legislation.
Section 8 of the Ali Act addresses the conflicts of interest within the
industry. 69 The Ali Act, in amending the Professional Boxing Safety Act of
1996, now provides for a "firewall" between promoters and managers.170
This firewall prevents a promoter and a manager from having financial
interest, direct or indirect, in the other's operations.17' This provision
appears to eliminate any conflict of interest between a promoter and manager
that may be prevalent within the industry. However, an exception exists.
This firewall "only applies to boxers participating in a boxing match of
10 rounds or more."'' 72 If a boxer is participating in a ten-round match, he is,
in all probability, already established within the industry. Further, if a boxer
164. 15 U.S.C. § 6307c(c).
165. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59.
166. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 35 (statement of Murad Muhammad).
167. Id. at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at p. 1).
168. See H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 2 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N.
329, 329.
169. 15 U.S.C. § 6308 (2000).
170. § 6308(b).
171. § 6308(b)(1).
172. § 6308(b)(2)(B).
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is participating in a match that is more than ten rounds, he is fighting in a
twelve-round bout-a championship bout. 73  These bouts are often
televised.1 74 "If [the boxer] is on pay-per-view, [he has] reached fame, and
with that you don't need protection. ,17P It is the boxers participating in the
four-round bouts that are in need of protection. However, the exception to
this provision effectively eliminates any such protection for the four-
rounder. A promoter is permitted to have a direct financial interest in the
management of a boxer who is participating in any bout with fewer than ten
rounds. This conflict of interest affects the purse the boxer ultimately
receives because the promoter and manager may be working together, when
they should be on opposite sides of the bargaining table. 76 The Committee
on Commerce rationalizes this exception by asserting that boxers participat-
ing in bouts with fewer than ten rounds cannot afford to have a separate
promoter and manager. 177 Therefore, the firewall provision would not apply.
Congress could have enacted a provision that would provide for an exception
in cases where an individual serves in both capacities to the boxer. Congress
has provided for an exception in cases where the boxer acts as his own
promoter or manager. Why not enact such exception where the promoter
is the manager? Nonetheless, Congress enacted a provision that eliminates
all boxers participating in under ten rounds of boxing from this firewall
protection. Consequently, this provision of the Ali Act only affects about
two percent of all fighters. 79 Further, the fighters to whom the protection
extends are world famous and affluent.1
80
This section also prohibits the promoter from paying for airline tickets
and hotel accommodations for the manager, although such compensation is
provided in connection with negotiations or the actual event-a practice that
is common in the boxing industry.18 1 Such accommodations are now deemed
indirect compensation, and illegal. Additionally, the fighter's manager
cannot serve as a commentator on the promoter's telecast, even though the
173. See supra note 29.
174. See supra Part II.E.
175. Boxing In and Out of the Ring, supra note 59 (statement of Jack Newfield).
176. See supra Part II.B, C.
177. H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 16 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N. 329,
339.
178. 15 U.S.C. § 6308(b)(2)(A).
179. See Symposium, supra note 22, at 255 (statement of Marc Ratner, Executive
Director of the Nevada Athletic Commission).
180. See id.
181. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith,
III, at p. 9).
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promoter may be paying the fair market value for his services. 182 To do so,
would be to receive compensation from the promoter other than the
consideration due under the manager's contract with the boxer. 1 3 The Ali
Act makes such commentating illegal, thus prohibiting the manager from
being employed by a promoter, except as permitted under the manager's
contract with a boxer. The Ali Act is, therefore, limiting the right to contract
between the manager and promoter.
With the passage of the Ali Act, several other demands have been
placed upon promoters. Promoters are now required to disclose information
to the boxing commissions and boxers before they may be entitled to
compensation. 8 4 This requirement does not take into account the industry
standards.185 Section 7e of the Ali Act provides that, before he is to receive
any compensation, the promoter must provide the boxer with: 1) the amount
of any compensation the promoter has contracted to receive from the match;
2) all fees assessed against the boxer's purse; and 3) any reduction in the
boxer's purse contrary to previous contracts. 86 These requirements are
impossible to meet. Promoters seldom know, in advance, how much they
will receive from a match. 18 7 The revenue depends greatly upon the live
gate, the pay-per-view buys, and the closed circuit distribution.'88
Sometimes, these figures are not known until months after the event. 89
Also, promoters may have long-term distribution agreements with
foreign broadcasters.19 These agreements provide that payments are made
in fixed installments for a number of events to take place over a set period of
time.1 9' Therefore, a promoter receives income for events before they even
take place. In some instances, he receives income before he knows who
182. See id.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 6308(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2000).
184. § 6307e(a)-(b) (2000).
185. See generally Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman
W. Smith, III, at pp. 2-9).
186. 15 U.S.C. § 6307e(b).
187. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith,
III, at p. 2).
188. See supra Part II.C.
189. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at
pp. 2-3).
190. Id. (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at p. 3).
191. Id.
192. Id.
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will be fighting.193 If the Ali Act were strictly construed, these agreements
would not be permitted.
Furthermore, in many instances, promoters receive advances, site fees,
and letters of credit before the event takes place.194 These are necessary to
financially effectuate the event. However, under the Ali Act, these practices
are not permitted. Also, promoters do not always know who the undercard
boxers 195 are going to be until the weigh-in.196 This lack of knowledge is due
to injuries and replacements that continuously occur up until the day before
the event. 197 The Ali Act does not take the industry standards into account.
If the Ali Act were to be strictly construed, most boxing matches could not
occur.
The Ali Act does more than harm promoters, however. It also harms
boxers. 98 Boxers who come from impoverished backgrounds 99 have not
seen the money to which they are being exposed in the boxing world. 2
Disclosing the gross income promoters receive to boxers, hurts the boxer by
presenting them with a misleading impression.2°' The promoter assumes the
risk of a promotion.m 2 Sometimes the promotion earns a profit, sometimes it
sustains a loss.203 If the promoter makes a profit, it should be considered
"compensat[ion] for assuming that risk."'
Further, in disclosing to boxers the amount of revenue the promoter
receives, the boxers are not being informed of the expenses the promoter
must pay. m5 For example, from the revenue, the promoter must pay the
opponent's purse, the undercard boxers' purses, and other such expenses
193. Id.
194. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at
p.3).
195. "Undercard boxers" refer to the boxers not participating in the main event. See
id. Generally, an event consists of numerous bouts, including the main event. See id.
196. Id. (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at p. 4).
197. Id.
198. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 35 ("ITihis law, that has been written, is
hurting the boxer. It is not helping them. It is hurting them-hurting them tremendously.")
(statement of Murad Muhammad).
199. See supra Part l.A.
200. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 38 (statement of Murad Muhammad).
201. See id. at 195 (statement of Ron Stevens, Matchmaker, Cedric Kushner
Promotions).
202. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at
p. 5).
203. Id.
204. See id.
205. Id.
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206
associated with a promotion, including the promoter's overhead. In seeing
a promoter's gross revenue, boxers get a false sense of their true worth.2°7
They begin to believe that they have greater leverage than they actually
do. 208 This false sense of leverage could compromise the entire event.209
Because the disclosures only mandate the disclosure of income, the
provision is "meaningless.... Net receipts might mean something, but gross
receipts [are] totally meaningless. '21°
The Ali Act provides that the promoter must make these disclosures to
all the boxers he is promoting.21' If the promoter, in addition to a main event
fighter, has a contract with an undercard boxer, he must make the disclosures
to him also. The undercard boxer, however, is not as responsible for most of
the revenue the promoter receives. Most of the generated revenue is due to
the main event fight, not the undercard.21 2 Yet, the boxer does not see this.
He only sees the gross receipts for the entire event. Moreover, boxers and
promoters have adverse interests and bargain for the best possible contract.
Seldom are business adversaries entitled to opposition's financial informa-
tion. The boxer, therefore, should not be entitled to the promoter's revenue.
In addition to promoters making disclosures to boxers, they must also
213
make disclosures to the boxing commissions. To the boxing commissions,
promoters must disclose "all payments, gifts, or benefits the promoter is
providing to any sanctioning organization .... ,2 4  When organizing an
event, the promoter often contracts with the venue for complimentary rooms
and food for the fighters and sanctioning organizations. Before the event
206. Id.
207. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (explaining the boxer's
misperception when a promoter discloses his revenue) ("[T]he fighter is going to
say... hey... [y]ou are making $10 million. I deserve [$]50,000 here, not [$]5,000.")
(statement of Ron Stevens).
208. Id. at 157.
209. Id. ("[W]e would have... major trouble because you don't understand these
athletes .... [I]f they ever see the kind of money... grossed in a fight, I guarantee
you... that when that fighter reads that, I am not fighting.") (statement of Murad
Muhammad).
210. Id. at 151 (statement of Patrick English, Attorney for Main Events).
211. 15 U.S.C. § 6307e(b) (2000).
212. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 174 ("[T]he problem comes when.., we
are getting $6 million for... this fight. It is not coming from that four-round fight. It is
coming from the main event.") (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III).
213. 15 U.S.C. § 6307e(a).
214. § 6307e(a)(3)(B).
215. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 195 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at
[Vol. 26:927
404
Nova Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [2002], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol26/iss3/1
Groschel
can take place, however, the promoter must disclose these figures to the
boxing commission. At that time, the promoter does not know the value of
the food or the value of the hotel room in which the member of the
sanctioning organization will be staying.1 6 Therefore, in practice, this
provision of the Ali Act could effectively prevent the event from occurring.
Promoters must also disclose a copy of any agreement a promoter has
217
with any boxer participating in the event. In common practice, many
agreements exist between a boxer and promoter.1 8 Promoters often have
merchandising agreements, personal management agreements, and several.... 219
expired bout agreements from which rights still extend. Under the Ali
Act, promoters must file all of these agreements with the Association of
Boxing Commissions ("ABC"). This provision is very broad. It is possible
that a promoter have twenty contracts for one boxer. 2o Although most of
these contracts have no relationship to the fight in question, if there are
rights extending from the contract, the promoter must disclose it.22' In
common practice, agreements may grant the boxer clip rights for his
22 223fights. 2 Though these rights are of de minimis value, the entire contract
must be disclosed to the ABC because rights still extend from it. This
requirement is extremely burdensome and bears no relationship to the
current boxing event.
With all the disclosures mandated, it appeared as if promoters were
opening their "entire books to the world."224 To counteract this fear, the Ali
Act also includes a confidentiality provision.225 This provision provides that
disclosures made under section 7e shall not be disclosed to the public
"except to the extent required in a legal, administrative, or judicial
proceeding." 22 Because some state law provides that information be made
public, the Ali Act provides an alternative. Section 7g provides that if state
law allows the information to be furnished to the public, the promoter can
216. Id. (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III, at p. 8).
217. 15 U.S.C. § 6307e(a)(1).
218. See Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 231.
219. Id. (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III).
220. Id. at 232 (statement of Patrick English).
221. Id. at 234.
222. Id.
223. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 234.
224. Id. at 180 (explaining his fear that the world would learn how the business is
done) (statement of Murad Muhammad).
225. 15 U.S.C. § 6307g (2000).
226. Id.
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choose to file the disclosures with the ABC.22 7  When perusing the
enforcement provision,22 however, it becomes evident that penalties are
provided for the violation of several sections, not including section 7e.
Therefore, the boxing commission can say they will keep the disclosures
confidential, but if they do not, they suffer no penalty. The ABC, however,
is under no requirement to make the disclosures public. 229 They can make
their own regulations 2'0 Therefore, promoters will undoubtedly file the
disclosures with the ABC.231  Consequently, the provision allowing the
promoters to file the disclosures with the state is superfluous.
The enforcement provision is also deficient of any foundation. Section
9 provides that the Attorney General of the United States may bring a civil
action against any individual who is reasonably believed to be in violation of
any provision of the Ali Act.2 2 An injunction may be granted to prevent the
233individual from continuing to engage in such activity. Further, if a
manager, promoter, matchmaker, or licensee violates any provision, he will
be fined not more than $20,000 and/or be imprisoned for not more than one
year.234 Though one year is an extensive period of time, a $20,000 maximum
fine may not discourage the affluent manager. It may be more beneficial to
him to take the risk of violating the Ali Act, than it may be for him to
conform.
However, section 9(b)(2) provides for harsher penalties.23 5  Upon
236conviction, any individual who violates certain provisions of the Ali Act
shall be:
imprisoned for not more than 1 year or fined not more than-
(A) $100,000; and
227. § 6307g(b).
228. 15 U.S.C. § 6309 (2000).
229. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 182 (statement of Sherman W. Smith, III).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 190 ("[A]s it stands, as the law is today-today-simply file it with the
ABC.") (statement of Buddy Embanato, Treasurer of the ABC).
232. 15 U.S.C. § 6309(a).
233. Id.
234. § 6309(b)(1).
235. See § 6309(b)(2).
236. These sections are: Protection from Coercive Contracts; Sanctioning
Organizations; Required Disclosures to State Boxing Commissions by Sanctioning
Organizations; Required Disclosures for Promoters; Required Disclosures for Judges and
Referees; and Judges and Referees. See 15 U.S.C. § 6309(b)(2). These penalties, however,
do not apply to Confidentiality or Conflict of Interest. See id.
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(B) if a violation occurs in connection with a professional
boxing match the gross revenues for which exceed
$2,000,000, an additional amount which bears the same ra-
tion to $100,000 as the amount of such revenues compared
to $2,000,000, or both.z 7
These criminal sanctions will mostly impact sanctioning organizations and
promotersY s Then, too, if one is found to have violated the conflict of
interest provision, he will be fined not more than $20,000 and/or imprisoned
for not more than one year.2 9 Boxers, if found to be in violation of any
provision, will be fined not more than $1000.m Though the boxer should be
responsible for himself, he is subject to the least fines.24
Section 9 also provides for civil sanctions. Under this enforcement
provision, a boxer can bring a civil cause of action if he has suffered
economic injury as a result of the violation of the Ali Act.242 States can also
bring a civil action on behalf of its residents to enjoin the match, enforce the
provisions of the Ali Act, obtain fines, or obtain other such relief the court
may deem necessary. z 3  This provision, however, also provides that
"[n]othing in this chapter authorizes the enforcement of any provision of this
chapter against the Federal Trade Commission, the United States Attorney
General, or the chief legal officer.., for.., acting or failing to act in an
official capacity."24  This exception effectively limits the reach of the Ali
Act on these individuals. Although it provides them with immunity from
prosecution for acting in their official capacity, it also provides them with
immunity for failing to act in their official capacity. They are denied the
incentive to comply with the letter of the law. If the chief legal officer of a
237. Id.
238. See id.
239. § 6309(b)(3). This provision only provides for such penalties against "[any
member or employee of a boxing commission, any person who administers or enforces State
boxing laws, and any member of the [ABC]..." because it was originally part of the
Professional Boxing and Safety Act of 1996. See § 6309(b)(2) (Supp. 111996). It, therefore,
does not provide criminal penalties if one violates the firewall provision because the firewall
provision was added as part of the Ali Act and no criminal sanction sections were added to
reflect the firewall addition. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 6309 (2000).
240. § 6309(b)(4).
241. "mhe fighter has to be responsible for himself cause we have brains, we think
for ourselves. Everybody always wants to point a finger at one person.... You can't only get
one person." Symposium, supra note 22, at 241 (statement of Evander Holyfield).
242. 15 U.S.C. § 6309(d).
243. § 6309(c).
244. § 6309(e)(1).
9492002]
407
: Nova Law Review 26, 3
Published by NSUWorks, 2002
Nova Law Review
state knows of a violation and does not inform the proper authorities, he is
under no threat of legal prosecution. He may opt to remain silent. This is
legal.
Lastly, the Ali Act raises concern for American promoters. 245 Because
boxing is an international sport, foreign promoters are common in the
business.246 However, they are not subject to the provisions of the Ali Act-
a United States law. The Ali Act, therefore, may place American promoters
at a disadvantage because foreign promoters will not be prohibited from
entering into certain financial arrangements that American promoters are
prohibited from entering.247 This legislation may, in effect, encourage
boxers or American promoters to do business abroad.
V. CONCLUSION
The Ali Act, though meritorious, provides boxers with little financial
protection. This legislation does not protect boxers as much as it provides
consequences for promoters.249 Furthermore, the boxers that the legislation
does reach are not the ones in need of the most protection. Rather, the Ali
Act protects the boxers that have already reached a level of success within
the profession. This legislation is premature and has not been carefully
considered.250 The Ali Act, in its hasty enactment, takes into account neither
the industry standards, nor the complexity involved in effectuating a boxing
match.
245. See H.R. REP. No. 106-449, pt. 1, at 29 (1999), reprinted in 2000 U.S.C.C.A.N.
329, 351 (statement of Edolphus Towns & Bobby L. Rush).
246. See id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Legislative Meeting, supra note 25, at 235-36 (discussing the disclosure
provisions) ("[W]hat about managers who have contracts with fighters and a contract with the
network the fighter don't know nothing about? Now, how do [sic] the fighter gets [sic]
protected by that?") (statement of Murad Muhammad). Under the Ali Act, managers do not
have to disclose agreements to the fighters. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6313 (2000).
The disclosure provisions only apply to sanctioning organizations, promoters, and judges and
referees. See §§ 6307d-6307f.
250. Paul Feeney, co-drafter of the Ali Act, acknowledged that he "would not be
surprised if [the disclosure provisions were] changed next year." Legislative Meeting, supra
note 25, at 148. Larry Hazzard, of the New Jersey Commission, also acknowledged that he
thought "we should go back now to the drawing board. . ." Id. at 248.
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Groschel
Though this legislation does little more than impede the business of
promoters,25 one thing is certain-boxing will prevail.
Cristina E. Groschel
251. Id. at 52 ("My experience tells me... that if the new rules significantly curtail a
promoter's ability to make money, there will be no incentive to promote boxing.") (statement
of Ron Stevens).
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